No. 92-190
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1992
EDWARD B. STANFORD; BETH STANFORD;
NANCY H. STANFORD, Personal
Representative of the Estate of
Neal A. Stanford, Deceased; and
REAS MADSEN,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
ROSEBUD COUNTY, MONTANA, et al.,
including EARL M. CRANSTON and
RICHARD C. HOEFLE,
Defendants and Respondents,
and
BOYD KINCHELOE and MAVIS
KINCHELOE, husband and wife,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Rosebud,
The Honorable Joe L. Hegel, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Robert C. Smith and John J. Cavan, Cavan, Smith,
Grubbs & Cavan, Billings, Montana
For Respondents:
James P. Healow, Sweeney & Healow, Billings, Montana
Joseph W. Sabol, Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 20, 1992
T
- Decided: September 22, 1992
Filed:
Clerk
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Appellants Boyd and Mavis Kincheloe appeal from an order of
the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Rosebud County, denying
their Motion to Amend and Supplement their pleadings. We affirm.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused
its discretion in denying appellants8 motion to amend their
pleadings.
The facts in this case are set forth in our opinion in
Stanford v. Rosebud County (1991), 251 Mont. 128, 822 P.2d 1074.
Litigation over the disputed royalty interest began with an
interpleader action in the federal district court in Billings,
Montana, in 1978. On destruction of diversity jurisdict~on,that
action was removed to the Sixteenth Judicial District, Rosebud
County where it subsequently was consolidated with this action by
plaintiffs/respondents Stanford. The litigation has proceeded,
albeit intermittently, since that time.
The procedural events relevant to the issue before us begin
with the District Court's scheduling conference on March 21, 1989,
at which the case was set for trial on January 9, 1990. After a
subsequent hearing on various motions by the parties, the District
Court entered an order which, in pertinent part, directed the
parties to file a statement of their claims, "setting forth all
right, title and interest they claim in and to the remaining 3.125%
royalty interest." The parties1 statements of claim were filed by
September 18, 1989. Appellants claimed title to a 75% proportional
share in the royalty interest based on their underlying mineral
2
interest.
Appellants subsequently moved for, and were granted, summary
judgment on their claim. We reversed on appeal on December 16,
1991. After denial of appellantst petition for rehearing, the case
remitted to the District Court on January 15, 1992.
Appellants moved to amend their pleadings on January 17, 1992,
to add a new theory of recovery based on constructive trust.
Respondents Hoefle and Cranston moved to join a real party in
interest on February 3, 1992. The District Court granted
respondentst motion on March 13, and denied appellants' motion on
March 30, 1992.
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying
appellants' motion to amend their pleadings?
The District Court denied leave to amend based on its 1989
order mandating statements of all claim, the length of time the
case had been pending, and the lack of a showing of good cause why
the claim appellants sought to assert was not raised prior to the
summary judgment ruling. Appellants contend that the court abused
its discretion.
Appellants rely on Rule 15, M.R.Civ.P., which requires that
leave to amend be freely granted. They cite Village Bank v.
Cloutier (1991), 249 Mont. 25, 813 P.2d 971, for the proposition
that refusal to allow an amendment offered at an opportune time and
necessary in the furtherance of justice is an abuse of discretion.
It is axiomatic that Rule 15, M.R.Civ.P., requires that leave
to amend be freely given when justice so requires. Our cases in
support of liberality in allowing amendments are so numerous and
well-settled as to require no recitation here. In the case before
us, the significant fact is that appellantsr motion was made after
this Court held that they had established no claim to title.
Appellants1 argument is that, even after judgment against them,
they are entitled to amend under the liberality doctrine.
Acceptance of this argument essentially would revise Rule 15 to
reauire leave to amend at anv time and remove all discretion from
the district courts. Neither the Rule nor our cases support such
a result.
In addition, while appellants correctly state the principles
regarding liberality in allowing amendments to pleadings from
Cloutier, they fail to take into account the facts of that case.
In Cloutier, defendants moved to amend; for the most part, the
amendments sought to redesignate as defenses matters originally
pleaded as counterclaims. The district court did not rule on the
motion. Some five months later, the district court entered summary
judgment against defendants on the basis of their original
pleading. We reversed, concluding that the court abused its
discretion in refusingto permit amendments offered at an opportune
time and resulting in little, if any, prejudice to plaintiff.
Cloutier, 249 Mont. at 28, 813 p.2d at 973.
The facts before us differ significantly from those in
Cloutier. In August, 1989, the District Court directed the parties
to file statements of claim setting forth all right, title and
interest to the disputed royalty. Appellants' statement of claim
did not assert the constructive trust theory they now seek to add.
At no time prior to their motion for summary judgment did
appellants seek leave to amend; instead, they successfully
proceeded to summary judgment on their asserted claim in the
District Court. Only after reversal of that judgment, based on a
conclusion by this Court that appellants failed to demonstrate any
claim to title whatsoever, did appellants attempt to assert--for
the first time in this litigation which has been ongoing for nearly
fourteen years--a claim based on a constructive trust theory.
Under these facts, there is nothing "opportune" about the timing of
appellantsv motion for leave to amend.
Appellants also rely on other Montana cases which they assert
support their entitlement to amend their pleadings: Priest v.
Taylor (1987), 227 Mont. 370, 740 P.2d 648; White v. Lobdell
(1984), 208 Mont. 295, 678 P.2d 637; Prentice Lumber Co. v. Hukill
(1972), 161 Mont. 8, 504 P.2d 277. None of these cases involved an
effort to amend pleadings after the party had lost on its original
claim.
Appellants' final argument relates to the fact that the
District Court allowed respondents Stanford to amend to add a real
party in interest after our Stanford decision, while denying their
motion to amend. We need note only briefly that the two situations
are not analogous. Other differences aside, judgment has not been
entered against the Stanfords on their claims.
Appellants have cited no authority for the proposition that,
under Rule 15 and the liberality doctrine, they are entitled to
amend their pleadings when the motion to amend is made after
judgment has been entered against them and that denial of such a
motion constitutes an abuse of discretion. Indeed, both common
sense and authority are to the contrary. The result contended for
would allow seriatim assertion of claims. Under such a process,
one of the important thrusts of the rules of civil and appellate
procedure--that actions contain all related claims and parties in
order that cases proceed in an orderly and expeditious manner to
final judgment--would be completely undone. The detriment to
parties litigant, as well as the burden such a process would place
on Montana courts, cannot be overstated.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed these matters in
Nguyen v. United States (9th Cir. 1986), 792 F.2d 1500. It cited
C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, §
2712 (2d ed. 1983) for the general rule that "a court ordinarily
will be reluctant to allow leave to amend to a party against whom
summary judgment has been entered. ... Nquyen, 792 F.2d at
1503. It went on to note that,
[mluch of the value of summary judgment procedure in the
cases for which it is appropriate .
. .
would be
dissipated if a party were free to rely on one theory in
an attempt to defeat a motion for summary judgment and
then, should that theory prove unsound, come back long
thereafter and fight on the basis of some other theory.
fd., citing Freeman v. Continental Gin Co. (5th Cir. l967), 381
F.2d 459, 469-70. We agree with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning.
We conclude that the rationale is equally applicable to the reverse
situation before us, involving a party affirmatively moving for
summary judgment on its pleaded theory of the case and then,
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ultimately having been unsuccessful, seeking to inject a new theory
of recovery via a post-judgment motion to amend pleadings. Indeed,
faced with this precise situation, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals cogently summarized as follows:
A busy district court need not allow itself to be imposed
upon by the presentation of theories seriatim.
Liberality in amendment is important to assure a party a
fair opportunity to present his claims and defenses, but
"equal attention should be given to the proposition that
there must be an end finally to a particular litigation."
Freeman, 381 F.2d at 469 (citation omitted).
Under the facts before it, the District Court exercised its
discretion to deny appellants' motion to amend their pleadings
based on the time at which the motion was made and the lack of a
showing of good cause why the claim appellants sought to assert was
not raised prior to the summary judgment ruling. We hold that the
District Court did not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.
We concur: fi
J A.- Chief Justice
/