No. 93-277
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1993
ASSOCIATED STUDENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA, JIM SEARS,
ERIC HUMMEL, and JOHN MADDEN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
THE CITY OF MISSOULA,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula,
The Honorable John S. Henson, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Noel K. Larrivee, Larrivee Law Offices, Missoula,
Montana; Bruce Barrett, ASUM Legal Services,
Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Jim Nugent, Missoula City Attorney, Missoula,
Montana
For Amici Curiae:
Phyllis A. Bock, Bozeman, Montana (Associated
Students of Montana State University): Michael
C. Riley, Dillon, Montana (Western Montana College)
'$ ?;1 .%T?e".
Submitted on Briefs: September 17, 1993
Decided: October 21, 1993
Clerk
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered Opinion of the Court.
The Associated Students of the University of Montana, Jim
Sears, Eric Hummel and John Madden seek injunctive and declaratory
relief from two Missoula city ordinances which regulate parking in
the residential areas adjacent to the University of Montana. They
appeal from an order of the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Missoula County, declaring the ordinances valid and ruling in favor
of the City of Missoula. We affirm the District Court.
The issues are:
1. Whether the City of Missoula has authority to regulate
and restrict parking in a certain residential district.
2. Whether a city ordinance which regulates and restricts
parking in a residential district violates the Equal Protection
Clauses of the United States and Montana Constitutions.
Prior to and during 1983, various residents of the neighbor-
hood adjacent to the University of Montana (University) campus in
Missoula asked the City for an ordinance relieving them of commuter
motor vehicle traffic and parking problems. The University had
experienced and is experiencing substantial growth in its enroll-
ment, which adversely affected the quality of living in the
residential neighborhood because of increased traffic and parking
difficulties. The Missoula City Council (City) and its committees
investigated and studied the situation for approximately three
years (from January of 1983 through June of 1986) before passing
city ordinance 2480, which created a procedure for establishing
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specific on-street parking restrictions. The February 3, 1986
ordinance enables the City to enact a residential parking permit
program, outlines the reasons for creating the program, enumerates
the program guidelines and explains application procedures. It
amended Title 10, Chapter 10.22 (Stopping, Standing, Parking) of
the Missoula Municipal Code, by adding sections 10.22.250 through
10.22.290.
Using these laws, on June 2, 1986, the City next enacted
ordinance 2505, which set up an on-street parking permit program to
be used in residential areas adjacent to the University. Ordinance
2505 added section 10.22.300 to the Missoula Municipal Code,
stating that commuter parking on the sides of some streets is
prohibited between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday
through Friday. Exceptions include parking on holidays, parking
for vehicles with permits, and parking for emergency or service
vehicles. The City established a $10 fine for each violation of
the ordinance.
Under provisions of the ordinance, University area residential
homeowners may purchase a parking permit for $10 and two guest
passes a year for $5 each. Nonresidents may not purchase these
permits.
On May 12, 1992, appellants sought an injunction prohibiting
the City from enforcing the residential University parking district
law and effectively requesting the court to declare the ordinances
void. The Associated Students of the University of Montana (ASUM)
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is an unincorporated association of students enrolled at the
University; Jim Sears is a residential parking district resident;
Eric Hummel is a student of the University: and John Madden is a
faculty member of the University. Together, they asserted that the
ordinances were created without requisite authority, that the
parking permit program is an arbitrary, discriminatory and
unreasonable misuse of the municipality's police powers, and that
the parking program violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the
United States and Montana Constitutions.
The District Court issued an opinion and order on April 5,
1993, upholding the ordinances. This appeal alleges that the
court's opinion and order is erroneous.
The standard of review for this Court is set forth in Steer,
Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 803 P.2d 601. We
review a district court's findings of fact for clear error, and we
determine whether its conclusions of law are correct. Steer, 803
P.2d at 603.
I
Did the City of Missoula have authority to regulate and
restrict parking in a certain residential district?
Clearly, the laws of our state set forth authority for
municipalities to establish parking plans such as the one at issue
here. Pursuant and in addition to its general police powers, a
municipality is free to enact ordinances which are not repugnant to
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established law. See generally § 7-5-4101, MCA (police powers),
and 3 61-12-101(14), MCA (traffic and vehicle regulation). As the
United States Supreme Court stated in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas (1974), 416 U.S. 1, 9, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1541, 39 L.Ed.2d 797,
804,
[t]he police power is not confined to elimination of
filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay
out zones where family values, youth values, and the
blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area
a sanctuary for people.
Specifically, our legislature has provided in § 7-14-4102,
MCA, that city or town councils may "regulate and prevent the use
or obstruction of streets . . . ." Section 61-12-101, MCA,
analogously authorizes municipalities to reasonably "regulate the
standing or parking of vehicles" and enact ordinances regulating
"traffic, pedestrians, vehicles, and operators thereof . . . .'I
The Montana Constitution supports a liberal construction of these
and other powers granted to local municipalities by the legisla-
ture. See Art. XI, § 4(2), Mont.Const.; Tipco Corp., Inc. v. City
of Billings (1982), 197 Mont. 339, 642 P.2d 1074.
Here, the City properly enacted both its enabling legislation,
ordinance 2480, and the University residential parking district
restrictions, ordinance 2505. Appellants go to great lengths to
point out the origin of public street use in Montana and other
places, continuing back to common law. This exhaustive history is
irrelevant where our legislature has granted municipalities the
statutory authority to create parking restrictions, and where our
5
constitution grants this authority to municipalities. Art. XI, §
4(2), Mont.Const.; §§ l-l-108, l-2-103, MCA. The constitutional
and statutory language being clear and unambiguous, we conclude the
District Court did not err in ruling the City has appropriate
authority to enact parking district restrictions.
II
Do city ordinances which regulate and restrict parking in a
residential district violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the
United States and Montana Constitutions?
City ordinances, like statutes, are presumed to be valid.
[W]hen considering the constitutionality of a statute,
the constitutionality is presumed and anyone attacking
the validity of a statute has a heavy burden of proving
the invalidity. [Citations omitted.]
In establishing this test, Montana is in accord with every
jurisdiction in the United States. [Citations omitted.]
In the Matter of Kujath (1976), 169 Mont. 128, 130, 545 P.2d 662,
663-64; see also State v. Lorash (1989), 238 Mont. 345, 777 P.2d
884. As the appellants and the City agree, the equal protection
challenge in this case involves neither suspect classes, quasi-
suspect classes, nor fundamental rights. Accordingly, the
appropriate standard of review is whether the resident and non-
resident distinction is rationally related to a legitimate
government objective. See Tioco, 642 P.2d at 1078. To satisfy the
equal protection rational relationship test, challengers must prove
that the legislative facts on which the classification is based
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could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental
decision maker. See Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. (1981), 449
U.S. 456, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.Zd 659.
The instant issue is similar to the issue presented to the
United States Supreme Court in County Board of Arlington County,
Virginia v. Richards (1977), 434 U.S. 5, 98 S.Ct. 24, 54 L.Ed.Zd 4.
Richards involved a Virginia county zoning ordinance which provided
for parking restrictions and permits in designated residential
areas. Persons without a permit were prohibited from parking in
the designated residential areas from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on
weekdays.
Commuters who regularly parked in the residential areas filed
suit against the county, alleging that the zoning ordinance was an
unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the law. The
Virginia Supreme Court held that the resident and nonresident
classification was "invidious discrimination" while expressly
noting that the ordinance "may relieve the [parking] problems" to
which it was directed. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
rejected the conclusion that the resident and nonresident
classifications resulted in invidious discrimination. The Court
stated
[t]o reduce air pollution and other environmental effects
of automobile commuting, a community reasonably may
restrict on-street parking available to commuters, thus
encouraging reliance on car pools and mass transporta-
tion. The same goal is served by assuring convenient
parking to residents who leave their cars at home during
the day. A community may also decide that restrictions
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on the flow of outside traffic into particular residen-
tial areas would enhance the quality of life there by
reducing noise, traffic hazards, and litter. By defini-
tion, discrimination against nonresidents would inhere in
such restrictions. [Citations omitted.]
The Constitution does not outlaw these social and
environmental objectives, nor does it presume distinc-
tions between residents and nonresidents of a local
neighborhood to be invidious. The Equal Protection
Clause requires only that the distinction drawn by an
ordinance like Arlington's rationally promote the
regulation's objectives. [Citations omitted.]
Richards, 434 U.S. at 7.
When determining the constitutionality of state law, other
state courts, like Virginia's, have erroneously applied an equal
protection standard more stringent than that sanctioned by the
United States Supreme Court. See Idaho Dep't of Employment v.
Smith (1977), 434 U.S. 100, 98 S.Ct. 327, 54 L.Ed.2d 324;
Richardson v. Ramirez (I974), 418 U.S. 24, 94 s.ct. 2655, 41
L.Ed.2d 551; and Lehnhousen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts (1973), 410
U.S. 356, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 35 L.Ed.2d 351. In each of those cases
the United States Supreme Court reversed the state court, conclud-
ing that the correctly applied legal standard upheld the constitu-
tionality of the subject state law.
The City of Missoula has a legitimate interest in preserving
the tranquility among University commuters and area residents. See
Memphis v. Green (1981), 451 U.S. 100, 127, 101 S.Ct. 1584, 1600,
67 L.Ed.2d 769, 790 ("[t]he residential interest in comparative
tranquility is . . . unquestionably legitimate"). It also has a
legitimate interest in assuring homeowners ample parking space for
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themselves and their guests. In addition, the City of Missoula has
an interest in reducing noise, traffic hazards, and litter in its
residential areas.
Furthering its interests, the City enacted ordinance 2480,
which states as its objective adequate parking for University area
residents. The record before us includes historical evidence
behind the ordinances in question. Where, as here, an ordinance is
lacking in purpose or clarity, it is helpful to analyze the
legislative history when determining correct interpretation. See
5 l-2-102, MCA. The minutes and testimony from the June 2, 1986
Missoula City Council meeting reveal several safety concerns, among
them: safety of children: driveway and garage blockage: and poor
visibility around corners because of parked cars.
These concerns lead us to conclude the resident and
nonresident distinction in ordinances 2480 and 2505 rationally
relates to the City's legitimate government interests, e.g., its
objective interest in providing convenient parking for University
area residents and its implicit interests in promoting tranquility
among commuters and residents, reducing noise, reducing traffic
hazards, and reducing litter. We therefore affirm the District
Court.
We concur:
Justice Xarla M. Gray did not participate in this decision.
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