No. 88-624
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1989
CANYON CREEK EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
affiliated with the Montana Education
Association. and KAREN TINNES,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-VS-
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, YELTdOWSTONE COUNTY
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 4,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honorable Diane G. Rarz, Judqe presiding.
COIJNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Emilie Loring; Hilley & Loring, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Charles E. Erdmann; Erdmann & P?right, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: Nov. 21, 1989
Decided: January 11, 1990
Filed:
Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Thirteenth
Judicial District, Yellowstone County, finding that the
Respondent, Board of Trustees, did not breach the terms of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into with the
Appellant, Canyon Creek Education Association. We find that
the District Court was without jurisdiction to hear the
matter and therefore remand for dismissal without- reachinq
the substantive issues concerning breach of contract.
The sole issue on appeal is:
Whether the District Court has jurisdiction to hear and
decide an action alleging breach of a collective bargaining
agreement, when the plaintiff has not first brought the case
before the County Superintendent.
Karen Tinnes (Mrs. Tinnes), the plaintiff in this
action, had been employed by the School District as a
nontenured substitute teacher and as a teacher's aid in the
1983-84 school year. In the 1984-85 and 1985-86 school
years, she had been employed as a full time teacher.
In the spring of 1986, it became evident to the School
Board that the School District was facing financial
uncertainty for the upcoming school year. State funding was
reduced and an attempt to pass a local mill levy had failed.
Due to such financial problems, the School Board decided to
meet on March 26, 1986, at a special meeting to address the
status of the nontenured teachers. A two day notice of the
meeting was given. At the meeting, the financial status of
the District was discussed and a decision was made not to
renew nontenured teachers. A letter was sent to all
nontenured teachers, including Mrs. Tinnes who was not
present at the meeting, informing them of the Roard's action.
Eventually Mrs. Tinnes was recalled to fill a
one-quarter time position for the 1986-87 school year. She
was not, however, recalled to fill six other positions which
opened during the year. Three of these positions--an
elementary counselor, a seventh grade school teacher, and a
music teacher, required special endorsements or experience
which Mrs. Tinnes did not have. However, she was qualified
to fill the other three positions. She was not given an
opportunity to fill these positions because the District
decided to fill them with a teacher who had prior experience
teaching in the grades where the openings occurred.
In 1987, the District was again experiencing financial.
difficulties and uncertainty. The Board met without givins
any type of notice to the nontenured teachers on February 16,
1987 to determine their status. The decision was made to
non-renew their contracts. Later in 1987, as the financial
situation for the District stabilized, the District recalled
and hired new teachers for various positions. Mrs. Tinnes
was not among those recalled.
Followinq her non-renewal in 1986, Mrs. Tinnes filed a
complaint in District Court alleging that the School Board
had breached the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into
by the School District and the teachers association. In
December of 1987, she filed an amended complaint which
contained additional allegations for the 1987-88 school year.
Trial was held on July 12, 1988 and the District Court found
in favor of the School District. This appeal followed.
On July 12, 1988, the same day that trial was held on
this case, this Court issued a decision in Throssell v. Board
of Trustees (Mont. 1988), 757 P.2d 348, 45 St.Rep. 1228. In
Throssell, we held that under S 20-3-210, MCA, the County
Superintendent must hear and decide all matters of
controversy arisinq as a result of decisions of the Board of
Trustees. Section 20-3-210, MCA, states in pertinent part
that:
. . . the county superintendent shall hear and
decide all matters of controversy arising in his
county as a result of decisions of the trustees of
a district in the county.
In Throssell, the plaintiff relied upon McBride v.
School District No. 1 (1930), 88 Mont. 110, 290 P. 252, in
support of his position that actions for money owed pursuant
to a contract are not contemplated within the meaning of
S 20-3-210, MCA. - -
In McBride, this Court held that when a.
teacher brings an action for a money judgment based upon
breach of contract, the rule of exhausting one's
administrative remedies does not apply. McBride, 290 P. at
254. The plaintiff in Throssell argued that because his
complaint sought solely monetary damages, the rule of McBride
applied.
We disagreed and held that as a general rule a claimant
in the school system must exhaust his administrative remedies
before filing a complaint or petition in District Court.
Throssell noted this general rule has three limited
exceptions. These exceptions are situations where state
agencies have been directly granted primary jurisdiction,
where the matter is governed by a specific statute or where
the Board has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
Throssell, 752 P.2d at 349-50. Because the plaintiff's cause
of action in Throssell did not come under any of these
exceptions, we held the District Court had no jurisdiction.
The case now before us involves two Collective
Bargaining Agreements. The first agreement was effective
between June 30, 1984 and June 30, 1986 and was in force when
Mrs. Tinnes was non-renewed in 1986. The second agreement
was effective from July 1, 1986 through June 30, 1988. This
Collective Bargaining Agreement was applicable to the 1987
non-renewal.
Following her non-renewal in 1986, Mrs. Tinnes filed an
appeal before the Yellowstone County Superintendent of
Schools. In this matter, she alleged that the reasons given
by the School Board for her non-renewal were not true. The
Superintendent found in favor of the School District on July
14, 1986, and dismissed the appeal.
Mrs. Tinnes continued, following this ruling, to pursue
her administrative remedies, on the grounds stated, and
appealed to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction.
However, on November 17, 1986, she also filed the District
Court action now on review, alleging breach of contract, due
to the School District's failure to comply with notice and
layoff-rehire provisions in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. The complaint was amended in December of 1987 to
include breach of contract allegations arising out of the
1987 non-renewal. The State Superintendent, on April 6,
1987, affirmed the decision of the County Superintendent and
dismissed Mrs. Tinnes' administrative appeal.
From the above facts, it is apparent that the District.
Court did not have jurisdiction to hear Mrs. Tinnes'
complaint. The action before the lower court was based upon
completely different theories than that presented to the
County Superintendent for the 1986 non-renewal and were never
presented for administrative review. Furthermore, the
allegations arising out of the 1987 non-renewal also were
never presented for administrative review.
In light of Throssell, in order for the District Court
to have jurisdiction, it is necessary for the litigant to
exhaust her administrative remedies. Accordingly, we hold
that the District Court was without jurisdiction to hear Mrs.
Tinnes' complaint and the complaint is to be dismissed.
As a final point, we note that Mrs. Tinnes relies
heavily upon McBride in support of her theory that she need
not exhaust her administrative remedies before filing her
complaint in District Court. This confusion on her part may
be partly caused by our failure to affirmatively overrule
McBride in Throssell. Therefore, in order to prevent further
confusion, we hereby affirmatively overrule McBride, and hold
that unless a claimant's cause of action falls under the
three exceptions enumerated in -
Throssell, he/she must present
his/her claim to the County Superintendent, invoking and
completing the administrative process first before resorting
to the courts.
Remanded for dismissal.
& -
8 Justice
We concur:
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A/
Chief Justice
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1 Justices
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