No. 90-238
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1990
MACK T. ANDERSON INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC.
Plaintiff and Appellant,
CITY OF BELGRADE, MONTANA, A
Municipal Corporation organized under
the laws of the State of Montana
and Belgrade Board of Adjustment,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Gallatin,
The Honorable Larry W. Moran, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
McKinley Anderson, Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Montana
Joseph W. Sabol, Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent:
William Schreiber, City Attorney, Belgrade, Montana
For Amicus Curiae:
Leo Ward; Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven, P.C.,
Helena, Montana (Montana League of Cities and Towns)
Roger Tippy; Tippy & McCue, Helena, Montana (Montana
Manufactured Housing and Recreational Vehicle
Association)
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Submitted: October 25, 1990
Decided: December 20, 1990
Filed:
Justice Diane G. Barz delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff, Mack T. Anderson Insurance Agency Inc., appeals
from an order of the Gallatin County ~istrict Court granting
summary judgment in favor of defendants city of Belgrade and the
Belgrade Board of Adjustment and dismissing plaintiff's complaint
which challenged the constitutionality of a Belgrade zoning
ordinance. The District Court affirmed the Belgrade Board of
Adjustment's decision which upheld the denial of plaintiff's
application for a building permit. We affirm.
The issues as framed by this Court are:
1. Is the zoning ordinance prohibiting the individual
placement of manufactured homes in an R-4 zoning district a
constitutional exercise of the city of Belgrade's police power?
2. Did the ~istrict Court abuse its discretion when it
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing?
On ~ p r i l25, 1989, plaintiff applied for a building permit to
place a manufactured (mobile) home on Lot 11 of Block 21 of the
Armstrong ~dditionto the City of Belgrade. The manufactured home
was to be placed on a permanent concrete foundation. The lot in
question is located in an.area having an R-4 zoning designation
which is defined under Belgrade City Zoning ordinance No. 466 as
a residential-apartment district. The ordinance was enacted in
accordance with a comprehensive zoning plan for the City of
Belgrade which was adopted in 1972 and revised in 1979. Modular
or site-built homes are treated as conventional housing under the
ordinance and are a permitted use within the R-4 district.
Individual placement of manufactured homes is not a permitted use
within the R-4 district, however, they are permitted in R-2-M and
R-S-M districts. Additionally, manufactured homes are permitted
in mobile home parks as conditional uses in R-3 and R-4 districts.
Under the City zoning ordinance a manufactured home is defined
as:
A factory built or manufactured transportable
residential structure more than thirty-two (32) body feet
in length and eight (8) feet or more in width, and built
on one or more permanent chassis for towing to the point
of use, and designed to be used without a permanent
foundation as a dwelling unit when connected to sanitary
facilities, and which bears an insignia issued by a state
or federal regulatory agency indicating that [the]
manufactured home complies with all applicable
construction standards of the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development definition of
manufactured home. . The phrase I1without permanent
foundation" indicates that the support system is
constructed with the intent that the manufactured home
placed thereon can be moved from time to time at the
convenience of the owner. A commercial coach,
recreational vehicle, and motor home is not a
manufactured home.
A modular home is defined as:
A factory-fabricated structure designed primarily
for human occupancy to be used by itself or to be
incorporated with similar units at a building site into
a structure on a permanent foundation and which complies
with the Montana Building, Plumbing, Electrical, and
Mechanical Construction Codes and the rules and
regulations for modular housing of the Building Code
Division of the Montana Department of Administration.
The term is intended to apply to major assemblies and
does not include prefabricated panels, trusses, plumbing
trees, and prefabricated sub-elements which are to be
incorporated into a structure at the site.
The meter base for incoming wiring is attached to
the exterior wall of the modular home; whereas, for a
manufactured home, the meter base must be attached to a
pole or a support which is isolated from the structure.
The units shall be listed and assessed by the County
Assessor as real or personal property.
Plaintiff Is application was denied on May 4, 1989, by the City
planning director on the basis that plaintiff's placement of its
manufactured home in the R-4 district would violate the zoning
ordinance.
Plaintiff, pursuant to 5 76-2-326, MCA, appealed to the
Belgrade Board of Adjustment. Plaintiff argued before the board
that the ordinance unduly discriminates against manufactured
housing in that no substantial difference exists between
manufactured housing and modular housing. The board, in its order
dated June 26, 1989, found that: (1) there is a difference between
a manufactured home and a modular home as those types of housing
are defined under the ordinance; (2) a manufactured home is not a
permitted use in an R-4 district; (3) an adequate supply of vacant
parcels exist in R-S-M and R-2-M districts each in which the
individual placement of manufactured homes is a permitted use; and
(4) a petition signed by fourteen citizens protested the placement
of the manufactured home in the R-4 district. Based on these
findings the board concluded that the City planning director
properly executed her duties and that the administrative decision
to deny the building permit was correct.
On August 2, 1989, plaintiff filed a complaint in the District
Court alleging that the action taken by the board in denying the
building permit was unreasonable and unconstitutional. On
September 21, 1989, an order for writ of certiorari to issue was
4
entered by the District Court pursuant to 1 76-2-327, MCA.
The District Court heard oral argument, reviewed the entire
record before it, and made an on-site inspection of the
geographical area in question. On March 12, 1990, the court
granted defendants1 motion for summary judgment dismissing
plaintiff's complaint and affirming the decision of the board of
adjustment. The District Court concluded that the zoning ordinance
in question was a legitimate use of the City of Belgrade's police
power. The court also concluded that "[a] decision for Plaintiff
in this case would have been . . . an unwise move in the direction
of judicial zoning, a step the [clourt is not prepared to take
under the circumstances presented.I1
From this judgment plaintiff now appeals.
I.
Is the zoning ordinance prohibiting the individual placement
of manufactured homes in an R-4 zoning district a constitutional
exercise of the City of Belgrade's police power?
Local municipal governments in Montana are empowered to enact
zoning ordinances restricting the use of property in their
jurisdictional area. Section 76-2-301, MCA, in pertinent part
states that:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or
the general welfare of the community, [the local
legislative body] ... is hereby empowered to regulate
and restrict ... the location and use of buildings,
structures, and land for trade, industry, residence or
other purposes.
A zoning ordinance enacted pursuant to this statutory authority
will be found to be a constitutional exercise of police power if
it has a substantial bearing upon the public health, safety, morals
or general welfare of the community. Freeman v. Board of
Adjustment (1934), 97 Mont. 342, 34 P.2d 534; see also, Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co. (1926), 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303.
It is plaintiff's contention that no reasonable basis exists
for allowing the placement of modular homes built to Uniform
Building Code (UBC) standards within the R-4 district and not
allowing the individual placement of manufactured homes built to
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) standards since HUD standards
are as safe as UBC standards. Plaintiff also argues that the
ordinance is unconstitutionally arbitrary because a manufactured
home cannot be placed in the R-4 district merely because the home
must reach its destination."towed on its own chassis.tt Plaintiff
further argues that there is no rational relationship between the
reasons for denying the requested permit and the purposes for which
the zoning ordinance was enacted and that the ordinance is
restrictive for persons of low and moderate incomes.
In examining the validity of the ordinance we note that the
purposes of local government zoning regulation in this state is set
forth in 5 76-2-304, MCA:
(1) Such regulations shall be made in accordance
with a comprehensive plan and designed to lessen
congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire,
panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the
general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to
prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue
concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate
provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools,
parks, and other public requirements.
(2) Such regulations shall be made with reasonable
consideration, among other things, to the character of
the district and its peculiar suitability for particular
uses and with a view to conserving the value of buildings
and encouraging the most appropriate use of land
throughout such municipality.
The purpose of zoning is not to provide for the highest or best use
of each particular lot or parcel of land within the zones or
community, rather it is to benefit the community senerally by the
sensible planning of land uses taking into consideration the
peculiar suitabilities and most appropriate use of land throushout
the communitv. Cutone v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge (1980), 187 Mont.
515, 520, 610 P.2d 691, 694.
The city of Belgrade agrees with plaintiff that HUD standards
are as safe as UBC standards. However, it asserts that its
ordinance prohibiting the individual placement of mobile homes
within the R-4 district is based on broader grounds than safety
including, but not limited to, a concern for long-term planning,
the unique qualities of manufactured homes, and the property values
of surrounding residents. It further asserts that it is necessary
to consider these factors to be able to reasonably enforce its
zoning regulations to promote the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare of the community. We agree with the District
Court, as it properly stated in this case, that local government
police power not only allows but requires consideration of these
matters as fundamental factors in zoning decisions. Accordingly,
we hold that these factors are legitimate bases for regulation.
Having determined that the bases for the City of Belgrade's
zoning ordinance are legitimate, the question then becomes whether
7
the ordinance's prohibition the individual placement
manufactured homes in the R-4 district bears a reasonable
relationship to the advancement of the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare of the community. In Freeman v. Board
of Adjustment (1934), 97 Mont. 342, 351-52, 34 P.2d 534, 537, this
Court stated that:
The trend of modern decisions, however, is to sustain the
validity of such ordinances and the statutes authorizing
them . . . Such ordinances have been very generally
sustained upon the theory that they constitute a valid
exercise of the police power; that is to say, they have
a substantial bearing upon the public health, safety,
morals and general welfare of a community. (Citations
omitted. )
We recognize that manufactured housing has become a major
factor in the housing of families and that the rapid increase in
the number of manufactured homes presents a complex zoning and
planning problem. Just like any other use, manufactured homes must
be provided for. However, as stated earlier, any provision must
be made by zoning regulations designed to benefit the communitv
qenerallv. Cutone, 610 P.2d at 694; see also Duckworth v. City of
Bonney Lake (Wash. 1978), 586 P.2d 860; Anderson, 2 American Law
of Zoning, 5 14.01 p. 665 (3d ed. 1986).
Most municipal efforts to totally exclude manufactured homes
from a community have been found unconstitutional as an
unreasonable exercise of police power. Duckworth, 586 P.2d at 866.
However, it has been generally held, in recognition of the
differing needs of the community, that manufactured or mobile homes
Itare residential uses which possess special
characteristics which warrant their separate regulation.
Thus, they may be confined to mobile home parks, or may
be excluded from residential districts . . . .
Absent
exceptional circumstances, the exclusion of this use from
a residential district is not regarded as unreasonable."
(Citations omitted.)
City of Lewiston v. Knieriem (Idaho 1984), 685 P.2d 821, 824. See
also, Duckworth, 586 P.2d at 867. ItThe indiscriminate placement
of mobile homes within a municipality may undermine conser:vation
of property values and stifle the development of a potential
residential neighborhood." Citv of Lewiston, 685 P.2d at 825.
Promoting the general health and welfare includes providing
necessary services such as water and sewerage, schools, and fire
protection. Section 76-2-304, MCA. "Cities have found it easier
to provide and regulate necessary services by limiting mobile homes
to mobile home parks or other designated areas." City of Lewiston,
685 P.2d at 825 (citing State v. Larson (Minn. 1972), 195 N.W.2d
In sum, if the municipality provides an adequate area for
manufactured home development, manufactured homes may be excluded
from conventional residential districts. In Martz v. Butte-Silver
Bow Government (1982), 196 Mont. 348, 353-54, 641 P.2d 426, 430,
this Court recognized that a municipality must ensure a fair share
of housing is within reach of persons of low and moderate incomes
and intimated that where an ordinance is shown to unduly exclude
manufactured housing the ordinance unconstitutional. the
present case the ordinance provides an adequate area for
manufactured home development. Manufactured homes are permitted
uses in R-S-M and R-2-M zoning districts and manufactured home
parks are permitted conditional uses in R-3 and R-4 districts. A
9
survey conducted in late 1986 reflects the present e:xisting
situation in the community of Belgrade and shows that approximately
16.88% of the available vacant parcels of land in the area are
zoned for manufactured housing.
We hold that the ordinance in question bears a reasonable
relationship to the advancement of the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare of the community of Belgrade and
constitutes a valid exercise of the City's police power.
In so holding, we note that this Court in Cutone v. Anaconda-
Deer Lodge (1980), 187 Mont. 515, 610 P.2d 691, quoted with
approval from Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926), 272 U.S. 365,
387-88, 47 S.Ct. 114, 118, 71 L.Ed. 303, 310-11, in which the
United State Supreme Court stated:
"The ordinance now under review, and all similar
laws and regulations, must find their justification in
some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public
welfare. The line which in this field separates the
legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of power is
not capable of precise delimitation ... If the validity
of the leqislative classification for zoninq purposes be
fairly debatable, the leqislative judqment must be
allowed to contr01.~~ (Emphasis added.)
Cutone, 610 P.2d at 696. In Cutone this Court also quoted with
approval from Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas (1974), 416 U.S. 1,
8, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1540, 39 L.Ed.2d 797, 803-04, in which the United
States Supreme Court, in upholding an ordinance which restricted
land use to one-family dwellings and prevented the occupation of
residences by more than two unrelated individuals within the
district, stated:
"We deal with the economic and social legislation
where legislatures have historically drawn lines which
we respect against the charge of violation of the Equal
Protection Clause if the law be fureasonable, not
arbitrarywf (quoting Rovster Guano Co. v. Virqinia, 253
U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 561, 64 L.Ed. 989) and bears
l rational relationship to a [permissible] state
a
objective.' Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76, 92 S.Ct. 251,
254, 30 L.Ed.2d 225.
"It is said, however, that if two unmarried people
can constitute a lfamily,lthere is no reason why three
or four may not. But every line drawn by a legislature
leaves some out that miqht well have been included. That
exercise of discretion, however, is a leqislative, not
a judicial, function." (Emphasis added.)
Cutone, 610 P.2d at 696.
As plaintiff points out, a number of state legislatures and
local government bodies have viewed the recent technological
improvements in manufactured homes as sufficient to eliminate rules
distinguishing them from modular homes. However, this Court is not
willing to sit as a super-legislature or super-zoning board. Kunz
v. Butte-Silver Bow (Mont. 1990), 797 P.2d 224, 226, 47 St.Rep.
1615, 1618; Cutone, 610 P.2d at 697. If an ordinance is found to
promote the public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the
community, as found here, the wisdom, necessity and policy of the
ordinance are matters more appropriately left to the legislative
body.
11.
Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing?
In two recent decisions this Court clarified the appropriate
standards for judicial review of an administrative ruling. See,
11
Steer, Inc. v. Depttof Revenue (Mont. December 11, 1990), No. 90-
106; Deptt of Revenue v. Kaiser Cement Corp. (Mont. December 11,
1990), No. 90-278. This Court will continue to use the Itclearly
erroneousw standard for reviewing findings of fact. However, in
reviewing conclusions of law, our standard of review will be merely
to determine if the administrative agency's interpretation of the
law is correct, instead of applying the inappropriate abuse of
discretion standard. In Steer, Inc. we stated that this standard
of review relating to conclusions of law applies "whether the
conclusions are made by an agency, workerst compensation court, or
trial court.tt Steer, Inc.'(Mont. December 11, 1990), No. 90-106,
slip. op. at 7. We further stated in Steer, Inc. that our standard
of review relating to conclusions of law is not to be confused with
our review of discretionary trial court decisions. In such
instances the standard of an abuse of discretion will still be
applied. Steer, Inc. (Mont. December 11, 1990), No. 90-106, slip.
op. at 7. This is the situation we are presented with here.
Plaintiff argues that the District Court erred in that,
without an evidentiary hearing, the court had no way of determining
if the findings or rulings of the Belgrade Board of Adjustment were
supported by the evidence. Section 76-2-327 (3) , MCA, provides the
district court with specific authorization to take additional
evidence on an appeal from a board of adjustment. However, the
court can, in the exercise of its discretion, determine not to take
additional evidence if it shall appear to the court that additional
evidence is not necessary to properly dispose of the matter.
In the present case the District Court had before it
approximately 45 pages of documents and maps which were submitted
by the City, along with 22.stipulations of fact and approximately
20 pages of documents submitted by plaintiff. Additionally, the
court viewed the entire geographical area, heard oral argument on
two separate occasions, plus had the Belgrade Board of Adjustment s
written decision and tape recording of the board's meeting in which
it upheld the denial of the permit. We hold the District Court did
not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.
8
Justice
We concur: