NO. 93-232
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1993
SAMUEL J. GRENZ,
Petitioner and Appellant,
-vs-
FIRE AND CASUALTY OF CONNECTICUT,
Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: Montana Workers' Compensation Court
The Honorable Timothy Reardon, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Samuel J. Grew, Pro Se, Stevensville, Montana
For Respondent:
Terry Spear, Matovich, Addy & Keller, P.C.,
Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 5, 1993
Decided: August 17, 1993
Filed:
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Claimant Samuel Grenz appeals from an order of the Workers'
Compensation Court dismissing his petition for workers'
compensation benefits. We affirm.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the Workers'
Compensation Court erred in concluding that the one-year statute of
limitations barred Grenz' workers# compensation claim for
disabilities allegedly resulting from a series of microtraumas.
In 1984, Samuel Grenz injured his right elbow while working
for the American Stud Company (American Stud) in Flathead County,
Montana. He continued his employment with American Stud until
1985. American Stud's insurer, Fire and Casualty of Connecticut
(F&C), paid disability and medical benefits for the bumped elbow
until 1991.
With the 1984 injury began a seemingly endless stream of
litigation that has resulted in multiple appeals to this Court and
innumerable proceedings in the Workers' Compensation Court. For
purposes of this opinion, we need address only the recent
procedural and factual history of this case.
In1991, this Courtaffirmedthe Workers' Compensation Court's
determination that Grenz was not permanently totally disabled as a
result of his 1984 elbow injury. Grenz v. Fire and Cas. of
Connecticut (1991), 250 Mont. 373, 380, 820 P.2d 742, 746
(hereafter Grenz I, although it was not, in fact, the first Grenz
appeal). We concluded that Grenz had failed to prove the causal
connection between his degenerative arthritis and the 1984 elbow
2
injury. Grenz I, 820 P.2d at 746.
In Grenz I, Grenz also attempted to argue on appeal that his
degenerative arthritis was caused by a series of "microtraumas"
associated with the heavy lifting, jarring, and vibrations of the
machinery at his employment: these microtraumas, he asserted, were
suffered subsequent to and separately from his 1984 elbow injury.
We refused to consider this argument as Grenz had not raised in it
the Workerst Compensation Court. To the contrary, Grenz had
steadfastly maintained that the 1984 elbow injury was his only
basis for compensation. Grenz I, 820 P.2d at 746.
Following Grenz I, Grenz filed a new claim for workers'
compensation benefits, asserting that his arthritis was caused by
microtraumas, separate and apart from, and subsequent to, the 1984
elbow injury. F&C moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that
Grenz' claim was barred by res judicata or, alternatively, by the
one-year statute of limitations of the Workers' Compensation Act.
The Workers' Compensation Court granted F&C's motion on the basis
of res judicata. Grenz appealed.
In Grenz v. Fire and Cas. of Connecticut (1992), 255 Mont.
121, 124, 841 P.2d 494, 496 (Grenz II), we reversed the Workers'
Compensation Court's determination that his microtrauma claim was
barred by res judicata, and remanded with limiting instructions:
Reversed and remanded with instructions to the Workers'
Compensation Court to proceed to a determination of the
insurer's alternative basis for its motion to dismiss,
namely, that Grenz's latest claims are time barred.
On remand, the hearing examiner determined that Grenz had not
filed his new claim within one year after he had stopped working
3
for American Stud in 1985 and, therefore, he had not complied with
§ 39-71-601, MCA (1983). Thus, the hearing examiner ordered the
dismissal of Grenz' new claim. The Workers' Compensation Court
adopted the hearing examiner's order on April 21, 1993. Grenz
appeals.
Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in concluding that the
one-year statute of limitations barred Grenz' workers' compensation
claim for disabilities allegedly caused by a series of
microtraumas?
Grenz raises several interrelated challenges to the Workers'
Compensation Court's application of the statute of limitations.
In reviewing conclusions of law of the Workers' Compensation Court,
we determine if the court‘s interpretation of the law is correct.
Grenz I, 820 P.2d at 745; Steer, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue (1990),
245 Mont. 470, 475, 803 P.2d 601, 603.
The statute of limitations which governs this issue provides
as follows:
(1) In case of personal injury or death, all claims shall
be forever barred unless presented in writing to the
employer, the insurer or the division, as the case may
be, within 12 months from the date of the happening of
the accident, either by the claimant or someone legally
authorized to act for him in his behalf.
. . . .
Section 39-71-601, MCA (1983). The statute unequivocally requires
that claims be presented in writing within twelve months of the
accident. Grenz concedes that his microtrauma "accidents" occurred
during his period of employment with American Stud, employment
which ended in 1985. He did not file his claim for benefits until
1992. Thus, it is undisputed that Grenz failed to comply with the
requirements of the Workers' Compensation Act's statute of
4
limitations. We turn, therefore, to his various arguments against
the application of 5 39-71-601, MCA (1983), to his situation.
REPORTING OF ARTHRITIS TO EMPMYER
Grenz first claims that he reported his work-related
microtrauma injuries to his employer within the statutory period.
He asserts that he reported pain in his other joints to his
treating physician in 1984, who, in a note to Grenz' employer,
recommended that Grenz perform lighter work because of his
degenerative arthritis. Grenz points to two other situations in
which he claims he informed his employer that he was suffering from
arthritis or that his work was aggravating his degenerative
condition.
Grenz ' actions do not satisfy the requirements of the statute
of limitations. Section 39-71-601, MCA, requires the claimant to
present the claim in writinq within the one-year time period;
nowhere does Grenz allege that he completed any type of paperwork
concerning this independent injury until 1992.
Second, during the time in question, Grenz steadfastly
maintained that his arthritis was caused by, and derivative from,
his elbow injury of August 1984. Indeed, in Grenz' statement of
facts to this Court, he states that "the different way he performed
his work in order to compensate for the bumped elbow may have been
the cause of these other joint problems." In Grenz I, we quoted
from Grenz' trial testimony in which he stated:
"Q. Your injury occurred in 1984?
"A. Right.
"Q. That's the only industrial injury you claim; is that
right?
"A. Right. . . u
5
Grenz I, 820 P.2d at 746. Therefore, although Grenz may have
V*informed" his employer that he was suffering from arthritis within
the one-year period, he does not point to any evidence by which he
informed his employer that he was suffering from arthritis caused
by microtrauma injuries separate and apart from the elbow injury.
Be continuously maintained that the bumped elbow was the source of
his arthritis.
The requirements of § 39-71-601, RCA, are mandatory, and
compliance with the time limits is essential to the action.
Wassberg v. Anaconda Copper Co. (1985), 215 Mont. 309, 315-16, 697
P.2d 909, 913. We conclude that Grenz did not satisfy § 39-71-601,
MCA (1983), by informing his employer that he was suffering from
degenerative arthritis caused by microtrauma injuries separate from
and subsequent to his right elbow injury.
EOUITABLE ESTOPPEL
Grenz next argues that F&C should be equitably estopped from
relying on the statute of limitations, citing Scott v. Utility Line
Contractors (1987), 266 Mont. 154, 734 P.2d 206, and Weigland v.
Anderson-Meyer Drilling Co. (1988), 232 Mont. 390, 758 P.2d 260.
Scott and Weialand are inapplicable to the case before us.
In both cases, the claimant failed to present his claim within
the one-year statutory period but assisted the employer in
preparing the Employer's First Report within the time period.
