No. 91-409
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1992
PATRICIA HANLEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SAFEWAY STORES, INC.,
SCOTT LANG, and DOUGLAS ROSSO,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District,
In and for the County of Silver Bow,
The Honorable Frank Davis, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Wade J. Dahood; Knight, Dahood, McLean
& Everett, Anaconda, Montana
For Respondent:
James M. Ragain and Kyle A. Gray;
Holland & Hart, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 4, 1992
Decided: August 2 1 , 1 9 9 2
Filed:
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff/appellant Patricia Hanley brought suit against
Safeway and two of its security employees for alleged wrongful
conduct committed during an interrogation which led to appellant's
discharge from employment. The District Court granted respondents'
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that various claims
asserted by appellant were preempted by federal labor law.
Appellant moved the ~istrict Court for a reconsideration.
Following the denial of that motion, appellant brought this appeal.
We reverse and remand.
The only issue before the Court is whether the District Court
erred in granting summary judgment for respondents on the basis
that appellant's claims were preempted by federal labor law?
Appellant was a member of the United Food and Commercial
Workers Union Local #4-R in Butte and was an employee of respondent
Safeway. At the time of appellant's discharge from employment,
there was a collective bargaining agreement in effect between
appellant's union and Safeway. Appellant was discharged by Safeway
after 25 years of employment for allegedly violating their work
rules regarding the proper procedure for recording customer sales.
Apparently, the proper procedure to be followed when an impatient
customer would leave the correct change for a purchase and then
leave the store, was to finish the checkout in progress, then
immediately record the money set aside as the next complete
customer transaction. Appellant was aware of this procedure. In
the spring and summer of 1988, Safeway's security personnel
conducted blind checker tests at the Butte store in which appellant
was employed. The security personnel would leave the exact change
for an item and then leave the checkstand without waiting for the
sale to be rung through. Respondents allege that upon later
checking the register tape it appeared that in seven out of eight
such blind tests appellant failed to properly record the
transactions.
The parties offer different versions of what transpired next.
According to Safeway, appellant met with two of Safeway's security
personnel, respondents Rosso and Lang, regarding the alleged
improper handling of customer transactions. After some discussion
with the security personnel, appellant wrote and signed a letter
admitting that she failed on occasion to record customer
transactions. In the letter, appellant indicated that she would
set aside the money and use it at the end of her shift to make
certain the till total came out correctly. Appellant denied
appropriating any of the money for personal use. This letter also
indicated that appellant's admission had "been written freely by me
without any threats, promises or coercion and is the most truthful
letter I can write."
Appellant's recollection of this event varies from that given
by the security personnel. Appellant states that she was directed
to a back room where the security personnel interrogated her
concerning the alleged improper customer transactions. Appellant
denied the charges and attempted to leave the room but was forced
by the security personnel to sit back down. Appellant alleges that
she was threatened with criminal action, coerced to make a
confession, and promised that if she did confess no further action
would be taken. Appellant states that after being alone in the
room for over an hour with the security personnel that they
dictated a confession which she wrote down and then signed. The
following day appellant was discharged. Appellant contends the
signed confession was false.
Following her discharge, appellant contacted her local union
president, Junie Best, who filed a grievance on behalf of
appellant. Safeway denied the grievance. The Union never sought
arbitration as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.
Approximately a year and one-half after the discharge from
employment, appellant brought suit against respondents in State
District Court. On appeal, appellant argues that the suit brought
in District Court was for damages resulting from false
imprisonment, emotional distress, unlawful restraint, intimidation,
employer misconduct, and slander. Upon motion of respondents, the
District Court granted summary judgment indicating that the claims
brought by appellant were preempted by federal law. Appellant
brought this appeal contending that the claims were not preempted
and that the District Court erred.
The only issue which this Court is addressing on appeal is
whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for
respondents on the basis that appellant's claims were preempted by
federal labor law.
A district court may grant summary judgment "when the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there are
no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Sherrodd, Inc. v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co. (1991), 249 Mont. 282, 284, 815 P.2d 1135,
1136; Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. Upon reviewing a grant or denial of
a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard
as the district court.
Respondents argue that appellant's state-law tort claims are
preempted by 5 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. 5 185(a) [hereinafter 5 3011.
Section 301 of the LMRA provides that:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
The power of Congress to preempt state law is well established.
This power is derived from the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of
the Federal Constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), 9 Wheat 1,
6 L. Ed. 23. Congressional action of legislating and preempting
state law in the field of labor relations is long established.
NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937), 301 U.S. 1, 57
S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893. The rationale for federal preemption in
the field of labor relations was explained by the United States
Supreme Court in their decision in Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.
(1962), 369 U.S. 95, 82 S. Ct. 571, 7 L. Ed. 2d 593, wherein the
Court stated:
The dimensions of 5 301 require the conclusion that
substantive principles of federal labor law must be
paramount in the area covered by the statute.
Comprehensiveness is inherent in the process by which the
law is to be formulated ... requiring issues raised in
suits of a kind covered by 5 301 to be decided according
to the precepts of federal labor law.
The importance of the area which would be affected
by separate systems of substantive law makes the need for
a single body of federal law particularly compelling.
The ordering and adjusting of competing interests through
a process of free and voluntary collective bargaining is
the keystone of the federal scheme to promote industrial
peace. State law which frustrates the effort of Congress
to stimulate the smooth functioning of that process thus
strikes at the very core of federal labor policy. With
due regard to the many factors which bear upon competing
state and federal interests in this area [citations
omitted], we cannot but conclude that in enacting g 301
Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law
uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules.
Lucas Flour (1962), 369 U.S. at 103-04.
It is clear from the foregoing that federal labor law must
preempt state law to the extent that the state law pertains to an
"area covered by the statute [§ 301].It However, it is equally
clear that federal law does not preempt all state laws which might
be considered to be associated with labor law. The United States
Supreme Court recently explained that:
Congress did not state explicitly whether and to
what extent it intended 5 301 of the LMRA to preempt
state law. In such instances courts sustain a local
regulation "unless it conflicts with federal law or would
frustrate the federal scheme, or unless the courts
discern from the totality of the circumstances that
Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of
the States." [Citation omitted.]
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 417 U.S. 202, 208-09, 105
S. Ct. 1904, 1910, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206, 213-14.
While Congress did not explicitly state to what extent 5 301
preempted state labor law, the language in 5 301 indicates that it
applies to "[sluits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce ... .I* The United States Supreme Court has
interpretedthis language on numerous occasions and these decisions
clearly set out general principles which clarify the extent of
preemption under 5 301.
In Lueck, the Court found that a state-law claim for the bad
faith handling of an insurance claim was preempted by federal law
because the matter was covered by the collective bargaining
agreement. In a later decision, the Court succinctly described the
test set out in Lucas Flour and applied in Lueck, stating that:
[Ilf the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the
meaning of a collective bargaining agreement, the
application of state law (which might lead to
inconsistent results since there could be as many
state-law principles as there are States) is preempted
and federal labor law principles - necessarily uniform
throughout the Nation - must be employed to resolve the
dispute.
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. (1988), 486 U.S. 399,
405-06, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1881, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410, 418-19. Linale
involved a claim brought in state court in which an employee,
working under a collective bargaining agreement, alleged that she
had been discharged for exercising her rights under the state's
workers1 compensation laws. The Court in Linule held that the
state-law claim was not preempted by federal labor law. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had earlier ruled
that the state-law claim was preempted by 5 301. The United States
Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that "the state-law
analysis might well involve attention to the same factual
considerations as the contractual determination [under the CBA] of
whether Lingle was fired for just cause." Linqle, 486 U.S. at 408.
However, the Court did not agree with the Court of Appealss
nconclusion that such parallelism renders the state-law analysis
dependent upon the contractual analysis." Linqle, 486 U.S. at 408.
The state law remedy and claim were independent of the collective
bargaining agreement for § 301 preemption purposes because the
state-law claim could be resolved without construing the collective
bargaining agreement. Linqle, 486 U.S. at 407. The Court
concluded by noting that preemption under 5 301:
[Mlerely ensures that federal law will be the basis
for interpreting collective bargaining agreements, and
says nothing about the substantive rights a State may
provide workers when adjudication of those right does not
depend upon the interpretation of such agreements.
Linsle, 486 U.S. at 409.
This test has been followed in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals which stated in relation to federal preemption under 5 301:
First, section 301 preempts state law claims which are
founded on rights created by a collective bargaining
agreement. [Citations omitted.] Second, section 301
preempts state law claims which are I8substantially
dependent on analysis of a collective bargaining
agreement." [Citations omitted.]
Stikes v. Chevron USA, Inc. (9th Cir. 1990), 914 F.2d 1265, 1268.
It appears from the arguments in the briefs of both parties,
that they accept as correct the foregoing discussion on the extent
of federal preemption under 5 301. It is the position of
respondents that the claims raised in the State District Court suit
by appellant are governed by the provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement and are therefore preempted by federal law.
Respondents argue that appellant should have sought remedy for the
alleged wrongful acts by first exhausting all available sources of
remedy under the collective bargaining agreement and then by filing
a timely suit in Federal District Court.
Respondents contend that while appellant's complaint was
artfully drafted so as to avoid any mention of the collective
bargaining agreement, the gravamen of the complaint is that in
discharging appellant, Safeway breached the collective bargaining
agreement. Respondents cite to Hyles v. Mensing (9th Cir. 1988),
849 F.2d 1213, 1216, wherein it was stated that in order:
To determine whether section 301 preempts a state
tort claim, we do not look to how the complaint is cast.
Rather we inquire whether "the claim can be resolved only
by referring to the terms of the CBA."
It is clear that through the artful drafting of a complaint almost
any breach under the collective bargaining agreement could be
restated as an independent state-law tort claim. Clearly, the
question of preemption must be decided on the substantive
independence of the state-law claims from the collective bargaining
agreement, and not from the fact that counsel was able to present
the claims without reference to the collective bargaining
agreement.
This Court recently reconsidered the issue of 5 301 preemption
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Linqle. In Foster v.
Albertsons, Inc. (Mont. 1992), Cause No. 91-346, decided July 27,
1992, this Court clarified that a state-law claim is preempted by
5 301 only where its resolution requires construing the collective
bargaining agreement. In the present case a decision on the merits
of appellant's claims may be made by the trier of fact without
reference to or interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement. The State of Montana has a substantial interest in
regulating the conduct alleged in this case and such interests may
be protected without interfering with the federal regulation of
labor law.
On appeal, respondents raise several questions concerning the
other claims appellant alleges to have asserted before the District
Court. Respondents contend that several of the claims raised by
appellant on appeal were not included in the original complaint and
that other claims included in the complaint do not state an
independent tort under Montana law. Inasmuch as the District Court
granted summary judgment based on federal preemption, these issues
were not addressed below and are not properly before this Court at
this time. The question of whether certain claims were properly
pled in the complaint, or whether they may be added by amendment,
as well as the question of whether in fact appellant has attempted
to bring claims which do not state an independent tort under
Montana law, must be decided by the District Court on remand. In
light of our holding that appellant's claims are not preempted by
federal labor law, the District Court's granting of summary
judgment for respondents must be reversed.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
We concur: