NO. 92-537
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1994
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DEAN GARY CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Sheridan,
The Honorable Richard G. Phillips, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jeffrey T. Renz and Andrew F. Scott, Legal Intern,
Montana Defender Project, University of Montana,
Missoula Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General,
Pamela P. Collins, Assistant Attorney General,
Helena, Montana
Steven Howard, Sheridan County Attorney,
Plentywood, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 2, 1994
Decided: June 23, 1994
Filed:
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
Dean Gary Christensen filed a petition for post-conviction
relief in the District Court for the Fifteenth Judicial District in
Sheridan County. The District Court dismissed the petition based
on its conclusion that post-conviction relief is only available to
persons adjudged guilty of an offense in a court of record.
Christensen was convicted of reckless driving and operating a motor
vehicle while an habitual traffic offender in the City Court for
the City of Plentywood. That court is not a court of record.
Christensen appeals the order of the District Court. We reverse
and remand.
The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred when
it dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief.
Christensen did not appeal his conviction, but on July 9,
1992, filed a petition for post-conviction relief with the District
Court, in which he sought to vacate and set aside the City Court
convictions on the bases that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel and his right to a jury trial. His affidavit alleged that
he was surprised when no jury was present at trial, and that after
voicing his objection to his attorney, the attorney motioned him to
be quiet and proceeded to trial before the Justice of the Peace.
Christensen further alleged that his attorney did not explain that
an appeal could be taken from his conviction.
These allegations were refuted in affidavits from Larry
O'Toole, Christensen's court-appointed attorney, and Tom Robertson,
the City Court Judge who presided at Christensen's trial. Eowever,
the District Court did not resolve the factual issue raised by the
contradictory allegations. Instead, it dismissed the petition
based on its interpretation of 5 46-21-101, MCA.
The issue in this case concerns a question of law. We review
conclusions of law to determine whether the district court's
interpretation of the law was correct. In re Mammage Burris (1993),
of
258 Mont. 265, 269, 852 P.2d 616, 619.
The statutory provisions for initiating post-conviction
hearings are found at g g 46-21-101 through -105, MCA. At issue are
the following provisions found at g 46-21-lOl(1) and (2), MCA:
When validity of sentence may be challenged. (1) A
person adjudged guilty of an offense in a court of record
who has no adequate remedy of appeal and who claims that
a sentence was imposed in violation of the constitution
or the laws of this state or the constitution of the
United States, that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose the sentence, that a suspended or deferred
sentence was improperly revoked, or that the sentence was
in excess of the maximum authorized by law or is
otherwise subllect to collateral attack upon any ground of
alleged error available under a writ of habeas corpus,
writ of coram nobis, or other common law or statutory
remedy may petition the court that imposed the sentence
or the supreme court to vacate, set aside, or correct the
sentence or revocation order.
(2) If the sentence was imposed by a justice's,
municipal, or city court, the petition must be filed with
the district court in the county where the lower court is
located.
Christensen contends that the District Court improperly
amended 46-21-101(2), MCA, when it concluded that the reference
to justice's courts and city courts in that section was
"surplusage" because § 46-21-101(1), MCA, limits post-conviction
relief to persons adjudged guilty of an offense in a court of
record, and that in doing so, the District court ignored an
elementary rule of statutory construction which provides that:
In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge
is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in
substance contained therein, not to insert what has been
omitted or to omit what has been inserted. Where there
are several provisions or particulars, such a
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give
effect to all.
Section 1-2-101, MCA. We agree.
Christensen cites Guub v. Milbank 11s11rattceCornpatty (1986), 220
Mont. 424, 427-28, 715 P.2d 443, 444-45, where we restated the
rules of statutory construction. These rules require this Court to
construe or interpret a statute in accordance with the intention of
the legislature. MissortlaCounIyv.Amen'canAsphalt, Inc. (1985), 216 Mont.
423, 426-27, 701 P.2d 990, 992. However, we must first look to the
plain meaning of the words of the statute. Stare ex re[. Palmer v. Hart
:1982), 201 Mont. 526, 530, 655 P.2d 965, 967. If the iaiiyuaye is
plain, unambiguous, direct, and certain, the statute speaks for
itself and there is no need to resort to a legislative history or
other means of interpretation. Palmer, 655 P.2d at 967.
We conclude that the language of 5 46-21-101(2), MCA, is clear
on its face and it is unnecessary to resort to other means of
interpretation. Section 46-21-101(1), MCA, provides the forum in
which to file a petition for post-conviction relief from an
adjudication of guilt in a court of record. Subparagraph (2) of
that section provides the forum in which to petition for relief
when the sentence was imposed in other courts, including city
court.
We conclude that the District Court erred when it dismissed
Christensen's post-conviction petition and hold that the remedy of
post-conviction relief is available to defendants from a "city
courtw regardless of whether that court is a court of record as
defined by 5 3-1-102, MCA, due to the plain and unambiguous
language of § 46-21-101(2), MCA.
We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the District Court and
remand defendant's petition for post-conviction relief for a
hearing on the merits.
We concur:
Justice Karla M. Gray, specially concurring.
I concur in the analysis and result reached by the Court on
the single legal issue presented; namely, that the District Court
erred in dismissing the petition for postconviction relief on the
basis that that remedy is unavailable in the district court to
persons adjudged guilty of an offense in a nonrecord court.
I write separately to clarify the intent of the final sentence
in the opinion, which "remandrs] defendant's petition for post-
conviction relief for a hearing on the merits." My concern is that
the words "hearing on the merits* could be read to limit the remand
and preclude the State from raising at that tine the issue of
whether Christensen meets the additional prerequisite to
postconviction relief under 5 46-21-101, MCA, of "no adequate
remedy of appeal."
It is that the i;eiued.YY"f p"rtioii "f
the statute was not the basis for the District Court's action in
dismissing the petition and is not an issue before us on appeal.
That procedural fact should not be interpreted as an undermining of
that portion of the statute. Nor should anything in this
concurring opinion be construed to suggest that the State raise the
issue on remand or to express any opinion that such a position, if
taken by the State, would have merit.
June 23, 1994
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid,
to the following named:
Jeffrey T. Renz
Montana Defender Project
U. of M. School of Law
Missoula, MT 59812
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General
Pamela P. Collins, Assistant
215 N. Sanders, Justice Building
Helena, MT 59620
Steven Howard
Sneridan Couniy Ai~orney
Sheridan County Courthouse
Plentywood, MT 59254
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MONTANA