NO. 8 9 - 3 9
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1989
JOHN BOEGLI, WALT BOEGLI, JOHN PAYNE,
ROBERT WALLER AND JACK YOUNG,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs-
GLACIER MOUNTAIN CHEESE COMPANY,
a Montana corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial. District,
In and for the County of Gallatin,
The Honorable Joseph Gary, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Karl P. Seel, Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent:
Michael Coil, Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 7, 1989
August
2
Clerk
Mr. Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Plaintiffs appeal from the dismissal of their action
against the defendant in the District Court for the Eight-
eenth Judicial District, Gallatin County. The District Court
based its dismissal on plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their
administrative remedies. We reverse the order of the Dis-
trict Court.
The issue is whether plaintiffs denied overtime compen-
sation under S 39-3-405, MCA, must seek relief exclusively
from the Commissioner of Labor under the provisions of Title
39, Chapter 3, MCA, entitled, "Wages and Wage Compensation."
At the filing of the complaint, plaintiffs were employ-
ees of the Glacier Mountain Cheese Company (GMCC) in Gallatin
County, Montana, who is the named defendant in this action.
The complaint alleged that as an employer GMCC is subject to
the provisions of the Montana labor laws contained in Title
39, Chapter 3. Plaintiffs alleged that GMCC was in violation
of § 39-3-405, MCA, which provides in relevant part:
OVERTIME COMPENSATION. (1) No employer shall employ
any of his employees for a workweek longer than 40
hours unless such employee receives compensation
for his employment in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek at a rate of not less than 14 times the
hourly wage rate at which he is employed.
Plaintiffs sought damages for overtime hours worked at the
rate of lf times the hourly wage, a penalty for failure to
pay the overtime compensation as it became due upon termi-
nation of employment pursuant to § 39-3-206, MCA, and costs
and attorney fees under § 39-3-214, MCA.
The defendant, GMCC, filed a Rule 12 (b)(1) motion to
dismiss, alleging that jurisdiction properly lies with the
Department of Labor and. that plaintiffs failed to exhaust
their administrative remedy. The District Court granted
defendant's motion and ordered dismissal of the action.
In this case we are called upon to interpret various
provisions of Title 39, Chapter 3, entitled "Wages and Wage
Compensation." Specifically, the statutes under Part 2 and
Part 4 must be reconciled in order to determine whether a .
wage claimant must exhaust an administrative remedy with the
Commissioner of Labor or whether an action can be initiated
in District Court. The statutes relevant to this inquiry are
as follows:
39-3-209. Commission of labor to investigate
violations and institute actions for unpaid wages.
It shall be the duty of the commissioner of labor
to inquire diligently for any violations of this
part and to institute actions for the collection of
unpaid wages and for the penalties provided for
herein in such cases as he may deem proper and to
enforce generally the provisions of this part.
39-3-211. Commissioner to take wage assignments.
Whenever the commissioner determines that one or
more employees have claims for unpaid ages, he
shall, upon the written request of the employee,
take an assignment of the claim in trust for such
employee and may maintain any proceeding appropri-
ate to enforce the claim, including liquidated
damages pursuant to this part. With the written
consent of the assignor, the commissioner may
settle or adjust any claim assigned pursuant to
this section.
39-3-212. Court enforcement of commissioner's
determination. A determination by the commissioner
of labor and industry made after a hearing as
provided for in parts 2 and 4 of this chapter may
be enforced by application by the commissioner to a
district court for an order or judgment enforcing
the determination if the time provided to initiate
judicial review by the employer has passed. The
commissioner shall apply to the district court
where the employer has its principal place of
business or in the first judicial district of the
state. A proceeding under this section is not a
review of the validity of the commissioner's
determination.
39-3-407. Enforcement. Enforcement of this part
shall be treated as a wage claim action and shall
be pursued in accordance with part 2 of this chap-
ter, as amended. This part may also be enforced in
accordance with part 5 of this chapter for the
benefit of certain employees in the mineral and oil
industry. The commissioner may enforce this part
without the necessity of a wage assignment.
39-3-408. Provisions cumulative. (1) The provi-
sions of this part shall be in addition to other
provisions now provided by law for the payment and
collection of wages and salaries but shall not
apply to employees covered by the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act except as provided in subsection (2).
(2) Sections 39-3-402 and 39-3-404 shall apply
to an employee covered by the Fair Labor Standards
Act if state law provides a minimum wage that is
higher than the minimum wage established under
federal law.
Plaintiffs rely primarily upon this last statute, §
39-3-408, MCA, which they contend makes the remedy provisions
of Title 39, Chapter 3 cumulative so that exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not required. Despite the clear
and unambiguous language of that statute, the defendant GMCC
argues that the other statutes cited above indicate a legis-
lative intention that the Commissioner of Labor must first
consider wage claims before the matter goes to district
court. The lower court agreed, ruling that S 39-3-408, MCA,
should not act as a hedge on the doctrine of administrative
remedies.
We first note the general rule of statutory interpreta-
tion found in § 1-2-102, MCA, which states that legislative
intent controls. Legislative intent is to first be
determined from the plain meaning of the words used, and if
interpretation of the statute can be so determined, the
courts may not go further and apply any other means of
interpretation. Oldenburg v . County of F l a t h e a d (19841, 208
Mont. 128, 130, 676 P.2d 778, 779. We conclude t h a t 5
3 9 - 3 - 4 0 8 ( 1 ) , MCA, i s c l e a r and unambiguous i n i t s d e s i g n a t i o n
of c u m u l a t i v e remedies:
The p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s p a r t s h a l l - - a d d i t i o n t o
be i n
o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s - p r o v i d e d by - f o r tG
now law
- -
payment and c o l l e c t i o n o f waqes a n d s a l a r i e s
- . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Defendant argues t h a t despite a lack of ambiguity, S
39-3-408, MCA, h a s been i m p l i e d l y a l t e r e d by t h e s u b s e q u e n t
enactment of other statutory provisions under Title 39,
C h a p t e r 3. S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e defendant p o i n t s t o § 39-3-212,
MCA, e n a c t e d i n 1974, which g i v e s t h e Commissioner t h e r i g h t
to apply to a district court for an order enforcing the
Commissioner's determination. The d e f e n d a n t contends that
any causes of action recognized by the Legislature upon
p a s s a g e o f 5 39-3-408, MCA, i n 1971 were t h e r e a f t e r s u b j e c t e d
t o t h e 1974 p r o v i s i o n s of 5 39-3-212, MCA.
In t h i s regard, defendant a t t a c h e s s i g n i f i c a n c e t o t h e
cumulative remedy provision of Part 5, which applies to
mineral and o i l employees, and a t t e m p t s t o distinguish it
from the cumulative provision of Part 4. The c u m u l a t i v e
remedy p r o v i s i o n o f P a r t 5 s t a t e s :
Remedy c u m u l a t i v e . The remedy h e r e i n p r o v i d e d f o r
t h e g r e a t e r s e c u r i t y f o r t h e payment of wages and
s a l a r i e s and t h e c o l l e c t i o n t h e r e o f s h a l l b e i n
a d d i t i o n t o any remedy now p r o v i d e d by law f o r t h e
payment and c o l l e c t i o n o f wages and s a l a r i e s .
S e c t i o n 39-3-520, MCA.
Defendant a r g u e s that S 39-3-520, MCA, i s unlike the
cumulative provision of § 39-3-408, MCA, b e c a u s e it c l e a r l y
s t a n d s a l o n e w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o any o t h e r p a r t o f T i t l e 39,
C h a p t e r 3 a s a means f o r i t s enforcement. Contrastingly, S
39-3-408, MCA, is subject to § 39-3-407, MCA, which requires
enforcement of Part 4 to be pursued in accordance with Part
2. Part 2 refers to the powers and duties of the
Commissioner of Labor. See §§ 39-3-209 to 213, MCA.
While this argument is discernable, we hold that it does
not provide sufficient basis for this Court to ignore the
plain language of § 39-3-408, MCA. That statute provides for
cumulative remedies. As a final point, S 39-3-408, MCA, was
amended in 1987 to include subsection ( 2 ) , which provides
that the section applies to an employee covered by the Fair
Labor Standards Act. While subsection (2) does not apply as
a matter of law to this case, the reenactment of subsection
(1) in 1987 does indicate a cumulative process. We hold that
resort to the Commissioner of Labor is not plaintiff's
exclusive option.
Reversed.
We Concur:
-Ti Chief Justice