IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
G. NICK HOLMES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SCHOOL
DISTRICT NOS. 4, 47, and 2,
MADISON AND JEFFERSON COUNTIES,
and NANCY KEENAN, SUPERINTENDENT
OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lewis and Clark,
The Honorable Henry Loble Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Charles E. Erdmann, Erdmann Law office, Helena,
Montana
Beda J. Lovitt, Office of Public Instruction,
Helena, Montana
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c-3 For Respondent:
.--i Richard L. Parish, Harlan, Thompson & Parish, P.C.,
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Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 12, 1990
Decided: May 8, 1990
Filed:
Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This case presents an appeal from a decision of the First
Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, Montana, reversing a
State Superintendent of Public Instruction's decision that
respondent would not be allowed to a nontenured teacher.
The District Court reinstated the County Superintendent's decision
that did allow respondent to llbumpll nontenured teacher.
a We
affirm.
Appellant raises essentially one issue for review:
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in reversing the
State Superintendent of Public Instruction's decision.
Respondent Holmes was a high school principal who had been
employed by appellant school district in that capacity for seven
years. Prior to becoming a principal, Holmes had over fourteen
years of classroom teaching experience. On March 5, 1986, the
school board voted to eliminate the position of high school
principal and combine that position with that of the district
superintendent. This decision was a reduction in force (RIF) based
on declining enrollment and economic considerations. The school
board duly gave Holmes notice of the decision and advised him of
his right to request a hearing, which he did.
The school board held the hearing on March 24, 1986. During
the hearing, the board passed the following two motions:
1. . . . We accept the superintendent's
recommendation that Mr. Holmes' contract be
terminated at the end of the 1985-86 contract
due to elimination of the high school
principal position which was based on
declining enrollment and administrative
reorganization.
2. . . . If Mr. Holmes is able to provide
evidence by April 11, 1986, of endorsements in
positions where the District currently has
non-tenured teachers, that Mr. Holmes be
allowed to llbumpll into the position, pursuant
to the Sorlie case and continue his status as
a tenured teacher.
NO further communication occurred between Holmes and the
school board between the March 24, 1986 meeting and the April 2,
1986 meeting. At the April 2, 1986 meeting, the school board
passed the following motion:
[Tlhat we rescind the motion that we, that was
carried, on March 24, that stated that if Mr.
Holmes was able to provide evidence by April
11, 1986, of endorsements in positions where
the District currently has non-tenured
teachers, that Mr. Holmes will be allowed to
I1bumpf1into that position pursuant to the
Sorlie case and continue his status as a
tenured teacher.
The school board gave Holmes no notice that this action would be
taken at the April 2, 1986 meeting.
At the time of the March 24, 1986 meeting, Holmes possessed
all necessary qualifications for certification as a teacher in
areas where nontenured teachers held positions. The Office of
Public Instruction (OPI) issued Holmesl certificate with the
necessary endorsements on April 10, 1986.
Holmes appealed the school board's decision to terminate his
services. Relying on Massey v. Argenbright (1984), 211 Mont. 331,
683 P. 2d 1332, the Lewis and Clark County Superintendent of Schools
reversed the decision of the school board and ordered Holmes
reinstated with back pay and benefits. The school board appealed
the County Superintendent's decision to the State Superintendent
of Public Instruction. Disagreeing with the County Superinten-
dent's interpretation of Massey, the State Superintendent reversed
that decision and reinstated the school board's decision. Holmes
appealed the State Superintendent's decision to the District Court.
The District Court reversed the State Superintendent's position
holding that the State Superintendent has misinterpreted Massey.
Further, the District Court held that the school board violated
Holmes' due process rights during the April 2, 1986 meeting when
it rescinded its earlier motion allowing Holmes to "bump11 a
nontenured teacher if he provided proper endorsements by April 11,
1986. The school board's appeal followed.
The Montana Administrative Procedures Act (MAPA) applies to
this case. Appellant argues that the District Court erred in the
legal conclusions it drew when it applied Massey to this case. In
contested cases under MAPA, conclusions of law are subject to an
''abuse of discretion1'standard of review. Harris v. Bauer (1988),
230 Mont. 207, 212, 749 P.2d 1068, 1071. The broader "abuse of
discretion1' standard of review applies to conclusions of law in
recognition of "the court's expertise in interpreting and applying
the law." Harris, 749 P.2d at 1071, quoting City of Billings v.
Billings Firefighters (1982), 200 Mont. 421, 430, 651 P.2d 627,
632.
Both parties agree that the resolution of this case rests on
the interpretation of Massey. In Massey, a school board terminated
Massey, a tenured teacher, due to a reduction in force, even though
he was qualified to teach in subject areas where nontenured
teachers held positions. The school board argued that it only
hired teachers who had majored in the subject areas in college.
Since Massey had neither majored in any of the subject areas nor
taught them previously, the school board decided that he should be
terminated. Massey countered that his certification embraced the
available subjects and that certification alone should establish
his qualifications.
In affirming the District Court's decision in Masseyfs favor,
this Court emphasized the rights conferred on tenured teachers by
the Teacher Tenure Act, 5 20-4-203, MCA. We stated:
Because Mr. Massey was a tenured teacher, he
was entitled under the tenure laws to a
certain degree of employment and economic
security, which non-tenured teachers do not
enjoy .
Massev, 683 P.2d at 1335. Accordingly, we held that under 3 20-
4-203, MCA, "the school board was obligated to offer Mr. Massey one
of the comparable teaching positions held by non-tenured teachers."
Massev, 683 P.2d at 1335.
Appellant argues that the Massey rationale did not obligate
the Board to offer Holmes a teaching position because, in contrast
to Massev, Holmes did not hold any teaching endorsements at the
time of his termination. Under the appellant's and State
Superintendent's reasoning, Massey's actual possession of the OPI
certificate becomes the critical element of the Massey decision.
Thus, even though Holmes possessed the proper qualifications, he
could not take advantage of his tenure rights because he did not
have the necessary paperwork completed at the moment he was
terminated. We disagree.
Contrary to appellant's contention, the cornerstone of the
Massey decision was Massey's tenure and the protection to which the
Teachers Tenure Act entitled him. In Massey, we emphasized that
[a] teacher's tenure is a substantial, valuable and beneficial
right, which cannot be taken away except for good cause. ' I 1 Massey,
683 P.2d at 1334, quoting State v. Dist. Court, Fergus County
(1954), 128 Mont. 353, 361, 275 P.2d 209, 214. Thus, Massey's
tenure coupled with his qualifications to teach in subject areas
where nontenured teachers held positions spawned the Massey
decision. Massey's possession the OPI certification paper was not
crucial because as Massey was a teacher, not an administrator, he
necessarily had OPI teaching certification.
Similar to Massey, Holmes possessed both tenure and the
qualifications to teach in subject areas where nontenured teachers
held positions. Thus, applying the M a s s e ~decision, we hold that
when the school board eliminated Mr. Holmes' position, 5 20-4-203,
MCA, obligated it to offer Holmes a comparable teaching position
held by a nontenured teacher. The OPI1s issuance of the
certificate showing Holmes' endorsements only memorialized the
qualifications Holmes was known to possess. Holmes would have met
the school board's April 11 deadline because the OPI issued the
certificate on April 10. To hold otherwise, elevates form over
substance.
Appellant argues that it is significant in terms of Holmes'
tenure that it terminated Holmes as principal in one motion and
then allowed him to Itbumpt1 nontenured teacher in a second motion.
a
This contention has no merit because logically the board had to
terminate Holmes as a principal before it could recognize Holmes'
tenure rights by allowing him to ltbumpl' nontenured teacher. The
a
number of motions the board utilized in its decision process does
not affect Holmes' substantive tenure rights nor the board's
obligation to honor those rights under 5 20-4-203, MCA.
In summary, then, § 20-4-203, MCA, and the Massev decision
compelled the board to allow Holmes to l'bumptl nontenured teacher
a
provided he met their deadline, which he would have. Holmes left
the March 24 meeting with his tenure rights intact. The due
process clause of both the federal and Montana Constitutions
protects a tenured teacher's interest in continued employment.
See, Bd. of Trustees v. Super. of Pub. Inst. (1976), 171 Mont. 323,
557 P.2d 1048. When, on April 2 the board rescinded its decision
to allow Holmes to "bumpt'without prior notice to Holmes, the board
unquestionably deprived Holmes of his interest in continued
employment without due process of law.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the District Court
correctly applied Massey. Further, the District Court correctly
determined that appellant violated Holmesl due process rights
during the April 2 meeting. We hold that the District Court did
not abuse its discretion in reversing the State superintendent of
Public Instruction and in reinstating the County Superintendent's
decision.
Affirmed. i