NO. 92-520
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1993
CYNTHIA K. MILLS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-v-
LINCOLN COUNTY, MONTANA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lincoln,
The Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Daniel W Hileman, Murray
. & Kaufman, Kalispell,
Montana
For Respondent:
Russell Jones, Spokane, Washington
Submitted on Briefs: October 5, 1993
~ ~ ~ i d December 7, 1993
~ d :
Filed:
.9i
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court
his is an appeal from a Nineteenth Judicial District, Lincoln
County, decision ordering a new trial and from the District Court's
order denying Lincoln County's motion for summary judgment. We
reverse.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the District Court
incorrectly denied Lincoln County's motion for summary judgment.
Respondent Cynthia K. Mills (Mills) was physically injured on
August 6, 1988, at the Lincoln County Landfill, near Libby in
Lincoln County, when she fell from a dumping platform into a refuse
pit. The Lincoln County Landfill is operated by Lincoln County
(County).
Mills filed a complaint and demand for a jury trial against
the County on May 3, 1989, in the United States District Court for
the District of Montana, Missoula District (federal court),
alleging negligence. The County filed a motion for summary
judgment, claiming immunity under T, 2-9-111, MCA, and on January 2,
1991, the United States District Judge granted the County's motion
on that basis.
Shortly after the federal court granted summary judgment to
the County, the state legislature significantly amended § 2-9-111,
MCA, with the stated purpose of clarifying that statutory
legislative immunity would extend only to legislative bodies of
governmental entities and only to legislative actions taken by
those bodies; immunity would not extend to non-legislative actions.
Hedges v Swan Lake
. & Salmon Prairie S.D. (1992), 253 Mont. 188,
2
193, 832 P.2d 775, 778. The amendment to the statute effectively
negated the County's immunity defense because the acts alleged were
not legislative acts.
At that point, Mills could have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the federal court decision based upon the change
in the statute, however, she did not file a motion for
reconsideration. She, thus, effectively precluded any relief that
she may have had in the federal court system, and the federal court
judgment became final .
Notwithstanding, Mills, filed a complaint against the County
in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, which was dated March 8,
1991. The County filed a motion for summary judgment on October
21, 1991. Following the denial of the County's motion for summary
judgment the case came to trial on September 22, 1992. On
September 25, 1992, the jury found that the County was not
negligent. On October 6, 1992, the District Court, upon its own
motion, ordered a new trial. The County filed its notice of appeal
to this Court from the trial court's order granting a new trial and
from its order denying the County's motion for summary judgment.
A number of issues were raised upon appeal, but one of the
issues is dispositive - whether the trial court correctly denied
the County's motion for summary judgment. Wnder Rule 56(c),
M.R.Civ.P., summary judgment is proper if the record discloses no
genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Kaseta v. N. Western Agency of
Gr. Falls (19921, 252 Mont. 135, 138, 827 P.2d 804, 806.
The County argues that Mills was barred from bringing her
action in the state court because of the federal court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the County in Millst first action.
When she filed her action in state court, the County again moved
for summary judgment, this time contending that Mills' complaint
was barred by the doctrines of judicata and collateral
estoppel. In response, Mills argues that judicata requires a
final judgment on the merits but that in this case, Montana's then
existing doctrine of sovereign immunity under 5 2-9-111, MCA,
deprived the federal court of jurisdiction and abated the action.
Therefore, Mills concludes, there was no final judgment on the
merits. In reply, the County argues that the case in the federal
court was dismissed pursuant to a summary judgment motion, not a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It
concludes its argument by asserting that a summary judgment is a
final judgment on the merits.
A review of the opinion and order of the federal court
dismissing Millst case provides that " t e plain language of the
'h
statute [§ 2-9-111, MCA] grants immunity to the county for the
actions of its Board, and the Board's members and agents. I.. . IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendantst motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED." The case was disposed of on a motion for summary
judgment, not on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Mills did not petition for reconsideration of the
opinion when, some months later, the legislature amended 5 2-9-111,
MCA, and limited the scope of legislative immunity.
The question then remains - is a summary judgment a final
judgment on the merits so that = judicata applies to bar the
state action?
We reaffirm the proposition that a summary judgment is,
indeed, a final judgment on the merits and that the = judicata
bar is, therefore, applicable. Smith v. Schweigert (1990), 241
Mont. 54, 785 P.2d 195.
The doctrine of res judicata bars not only the issues
litigated in the former action, but also issues which might have
been litigated in the former action.
The doctrine of iudicata is firmly established
to stand for the proposition that a party should not be
able to relitigate a matter that that party has already
had the o~~ortunity litigate, and the public policy
to
that there must be some end to litigation.
"Once there has been full opportunity to present an
issue for judicial decision in a given proceeding ...
the determination of the court in that proceeding must be
accorded finality as to all issues raised or which fairly
could have been raised, else judgments night be attacked
piecemeal and without end.n (Citations omitted.)
(Emphasis in original.)
First Bank v Fourth Judicial Dist. Court (1987), 226 Mont. 515,
.
519-520, 737 P.2d 1132, 1134-1135. See also: Sheffield Ins. v.
Lighthouse Properties (1992), 252 Mont. 321, 324, 828 P.2d 1369,
1371. (WGenerally, res judicata bars relitigation not only of
issues that have already been decided but also issues that the
parties had the o~~ortunity present for decision.")
to
Unfortunately, Mills* recourse from the unfavorable decision
in federal court was to file a motion for reconsideration or relief
from judgment in the United States District Court after the
legislature amended § 2-9-111, MCA. See, for example, Koch v.
Billings School Dist. No. 2 (l992), 253 Mont. 261, 833 P.2d 181.
In this case, Mills did not file a motion for reconsideration.
We hold simply that the federal court summary judgment was a
final judgment on the merits and that Mills' state court action
was, consequently, barred. In so ruling, we point out that the
dispositive issue raised and argued here was whether a summary
judgment is a final judgment on the merits. Mills did not analyze
the four criteria necessary for the application of a iudicata and
whether those four criteria were present here. Furthermore, Mills
did not discuss or analyze the effect of an intervening change in
the law on the element of identity of issues necessary for the
application of res judicata. We decline to consider those issues
sua s~onte. Mills simply argued that S 2-9-111, MCA, deprived the
federal court of subject matter jurisdiction and that consequently,
there was no adjudication on the merits of her claim.
Whether the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction of
Mills' claim is not the issue here, and the federal court made no
determination on that as a basis for its ruling. The point to be
noted is that, right or wrong, the federal court entered summary
judgment against Mills; that judgment became final by Mills*
failure to pursue the available remedy in federal court; and she is
now bound by that judgment. Public policy requires that, at some
point, there must be finality to litigation. Wellman v. Wellman
(1982), 198 Mont. 42, 46, 643 P.2d 573, 576. If parties are
allowed to commence new lawsuits on already-litigated claims and
issues every time a subsequent change in the law might, arguably,
change the result of the first litigation, it is safe to say that
there would be few "final judgments" ever entered.
The District Court erred in not granting the motion for
s w a r y judgment filed by the County. Furthermore, because the
County's motion for summary judgment should have been granted, it
was improper for the court to, sua s~onte,
order a new trial and to
award judgment for sanctions against the County.
The District Court's order for a new trial is reversed, and
this case is remanded with instructions to the District Court to
enter summary judgment in favor of the County on Mills' claim and
to vacate the judgment for sanctions against the County.
./
December 7, 1393
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following
named:
Daniel W. Hileman
Murray & Kaufman
P. 0. Box 728
Kalispell, MT 59903-0728
Russell Jones
Attorney at Law
North 9 Post Street, Suite 315
Spokane, WA 99201