No. 89-287
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
CLIFFORD BEIL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-
THADDEUS MAYER,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula,
The Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Mark E. Westveer; OfBrien Law Office, Missoula,
Montana
For Respondent:
Stacey Weldele-Wade; Worden, Thane & ~aines,
Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: Feb. 15, 1990
Filed:
Clerk
Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff Clifford Beil appeals from a jury verdict of the
Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, finding that the
defendant, Thaddeus Mayer, was not liable for damages incurred by
Beil in an automobile accident. We reverse.
The issues pertinent to our review are:
1. Whether the District Court erred when it refused Beil's
motion in limine requesting the court to prohibit the disclosure
to the jury of a previous settlement amount which was attained
through the settlement of an injury received in a subsequent
automobile collision;
2. Whether Beil waived his objection to the evidence
concerning sums paid in the settlement;
3. Whether the error committed by the District Court
regarding the settlement amount was harmless error.
On August 27, 1983, Beil and Mayer were involved in an
automobile collision. The facts surrounding that accident are not
relevant to the issues now before us. However, Beil did bring a
lawsuit alleging negligence on the part of Mayer. In that lawsuit
Beil sought to recover damages for injuries sustained as a result
of the accident.
In addition to the 1983 accident, Beil has been involved in
two other automobile collisions. The first collision occurred on
March 3, 1979. As a result of this accident, Beil filed a lawsuit
which was eventually settled. In January of 1986, Beil was
involved in another automobile accident. A lawsuit was filed, and
it, like the previous litigation was settled.
When Beil filed the present lawsuit against Mayer, he sought
damages for all medical expenses incurred or yet to be incurred,
lostwages, loss of future earning capacity, indefinite future pain
and suffering and changes in lifestyle. Before trial he sought a
motion in limine to preclude the amounts of the 1979 and 1986
settlements from being admitted as evidence. He argued that this
evidence was inadmissible because its disclosure would serve to
prejudice the jury and that it was irrelevant and privileged.
Mayer agreed that the amount of the 1979 settlement was not
relevant and therefore should not be admitted. However, he
maintained that the amount of the 1986 settlement was relevant
because Beil was seeking damages for future pain and suffering,
future medical expense and future wages. Mayer argued that because
Beil had already received compensation for future damages through
the 1986 settlement, its amount was relevant to the determination
of damages in the present case. He maintained that the jury should
be informed of the settlement amount so that it could deduct
compensation for future damages already awarded by the 1986
settlement from any monetary compensation that it might award Beil.
According to Mayer, if the court did not allow this disclosure, it
was possible that Beil may realize a double recovery.
The District Court agreed with Mayer and allowed him to
introduce into evidence the amount of the 1986 settlement. Beil
had objected to this course of action. However, after his motion
in limine was denied, he stipulated to a statement of facts
3
relative to the amount of the settlement. This statement was read
to the jury during the course of the trial.
Following the trial, the jury found that Mayer was not
negligent and a verdict in favor of the defendant was entered.
Beil moved for a new trial and claimed that the District Court's
decision to allow the settlement amount into evidence prevented him
from having a fair trial and that there was insufficient evidence
to justify the jury's verdict. Beil1s motion was denied and this
appeal followed.
I
Beil maintains that evidence of the amount of the 1986
settlement award was inadmissible because it was irrelevant and
prejudicial. We agree that this evidence was not relevant to any
substantive issue presented in this trial.
We begin our analysis with the premise that unless otherwise
provided, all relevant evidence is admissible and all evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible. Rule 401, M.R.Evid. Rule
401 of the Montana Rules of Evidence defines relevant evidence as:
'I. .
. evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more or less probable than it would be
without the eviden~e.'~
Mayer argues that the settlement amount was relevant to the
issue of damages. He maintains that the jury was entitled to know
the amount of the 1986 settlement so that they could render a
verdict which would correctly award Beil only damages arising out
of the 1983 accident. According to his argument it was a fact
question for the jury to decide how much of Beil1s future damages
were attributable to the 1986 accident and how much were
attributable to the 1983 occurrence. In order to make this
determination, it was necessary to inform the jury of the 1986
settlement amount.
We disagree with this argument. The monetary value placed
upon damages flowing from the 1986 accident has no bearing upon
the injuries sustained by Beil in 1983. Damages incurred in the
1983 collision could be established through medical and testimonial
evidence. The admission of evidence relating to the 1986
settlement, therefore, only served to interject immaterial,
prejudicial information into the trial.
Evidence of this type is usually considered immaterial for two
reasons. First, as we stated earlier, the amount of a previous
settlement rarely has any relevance to the determination of damages
at issue in the present trial. Second, its admission does not give
the jury a true picture of the reason for the settlement amount.
Oftentimes, an injured plaintiff will accept a settlement for
reasons which are extraneous to the true issue at hand. For
instance, an insurance policy limit can and often times does,
dictate a settlement amount. See Azure v. City of Billings (1979),
182 Mont. 234, 596 P.2d 460. This information cannot, however, be
revealed to the jury, and consequently it must operate on
incomplete information while engaging in its deliberations. Given
this fact, a previous settlement amount should not be revealed to
the jury, because it only serves to result in confusion and
possible prejudice against the plaintiff.
However, although the amount of a previous settlement is not
generally admissible, the nature, extent and severity of a
subsequent injury is often relevant to the determination of
damages. A tortfeasor should only be held liable for injuries
which he causes. He should not be held liable for damages
sustained by the plaintiff in a subsequent accident involving a
separate tortfeasor. Therefore, the nature and extent of a
subsequent injury are relevant to the jury's determination of
damages and a jury can be directed to apportion damages through
questions supplied on the verdict form. Bruckman v. Pena (Colo.
1971), 487 P.2d 566.
Once damages have been quantified the trial court can deduct
any damages for future injuries which were duplicated through
separate awards for distinct injuries, if any. Azure v. City of
Billings (1979), 182 Mont. 234, 596 P.2d 460. The trial court can
tell the jury that it is to concern itself only with the issues
before it and not speculate as to amounts of any other settlements
received by plaintiff. The court may tell the jury that the court
will take care of these factors at a later time after the jury has
reached its verdict. Azure, 596 P.2d at 467.
I1
Having found the 1986 settlement amount inadmissible, we must
now determine whether Beil waived his objection to this evidence.
In order to preserve an objection for purposes of appeal, the
objecting party must make an objection and state its specific
grounds. The objection must appear on the record. Rule 103,
M.R.Evid. As stated earlier, Beil objected to all evidence
pertaining to the 1986 settlement amount, before trial, in his
motion in limine. Following this refusal, Beil stipulated to an
agreed set of facts relative to the amount of settlement. This
stipulation was read to the jury during trial. Beil also
voluntarily referred to the settlement in his opening argument and
through testimony during his case in chief.
Mayer argues that in order to maintain his objection, Beil
had to object to the evidence, not only by the motion in limine,
but also when the evidence was introduced during the trial.
According to this argument, an objection to evidence must be
continually renewed, even though a proper objection was registered
before trial. Mayer further argues that Beil waived his prior
objection by stipulating to agreed facts concerning the 1986
settlement.
Beil, on the other hand, maintains that he properly registered
his objection to the evidence. Once that objection was denied, he
attempted to deal with its imminent introduction in the best way
that he could. As a matter of trial tactics, he brought up the
settlement during his case in chief, so that he could attempt to
minimize its prejudicial impact. He entered into the stipulation
in an effort to prevent needless disagreement over known facts
which were part of the settlement. These trial tactics, he
maintains, should not constitute a waiver to his original
objection.
We agree with Beills argument. The following exchange between
Beil and the District Court Judge indicates that Beil properly
preserved his objection for review. The exchange took place
following the denial of Beills motion in limine:
Mr. OIBrien: Your Honor, have I sufficiently preserved
the objection to that ruling for purposes of appeal?
The Court: Well, I understand that you are objecting to
everything I did.
Mr. OIBrien: Okay.
At trial following Beills original objection, the nature of
the evidence was not modified. Therefore, Beills objection at the
time of his motion in limine, covered the same evidence which was
presented at trial. We hold that this objection was sufficient,
and consequently we can properly review Beil's objection and hold
the evidence improperly admitted.
As a final point, Mayer argues that even if the settlement
evidence was improperly admitted, the erroneous ruling constituted
harmless error. According to Mayer, the jury found that he was not
negligent. The 1986 settlement evidence only pertained to damages
and since it had no relevance to Mayerls negligence, its admission
could not have influenced the jury. It therefore did not affect
the outcome of the trial and consequently should be regarded a
harmless error, which did not affect the substantial rights of
Beil. Based on this assumption, Mayer argues that this Court
should not reverse the judgment of the District Court. See Rule
1 , M.R.App.P.
4
We cannot hold as a matter of law that the erroneous admission
of this evidence was harmless. In fact, it appears as though the
jury may have been substantially influenced by its admission.
Following trial, the jury questioned the District Court Judge
concerning the damage issue:
'THE COURT: Now ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the
bailiff has handed me this note. "Judge Green, if the
jury decided 50/50 percent negligence on behalf of the
plaintiff and defendant, how can we represent this on the
verdict and still show no monetary reward?" Well, as I
instructed you, it would take eight or more of your group
to find -- decide on any question involved in this case,
and, apparently, you're asking if you find the jury --
the jury finds that the defendant is 50 percent negligent
and the plaintiff is 50 percent negligent; is this
correct?
JURY FOREPERSON: Yes.
THE COURT: Well, if that is what you find, eight or more
of your number on each one of those questions --
JURY FOREPERSON: Yes.
THE COURT: -- you can answer question one, 'Was the
Defendant negligent?'; question two, 'Was the Defendant's
negligence a proximate cause of injury or damage to the
Plaintiff?'; and question three, 'Was the Plaintiff
negligent?'. That's where you'd get the two parties.
And question four, was the plaintiff's negligence a
proximate cause of the injury? Then you could go to
question five, 'Using one hundred percent (100%) as the
total combined negligence of the parties which
contributed to the injury or damage to the Plaintiff,
what percentage of such negligence is attributable to the
Plaintiff?' There you put in whatever percentage you
find is attributable to the Plaintiff. You could then
go on, and answer question six, and the Court would take
care of the verdict based on what you -- how you answer
these questions, but there's no problem with doing that.
Do you understand?
JURY FOREPERSON: Huh-uh? May I speak for the group?
THE COURT: Surely.
JURY FOREPERSON: In answering the questions, we did not
wish to put all the blame on M . Mayer at that particular
r
intersection, nor did we wish to put it all on Mr Beil,
and still our monetary rewards would have been so meager
THE COURT: Now you don't -- I don't want you to explain
that to me now.
JURY FOREPERSON: Okay. We go back down again, and put
some figures in there.
THE COURT: The thing is whatever percentage you
determine is due to the plaintiff you will put in -- as
a -- answer to question five. Again, 'Using one hundred
percent (100%) as the total combined negligence of the
parties which contributed to the injury or damage to the
Plaintiff, what percentage of such negligence is
attributable to the Plaintiff?' And you have placed in
there whatever percentage you find is attributable to the
plaintiff. You understand that now?
JURY FOREPERSON: Yes, uh-huh.
THE COURT: Very well. You will be reconducted to the
jury room.
This exchange indicates that the amount of settlement had an
influence on the jury in determining the responsibility of each
party for the accident. Here they found no liability on the part
of Mayer.
In prior cases we have stated that where controversial
evidence was erroneously admitted at time of trial, and on appeal
a showing was made that substantial rights might well have been
effected, the error was not harmless. State Highway Commission v.
Churchwell (1965), 146 Mont. 52, 403 P.2d 751.
It appears as though Beil's substantial rights have been
affected and accordingly the evidence was not harmless. The jury's
verdict is vacated and this case is remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
We Concur:
Justice
4
'Chief Justice