IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 38905
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 449
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Filed: April 19, 2012
)
v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
FLOYD ORVIN BATES, ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
Defendant-Appellant. ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bonneville County. Hon. Gregory S. Anderson, District Judge.
Order revoking probation and requiring execution of unified eight-year sentence
with six-month determinate term for delivery of methamphetamine, affirmed.
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Shawn F. Wilkerson, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
Before LANSING, Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;
and MELANSON, Judge
PER CURIAM
Floyd Orvin Bates was convicted of delivery of methamphetamine, Idaho Code § 37-
2732(a)(1)(A). The district court imposed a unified eight-year sentence with a three-year
determinate term, suspended the sentence, and placed Bates on supervised probation for eight
years, with the condition that he serve 180 days in jail. Subsequently, Bates
was found to have violated several terms of the probation, and the district court consequently
revoked probation, ordered execution of the original sentence, and retained jurisdiction. Bates
filed a notice of appeal and an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence which
was denied. Following a status conference, the district court entered an amended judgment
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reducing the determinate portion of Bates’s sentence from three years to six months. Bates
contends that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation.
It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122
Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772
P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App.
1988). In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation
is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v.
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834
P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation
has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the
court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at
325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989).
The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158,
162, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2010). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal
only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834
P.2d at 327.
Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review
and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well
established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822
P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-
73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v.
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).
When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of
probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original
judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our
review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring
between the original sentencing and the revocation of the probation. Id.
Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering
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execution of Bates’s modified sentence. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing
execution of Bates’s previously suspended sentence is affirmed.
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