Scott, 734 P.2d at 208; Weisland, 758 P.2d at 262. We concluded in
both cases that the Employer's First Report contained ample
information to inform the employers of the nature and basis of the
6
workersr potential claims. The report satisfied the purpose behind
§ 39-71-601, MCA, which is to give the employer written notice of
the worker's claims within twelve months of the injury or accident
in order to allow the employer to investigate the claim and, if
necessary, prepare a defense. Scott, 734 P.2d at 208; Weialand,
758 P.2d at 262.
Grenz did not assist his employer in completing an Employer's
First Report of a new and separate microtrauma-based injury; in
fact, he did nothing that would have alerted the employer to this
new cause of his degenerative arthritis. As stated above,
throughout this period, Grenz insisted that the arthritis was
caused by his elbow injury. It was only after he had lost his case
concerning the elbow injury in 1991 that he asserted that the
arthritis was caused by a series of microtraumas unrelated to the
elbow injury. The employer and insurer were completely unable to
investigate the claim and prepare a defense to the microtrauma
injury until 1992, seven years after Grenz had ceased working at
American Stud. The equitable estoppel principles from Scott and
Weisland simply have no application here.
In another twist to his estoppel argument, Grenz claims that
F&C waived its right to deny his claim for benefits because it paid
medical benefits for treatment of his arthritis. We find no merit
to this argument. As explained in Grenz I, F&C accepted liability
for Grenz' disabilities resulting from his bumped elbow and paid
benefits to Grenz only for disabilities resulting from the bumped
elbow. Grenz I, 820 P.2d at 747. We also emphasized in Grenz I
that under 5 39-71-608, MCA (1983), F&C's payment of benefits did
7
pc& waive its right to subsequently assert nonliability for
conditions not related to the elbow injury. Grenz I, 820 P.2d at
747. Thus, we conclude that F&C has not waived its right to deny
liability for the unrelated, microtrauma-based injuries now claimed
by Grenz.
As a third aspect to his estoppel theory, Grenz claims that
F&C "knew of Grenz's degenerative condition and . . . [a]t no time
did they inform Grenz or his attorney of the need to file or modify
his claim, though the evidence clearly shows that the Respondent
knew of Grenz's seeking medical care for his degenerative
condition." He also claims that because he was functionally
illiterate, he is entitled to more leniency. We disagree.
Faced with a similar argument in Wassberq, we emphasized:
. . . the duty is upon the claimant to file his claim,
not upon the insurer to solicit claims. The Workmen's
[sic] Compensation Act has not changed the principle that
he who asserts a right has the burden of proof or the
burden of proceeding.
Wassberq, 697 P.2d at 915. The employer has no duty to pursue the
employee's claim for him. Wassberq, 697 P.2d at 916. As in
Wassberq, Grenz was cognizant of the availability of a compensation
claim; he had participated in the process before. Regarding his
asserted illiteracy, we note that Grenz initially obtained workers'
compensation benefits for his elbow injury beginning in 1984 and
has become quite familiar with the procedures involved. We also
note the reams of judicial papers which Grenz has filed as a very
competent pro se litigant in the process of this protracted
litigation. F&C had no duty to inform Grenz of his duty to assert
a separate claim.
8
We conclude that, under any form of equitable estoppel, the
statute of limitations is not tolled in this case.
BREACH OF TRUST
Lastly, Grenz asserts that F&C stood in a trust relationship
with Grenz and that F&C breached that trust in handling his
workers' compensation claim. In Grenz II, this Court specifically
limited the issues on remand:
Reversed and remanded with instructions to the Workers'
Compensation Court to proceed to a determination of the
insurer's alternative basis for its motion to dismiss,
namely, that Grenz's latest claims are time barred.
Grenz II, 841 P.2d at 496. Given that explicit mandate, Grenz was
precluded from raising the new issue of breach of trust on remand
and, therefore, the issue is not properly before this Court.
We conclude that the Workers1 Compensation Court did not err
in dismissing Grenz' petition for Workers1 Compensation benefits
based on his failure to comply with the statute of liy\itations.
Affirmed.
We concur:
August 17, 1993
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the
following named:
Samuel J. Grenz
P.O. Box 444
Stevensville, MT 59870
Terry Spear
Attorney at Law
225 Petroleum Bldg., 2812 First Ave. No.
Billings, .MT 59101
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT