No. 90-171
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1991
STATE OF MONTANA and
DOUGLAS A. HEGEMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Gallatin,
The Honorable Larry W. Moran, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jeff Renz, Esq., Billings, Montana
Eula Compton, Esq., Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Marc Racicot, Attorney General; Kathy Seeley,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
William Schreiber, Esq., Belgrade, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 28, 1991
~ecided: April 2, 1991
Filed:
I
Clerk
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Douglas A. Hegeman appeals his convictions and sentences of
failing to display a motor vehicle registration on demand,
disorderly conduct, and obstructing a police officer, following a
bench trial in the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County.
We reverse and remand.
Mr. Hegeman raises the following issues:
1. Did the District Court lack jurisdiction over this case
by reason of the city court's failure to enter sentence and
judgment against Mr. Hegeman?
2. Did the District Court err when it denied Mr. Hegeman's
right to a jury trial because Mr. Hegeman failed to demand a jury
trial in his notice of appeal, in violation of an unpublished court
rule?
3. Was Mr. Hegeman charged and convicted of disorderly
conduct for engaging in speech and gestures that are protected
under the Montana and United States Constitutions?
4. Is 5 45-7-302 (I), MCA, on its face, unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad, or is this statute unconstitutionally
overbroad as it was applied to Mr. Hegeman?
On October 2, 1989, Belgrade City Police Officer John Woodland
observed and stopped a vehicle that did not have a 1990 renewal
sticker on its front license plate. Upon stopping the vehicle, the
vehicle's driver, later identified as Douglas Hegeman, loudly and
vigorously challenged Officer Woodland's authority to make the
stop, claiming that the officer did not have probable cause.
Officer Woodland repeatedly requested Mr. Hegeman to produce
his motor vehicle registration, his driver's license, and his proof
of insurance. Mr. Hegeman, however, repeatedly refused to provide
Officer Woodland with the requested documentation. Furthermore,
Mr. Hegeman exhibited an aggressive and abusive behavior toward
Officer Woodland through a display of verbal intimidation and
threatening arm gestures. Accordingly, Officer Woodland mentally
reviewed possible defensive actions he could employ to defend
himself.
After several minutes of this continued behavior, Officer
Woodland repeatedly requested Mr. Hegeman to exit his vehicle.
Mr. Hegeman repeatedly refused Officer Woodland's requests. Mr.
Hegeman finally exited his vehicle when Officer Woodland assured
him that he would not be physically harmed.
Following his departure from his vehicle, Officer Woodland
once again requested Mr. Hegeman to produce his motor vehicle
registration, his driver's license, and his proof of insurance.
Mr. Hegeman responded that he did not know where his driver's
license was, but produced several documents from his vehicle's
glove compartment one of which was his motor vehicle registration.
Attached to his motor vehicle registration was the 1990 renewal
sticker, which should have been on the vehicle's front license
plate. At a later time, Mr. Hegeman produced his driver's license
and proof of insurance. Officer Woodman then inquired if Mr.
Hegeman was in fact Douglas A. Hegeman; Mr. Hegeman did not
respond. Officer Woodman then informed Mr. Hegeman that he was
under arrest for disorderly conduct and effected the arrest.
On November 28, 1989, Mr. Hegeman, appearing s , was
convicted of failing to display a motor vehicle registration on
demand, disorderly conduct, and obstructing a police officer
following a jury trial in city court. Immediately after the jury
rendered its verdict, Mr. Hegeman filed a notice of appeal. Mr.
Hegeman included a claim in his notice of appeal that "Until a
decision is rendered by the District Court, the City of Belgrade
is further barred from action toward the defendant pursuant to [§I
46-20-204 (3) [ ,] [MCA] .
'I The city court thereafter noted: "Request
to continue sentencing until after appeal--approved.@'
On February 9, 1990, Mr. Hegeman, again appearing pro se, was
tried & novo at a bench trial before the District Court, and was
again convicted of the charges. Mr. Hegeman received the following
sentences: a $25.00 fine plus a $10.00 misdemeanor fee for failure
to exhibit his motor vehicle registration when requested; two days
in jail, a $100.00 fine, and a $10.00 misdemeanor fee for disorder-
ly conduct; and thirty days in jail, a $300.00 fine, and a $10.00
misdemeanor fee for obstructing a peace officer. These sentences
have been stayed pending this appeal by Mr. Hegeman.
1. Did the District Court lack jurisdiction over this case
by reason of the city court's failure to enter sentence and
judgment against Mr. Hegeman?
Mr. Hegeman argues that because the Belgrade City Court never
imposed sentence, or entered judgment against him, the District
Court never obtained jurisdiction of Mr. Hegeman's case. We agree.
A district court may have concurrent original jurisdiction or
appellate jurisdiction over criminal matters involving mis-
demeanors. See Mont. Const., Art. VII, s 4 (jurisdiction of
district courts) ; 5 5 3-5-301 to -303, MCA (original jurisdiction
and appellate jurisdiction of district courts). In particular,
§ 3-5-302(2), MCA, provides:
The district court has concurrent original
jurisdiction with the justice's court in the
following criminal cases amounting to mis-
demeanor :
(a) misdemeanors arising at the same time as
and out of the same transaction as a felony or
misdemeanor offense charged in district court;
(b) misdemeanors resulting from the reduction
of a felony or misdemeanor offense charged in
the district court; and
(c) misdemeanors resulting from a finding of
a lesser included offense in a felony or
misdemeanor case tried in district court.
Except in these identified instances, a district court is limited
to appellate jurisdiction of misdemeanor cases. Mont. Const. Art.
VII, !
j 4; 5 5 3-5-301 to -303, MCA. However, imposition of sentence
and final judgment by a justice or city court are a prerequisite
to appeal to a district court. See §§ 46-17-311(2), 46-20-104(1),
MCA. Furthermore, a party may not consent to subject matter
jurisdiction nor waive the want of jurisdiction. State v. Akers
(1938), 106 Mont. 43, 57, 74 P.2d 1138, 1145.
Clearly, this case was not within the District Court's
original jurisdiction as it does not fall into any of the iden-
tified instances under 5 3-5-302(2), MCA. And, this case was not
within the District Court's appellate jurisdiction because the
city court failed to impose sentence and enter a final judgment
against Mr. Hegeman. We therefore hold that the District Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the
District Court's sentence and judgment and instruct the District
Court to remand this case to the Belgrade City Court for imposition
of sentence and final judgment. Because we find reversible error
in this first issue, we decline to discuss the other three issues
raised by Mr. Hegeman in this appeal.
Reversed and remanded.
Chief Justice
We concur: