NO. 91-048
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1991
ROWLAND THROSSELL,
MAY 3 0 1991
petitioner and Appellant,
-vs-
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GALLATIN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7,
BOZEMAN, MONTANA,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Gallatin,
The Honorable Larry W. Moran, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Gregory 0. Morgan, Bozeman, Montana.
For Respondent:
Donald E. White; White & Seel, Bozeman, Montana.
submitted on briefs : April 18, 1991
Decided: May 30, 1991
Filed:
Clerk
Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
A retired school administrator brought this action claiming
that he was entitled to benefits under the Bozeman Public Schoolst
Voluntary Career Option Plan, offering retirement benefits
identical to those afforded teachers. The District Court for the
Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County, denied the
administrator such benefits and he now appeals. We affirm.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred
in holding that Mr. Throssell, as an administrator, was not
entitled to Option Plan benefits under his contract?
School District No. 7 of Gallatin County hired Mr. Throssell
in 1976 as Senior High Vice Principal. His contract provided that
he receive fringe benefits the same as Ifall other benefits equal
to those offered to other certified employees of the District . .
. unless otherwise addressed in this contractn.
In 1983, Mr. Throsself gave notice of his intent to r e t i r e at
the end of the 1984 academic year. In April 1984, the School
District adopted the Bozeman Public Schoolts Voluntary Career
Option Plan (Option Plan). The Option Plan speaks of I1out-of-
and service. The
controversy here involves lldistrict-creditedlr
service. The Option
Plan provides in part:
For the purpose of this program, the term teacher shall
be as defined in the Collective ~ a r g a i n i n g Agreement
between School Dist. #7 and the Bozeman Education System.
...
The amounts of payment involved are strictly dependent
upon the number of years of district-credited service.
(Emphasis added).
The Collective Bargaining Agreement defines "teacherm as
follows:
Unless otherwise indicated the terms "teachertt or
I1teachers," when used in this agreement, refer[s] to .
* . .
all employees who are certified in Class 1, 2, 4, or 5
as provided in Section 20-4-106, MCA, whose positions
require certification and all other employees who are
required to be licensed to perform educational services
of a professional nature but shall exclude all
supervisory employees, e.g.! the superintendent,
assistant superintendent, prxncipals and assistant
principals, . ..(Emphasis added),
Prior to retiring, Mr. Throssell applied for benefits under
the Option Plan. The School District trustees denied his
application for benefits under the Option Plan upon two grounds:
(1) As an administrator in the School District he was specifically
excluded from the benefits of the Option Plan; and (2) he would not
be entitled to compensation under the Option Plan as he had only
eight years of in-district credit with the School District.
Thirteen years of district-credited service are needed to qualify
for the Option Plan.
Mr. Throssefl appealed the case to the Gallatin County
Superintendent of Schools. The County Superintendent found that
the Option Plan would be a benefit included in Mr. Throsselll last
s
contract in 1983 but that it was necessary to have at least
thirteen years of district-credited service for a teacher to
qualify under the Option Plan. She further found that the
provisions of the schoollscollective bargaining agreement allowing
a maximum number of seven years of district-credited service
applies only to "teacherstt
hired during the term of the collective
bargaining agreement dated July 1, 1983, through June 30, 1984.
She concluded that Mr. Throssell had eight years of in-district
service but that neither his 1976 nor his 1983 contracts contained
any provision granting him credit for any out-of-district service.
Thus, his claim was again denied.
Mr. Throssell appealed to the State Superintendent of Public
Instruction (State Superintendent) who held that Mr. Throssell was
entitled to benefits if he were qualified. The State
Superintendent affirmed the County Superintendent's decision.
Subsequently, Mr. Throssell appealed the decision to the District
Court pursuant to 5 2-4-702, MCA.
The District Court found that the County Superintendent and
the State Superintendent committed an error of law by considering
only part of the definition of the term "teacheraf used in the
as
Option Plan, and failing to consider specific language in the
definition:
[The Option Plan] . . .
shall exclude all supervisory
employees, e.g., the Superintendent, Assistant
Superintendent, Principals and Assistant Principals, .
..
Thus, the District Court held that as an Assistant Principal, Mr.
Throssell was not eligible to receive Option Plan benefits because
he was specifically excluded by the language of the Option Plan.
Mr. Throssell appeals the District Court's decision.
Did the District Court err in holding that Mr. Throssell, as
an administrator, was not entitled to Option Plan benefits under
his contract?
Two factors must be met before Mr. Throssell can receive
benefits. First, he must be an employee "eligible'l under the
Option Plan to receive such benefits. Second, if he is eligible,
he must meet a minimum requirement of thirteen years of district-
credited service so that he may actually receive the benefits.
The District Court concluded that Mr. Throssell was not
eligible for coverage. We disagree. Mr. Throssellls contract
provided that he receive the following fringe benefits (in part):
A. Full family health, dental and vision Insurance.
All other benefits equal to those offered to other
certified employees of the District which includes but
is not limited to Maternity Leave, Emergency Leave, Leave
for Civic Duties, Personal Leave and Leaves of Absence,
unless otherwise addressed in this contract. (Emphasis
added) .
Nowhere does the contract otherwise provide that Mr. Throssell
should not receive benefits equal to those offered to other
certified employees. The District Court's reference to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement's definition of teacher was
correct. However, it must also consider Mr. Throsselltsindividual
contract which allows Itall other equal benef itstt. We therefore
reverse the ~istrictCourt's conclusion that Mr. Throssell is not
entitled to benefits under the Career Option Plan.
Mr. Throsselltsrecord of service card showed the number "11"
in the 190utM
column. Throssell contends that the School District
credited him with eleven years of out-of-district service on the
permanent record card and thus, he is entitled to benefits under
the Option Plan.
The State Superintendent addressed that argument as follows:
The maximum number of years out-of-district service
a "new teachert1could be credited is seven years. A
decision on the actual number of years of out of district
service credited to a new teacher is made by the District
at the time of hire. The new teacher's placement on the
salary matrix requires the District to decide how many
years of out-of-district service it will credit to a new
teacher. The term "district-credited" requires action
on the part of the District. The ~istrictmay credit a
new teacher with zero through seven years of out-of-
district service.
As the County Superintendent concluded, Mr. Throssell was not a
"new teacher" when he entered into his final contract in 1983. The
1983 contract does not contain a provision granting credit to Mr.
Throssell for any out-of-district service. Therefore, district-
credited service for new teachers under the 1983 - 1984 Collective
Bargaining Agreement is not a benefit to which Mr. Throssell would
be entitled under his 1983 contract because he was not a "new
teacher" in 1983. For this reason, the County Superintendent and
the State Superintendent concluded that Mr. Throssell did not meet
the requirement for a minimum of thirteen years of district-
credited service to qualify for the Option Plan. The scope of
review of administrative decisions is somewhat limited. See 5 2-
4-704 ( 2 ) , MCA.
Our function as an appellate court reviewing an
administrative decision is not to substitute our judgment
for that of the County [or State] Superintendent but
rather to review the whole record to determine if the
administrative findings are clearly erroneous or if the
County Superintendent's [or State Superintendent's]
conclusions of law constitute an abuse of discretion.
Harris v. Cascade County School Dist. No. 6 and F (1990), 241 Mont.
274, 277, 786 P.2d 1164, 1166. After reviewing the record, we
conclude that the County and State Superintendents' findings are
not clearly erroneous nor were the conclusions of law an abuse of
discretion, and affirm their conclusion that Mr. Throssell did not
meet the thirteen year minimum requirement.
While we affirm the final holding of the District Court that
Mr. Throssell will not receive Option Plan benefits, we disagree
with the basis for its decision. As previously stated, Mr.
Throssell's contract specifically provided that he receive "all
other equal benefitsttequal to those offered to other certified
employees of the District. Thus, we hold that in this case, under
Mr. Throssellts contract he was eligible to receive Option Plan
benefits if he satisfied the thirteen year minimum requirement of
district-credited service. We agree that the record supports the
conclusions of the Superintendents that he did not.
We affirm the District Court's denial of benefits to the
plaintiff.
We Concur:
Chief Justice
May 30, 1993
CERTf FICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the
following named:
Gregory 0. Morgan
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1530
Bozeman, MT 59715
Donald E.White
White & See1
1800 W. Koch, Ste. 9
Bozeman, MT 59715
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MONTANA