No. 94-250
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1994
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-v-
DALE MANTZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Galiatin,
The Honorable Larry W. Moran, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
John M. Kauffman, Gallatin County Public Defender,
Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Jennifer
Anders, Assistant Attorney General; Michael
Salvagni, Gallatin County Attorney, Bozeman,
Montana; Susan Wordal, Bozeman City Prosecutor,
Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 28, 1994
Decided: December 23, 1994
Filed:
Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from the Eighteenth Judicial District
Court's denial of a motion to dismiss the charges against Mantz
because of a lack of speedy trial. We affirm.
The only issue on appeal is did the District Court err when it
denied appellant's motion to dismiss the charges filed against him
for lack of a speedy trial?
In July of 1992, Dale Mantz (Mantz) was charged by complaint
in Gallatin County City Court with one count of misdemeanor assault
pursuant to 5 45-5-201, MC??.. The charge springs from an incident
in which Mantz, a light bulb vendor, attacked the manager of JB's
Big Boy restaurant in Bozeman, Montana. A jury trial was held on
January 20, 1993 at which Mantz was found guilty of misdemeanor
assault.
Mantz appealed his action to the District Court on January 22,
1993 seeking a new trial. On December 7, 1993, prior to the
District Court trial, Mantz filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
a speedy trial. The court denied the motion and heard the matter
on December 13, 1993. After a bench trial, the court found him
guilty of misdemeanor assault.
On April 8, 1994, the court sentenced Mantz to three months in
the Gallatin County Detention Center with all but 48 hours
suspended, and ordered him to pay a fine and court costs as a
condition of his suspended sentence. On April 18, 1994, Mantz
filed a pro se appeal to this Court. He also filed a Motion for
Reduced Sentence which was denied by the District Court on April
28, 1994.
Did the District Court err when it denied appellant's motion
to dismiss the charges filed against him for lack of a speedy
trial?
Manta argues that § 46-13-401(2), MCA, states that a defendant
cannot be brought to trial after six months on a misdemeanor
charge. He argues that he waited almost a year for his trial and
the court should have dismissed his case for lack of a speedy
trial. Mantz also contends that the court cannot deviate from the
statutorily required six month limit because to do so would violate
the separation of powers between the judicial and the legislative
or executive branches. The State argues that the six-month rule
does not govern speedy trial issues in cases which are appealed
from justice court to district court.
The District Court concluded that defendant had caused bodily
injury to the manager by assaulting him and sentenced him to three
months in the Gallatin County Detention Center, with all but 48
hours suspended and ordered him to pay costs and fines.
Because the basis of the motion to dismiss is based upon a
legal interpretation made by the District Court, we will review the
court's legal conclusions as to whether the court was correct in
its interpretation of the law. Doting v. Trunk (1993), 259 Mont.
343, 856 P.2d 536. The statute at issue is § 4613-401(2), MCA:
(2) After the entry of a plea upon a misdemeanor charge,
the court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown,
shall order the prosecution to be dismissed, with
prejudice, if a defendant whose trial has not been
postponed upon the defendant's motion is not brought to
trial within 6 months.
Whi.le Mantz argues that this statute required the District Court in
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this matter to grant his motion to dismiss because it took almost
a year to bring the case to trial at the District Court, we have
already interpreted this statute as inapplicable to those
situations in which the case comes from justice court to a trial de
nova in district court.
In State v. Sunford (19901, 244 Mont. 411, 796 P.Zd 1084, we
stated:
The six month rule contained in § 46-13-201(2), MCA
(1989) [now renumbered as § 46-13-401(Z), MCA (1991)l
does not apply in circumstances where the defendant is
tried in justice court and judgment is appealed for trial
de nova in district court. . . . A trial de nova is a
'new trial,' one which does not strictly speaking, arise
out of entry of plea upon a complaint but arises out of
an appeal. . . Once an action is appealed from justice
to district court, it is treated as if it were a new
trial. Questions regarding speedy trial in cases
concerning new trials are analyzed under the
constitutionai standards of Barker v. Wingo (19723, 407
U.S. 514, 92 s.ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101.
Sunford, 244 Mont. at 415-416, 796 P.2d at 1086-1087.
The Barker v. Winqo test involves: (1) the length of the
delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the assertion of the right
to speedy trial by the defendant; and (4) the prejudice to the
defense. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at
117. The record contains a transcript of the proceedings held by
the court, just prior to the trial, in which the court heard
arguments from both counsel concerning the above elements and their
bearing on the case
The court specifically determined that the State had not
intended by its actions to delay the trial. The record shows that
the State actually sought a speedy resolution of the trial. The
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trial took 320 days from appeal to trial because the court itself
had scheduling difficulties.
Further, the court determined that the Barker criteria were
met and Mantz had objected in timely fashion on December 7, 1993.
The trial was scheduled for December 13, 1993.
The court determined that its decision to dismiss or not
dismiss hinged on whether Mantz had been prejudiced by this time
and whether his constitutional rights had been violated. Mantz
argued that he lost business because of the incident. Mantz also
argued that he has high blood pressure and that the anticipation of
the proceedings caused him high anxiety and, hence, medical
problems.
Here, the court considered these arguments and determined that
Mantz lost business because of the incident itself, not the length
of the delay for trial. Also, the court determined that Manta had
provided no medical evidence that the length of delay had caused
him any medical problems. Therefore, the court did not dismiss the
case because it determined that according to the Barker criteria,
no lack of a speedy trial occurred here.
We conclude that the District Court correctly considered the
Barker v. Winqo elements because this was an appeal from a justice
court which resulted in a trial de nova in district court. The
six-month rule from § 46-13-401(2), MCA (1991), applies to the
initial trial in justice court.
We hold that the District Court did not err when it denied
appellant's motion to dismiss the charges filed against him for
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lack of a speedy trial.
Affirmed.
I /
Justices
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Justice Terry N. Trieweiler specially concurring.
I concur with the result of the majority opinion. I do not
agree with the legal reasoning given for the majority opinion.
Section 46-13-401(Z), MCA, requires that people charged with
misdemeanors be brought to trial within six months. It does not
make a distinction between pretrial delay in justice court and
pretrial delay in district court. That fictional distinction was
created by this Court in State y. Sunford (1990), 244 Mont. 411, 796
P.2d 1084, by sheer judicial legislation. Therefore, I decline to
follow that decision.
However, I conclude that the result must necessarily be the
same as that arrived at by the majority. Section 46-20-104(2),
MCA, prohibits this Court from reviewing a district court's error
unless there was a timely and appropriate objection in the district
court. In this case, the defendant did not raise the applicability
of § 46-13-401(2), MCA, in the District Court. Therefore, he
waived the right to raise that argument on appeal.
For these reasons, I specially concur with the result of the
majority opinion.
I
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., joins in the foregoing concurring
opinion.
Justice
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