No
No. 99-423
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1999 MT 320
297 Mont. 282
993 P.2d 663
CHARLES S. ("CHUCK") BRAGG, JR.,
and PATRICIA S. BRAGG, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
WILLIAM D. McLAUGHLIN, and
SONJA INDRELAND McLAUGHLIN,
husband and wife,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Park,
The Honorable John R. Christensen, Judge presiding.
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-423%20(12-22-99)%20Opinion.htm (1 of 8)4/10/2007 3:00:56 PM
No
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
William D. McLaughlin and Sonja Indeland McLauglin, Pro Se;
Wilsall, Montana
For Respondents:
Joseph T. Swindlehurst, Huppert & Swindlehurst, P.C.;
Livingston, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 18, 1999
Decided: December 22, 1999
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
1. ¶ The Plaintiffs Chuck and Patricia Bragg, brought this action in the District Court
for the Sixth Judicial District in Park County alleging interference with their
easement. The District Court entered judgment for the Plaintiffs and awarded
punitive damages to the Plaintiffs. Following a protracted procedural history, the
Defendants William and Sonja McLaughlin filed a Rule 60(b), M.R.Civ.P. motion
for relief from judgment alleging that the District Court's judgment was void for
lack of jurisdiction. The District Court denied the Defendants' motion. Defendants
appeal that denial. We affirm the order of the District Court.
2. ¶ Although a number of issues are raised by the Defendants on appeal, we find the
following issues dispositive:
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-423%20(12-22-99)%20Opinion.htm (2 of 8)4/10/2007 3:00:56 PM
No
3. ¶ 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it dismissed the Defendants'
Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment?
4. ¶ 2. Should sanctions be imposed against the Defendants for filing a frivolous
appeal?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5. ¶ The Braggs filed a complaint against the McLaughlins on June 29, 1994, to quiet
title to an easement across property belonging to the McLaughlins, to enjoin the
McLaughlins from further interference with the Braggs' use and enjoyment of the
easement, and for an award of compensatory and punitive damages for slander of
the Braggs' title to the easement and real property.
6. ¶ On September 21, 1994, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction against
the McLaughlins. The McLaughlins appealed the preliminary injunction to this
Court. In Bragg v. McLaughlin I (1995), Supreme Court Cause No. 94-591, a
noncite opinion, we upheld the preliminary injunction.
7. ¶ A bench trial was then held and judgment entered in favor of the Braggs on May
31, 1996. The McLaughlins appealed the judgment to this Court. In Bragg v.
McLaughlin II (1997), Supreme Court Cause No. 96-512, a noncite opinion, the
judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the District Court
on August 28, 1997, for reconsideration of the award of punitive damages pursuant
to the provisions of § 27-1-221(7)(b), MCA. After remand, the District Court
scheduled a conference for November 13, 1997, at which to set a hearing date on the
issue of punitive damages. Both parties were notified. However, when the
conference occurred the McLaughlins did not attend.
8. ¶ On January 30, 1998, the District Court conducted an evidentiary hearing to
consider the issue of punitive damages. The McLaughlins did not attend this
hearing. Following the hearing, the District Court entered judgment against the
McLaughlins for punitive damages in the amount of $60,000. The McLaughlins
appealed the punitive damage award to this Court. On November 24, 1998, in Bragg
v. McLaughlin III (1998), Supreme Court Cause No. 98-315, a noncite opinion, we
affirmed the District Court's judgment for punitive damages.
9. ¶ On December 10, 1998, the McLaughlins appealed the District Court's findings of
fact and conclusions of law and judgment after remand. In Supreme Court Cause
No. 98-699, an Order was entered on January 7, 1999, dismissing that appeal for
failure to timely appeal pursuant to Rule 5(a) of the Montana Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-423%20(12-22-99)%20Opinion.htm (3 of 8)4/10/2007 3:00:56 PM
No
10. ¶ On March 19, 1999, the McLaughlins filed a Rule 60(b), M.R.Civ.P. motion for
relief from judgment with the District Court alleging that the District Court's
judgment was void and without legal effect. On April 26, 1999, the District Court
denied the McLaughlins' motion for relief from judgment and prohibited further
filings by the McLaughlins without prior leave of court. The McLaughlins are
presently before this Court to appeal the District Court's denial of their Rule 60(b)
motion for relief from judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
11. ¶ The appropriate standard of review is whether the District Court abused its
discretion when it denied the motion to alter or amend its judgment. See Ulrigg v.
Jones (1995), 274 Mont. 215, 219, 907 P.2d 937, 940.
DISCUSSION
ISSUE 1
12. ¶ Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it dismissed the Defendants' Rule
60(b) motion for relief from judgment?
13. ¶ The McLaughlins' brief raises 14 different reasons why the District Court's
judgment after remand is void. The thrust of the McLaughlins' argument, however,
is that the District Court failed to follow the statutory law with regard to awarding
punitive damages, pursuant to §§ 27-1-220, -221, and 27-8-313, MCA. The
Plaintiffs respond that the McLaughlins' arguments are barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. The Plaintiffs are correct.
14. ¶ The District Court denied the McLaughlins' Rule 60(b), M.R.Civ.P. motion for
relief from judgment, stating: "[t]he issues raised by the motion have been appealed
not once, not twice, but three times to the Montana Supreme Court and affirmed by
the Appellate Court. Defendants' present motion is dilatory in nature and without
substance in law or fact."
15. ¶ The doctrine of res judicata prevents a party from relitigating a matter that the
party has already had an opportunity to litigate. Loney v. Milodragovich, Dale &
Dye, P.C. (1995), 273 Mont. 506, 510, 905 P.2d 158, 161. Res judicata is based on
the public policy that there must be some end to litigation. Loney, 273 Mont. at 510,
905 P.2d at 161. The doctrine of res judicata stands for the proposition that a final
judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-423%20(12-22-99)%20Opinion.htm (4 of 8)4/10/2007 3:00:56 PM
No
causes of action or issues thereby litigated, as to the parties and their privies, in all
other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.
State ex rel. Harlem Irrigation Dist. v. Montana Seventeenth Judicial Dist. Court
(1995), 271 Mont. 129, 132, 894 P.2d 943, 944_45.
16. ¶ A claim is res judicata when four criteria are met: the parties or their privies are
the same; the subject matter of the claim is the same; the issues are the same and
relate to the same subject matter; and the capacities of the persons are the same in
reference to the subject matter and the issues. Loney, 273 Mont. at 511, 905 P.2d at
161. The most important of the four criteria for res judicata is the identity of issues.
Marriage of Blair (1995), 271 Mont. 196, 203, 894 P.2d 958, 963.
17. ¶ The McLaughlins' District Court motion is based solely on Rule 60(b)(4) of the
Montana Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons:
....
(4) the judgment is void . . . .
It is a general principle that when a court has jurisdiction over the person and the
subject matter, and the judgment rendered is not in excess of the jurisdiction or
power of the court, no error or irregularity can make the judgment void. See 46 Am.
Jur. 2d Judgments § 14.
18. ¶ In Bragg v. McLaughlin II (1997), Supreme Court Cause No. 96-512, a noncite
opinion, we held that "the District Court did have subject matter jurisdiction over
this cause of action." In Bragg v. McLaughlin III (1998), Supreme Court Cause No.
98-315, a noncite opinion, this Court stated as follows:
The McLaughlins' second argument for striking the District Court's post-remand
judgment is that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over them, because
the lower court failed to personally serve them with a show cause order required
under § 27-8-313, MCA. This argument also fails because, as we have previously
discussed, the District Court was under no obligation to issue a show cause order
under § 27-8-313, MCA, in order to bring the pending issue of punitive damages to
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-423%20(12-22-99)%20Opinion.htm (5 of 8)4/10/2007 3:00:56 PM
No
its final resolution at the trial level. Moreover, the McLaughlins' related contention
that the evidentiary hearing was improperly held ex parte, as a result of the lack of
personal service of process is an equally faulty statement of the law for the same
reason.
19. ¶ Additionally, we have previously addressed the issue of the authority of the
District Court to award punitive damages to the Plaintiffs in this case. In Bragg v.
McLaughlin II (1997), Supreme Court Cause No. 96-512, a noncite opinion, we held
that "the District Court erred in awarding punitive damages to the Braggs without
complying with the statute and we remand[ed] to the District Court for
reconsideration of punitive damages in light of the requirements of § 27-1-221(7)
(b), MCA." Section 27-1-221(7)(b), MCA, requires that the District Court "clearly
state the reasons for making the [punitive damages] award in findings of fact and
conclusions of law," demonstrating its consideration of nine specific criteria. We did
not hold, as the McLaughlins contend, that the District Court's award of punitive
damages was not proper in this type of action.
20. ¶ Following our instructions after remand, the District Court entered its judgment,
setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law, demonstrating the District
Court's consideration of the nine specific criteria pursuant to § 27-1-221(7)(b),
MCA. The McLaughlins then filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P. to
alter or amend the judgment entered after remand. In Bragg v. McLaughlin III
(1998), Supreme Court Cause No. 98-315, a noncite opinion, we upheld the District
Court's denial of the McLaughlins' motion to rescind the entry of the judgment after
remand in which the District Court awarded $60,000 in punitive damages to the
Plaintiffs. In that appeal, the McLaughlins argued essentially the same issues that
they argue in this appeal.
21. ¶ Moreover, the arguments that the McLaughlins did not specifically make in their
previous appeals regarding the validity of the District Court's punitive damages
award are also barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata
bars not only issues which were previously litigated, but also issues which could
have been litigated in the prior proceeding. Hollister v. Forsythe (1996), 277 Mont.
23, 27, 918 P.2d 665, 667. In Wellman v. Wellman (1982), 198 Mont. 42, 45-46, 643
P.2d 573, 575, we stated the following:
Once there has been full opportunity to present an issue for judicial decision in a
given proceeding . . . the determination of the court in that proceeding must be
accorded finality as to all issues raised or which fairly could have been raised, else
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-423%20(12-22-99)%20Opinion.htm (6 of 8)4/10/2007 3:00:56 PM
No
judgments might be attacked piecemeal and without end.
(Emphasis added.)
22. ¶ In Searight v. Cimino (1989), 238 Mont. 218, 222, 777 P.2d 335, 337, we stated:
In the present case, appellants had the same opportunity to raise the voidness issue
when Mr. Cimino first filed his motion to cause execution of an airport easement.
They did in fact object to the District Court's ability to enforce an easement under
Rule 70, M.R.Civ.P., in their motion to alter or amend the judgment following
disposition of the easement issue. They further raised the specific issue of lack of
subject matter jurisdiction in their Petition for Rehearing after this Court's opinion in
the matter. Because the substance of appellants' challenge to the District Court's
actions has remained the same, it is apparent they are merely attempting to
relitigate issues which have already been decided by invoking different labels by
which to contest the proceedings, one of which is subject matter jurisdiction. We
will not allow appellants' characterization of their claim to hinder application of the
doctrine of res judicata, and the prevention of protracted litigation.
(Emphasis added.)
23. ¶ In the present case, the McLaughlins had ample opportunity to appeal all aspects
of the punitive damages award in their previous appeal, Bragg v. McLaughlin III
(1998), Supreme Court Cause No. 98-315, a noncite opinion, in which they
appealed the denial of their motion to rescind entry of the judgment after remand.
Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata applies and bars the McLaughlins from
arguing anything further regarding the validity of that judgment.
24. ¶ Because all of the issues raised by the McLaughlins in their Rule 60(b), M.R.Civ.
P. motion are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, we conclude that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the McLaughlins' motion for relief
from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), M.R.Civ.P.
ISSUE 2
25. ¶ Should sanctions be imposed against the McLaughlins for filing a frivolous
appeal?
26. ¶ As a final matter, the Plaintiffs request the imposition of sanctions against the
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-423%20(12-22-99)%20Opinion.htm (7 of 8)4/10/2007 3:00:56 PM
No
McLaughlins pursuant to Rule 32, M.R.App.P., which provides the following:
If the supreme court is satisfied from the record and the presentation of the appeal in
a civil case that the same was taken without substantial or reasonable grounds, such
damages may be assessed on determination thereof as under the circumstances are
deemed proper.
27. ¶ Throughout the course of this lengthy dispute, the McLaughlins have displayed
significant disdain for the integrity of the judicial process. The McLaughlins have
appealed to this Court five times and presented repetitious issues; including the
punitive damage issue.
28. ¶ It is important for the sake of the litigants and for the judicial system that litigation
will at some time finally end. Tipp v. Skjelset, 1998 MT 263, ¶ 28, 291 Mont. 288, ¶
28, 967 P.2d 787, ¶ 28. Moreover, this Court is burdened by a heavy volume of
business and the problem is needlessly aggravated when frivolous appeals are taken.
CNA Ins. Co. v. Dunn (1995), 273 Mont. 295, 302, 902 P.2d 1014, 1018.
29. ¶ We conclude that this appeal was taken without substantial or reasonable grounds.
We further conclude that this is a proper case in which to impose sanctions for a
frivolous appeal pursuant to Rule 32, M.R.App.P., and we, therefore, remand to the
District Court for a determination of the Plaintiffs' reasonable costs and attorney
fees incurred on appeal. That amount should be added to the Plaintiffs' judgment
against the Defendants.
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
We Concur:
/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JIM REGNIER
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-423%20(12-22-99)%20Opinion.htm (8 of 8)4/10/2007 3:00:56 PM