No. 92-350
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
, 2 2
IN THE MATTER OF B. L. T.,
A Youth Under the Age of Eighteen.
Y 27
GLsl.inOF SUPREME COURS
sTA1.E OF MONTANA
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula,
The Honorable Douglas G. H a r k i n , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
J. Dirk Beccari, Marcia M. Jacobson, Public
Defender's Office, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Barbara Harris,
Assistant, Helena, Montana; Robert L. Deschamps,
111, County Attorney, Gary L. Hendricks, Deputy,
Missoula, Montana
Amicus :
Ann Gilkey, Department of Family Services, Helena,
Montana; Sue Burrell, Clark Peters, Loren Warboys,
Youth Law Center, San Francisco, California
Submitted on Briefs: April 30, 1993
Decided: May 2 7 , 1993
Filed:
Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal of an order of the Youth Court in the Fourth
Judicial District, Missoula County, ordering the youth's placement
at Pine Hills School for Boys until he reaches the age of eighteen
years. We reverse.
The sole issue for our review is whether the Youth Court had
the authority to determine the length of time B.L.T. must spend at
Pine Hills School for Boys when custody was committed to the
Department of Family Services.
B.L.T. was placed in Pine Hills School for Boys (Pine Hills)
for the first time in January 1991. He remained there until April
4, 1991 when he was released by the Department of Family Services
(Department). On December 18, 1991, ,3 second petition was filed
with the Youth Court alleging that B.:L.T. was a delinquent youth
because he had committed two subsequent. thefts. While he was being
transported to Pine Hills on January 3 , 1992 to await trial on the
theft charges, he and another youth escaped from the transport van
in a car stolen by a third youth.
On January 9, 1992, after the prearranged escape from the
transport van, the petition was amended to allege an additional
count of theft and one count each of escape and criminal mischief.
On May 11, 1992, pursuant to an agreement between the youth and the
State, these charges were amended, alleging that B L.T . . had
committed an unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, a theft by
accountability, and escape. B.L.T. admitted to these charges.
The Youth Court ordered that 15-year-old B.L.T. be committed
to the custody of the Department, with placement at Pine Hills
until he reaches the age of eighteen years. The Youth Court's
order gave custody of B.L.T. to the Department on May 13, 1992.
Section 41-5-103(17) defines "legal custody" as follows:
(a) "Legal custodyt1means the legal status created by
order of a court of competent jurisdiction that gives a
person the right and duty to:
(i) have physical custody of the youth;
(ii) determine with whom the youth shall live and
for what period;
(iii) protect, train, and discipline the youth; and
(iv) provide the youth with food, shelter,
education, and ordinary medical care.
- (Emphasis
supplied.)
B.L.T. contends that the Youth Court could not give legal
custody to the Department and at the same time retain the power to
control where he will live for a specified period of time. B.L.T.
further contends that after the Youth Court has placed him at Pine
Hills, the Department has the sole authority to determine when he
is in need of less restrictive placement and is sufficiently
rehabilitated to leave Pine Hills. The Youth Court's order, he
argues, is more like a sentence imposed upon habitual offenders and
is not in keeping with the purpose of the Youth Court Act--
rehabilitation and not retribution.
The Youth Court's judgment will not be overruled unless it is
clear that the court abused its discretion. In the Matter of
T.A.S. (1990), 244 Mont. 259, 263, 797 P.2d 217, 220.
The Montana Youth Court Act, Title 41, Chapter 5, MCA, governs
the handling of youth offenders in Montana. The Youth Court Act
has a specific statement of purposes which is stated in 3 41-5-102,
MCA, as follows:
Declaration of purpose. The Montana Youth Court Act
3
shall be interpreted and construed to effectuate the
following express legislative purposes:
(1) to preserve the unity and welfare of the family
whenever possible and to provide for the care,
protection, and wholesome mental and physical development
of a youth coming within the provisions of the Montana
Youth Court Act;
(2) to remove from youth committing violations of
the law the element of retribution and to substitute
therefor a program of supervision, care, rehabilitation,
and, in appropriate cases, restitution as ordered by the
youth court;
(3) to achieve the purposes of (1) and (2) of this
section in a family environment whenever possible,
separating the youth from his parents only when necessary
for the welfare of the youth or for the safety and
protection of the community;
(4) to provide judicial procedures in which the
parties are assured a fair hearing and recognition and
enforcement of their constitutional and statutory rights.
Before ordering the placement of a delinquent youth in a youth
correctional facility, the Youth Court must determine that the
youth is a serious juvenile offender and that such placement is
necessary for the protection of the public. Section 41-5-
523 (1)(b) (ii), MCA. The Youth Court here determined that B. L.T.
was a serious juvenile offender and committed him to the
Department, specifying that B.L.T. be placed in Pine Hills. In
making this order, the Youth Court made the requisite finding that
such placement was necessary for the protection of the public.
Section 41-5-523(2), MCA, states: "When a youth is committed
to the department, the department shall determine the appropriate
placement and rehabilitation program for the youth . . . ." TWO
provisions in the Youth Court Act concern jurisdiction of the Youth
Court after it has committed a youth to the Department:
Retention of jurisdiction. Once a court obtains
jurisdiction over a youth, the court retains jurisdiction
unless terminated by the court or by mandatorv
termination in the following cases:
(1) at the time the proceedings are transferred to
adult criminal court:
(2) at the time the youth is discharaed bv the
department; and
(3) in any event, at the time the youth reaches the
age of 21 years. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 41-5-205, MCA.
Continuing jurisdiction of youth court. The vouth court
committing a delinquent youth or a youth in need of
supervision to the department of family services retains
continuins jurisdiction over the vouth until the vouth
becomes 21 years of aqe or is otherwise discharaed by the
department after notice to the vouth court of oriainal
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 41-3-1114, MCA. These statutes were changed significantly
by the 1987 legislature. section 41-5-205 (2), MCA (1985),
previously provided that the Youth Court lost jurisdiction "at the
time of commitment of the youth to the custody of the department of
institutions" and 1 41-3-1114, MCA (1985), previously provided:
The youth court placing a delinquent youth or a child in
need of supervision in a youth care facility retains
continuing jurisdiction over the youth until the youth
becomes 21 years of age or is otherwise discharged b~
order of the court. (Empahsis supplied.)
The 1987 legislature enacted House Bill 325 (HB 325), which
consolidated services affecting youth into the Department of Family
Services. The 1987 revisions of the above-quoted statutes reflect
the expanded role of the Department in youth services and the
diminished role of the youth courts. In a joint hearing of the
State Administration Committee conducted on January 23, 1987, a
member of the Youth Services Study Council, speaking in support of
HB 325, emphasized that services to youth were very fragmented
resulting in no continuity or flexibility and that the bill would
dramatically change the judge's dispositional authority. Other
proponents of HB 325 shared their concerns that the bill as
originally drafted would limit the youth court in the disposition
it could take over a youth--limiting it to either placing the youth
on probation or committing the youth to the department. They felt
that the youth courts should be given a little more authority.
Subsequently, the legislation was amended to include the authority
of the youth court to specify placement of delinquent youths to a
youth correctional facility provided that the youth is first
determined to be a serious juvenile offender.
The outline of HB 325 prepared prior to its consideration by
the legislature contains the following statements:
Section 5 4 amends 4 1 - 5 - 2 0 5 to allow the youth court's
jurisdiction of a youth to continue until the new
department discharges a youth. Currently, this statute
terminates the youth court's jurisdiction at the time the
youth is committed to the state. This amendment is in
accordance with the Council's recommendation to alter the
dispositional options available to the youth court in
Section 60, but to allow the youth court to continue to
be involved at the judge's discretion by extending the
court's jurisdiction. Some have indicated that allowing
continued jurisdiction is messy, but the Council wanted
to be sure that youth court iudqes have an obvious method
to review cases if auestions arise.
. . .
Section 60 is the amendment to the dispositional options
available to the youth court judge. The Council
recommended that the youth court judge should have the
authority to order placement of youth in need of
supervision or a delinquent youth, but that the new
department, which is responsible for the funding for the
placement, be the party responsible to place the youth.
. . . Placement advise (sic) and recommendations would
become decisions by departmental staff who are currently
youth court staff.
1) . . .This amendment continues all of the existing
dispositional authority of the judge with the exce~tion
of the actual facility or home the youth is placed. Some
judges indicated that they need to be able to protect
their communities from dangerous juvenile offenders. The
Council then recommended that the judges be able to
require a physically secure placement in the case of
public safety. With the definition of the "serious
iuvenile offender" added .. . and the amendments . . . ,
that recommendation is accomplished. (Emphasis supplied.)
Before the consolidation of youth services into the Department
of Family Services in 1987, a youth court could sentence a youth to
a facility for any period of time up to the child's 21'st birthday.
section 41-2-1113, MCA (1985). The 1987 legislature repealed 5 41-
2-1113, MCA (1985), and the provision that the court may place a
delinquent youth in a facility for any period of time up to the
child's 21'st birthday is no longer a part of the Youth Court Act.
It is clear from the Declaration of Purpose of the Youth Court
Act that the express legislative purposes include the removal of an
element of retribution, and the substitution of a program of
supervision, care, rehabilitation, and in appropriate cases,
restitution. Matter of T.A.S., 797 P.2d at 220. The statutes do
not give to the Youth Court the specific power to fix a determinate
amount of time to be served. That is consistent with the
elimination of the element of retribution.
In 5 41-5-106, MCA, the legislature has emphasized that the
placement to a youth correctional facility shall not be deemed
commitment to a penal institution, and such an adjudication shall
not be deemed a criminal conviction. As stated in In the Matter of
C.S. (1984), 210 Mont. 144, 146, 687 P.2d 57, 59:
A sentence of imprisonment following a criminal
conviction is imposed because a particular crime was
committed, and its purpose is both retributional and
rehabilitational. Though a juvenile commitment is
usually triggered by a crime, the commitment is strictly
for rehabilitation, not retribution. . . . There is more
than an artificial distinction between commitment under
the Youth Court Act and sentencing under the Montana
Criminal Code. Thus an adult sentenced for a crime and
a juvenile committed to the youth authorities are not
similarly situated with respect to the purpose of their
detention.
Similarly in Matter of T.A.S. 797 P.2d at 220, this Court
reemphasized these points, stating:
Both the Youth Court Act and this Court have made it
clear that a delinquent youth is not committed to the
Department as punishment for a crime, but is committed as
a delinquent youth for care, protection and
rehabilitation. . . . Commitment is strictly for
rehabilitation, not retribution. . . . The purpose of
the Youth Court Act is "to provide a mechanism through
which the state can act as the parens patriae of its
youth." (Citations omitted.)
The Youth Court does have a statutorily reserved power to revoke or
modify a disposition. In In the Matter of the Application of
Robert Peterson on Behalf of B.S.M. (1989), 235 Mont. 313, 767 P.2d
319, 321, this Court stated:
The power of the Youth Court is not diminished through
granting the Department placement power of a delinquent
youth. The court has the exclusive power to sentence the
youth. If the court chooses to place the youth with the
Department, it is just one of the possible proper
dispositions. Furthermore, the court reserves residual
power, pursuant to § 41-5-523(5), which allows it to
revoke or modify the disposition of the Department at any
time, upon notice to the Department and subsequent
hearing. This assures that the youth retains his rights
in case the Department exceeds or abuses its authority.
Peterson further concluded that the youth court has authority
to review Department decisions to determine if the placement is in
the best interests of the minor. Peterson, 767 P.2d at 321. The
Department's broad authorityto fashion rehabilitation programs for
youths committed to its care is not diminished when the court
adjudges the child a "serious offender" and specifies that the
youth be placed in a state youth correctional facility under § 41-
5 - 5 2 3 1 (b)(ii), MCA, except to the extent that the initial
placement choice has already been made.
Other states with similar statutory schemes have determined
that the rehabilitative goals of their juvenile offender acts
require that ultimate authority over the child rest with the
appropriate human services agency, not the court. In so holding,
the West Virginia Supreme Court commented that "it is quite likely
that a rule which would permit courts to sentence children for a
definite term would confound the rehabilitation and behavior
modification program of the institution. State ex rel. Washington
v. Taylor (W. Va. l98O), 273 S.E.2d 84, 86. See also In re the
Welfare of Lowe (Wash. 1978), 576 P.2d 65.
It is important that we emphasize the distinction between the
present case and Matter of T.A.S. In Matter of T.A.S., after
reviewing the theory of commitment to the Department as not being
punishment for a crime but for care, protection and rehabilitation
in order to provide a mechanism through which the State could act
as the equivalent of a parent for the youth, this Court concluded
that it was not an abuse of discretion to commit the youth to the
Department until age 19. Matter of T.A.S., 797 P.2d at 220. It is
important to keep in mind the broad discretion given to the
Department under the Youth Court Act. When a youth is committed to
the Department, the Department has the statutory power to determine
appropriate placement and rehabilitation programs for the youth,
subject to various statutory limitations. As a result, a
commitment to the Department is not equivalent to a commitment to
a specific state correctional facility, such as Pine Hills. If the
Youth Court in the present case had committed B.L.T. to the
Department for a specified period of time, we would have approved
that determination. However, there is no legislative authority
granting the Youth Court the power to commit B.L.T. to Pine Hills
School for Boys, a specific correctional facility, for a specified
period of time.
We hold that the Youth Court did not have the authority here
to determine the length of time B.L.T. should spend at Pine Hills.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
We Concur:
May 27, 1993
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following
named:
J. DIRK BECCARI and Maria M. Jacobson
Public Defender's Office
317 Woody Street
Missoula, MT 59802
HON. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General
Barbara Harris, Assistant
215 N. Sanders, Justice Bldg.
Helena, MT 59620
ROBERT L. DESCHAMPS, 111, County Attorney
Gary L. Hendricks, Deputy
Missoula County Courthouse
200 West Broadway
Missoula, MT 59802
Ann Gilkey, Legal Counsel
Dept. of Family Services
P.O. Box 8005
Helena, MT 59604
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
S T A T OF MONTANA
', I