No. 92-138
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
VERNON SAGE and ALMA SAGE,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
MICHAEL T. ROGERS and
AMERICAN PANEL COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula,
The Honorable Douglas G. Harkin, Judge presiding
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Terry G. Sehestedt, Attorney at Law,
Missoula, Montana
For Respondents:
Darla J. Keck, Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind,
Missoula, Montana
D Submitted on Briefs: November 5, 1992
Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from an order of the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Missoula County, granting plaintiffs possession of
commercial rental property plus costs for damages and denying
defendant's motion for a new trial. We affirm the court's judgment
with the exception of $95.85 as herein noted.
The issues on appeal are:
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Rogers'
motion for a new trial?
2. Did the District Court err in ruling that notice given to
terminate a tenancy when insufficient for one period of tenancy is
sufficient to terminate for a subsequent rental period?
3. Did the District Court err in ruling that the landlords were
entitled to holdover penalties for the portion of December during
which the tenant remained in possession, plus treble rent?
4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in awarding
damages to the landlords for the loss of their locking device?
5. Did the District Court err in awarding damages to the
landlords for the damage sustained on the landlords1 rental
property?
6. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing to
award damages to tenant on the ground that amounts claimed were
speculative?
7. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing to
award nominal damages to tenant?
8. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing to
2
award tenant attorney's fees incurred with respect to the November
28, 1989 hearing?
9. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in awarding
landlords costs for a discovery deposition and for a partial
transcript of proceedings?
This case involves the rental of commercial property located
at 5000 Highway 93 South, Missoula, Montana. The property owned by
Vernon and Alma Sage (Sages or landlords), was advertised for rent
in the Messenqer at a $575 per month rental fee. On April 19,
1989, the ad was answered by Michael T. Rogers (Rogers or tenant)
who owns American Panel Company, Inc. Rogers was seeking a
location for his company which manufactures heat resistant panels
for wood stoves.
The Sages subsequently rented the space to Rogers on an oral
lease, with the rent payable on the first of every month. Both the
Sages and Rogers testified that the utility bill was to be put into
Rogers' name and that he was required by the Sages to keep the
premises clean. The Sages testified that Rogers failed to pay the
rent on time, did not have the utility bill put into his name and
left garbage all over the property. According to the Sages, Rogers
also damaged parts of the warehouse itself.
As a result, the Sages sent a Notice of Rental Agreement
Termination to Rogers on July 24, 1989. This notice terminated the
month-to-month tenancy with the defendant and required that he
leave on or before August 24, 1989. The Sages extended his
termination date to October 1, 1989, if certain conditions were
met: he must agree to pay the next rent check on time and to pay
$250 deposit for the utility bill and $500 for cleaning. Rogers
paid the $250 for the utilities, did not pay the $500 and did not
pay his rent on time. At the end of September the Sages went on a
fishing trip, expecting Rogers to be gone from the premises when
they returned. However, when they returned on October 1, 1989,
they found Rogers still there. Rogers placed a rent check on the
Sages' desk and Mr. Sage cashed the check even though the Sages
still wished Rogers to leave the premises.
After Mr. Sage cashed the check he provided another notice to
Rogers to vacate. The notice was given to Rogers on October 3,
1989 for him to vacate by November 1, 1989. When the notice was
delivered, Rogers stated that he would not leave the premises. On
November 2, 1989, when Rogers was still at the warehouse, the Sages
placed a padlock on the front door, along with a note addressed to
Rogers requesting that he come to the Sages' office. Rogers was
out of town but an employee came to the Sages' office to request
entrance to the factory-warehouse. The Sages immediately removed
the lock from the door.
On November 3, 1989, Rogers attempted to pay rent for the
month of November by laying the check on the Sages1 office desk.
Mrs. Sage ran after him and threw the check into Rogers' car window
as he drove away. She told him that she did not want the check.
She then placed a padlock on the door. Minutes later Rogers
returned and, seeing the lock on the door, headed for his forklift.
