IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
DISTRICT NO. 55, and HIGH SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 55-HI MUSSELSHELL
COUNTY, MONTANA,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
MUSSELSHELL COUNTY and MARGARET
REIGHARD, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS,
MUSSELSHELL COUNTY,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourteenth ~udicial~istrict,
In and for the County of Musselshell,
The Honorable Thomas Olson, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Laurence R. Martin and Sol Lovas; Felt, Martin,
Frazier & Lovas, P.C., Billings, Montana
For Respondents:
Kenneth D. Tolliver and James C. Reuss; Wright,
Tolliver & Guthals, Billings, Montana
Submitted: October 25, 1990
Decided: December 12, 1990
I*
Filed:
Clerk
?
r >
Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court.
School Districts No. 55 and No. 55-H of Musselshell County,
Montana, appeal the order of the District Court of the Fourteenth
Judicial District granting Musselshell County's cross-motion for
summary judgment. The School Districts had filed this action to
obtain damages for alleged loss of operating revenues resulting
from miscalculations of the mill levy by the County Superintendent
of Schools. We affirm.
We frame the issues as follows:
1. Should the action have been dismissed because the School
Districts had no legal authority to sue the County for damages?
2. Did the District Court correctly grant the County's motion
for summary judgment based on legislative immunity?
The facts are undisputed. The Superintendent of Schools for
Musselshell County admits that she miscalculated the mill levy
required to raise funds needed by the School Districts for fiscal
year 1986-87. Through her faulty computations, she arrived at 8.37
mills for the elementary school district general fund levy and 8.69
mills for the high school district general fund levy. Correct
figures were 17.14 mills for the elementary levy and 15.25 mills
for the high school levy.
The County Superintendent reported the incorrect number of
mills to the Board of County Commissioners, which levied the 1986
school tax based on her figures. As a result of the low millage
levy, school district revenues were short by $187,498 for the 1986-
r
*
. .
7
87 school year. Due to use of reserve funds, operation of the
schools was not impacted. Faculty and staff were paid, and no
programs or personnel were cut. Since the millage levy was later
adjusted, functioning of the school for the following school year
was not affected.
The School Districts sued the County for recovery of lost
revenues and losses of investment income on decreased reserve
funds. The School Districts also requested an injunction requiring
the County to reimburse the Districts for costs and damages that
might be incurred in a lawsuit asserting violations of 5 5 15-10-
401 to -412, MCA, which limit property taxes to 1986 levels. Prior
to this action, the District Court had issued an order authorizing
the County to utilize correct 1986 mill levy figures for purposes
of 5 5 15-10-401 to -412, MCA.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court
granted the motion of the County on the basis that the County was
immune from suit. From this decision, the School ~istrictsappeal.
Should the action have been dismissed because the School
Districts had no legal authority to sue the County for damages?
Summary judgment was granted on the basis of governmental
immunity. When a case is disposed of below on a motion for summary
judgment before a judge sitting without a jury and the facts are
uncontested, lithe scope of review is much broader than in other
appeals and the Supreme Court is free to make its own examination
of the entire case and reach a conclusion in accordance with its
findings." McCain v. Batson (1988), 233 Mont. 288, 298, 760 P.2d
725, 731. Furthermore, this Court will uphold the district courtls
decision, if correct, regardless of the reasons given below for the
result. Jerome v. Pardis (1989), 240 Mont. 187, 192, 783 P.2d 919,
922; Shimsky v. Valley Credit Union (1984), 208 Mont. 186, 190, 676
P.2d 1308, 1310.
In this case the facts are undisputed. The County concedes
that the County Superintendent of Schools erred in computing the
mill levy and that the County Board of Commissioners levied the
incorrect tax based on her calculations. Before we address the
question of governmental immunity, we need to decide the more basic
issue of whether the School Districts, as governmental entities,
were authorized to bring suit against the County, another
governmental entity.
Since this is a case of first impression, we have reviewed
decisions of other jurisdictions concerning the issue of whether
one governmental entity may sue another. In some jurisdictions
courts have resolved the issue based on whether the governmental
entity had standing to sue. See, e.g., East Grand County School
District No. 2 v. Town of Winter Park (Colo. App. 1987), 739 P.2d
862; capital View Fire District v. County of ~ichland (S.C. App.
1989), 377 S.E.2d 122.
At the threshold of every suit is the requirement that parties
have standing to sue. The plaintiff is required to have "Isuch a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens presentation of issues.111
Olson v. Department of Revenue (1986), 223 Mont. 464, 469, 726 P.2d
1162, 1166 (quoting Baker v. Carr (1962), 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82
S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 678). While the School Districts
may or may not meet criteria to establish standing to sue, the real
issue is whether the school district, as a political subdivision
of the state, has legal authority to exercise standing. Harrison
County v. City of Gulfport (Miss. 1990), 557 So.2d 780, 784.
In examining decisions of other courts allowing suit on
grounds other than standing, we note that most do not involve
seeking damages from the other governmental entity. For example,
courts have permitted challenges to the constitutionality of a
statute; actions to oppose annexation of county lands by a city;
suits for declaratory judgments construing state revenue laws; and
actions to determine title to real property held by the state. See
Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc. (Ky. 1989), 790 S.W.2d
186 and Simons v. Laramie County School District No. 1 (Wyo. 1987),
741 P.2d 1116 (challenging constitutionality of statutes); Harrison
County v. City of Gulfport (Miss. 1990), 557 So.2d 780 (annexation
opposition) ; State ex rel. Independence School District v. Jones
(Mo. 1983), 653 S.W.2d 178. (declaratory ruling on construction of
statute); Coos County v. State (Or. 1987), 734 P.2d 1348 (quiet
title action).
In most situations where a governmental entity has sought
damages from another governmental entity, as here, the suit has not
been allowed. See Carbon County School District No. 2 v. Wyoming
State Hospital (Wyo. 1984), 680 P.2d 773; State v. Board of County
Commissioners of Johnson County (Wyo. 1982), 642 P.2d 456; but see
Board of Education v. Town of Riverdale (Md. 1990), 578 A.2d 207
(local government tort immunity cannot be asserted as a defense
when sued by the state or a state agency, the source of its
immunity).
School districts, municipalities, and counties are political
subdivisions of the state. As creations of the state, "[elxcept
as provided by the state, they have no existence, no functions, no
rights and no powers." East Jackson public Schools v. State (Mich.
App. 1984), 348 N.W.2d 303, 306. When a school district or other
subdivision of state government attempts to bring an action against
another governmental subdivision, the state, in effect, is suing
itself. Carbon County, 680 P.2d at 774. The logic of this view
cannot be denied. While the taxpayers, as represented by the
School Districts, may benefit, the taxpayers, as represented by the
County, must pay, through taxes or insurance, the deficient funds
to the School Districts.
Generally, courts will not allow suits between governmental
entities unless express or implied statutory authority exists. The
Missouri Supreme Court refused to permit a county assessor's appeal
of a decision of a county board of equalization because no statute
authorized such an appeal. OIFlaherty v. State Tax Commission of
Missouri (Mo. 1984), 680 S.W.2d 153; see also City of Richmond
Heights v. Board of Equalization (Mo. 1979), 586 S.W.2d 338 (city
had no authority to appeal assessment by county board of
t
8 8
equalization) ; State ex rel. St. Francois County School District
R-I11 v. Lalumondier (Mo. 1975), 518 S.W.2d 638 (school district
not allowed to obtain review of county board of equalization
decision). Similarly, ~ichigancourts have held that a school
district has no power to challenge a state funding measure Iton
behalf of residents within their boundaries, or to expend public
funds to finance such litigation of, or on behalf of, private
citizens." East Jackson public Schools, 348 N.W.2d at 306.
We can find no statutory authority granting a school district,
a governmental subdivision, the right to sue another governmental
subdivision for damages. We hold that in the absence of a specific
statutory or constitutional provision, one governmental subdivision
may not sue another for damages.
I1
Did the District Court correctly grant the County's motion for
summary judgment based on legislative immunity?
Since we have concluded that the School ~istricts and the
County are not proper parties to this action, we need not consider
the immunity question.
Affirmed.
We concur: