Throssell v. BD. OF TR. GALLATIN CTY. SD 7

NO. 87-541
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1988

ROWLAND THROSSELL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GALLATIN COUNTY
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7, BOZEMAN,
MONTANA,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Gallatin,
The Honorable Bryon L . Robb, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Gregory 0 Morgan argued, Bozeman, Montana
.

For Respondent:
Donald E. White argued, Bozeman, Montana

Submitted: June 28, 1988
Decided: July 12, 1988

Filed: ,!uk 1 2 1988

Clerk
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. delivered the Opinion of the
Court.

Appellant Throssell appeals from the summary judgment of
the District Court, Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin
County, in which the court dismissed Throssell's complaint
for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. We
vacate the District Court's order and remand the cause to the
Gallatin County Superintendent of Schools with instructions.
In 1976, Throssell was hired as an administrator and
vice-principal for Senior High School of District No. 7 in
Gallatin County. He continued to be rehired through a series
of one-year contracts until 1983. In May, 1983, Throssell
told the school that he planned to retire after the 1983-84
school year and he requested that his retirement stipend be
added into his contract for his last year. His contract
allowed him $250 for each year of his 8 years of district
service. He was hired for that year as an assistant
principal at Bozeman Jr. High.
In April, 1984, the school district adopted a new
retirement plan which encouraged teachers to retire early.
This "voluntary career option plan" provided that teachers
with 13 or more years of "district credited service" were
entitled to lump-sum payments at retirement.
Throssell claimed his contract entitled him to benefits
under this plan but upon hearing in January, 1985, the
District Board of Trustees denied his claim because he was an
administrator and by definition excluded from the plan. The
Board also determined that he had not acquired a sufficient
number of years of district credited service to be eligible.
Throssell appealed this decision to the Gallatin County
Superintendent of Schools who, upon motion by Throssell,
determined that she did not have jurisdiction to hear the
matter because it was a claim for breach of contract and not
a controversy intended to be heard under S 20-3-210, MCA.
She granted Throssell's motion and "denied" the appeal. This
decision was not appealed to the State Superintendent of
Public Instruction by either party.
Throssell then filed a complaint in the District Court
on October 22, 1985. On November 13, 1985, the School
District made a motion to dismiss the claim for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Both parties briefed the
motion and additional briefs were ordered August 26, 1986.
Upon suggestion by the School District, the court viewed the
School District motion as one for summary judgment and
granted it on November 3, 1987. Throssell appeals from this
judgment.
Among the seven issues Throssell specifies on appeal is
whether the County Superintendent properly denied
jurisdiction over the controversy. Because we hold that the
County Superintendent had jurisdiction and therefore the
District Court had no jurisdiction to hear this cause of
action, we will not address the remaining six issues.
Throssell contends that S 20-3-210, MCA, which grants
the County Superintendent the power to hear school
controversies was correctly limited by the County
Superintendent's decision to abandon jurisdiction over a
cause of action based upon a breach of contract. He argues
that pursuant to this Court's decision in McBride v. School
District, No. 2 (1930), 88 Mont. 110, 290 P. 252, actions for
money owed pursuant to a contract are not contemplated within
the meaning of S 20-3-210, MCA. We disagree.
Section 20-3-210, MCA, states in pertinent part:
Controversy appeals and hearings. (1) Except as
provided under 20-3-211, the county superintendent
 shall hear and decide all matters of controversy
arising in his county as a result of decisions of
the trustees of a district in the county.
The Gallatin County Superintendent agreed with appellant
that there was no difference between the instant case and one
which involved a breach of contract with an outside supplier.
Both involved the seeking of a money judgment. As support
for his position, Throssell cites to McBride in which a
teacher brought an action against the school district for one
month's salary following the district's rejection of the
teacher's reapplication for employment. This Court held that
because the action was for a money judgment for breach of
contract the rule of exhausting one's administrative remedies
did not apply. McBride, 290 P. at 254. A search of
subsequent case law shows that since the Montana
Administrative Procedures Act became applicable to school
controversies in 1977, this Court has allowed few exceptions
to the rule that a claimant in the school system must exhaust
his or her administrative remedies. These exceptions include
where state agencies have been directly granted primary
jurisdiction resulting in decisions outside the
administrative exhaustion doctrine, Johnson v. Bozeman School
Dist. No. 7 (Mont. 1987), 734 P.2d 209, 44 St.Rep. 531, and
where the matter is governed by a specific statute. See,
e.g., Jarussi v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 28
(1983), 204 Mont. 131, 664 P.2d 316. An older exception
exists where the Board has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. Peterson v. School Board, District No. 1
(1925), 73 Mont. 442, 236 P. 670. Recent case law shows that
even when a money judgment is requested the administrative
appeals process has been followed. See, Yanzick v. School
District No. 23, Lake County (1982), 196 Mont. 375, 641 P.2d
431 (tenured teacher sought reinstatement and back pay) ;
Pryor School District Nos. 2 & 3 v. Superintendent of Public
Instruction (Mont. 1985), 707 P.2d 1094, 42 St.Rep. 1405
(unlawfully discharged principal awarded one year ' s pay) ;
Harris v. Bauer (Mont. 1988), 749 P.2d. 1068, 45 St.Rep. 147
(school psychologist awarded tenure and back pay with
interest). These cases illustrate that the seeking of a
money judgment is not the dispositive factor in determining
the educational agency's jurisdiction over a matter.
Throssell is a retired school administrator with a claim
that his contract with the school district entitles him to
the identical retirement benefits afforded teachers through
the new school district retirement plan. This is
distinguishable from an action by an outside supplier on a
contract with the school district and thus is a "controversy
arising ... as a result of decisions of the trustees of a
district ... " fully contemplated within the meaning of §
20-3-210, MCA. Therefore the County Superintendent
improperly abandoned jurisdiction over the matter. The
District Court, then, had no jurisdiction to hear the case.
Accordingly, we vacate the District Court's Order granting
defendant ' s motions to dismiss and for summary judgment and
remand this matter to the Gallatin County Superintendent for
hearing and for the entering of findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
/'
Vacated and remanded.

Justice
We Concur: ,
/