The Sages' son, Russell, seeing that Rogers intended to force entry
into the building, shot several "warning" shots into the air and
then called the police to report having done this. Rogers
continued toward the overhead door with his forklift and forced it
open, damaging the door.
The Sages filed an action for possession and damages in the
Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, on November 6,
1989. The District Court ruled on this motion on November 28,
1989 stating that although the October 3 notice was not sufficient
to evict Rogers by November 1, 1989, a prima facie case existed for
Rogers to vacate the premises by December 1. It, therefore, denied
the Sages' motion for immediate possession of the property. The
court informed the Sages that they could not file their claim for
ejectment again until December 1, 1989, because the court could not
eject the tenant prior to that date.
The Sages filed an Amended Complaint for possession and
damages on December 1, 1989. Since Rogers had still not left the
premises, the Sages moved the court to issue an order to show cause
why Rogers should not be ordered to immediately return possession
of the property to the Sages. The motion requested a hearing on
December 11, 1989. The motion was never ruled on because Rogers
vacated the premises voluntarily on December 6, 1989.
A trial was held on September 11, 1991. The District Court
issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law on September 24,
1991. Rogers filed an objection to the Sages' statement of costs
and in October, 1991 moved in the alternative for a new trial or
for amended findings and judgment. The court denied the motion.
From that denial and the trial court's decision, Rogers now
appeals.
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Rogers'
motion for a new trial?
Rogers argues that he is entitled to a new trial because of
irregularity in the proceedings. According to Rogers, the court
ruled on who was entitled to possession of the property during the
November 28, 1989 hearing, before Rogers had an opportunity to
present his case. According to Rogers, the trial judge went into
court thinking he had already ruled on who was entitled to
permanent possession. The Sages argue that no irregularities
occurred either at the hearing in November of 1989 or the court
trial of September 11, 1991.
A new trial will be granted when there is an:
irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or
adverse party or any order of the court or abuse of
discretion by which either party was prevented from
having a fair trial;. ..
Section 25-11-102(1), MCA. The District Court denied Rogers'
motion for a new trial. We will not reverse a district court's
grant or denial of a new trial absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. Tappan v. Higgins (l989), 240 Mont. 158, 783 P.2d 396.
Rogers' petition for a new trial centers on the court's
decision of November 28, that the Sages could file their ejectment
action again on December 1, 1989. In its ruling, the court
determined that the October 3, 1989 notice was insufficient to
terminate the tenancy as of November 1, 1989, but, as a matter of
6
law, was sufficient to terminate a monthly tenancy on December 1,
1989. Therefore, the court instructed the Sages that they must
file their ejectment action again on December 1, 1989 because the
court could not consider any action during the period that Rogers
had to vacate.
The court's direction was a legal one and determined only the
sufficiency of the notice to terminate the tenancy on November 1,
1989. The court did not decide on November 28, 1989, who had
eventual right to possession or what the actual term of the
original agreement was. We conclude that Rogers mischaracterizes
the court's statements and actions during the November 28, 1989
hearing. By issuing the hearing order, the court did not create
irregularities in the proceedings at trial nor did it fail to
permit Rogers a chance to present his case. Reversal of the
November 28 decision is not warranted.
We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Rogers' motion for a new trial.
11.
Did the District Court err in ruling that notice insufficient to
terminate one periodic tenancy is sufficient to terminate a
subsequent periodic tenancy?
Rogers claims that a notice to terminate a tenancy which is
insufficient for one periodic tenancy is insufficient forever. The
Sages argue that a notice insufficient for one thirty day period
works to terminate the tenancy at the next possible date.
The resolution of this issue is a legal determination. We
review matters of law as to whether they are correct. Steer, Inc.
v. Dept. of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 803 P.2d 601. The
question of whether a notice insufficient to terminate one periodic
tenancy is fatal for all subsequent periods or whether it is
sufficient to terminate a subsequent periodic tenancy is a case of
first impression in Montana.
Rogers contends that Montana decided this question forty years
ago in Welsh v. Roehm (l952), 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816.
According to Rogers, Welsh stands for the proposition that if a
notice is insufficient for one thirty-day period, it is
insufficient forever; thus, such insufficiency makes the notice at
issue fatal. However, Welsh is not dispositive of the case at bar.
First, Welsh is a residential case. The action before us
involves commercial property. Second, in Welsh, the owner was told
by the federal government that he could not evict the tenants
because of federally controlled rent procedures. Here, there is no
question of federal rent control. Third, the Welsh Court did not
concern itself with any further insufficiency beyond the first
insufficient notice:
The notice was insufficient under Montana law to form a
basis of a court action to remove the Welshs [sic] from
the premises, since such notice, the rent having been
paid in advance, must be of thirty days duration.
Welsh, 125 Mont. at 519. The Welsh Court never considered any
further notice because no further notice was given. Instead of a
second notice, Welsh's landlord simply moved into the Welsh's
living room with his family and stayed for seventeen days. Both
Welsh's facts and its holding make it inapplicable to the case
8
before us.
While no other Montana case deals specifically with this
issue, both case law from other jurisdictions and learned treatises
provide that the original insufficiency does not make the notice
fatal :
It has been held that while a notice given shortly after
the beginning of one monthly period is inadequate to
terminate the tenancy at the end of that period or at the
expiration of the time stated in the notice, it is
nevertheless adequate to terminate the tenancy at the end
of the next monthly period.
50 Am.Jur.Zd, Landlord and Tenant, § 1211 (1970). Further, the
Restatement 2d of Property states:
On March 1, Landlord and Tenant enter into a month to
month tenancy to begin on that date. No provision for
notice is made. In order to terminate Tenant's tenancy
on November 30, Landlord must give Tenant notice no later
than 11:59 p.m. on October 31. A notice given on
November 1 will not run for one full period before the
monthly tenancy renews itself immediately at 11:59 p.m.
on November 30. However, the November 1 notice is
effective to terminate the lease on December 31 even
though it specified November 30 as the date of
termination.
Restatement 2d of Property, Landlord Tenant relations hi^, 1 1.5,
comment f (1977).
The District Court, here, relied not on the treatises but on
Dickens v. Hall (N.M. 1986), 718 P.2d 683, for its determination
that the October 3 notice in the instant case, although
insufficient for termination of tenancy by November 1, was
nevertheless effective on December 1. The facts of Dickens are
very similar to the facts here.
The commercial lease in question in Dickens was an oral month-
to-month lease. Dickens notified Hall by letter dated March 8,
1984, that he was to vacate the premises. Hall never received the
letter, so on March 29, 1984, Dickens sent Hall another letter to
vacate which was received on April 2, 1984. Hall refused to leave
the premises and Dickens filed an action on April 11, 1984. The
court ruled that Dickens was entitled to the premises after May 2,
1984 because a notice insufficient for one thirty-day period is
sufficient for the subsequent period. Dickens, 718 P.2d at 685.
The court also ruled that Dickens could not file the action during
the time that Hall had to vacate.
Nothing in Montana's statutes pertaining to commercial leases
controls the situation here. Section 70-26-201, MCA, in substance
provides that commercial leases are presumed to be for a one-year
term if no other term is expressed in the hiring. With regard to
renewal by continued possession, 1 70-26-204, MCA, provides:
Renewal of lease by lessee's continued possession. If a
lessee of real property leased under an arrangement not
governed by chapter 24 [Residential leases] of this title
remains in possession thereof after the expiration of the
hiring and the lessor accepts a rent from him, the
parties are presumed to have renewed the hiring on the
same terms and for the same time, not exceeding 1 month
when the rent is payable monthly, or in any case 1 year.
With regard to the required notice to terminate a lease, 5 70-26-
205, MCA, provides in pertinent part:
Notice required to terminate lease. (1) A hiring of real
property for a term not specified by the parties is
presumed to be renewed as stated in 70-26-204 at the end
of the term implied by law unless one of the parties
gives notice to the other of his intention to terminate
the hiring at least as long before the expiration thereof
as the term of the hiring itself, not exceeding 1 month.
According to the record, the lease was an oral month-to-month
lease. Because the rent was payable monthly, 5 205 required a
month's notice to vacate or terminate. While these statutes do
determine that a one-month notice was required, they do not address
the specific question before us: whether a notice given on October
3 requiring the tenant to vacate by November 1 was sufficient to
require vacation on December 1.
In a similar manner, S 70-27-104, MCA, with regard to
termination of a tenancy at will requires written notice to remove
within a period of not less than one month to be specified in the
notice, but does not address the specific issue here.
We conclude that the above quotation from Am.Jur.2d, Landlord
and Tenant, and from Restatement 2d of Property correctly sets
forth the rule to be applied in Montana. We therefore hold that
the October 3, 1989 notice to vacate by November 1, 1989 was
insufficient to terminate the tenancy on October 31, 1989, but was
effective to terminate the tenancy on November 30, 1989. As a
result we affirm the determination of the District Court on this
issue.
111.
Did the District Court err in ruling that the landlords were
entitled to holdover penalties for the portion of December during
which the tenant remained in possession plus treble rent?
Rogers contends that the court could not award quadruple
damages. The Sages contend that a person who remains in possession
after adequate written notice to vacate is "holding overt1and that
such tenant can be assessed treble damages plus interest and
exemplary damages.
The tenant remained in possession through December 6, 1989 and
did not pay rent for such occupancy. The District Court determined
that at a monthly rent of $575, the rent for six days was $95.85.
Therefore, the court awarded the Sages the amount of $95.85 x 3 as
treble rent and $95.85 as rent for the six day period which the
tenant heldover. Whether this assessment was appropriate is a
question of law which we review as to whether the District Court
was correct. Steer, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue (l99O), 245 Mont.
Here, Rogers1 argument concerning the quadruple rent is well-
taken. The treble rent is expressly provided for in § 70-27-207,
MCA. However, the $95.85 which the Sages claim are exemplary
damages pursuant to 5 70-27-209, MCA, are not appropriate.
Exemplary damages are only awarded as punitive in nature:
-
Punitive damages when allowed. (1) Except as otherwise
expressly provided by statute, a judge or jury may award,
in addition to compensatory damages, punitive damages for
the sake of example and for the purpose of punishing a
defendant.
(2) (a) Unless otherwise expressly provided by statute,
punitive damages may not be recovered in any action
arising from:
(i) contract; or
(ii) breach of contract. ...
Section 27-1-220, MCA. This case is a contract case and the
applicable statutes do not expressly provide for punitive damages
in a contract situation dealing with a commercial lease. We,
therefore, conclude that the District Court was only permitted to
award treble rent as damages and not the separate amount of $95.85.
Therefore, we hold that the District Court erred in ruling
that the landlords were entitled to holdover penalties for the
portion of December during which the tenant remained in possession
plus treble rent. We reverse the District Court assessment of the
$95.85 rent for the six hold over days, but affirm the assessment
of treble rent at $95.85 x 3.
IV.
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in awarding damages to
the landlord for the loss of their locking device?
Rogers argues that the Sages were not entitled to take the law
into their own hands by locking Rogers out of his business.
According to Rogers, the Sages should not then benefit from their
illegal behavior by demanding recompense for the lock used in the
illegal lock out. The Sages contend that they asked for the lock
on several occasions, that just because the landlords were not
entitled to lock the warehouse, does not mean that Rogers has the
right to convert the property to his own use.
The record reveals that the Sages were in error in locking the
warehouse door, even if for only a short time. The record further
indicates that the lock was not returned to the Sages. Two wrongs
do not make a right. Rogerst failure to return the landlordst
property makes him responsible for its disappearance.
The awarding of damages rests with the sound discretion of the
trier of fact. Vinion v. Wood Yard, Inc. (1988), 232 Mont. 110,
755 P.2d 31. We hold that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding damages to the landlords for the loss of
their locking device.
v.
Did the District Court err in awarding damages to the landlords for
the damage sustained on the landlords' rental property?
The District Court awarded judgment against the defendants for
repairs and cleaning in the amount of $3,003.74, which was composed
of the following:
Repair of rear door
Repairs completed by Overhead Door Company of
Missoula . . .
$60.00
Pressure wash floor - removal of cement/masonry
Cleaning done by Hydro-Chem Industrial Cleaning, .
.. . Missoula, Montana ...
$2070.00
Sump, clean and unplug floor drain
Repairs and Cleaning done by Rod's General
Services, ... Florence, Montana . ..
$277.50
Replace toilet facility
Completed by Little Lodges, . . . Missoula . . .
$386.24
Painting of walls
Completed by Rod's General services, Florence,
Montana ...
$100.00
Replacement of exterior metal panels
$110.00
Mr. Sage testified that they received bids from different
parties for each of the items listed above and accepted the low bid
in each instance. Mr. Sage identified the repair estimates and the
bills submitted and testified that the Sages had paid each of the
bills making up the above items. Rogers objected to the admission
of the bills in evidence on the grounds that the bills were
14
hearsay.
When reviewing the findings of a district court sitting
without a jury, we determine whether the findings are clearly
erroneous. Trad Industries, Ltd. v. Brogan (1991), 246 Mont. 439,
805 P.2d 54. Clearly erroneous is defined as whether the court's
decision is supported by substantial evidence. Id.
A representative of Hydro-Chem testified at length and his
testimony was sufficient to establish the $2,070 charged by his
company. Mr. and Mrs. Sage also testified as to the other items,
explaining in detail the nature of the services performed, the
estimates obtained from other persons, and described the nature of
the services rendered and the payment of each of the items by the
Sages. The record contains no evidence submitted by Rogers in
opposition to the evidence by the Sages. We conclude that the
District Court was not clearly erroneous in awarding the damages in
the amount of $3,003.74 and that there is substantial evidence to
support each award without consideration of the written statements
or bills themselves. We further conclude that appellant's argument
concerning hearsay is without merit.
We hold the District Court did not err in awarding damages to
the landlords for the damages sustained on the landlords' rental
property.
VI .
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing to award
damages to tenant on the ground that amounts claimed were
speculative?
Rogers contends that he was damaged by the time that his
company was locked out by the Sages and by the adverse working
conditions the Sages created by shooting a gun in the air. The
Sages contend that Rogers has proven no damage. In addition, the
Sages argue that the only piece of evidence submitted by Rogers was
a summary of his work records for 1989 and 1990. The record
reflects that Rogers provided no concrete evidence that his
business was down 206 panels as he testified.
In order to recover for lost profits, Rogers has to establish
them with some certainty as well as prove the source of the lost
profits. Stensvad v. Miners and Merchants Bank of Roundup (1982),
196 Mont. 193, 640 P.2d 1303. A review of the record failed to
establish that Rogers presented evidence to establish his lost
prof its.
We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to award damages to tenant on the ground that amounts
claimed were speculative.
VII.
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing to award
nominal damages to tenant?
Rogers asserts that a forcible entry or detainer occurred by
the landlords when they excluded him from the premises. The Sages
contend that the District Court could have awarded nominal damages
to Rogers but was under no directive to do so.
Nominal damages when no appreciable detriment. When a
breach of duty has caused no appreciable detriment to the
party affected, he may yet recover nominal damages.
section 27-1-204, MCA. The District Court may set nominal damages.
The record indicates that the District Court found that the Sages
acted in a good faith belief that they were permitted to lock the
tenant out.
We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to award nominal damages to tenant.
VIII.
id the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing to award
tenant attorney's fees incurred with respect to the November 28,
1989 hearing?
Rogers argues that although there is no statute or contract
that provides for attorney's fees in this case, the court should
have awarded them to tenant because the Sages were not entitled to
evict them on November 28, 1989. The Sages argue that there is no
basis in equity or law for an award of attorney's fees to the
tenant.
The general rule is that absent a statute or contract,
attorney's fees will not be awarded. Joseph Russell Realty Co. v.
Kenneally (1980), 185 Mont. 496, 605 P.2d 1107. Here, the court
did not award attorney's fees. Absent an abuse of the lower
court's discretion, this Court will not reverse the lower court's
decision concerning attorney's fees. Russell, 185 Mont. at 505,
605 P.2d at 1112.
We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to award tenant attorney's fees incurred with respect
to the November 28, 1989 hearing.
IX .
id the ~istrictCourt abuse its discretion in awarding landlords
costs for a discovery deposition and for a partial transcript of
proceedings?
Rogers contends that the District Court improperly awarded the
Sages $126.75 for a deposition which was not used at trial and
$16.25 for a partial transcript of the November 28, 1989 hearing
which was transcribed for the Sages1 convenience. The Sages argue
that these charges were proper under 9 25-10-501, MCA.
Section 25-10-501, MCA, provides the procedure for which the
party in whose favor judgment is rendered claims his costs. The
Sages claimed both the aforementioned as cost of the litigation.
The Sages here indicate that the deposition of Rogers was used at
the time of the September 11, 1991 trial to impeach him and thus
the use of the deposition was taxable and, therefore, an allowable
cost. Deposition costs are allowable where the deposition is used
at trial. Cash v. Otis Elevator, Co. (1984), 210 Mont. 319, 684
P.2d 1041. The record sustains the Sages1 argument that the
deposition was so used.
The record indicates that before the September 11, 1991 trial,
and before the court issued its findings and conclusions, the
partial transcript of the November 28, 1989 hearing was used to
refresh the judge's memory about his prior ruling. Because this
partial transcript was so used, its cost is legitimate.
We hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding the landlords their costs for a discovery deposition and
for a partial transcript of proceedings.
We affirm the court's judgment with the exception that it
should be reduced by the amount of $95.85.
c Chief Justice
p t i c e
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I concur with the majority's conclusions, except for those
expressed under Issue V. It is clear that there was an inadequate
evidentiary basis for the damages awarded in paragraphs (a), (c),
(d), and (f) of the District Court's Finding No. 14. Therefore, I
would amend the judgment by striking the recovery of damages in the
amount that those items represent.
Section 27-1-302, MCA, requires that "[dlamages must in all
cases be reasonable, and . . . no more than reasonable damages can
be recovered."
In this case, the plaintiffs' evidence in regard to the above
damages consisted of offering several repair estimates and bills
and then testifying that the bills had been paid. At no time was
there any evidence that these expenditures were reasonable for the
type of damage that had been sustained.
Furthermore, the bills on which the District Court based its
damage award should never have been admitted. They were clearly
out-of-court statements as defined in Rule 801, M.R.Evid., which
were offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein.
The bills were offered to prove that the work was done and that the
amount for which the bills were submitted was a reasonable amount.
Therefore, pursuant to Rule 802, M.R.Evid., the bills were not
admissible and since defendants properly objected to their
admission on the basis that they constituted hearsay, they should
have been excluded. Without the inadmissible bills, there was no
evidentiary basis for determining the reasonable amount of
plaintiffs1 damages. The mere fact that plaintiffs paid the
amounts stated did not make their expenditure reasonable.
Plaintiffs had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the reasonable value of their damages. The majority
casually shifts the burden to defendants by suggesting that since
defendants did not disprove the amount of damages claimed by
plaintiffs, then plaintiffs' proof was sufficient.
This new rule of trial practice should indeed surprise most of
the practicing bar in the State of Montana.
The majority opinion ignores simple rules of evidence,
elementary principles of trial practice, and fundamental rules
regarding a litigant's burden of proof.
For these reasons, I dissent from Part V of the majority
opinion.
Justice Karla M. Gray concurs in the foregoing concurrence and
dissent.
Justice R. C. McDonough, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority except as to Issue V to which I
dissent. The bills as offered were not admissible and therefore
plaintiffs did not prove the damages allegedly represented by the
bills.
Justice
March 9, 1993
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following
named:
Terry G. Sehestedt
Attorney at Law
P. 0 . Box 8281
Missoula, MT 59807
Darla J. Keck
Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind
201 W. Main, Central Square Building
Missoula, MT 59802
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT