NO. 92-286
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1992
SAMUEL J. GRENZ,
Claimant and Appellant,
-vs-
FIRE AND CASUALTY OF CONNECTICUT,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: The Workersr Compensation Court,
The Honorable Timothy W. Reardon, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Samuel J. Grenz, Pro Se, Stevensville, Montana
For Respondent:
Terry G. Spear, Matovich, Addy & Keller; Billings,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 22, 1992
3. Decided: November 5, 1992
I Clerk
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Claimant Samuel J. Grenz appeals from a May 14, 1992, order of
the Workers' Compensation Court dismissing with prejudice
consolidated cause WCC No. 9202-6378 on res judicata grounds. We
reverse.
Samuel Grenz injured his right elbow while working for the
American Stud Company in Flathead County, Montana, on August 22,
1984. That accident and related claims have resulted in eight
prior appeals by Grenz to this Court, three in 1991 alone. In each
case, we affirmed the district court's or Workers' Compensation
Court's action rejecting Grenz's claims.
Subsequent to our last decision, Grenz filed new claims.
These claims were consolidated as cause WCC No. 9202-6378. The
claim specifically at issue here is Grenz's assertion that his
current degenerative arthritis was caused by work-related micro-
trauma separate and apart from, and subsequent to, the August 1984
injury. Fire and Casualty of Connecticut (the insurer) denied
liability on the basis that the claim was not filed timely and
later moved the Workers' Compensation Court to dismiss Grenz's
petition with prejudice.
The insurer asserted two arguments in its motion to dismiss:
first, that the micro-trauma claim was barred by res judicata; and
second, that the claims were barred because not filed timely. The
Workers' Compensation Court applied res judicata in granting the
motion to dismiss. It did not address whether the claims are time
barred.
2
The sole issue we address is whether the Workers' Compensation
Court erred in concluding that res judicata bars the micro-trauma
claim.
The court correctly set forth the four substantive criteria
which must be met for the doctrine of res judicata to apply: (1)
the parties or their privies must be the same; (2) the subject
matter of the action must be the same; (3) the issues must be the
same and relate to the same subject matter; and (4) the capacities
of the persons must be the same in reference to the subject matter
and to the issues. Whirry v. Swanson (Mont. 1992), 836 P.2d 1227,
49 St.Rep. 764; Phelan v. Lee Blaine Enterprises (1986), 220 Mont.
296, 716 P.2d 601. Applying the elements to the claim before
it, the Workers' Compensation Court determined that the lack of
causal connection between claimant's current condition and his work
has been adjudicated previously and finally in Grenz v. Fire and
Cas. of Connecticut (1991), 250 Mont. 373, 820 P.2d 742. We
disagree.
The issue in Grenz was whether the Workers' Compensation Court
erred in ruling that claimant was not permanently totally disabled
Itas a result of his August 22, 1984, right elbow injury." 250
Mont. at 378, 820 P.2d at 745. Our holding was specific:
After reviewing the entire record in this case, we hold
that there is substantial credible evidence to support
the Workers' Compensation Court's finding that the
claimant failed to establish a causal connection between
his current ohvsical condition and his 1984 riqht elbow
iniurv. . . . [A] causal connection between the
claimant's current ohvsical oroblems and his 1984 riqht
elbow iniurv is not oresent.
- at 380, 820 P.2d at 746 (emphasis added).
Id. On the basis of this
lack of causal connection to the injury on which Grenzlsclaim was
grounded, we determined that "the Workers1 Compensation Court
correctly concluded that the claimant is not permanently totally
disabled. Ir a. Thus, while Grenz finally and conclusively
determined the lack of causal connection between the 1984 injury
and claimantrscurrent condition, it did not address or determine
the question of causal connection between his condition and any
alleged cornpensable event or events occurring subsequent to that
time .
Claimant did attempt to raise the micro-trauma issue on appeal
in Grenz. The insurer argued that Grenz was asserting a different
theory on appeal than was presented to the Workersr Compensation
Court. We agreed, stating tt[oJur
review of the record shows that
the claimant admitted at trial that the sole basis for his claim to
benefits in that ~roceedinqwas his 1984 injury." - at 379, 820
Id.
P.2d at 746 (emphasis added) . We then refused to address the
micro-trauma theory, stating:
[O]n appeal, we will consider only whether the Workers1
Compensation Court properly determined that the claimant
failed to establish a causal connection between his
current physical condition and his August 22, 1984, right
elbow injury and, therefore, was not permanently totally
disabled as a result of the 1984 injury.
-
Id. at 379-80, 820 P.2d at 746.
Grenz does not support the Workers1 Compensation Court's
determination that lack of causal connection between claimantrs
current condition and any and all work-related events was
established therein. The criteria necessary for application of res
judicata not being met, we conclude that the Workersr Compensation
Court erred in dismissing Grenzlsmicro-trauma claim on the basis
of res judicata.
It is appropriate to note here that we sympathize with the
frustration and expense these proceedings have caused all involved.
Indeed, we previously have expressed our concern over the
multiplicity of claimant's proceedings and the overall "cost" of
those proceedings to the finite resources of the judicial system.
See Grenz v. Medical Management Northwest (1991), 250 Mont. 5 8 , 6 4 ,
817 P.2d 1151, 1155. We reiterate that concern here; it has not
lessened. We must be ever vigilant, however, in ensuring that
human propensities to frustration over seemingly endless litigation
do not result in less than the full and fair consideration on legal
principles to which litigants are entitled in Montana's courts.
Reversed and remanded with instructions to the Workers1
Compensation Court to proceed to a determination of the insurerls
alternative basis for its motion to dismiss, namely, that Grenzas
latest claims are time barred. I r
Chief Justice
November 5, 1992
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following
named:
Samuel J. Grenz
P.O. Box 444
Stevensville, MT 59870
Terry G. Spear
Attorney at Law
2812 First Ave. No., 225 Petroleum Bldg.
Billings, MT 59101
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT