No. 93-576
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1994
IN RE MARRIAGE OF
MARGARET HAYES,
Petitioner and Respondent,
ROBERT HAYES,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District,
In and far the County of Valley,
The Honorable Leonard Langen, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Robert D. Morrison, Morrison Law Firm, Whitefish,
Montana
For Respondent:
Matthew W. Knierim, Christoffersen & Knierim,
Glasgow, Montana
Justice Fred S. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from the amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Dissolution in a marriage dissolution filed
in the District Court for the Seventeenth Judicial District, Valley
County. We reverse and remand.
We restate the issue on appeal:
Did the District Court err in its amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Dissolution by relying on an oral property
agreement between the parties?
The petitioner wife brought this action for dissolution on
July 18, 1990. The husband filed his response on October 26, 1990.
The matter of the dissolution of the parties was set for trial on
May 26, 1992. At 9:00 a.m. on the morning of the trial, the
parties agreed to attempt to settle. Throughout the day,
negotiations between the parties continued and at 4 : 5 5 p.m. the
court reconvened for the purpose of considering the terms of the
settlement.
The court indicated that judgment would be entered once the
stipulated oral settlement agreement had been reduced to writing
and resubmitted to the court. The oral agreement did not contain
specific property valuations nor was it ever reduced to writing.
Despite counsel's failure to reduce the agreement to writing, the
court entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and
Dissolution without that formal statement of the agreement.
This Court on appeal held that the settlement agreement needed
to be more specific to avoid the type of controversy presented in
2
this case and that the record did not establish an agreement
between the parties. Marriage of Hayes (1993), 256 Mont. 2 6 6 , 268,
846 P . 2 d 272, 273 (Hayes I). The cause was remanded to the
District Court which issued an Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. The amended version contained parts of the
transcript verbatim but no written version of the parties'
agreement.
In its amended findings, the court determined that the
settlement was not unconscionable and that it was not necessary
that a written agreement be entered into. The court indicated that
it was correcting a "clerical error" in the original document
issued by the court. No hearing was conducted on remand and no
evidence was presented to the court in support of the amended
findings .
The husband appeals the amended findings of the court as
inappropriate because of a lack of formal written agreement between
the parties.
Did the District Court err in its amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Dissolution by relying on an oral property
agreement between the parties to the underlying dissolution?
Appellant husband contends that just as the initial findings
were inadequate because they were not based upon a written
agreement, so too are the amended findings inadequate because the
agreement was never reduced to writing on remand. The husband
argues that the court's amended findings were incorrectly taken
from the record and that he never had a chance to review the
findings or approve them. Further, the husband argues that the
required whether a valid agreement exists between the parties or
not.
Respondent wife argues that the court's responsibility in a
divorce proceeding is to determine whether or not the agreement
According to the wife, 5
made by the parties is llunconscionable.ll
40-4-201(2), MCA, makes the terms of an agreement binding upon the
court unless it concerns support, custody or visitation. The wife
contends that all the court could do in this instance is to
determine whether the agreement was unconscionable.
We review a ~istrictCourt's interpretation of the law as to
whether it is correct. Steer Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990),
245 Mont. 470, 803 P . 2 d 601. This case was remanded once because
no written agreement had been entered into the record. Haves, 256
Mont. at 268, 846 P . 2 d at 273. Since Hayes I was decided, we
decided another case that, relying on Haves I, specifically
interpreted 5 40-4-201(1), MCA, as requiring a written agreement.
See Simms v. Simms (1994), Cause No. 93-110, handed down March 28,
1994. We stated in ~ i m m s :
Section 40-4-201, MCA, provides that the district court
is bound by the parties' separation agreement in matters
of property distribution and maintenance if the court
finds that the separation agreement is not
unconscionable. However, the only separation agreement
referred to in the statute is the written separation
agreement. Absent a written separation agreement, there
is nothing for the district court to review and on which
to make a finding regarding conscionability. Under such
circumstances, the district court has no alternative but
to try the case on the merits and to dispose of the
property, maintenance, support, custody and visitation
issues on the basis of the applicable statutory criteria,
evidenced by the entry of appropriate findings of fact,
conclusions of law and judgment. (Emphasis in original. )
Simms, page 7 and 8, slip opinion.
Our statute clearly requires a written agreement:
40-4-201. Separation agreement. (1) To promote amicable
settlement of disputes between parties to a marriage
attendant upon their separation or the dissolution of
their marriage, the parties may enter into a written
separation asreement containing provisions for
disposition of any property owned by either of them,
maintenance of either of them, and support, custody, and
visitation of their children. (Emphasis added.)
Section 40-4-201(1), MCA. The parties in this case do not have a
written agreement. All that exists in the record is a transcript
of oral stipulations concerning property which, as we stated in
Simms
r are insufficient for court d e t e r m i n e whether the
agreement itself is unconscionable. Further, appellant alleges
that the court's transfer of those stipulations into its findings
resulted in several errors.
We conclude the District Court erroneously relied upon the
oral agreement between the parties. The District Court here had no
alternative but to try the case on the merits and to dispose of the
property and other issues on the basis of the applicable statutory
criteria, and the rule set forth in Simms, evidenced by the entry
of appropriate findings and conclusions. We hold that the District
Court erred in its amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Dissolution by relying on an oral property settlement agreement
between the parties t o the underlying dissolution.
Reversed and remanded.
I
I
March 31, 1994
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by U i e States mail, prepaid, to the
ntd
following named:
Robert D. Morrison
Morrison Law Firm
P.O. Box 1929
Whitefish, MT 59937
Matthew W. Knierim
CHRISTOFFERSEN & KNZERIM, P.C.
P.O. Box 29
Glasgow, MT 59230
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STAW OF. MONTANA