No. 90-197
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1990
IN THE MATTER OF G.P.,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honorable Maurice R. Colberg, Jr., Judge
presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Terry L. Seiffert, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
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Dale Mrkich, Deputy Yellowstone County Attorney,
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4 Yyly Marc Racicot, Attorney General; Patti Powell, Asst.
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: Atty. General; Helena, Montana
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*- Submitted on Briefs: August 16, 1990
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l i l t ...- Decided: September 27, 1990
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'Clerk
Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the Court.
The Respondent G. P. appeals the order of the Montana
Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, committing him
to the Montana State Hospital for a period of 90 days on the
grounds that he is seriously mentally ill according to 1 53-21-
102 (15), MCA. We affirm.
G. P. raises a sole issue on appeal: Did the District Court
err in committing him as being seriously mentally ill under 5 53-
21-102(15) rather than mentally ill under 1 53-21-102(8) MCA?
The parents of G. P., age 37, filed a request for G. P.'s
commitment with the Yellowstone County Attorney's office on
February 7, 1990. The request described various conduct of G. P.
that his parents believed indicated the need for commitment: G.
P. slept most of the time; ate very little; tore at his clothing;
stood outside and stared into space; doubled up as if in pain; tore
up his own apartment on one occasion; had not come to his parents
house to pick up his sole source of income, his SSI check; and he
refused to take his medication prescribed for him during prior
hospitalizations. G. P. Is parents alleged that G. P. was unable
to take care of himself because G.P. was seriously mentally ill.
A notation was made on the request for commitment by a worker of
the Billings Mental Health Center, stating that since his recent
hospitalization G. P. failed to follow any of the recommendations
of those assigned to his case and that this led the worker to
believe that G.P.'s illness had become worse.
The following day the County Attorney initiated a petition for
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commitment. At this time G. P. was not being detained. On the
date G.P. was to make his initial appearance he allegedly refused
to enter the courtroom. The court found probable cause to detain
G. P. for his own safety and ordered G. P. to be detained and
evaluated by a certified mental health professional.
On February 14, 1990 G. P. was evaluated by Roshadi Azzam, a
psychiatrist at Deaconess Hospital. Dr. Azzam testified at the
commitment hearing the following day. Largely based on Dr. Azzamls
findings, which were incorporated into the findings of the court,
the District Court concluded that G. P. l1is beyond a reasonable
doubt seriously mentally ill as defined in Section 53-21-102 MCAm
and ordered that G. P. be committed to the Montana State Hospital
at Warm springs for a period of treatment and evaluation not to
exceed three months, unless extended as provided for by 5 53-21-
128, MCA (1983). The courtls order allowed for treatment by
injection of medication if deemed necessary by the attending
physician. G. P. now appeals the commitment order.
The standard of proof for a commitment hearing is set forth
in 5 53-21-126(2), MCA:
The standard of proof in any hearing held pursuant to
this section is proof beyond a reasonable doubt with
respect to any physical facts or evidence and clear and
convincing evidence as to all other matters, except that
mental disorders shall be evidenced to a reasonable
medical certainty. Imminent threat of self-inflicted
injury or injury to others shall be evidenced by overt
acts, sufficiently recent in time as to be material and
relevant as to the respondent's present condition.
Thus, the above standard of proof required in involuntary
commitment proceedings is bifurcated: (1) with respect to physical
facts or evidence, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt;
and (2) as to all other matters, including the existence of a
mental disorder, there must be clear and convincing evidence.
Section 53-21-126(2), MCA; In the Matter of R.T. (1983), 204 Mont.
493, 495, 665 P.2d 789, 790; citing In the Matter of N.B. (1980),
190 Mont. 319, 323-324, 620 P.2d 1228, 1231, construing Section 53-
21-126(2), MCA, in light of the constitutional requirements of
Addington v. Texas (1979), 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d
323. Under this bifurcated standard, proof of mental disorders to
a reasonable degree of medical certainty is sufficient if,
considered with all the other evidence in the case, the trier of
fact is led to the conclusion that the mental disorder exists by
clear and convincing proof. N. B., 620 P.2d at 1231.
G. P. contends that the State failed to meet its burden of
clear and convincing proof that he is seriously mentally ill. The
definition of "seriously mentally ill1'is found at 553-21-102 (15),
MCA :
"Seriously mentally illw means suffering from a mental
disorder which has resulted in self-inflicted injury or
injury to others or the imminent threat thereof or which
has deprived the person afflicted of the ability to
protect his life or health. For this purpose, injury
means physical injury. ... (Emphasis added.)
As quoted earlier, the statutes also require that "[i]mminent
threat of self-inflicted injury or injury to others shall be
evidenced by overt acts, sufficiently recent in time as to be
material and relevant as to the respondent's present condition."
Section 53-21-126(2), MCA.
G. P. contends that the District Court erred in finding him
nseriously mentally illw under this definition because of a lack
of evidence of overt acts. G.P. alleges that in Dr. Azzamfs
report, the doctor incorrectly restated what he had heard from an
emergency room physician, that I1[a]pparently, Mr. ... [G. P.]
was in a court hearing when he became uncontrollably violent and
threatening to the members of the court and therefore he was
restrained. . . ." G. P. points out that this statement is false
because he never appeared in court. G. P. then argues that because
this is the only evidence of an overt act, the court erred in
finding him seriously mentally ill;" and at the very most the
court could have found him to be "mentally illgn provided in 5
as
53-21-102 (8), MCA.
We disagree. Evidence of overt acts is only necessary to
prove serious mental illness based on tvself-inflictedinjury or
injury to others or the imminent threat thereof.lV Sections 53-
21-102(15) and 53-21-126(2), MCA. However, it is not necessary to
present evidence of overt acts to prove serious mental illness
based on a respondent "suffering from a mental disorder . . . which
has deprived the person afflicted of the ability to protect his
life or health." Section 53-21-102(15), MCA; Matter of C. M.
(1981), 195 Mont. 171, 173-174, 635 P.2d 273, 274-275.
Here, there is clear and convincing evidence that G. P.Is
illness deprives him of the ability to protect his own life and
health. Dr. Azzam diagnosed G. P. as a severe chronic paranoid
schizophrenic who without medication develops auditory
hallucinations that direct him to do things he cannot control, thus
posing a danger to himself and others. Dr. Azzam concluded that
long term treatment in the state hospital with medication was
appropriate. G. P. flatly refuses to take his medication,
insisting, "1 don't need any medicati~n.~~His roommate also
testified that G. P. refuses to take and denies that he needs
medication. The testimony of his parents indicates that prior to
the hearing he refused to take his medication, slept most of the
day, ate very little, and often stood outside his trailer staring
vacantly at nothing. He continually failed to pick up his social
security check, which was his sole source of income. We recognize
that I1[i]t is one thing to commit an individual who cannot function
sufficiently to supply basic survival needs, and another to commit
an individual who merely 'chooses to live under conditions that
most of society would conclude to be substandard .... *It R. T.
665 P.2d at 791. But here the evidence indicates that G. P. Is
illness was interrupting his cognitive processes, was causing
delusional thinking, and was thereby interfering in a sever way
with his functioning. C. M., 635 P.2d at 274-275. Under these
circumstances, the evidence is clear and convincing that G.P.Is
mental disorder renders him unable to protect his own life or
health. See C. M., supra. The order of the District Court is
affirmed.