IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 37591
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 2011 Opinion No. 52
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Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Filed: August 26, 2011
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v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
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JAMES M. ANDERSON, )
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Defendant-Appellant. )
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Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bonner County. Hon. Steven C. Verby, District Judge.
Unified twenty-year sentence with ten-year determinate term for second degree
murder, vacated, and case remanded for resentencing.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Elizabeth A. Koeckeritz, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
LANSING, Judge
James M. Anderson was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder, Idaho Code
§§ 18-4001, 18-4003, 18-4004. The district court imposed a unified twenty-year sentence with a
ten-year determinate term. Anderson thereafter filed a motion for reduction of his sentence
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, which the district court denied. In its order denying the
motion, the district court commented that Idaho Code Section 18-4004 “requires a minimum of
ten (10) years fixed” and “[t]he court does not have the authority to reduce the fixed portion of
Mr. Anderson’s sentence” as was requested in Anderson’s Rule 35 motion.
Anderson appeals, contending that his sentence is excessive on the facts of this case and
that the district court abused its discretion in denying the Rule 35 motion because the court
misinterpreted Idaho Code Section 18-4004. We conclude that because the record shows that the
district court misconstrued the statutory sentencing requirement for second degree murder and
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thereby failed to recognize the full scope of its sentencing discretion, the sentence must be
vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.
We review a sentence on appeal for abuse of the sentencing court’s discretion. State v.
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007); State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825
P.2d 482, 490 (1992); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
When reviewing a trial court’s discretionary decision, we conduct a multi-tiered inquiry,
examining: (1) whether the trial court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with
any legal standards applicable to the specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 568, 165 P.3d 273, 282 (2007);
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989); State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho
820, 823, 186 P.3d 676, 679 (Ct. App. 2008). The first of these inquiries is satisfied only if the
trial court correctly perceived the full scope of its discretion. State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262,
266, 77 P.3d 487, 491 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Hansen, 130 Idaho 845, 848, 949 P.2d 593, 596
(Ct. App. 1997); State v. Brashier, 127 Idaho 730, 737, 905 P.2d 1039, 1046 (Ct. App. 1995).
The record in the present case reveals that the district court did not properly understand
the scope of its discretion under the governing sentencing statutes. The permissible sentencing
range for second degree murder is established by I.C. § 18-4004, which provides, “Every person
guilty of murder of the second degree is punishable by imprisonment not less than ten (10) years
and the imprisonment may extend to life.” Sentences for this offense are also subject to
provisions of I.C. § 19-2513 (the “Unified Sentencing Act”), which states in part:
The court shall specify a minimum period of confinement and may specify a
subsequent indeterminate period of custody. The court shall set forth in its
judgment and sentence the minimum period of confinement and the subsequent
indeterminate period, if any, provided, that the aggregate sentence shall not
exceed the maximum provided by law. During a minimum term of confinement,
the offender shall not be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of
sentence for good conduct except for meritorious service except as provided in
section 20-223(f), Idaho Code. The offender may be considered for parole or
discharge at any time during the indeterminate period of the sentence and as
provided in section 20-223(f), Idaho Code.
The full sentence imposed in compliance with this section, including both the “minimum period
of confinement” and the “indeterminate period of custody,” is customarily referred to as the
“unified sentence,” while the minimum term of confinement is often referred to as the “fixed
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term” or the “determinate term.” From the district court’s statements in its order denying
Anderson’s Rule 35 motion, it is apparent that the court understood the Idaho Code Section 18-
4004 requirement of a sentence for second degree murder of not less than ten years to mean that
a ten-year fixed term was required, whereas that provision establishes a minimum unified term.
As we stated in State v. Paul, 118 Idaho 717, 720, 800 P.2d 113, 116 (Ct. App. 1990):
By the provisions of I.C. § 18-4004, the district court was constrained to
pronounce an overall sentence that could not be less than ten years and the
sentence could extend to life imprisonment. . . . While the district court had to
pronounce some minimum period of incarceration, I.C. § 19-2513, the length of
the mandatory minimum component was to be determined solely by the exercise
of the court’s sound discretion.
That the Section 18-4004 requirement of imprisonment of not less than ten years refers to the
unified term, not a fixed or determinate term, was very recently confirmed by the Idaho Supreme
Court in Booth v. State, ___ Idaho ___, ___ P.3d ___ (July 28, 2011). There, the Court rejected
the State’s assertion that a conviction for second degree murder carries a minimum sentence of
ten years fixed, noting that “a defendant convicted of second-degree murder only faces a unified
term of not less than ten years.” Id. at ___, ___ P.3d at ___ (emphasis added). See also State v.
Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 856, 26 P.3d 31, 39 (2001) (unified thirty-five-year sentence with seven-
year fixed term for second degree murder affirmed). Thus, there is no mandatory fixed or
determinate period of confinement for second degree murder, but the unified sentence,
encompassing both the fixed and indeterminate terms, must be at least ten years. State v.
Hansen, 120 Idaho 286, 290 n.1, 815 P.2d 484, 488 n.1 (Ct. App. 1991).
Because the district court did not understand the full scope of its discretion in imposing
sentence on Anderson, and because it is not clear from the record whether the trial court would
have chosen the same sentence if it had understood that a fixed term of less than ten years was
permissible, resentencing is necessary.
Anderson’s sentence is vacated and the case remanded to the district court for
resentencing.
Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.
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