NO. 94-411
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1995
STATE ex rel. HARLEM IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
MATT MCCANN, RALPH SNIDER and KNUTE KULBECK,
Relators,
v.
MONTANA SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, BLAINE COUNTY, and THE HONORABLE f$ ';‘{ & L* is9 5
JOHN McKEON, Presiding Judge,
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and
CLINTON LOVE and ROSE MARY LOVE,
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Relators:
Robert D. Morrison, Morrison Law Firm,
Whitefish, Montana
For Respondents:
David L. Irving, Attorney at Law,
Glasgow, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 16, 1995
Decided: May 4, 1995
Filed:
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiffs, Clinton Love and Rose Mary Love, filed an
amended complaint in the District Court for the Seventeenth
Judicial District in Blaine County in which they alleged several
claims against the defendants, the Harlem Irrigation District and
its commissioners, based on the District's refusal to provide water
to the Loves. Pursuant to Rule 12(c), M.R.Civ.P., the District
moved for judgment on the pleadings, based in part on the doctrine
of res judicata . The District Court denied the motion and the District
petitioned this Court to reverse the District Court by the exercise
of supervisory control. We accepted original jurisdiction pursuant
to Rule 17(a), M.R.App.P., and in the exercise of supervisory
control, reverse the order of the District Court.
The Irrigation District raises the following dispositive
issue: Does the doctrine of resjudicata preclude litigation of the
issues raised in the Loves' amended complaint?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Harlem Irrigation District is a public corporation,
comprised of elected commissioners, which is responsible for
managing a water irrigation system in Blaine County. The Loves
owned property located in the Irrigation District. Based on its
contention that they failed to pay their share of the taxes
required for the operation of the Irrigation District, the
commissioners have terminated the Loves' irrigation water on
several occasions since 1983.
2
In August 1983, the Loves filed a complaint, given Blaine
County Cause No. 8195, in which they alleged that the District and
two of its commissioners were liable for lost crops and punitive
damages as a result of the termination of the Loves' water supply.
That complaint was consolidated with another complaint, No. 8342,
in which the same allegations were made against a third
commissioner. The Loves alleged that the defendants acted
"willfully, maliciously and were guilty of wanton disregard of the
rights of the Plaintiffs and in violation of Montana Law and the
bylaws of the District . . . .'I The Irrigation District moved for
summary judgment, and on November 9, 1989, the District Court
granted its motion based on sovereign immunity. This Court
affirmed that judgment based on its interpretation of former S 2-9-
211, MCA (1989). Lovev. HurlemIrrigutionDist (1990), 245 Mont. 443, 802
P.2d 611 (LoveI)
After our decision in LoveI, the Loves filed another complaint
on May 20, 1991, as Blaine County Cause No. DV 91-31, and an
amended complaint on April 7, 1992. In Count One of their amended
complaint, the Loves alleged that the District's denial of water in
1983, 1988, and 1989 violated contractual and statutory duties owed
to the Loves.
In Count Two, they alleged that the Irrigation District's
actions were "arbitrary, careless and negligent," as well as
"willful and malicious acts of negligence." Count Two claimed that
3
the District's conduct violated the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
In Count Three, they alleged that the District's actions
constituted actual or constructive fraud, and in Count Four they
claimed that the District's acts deprived them of property without
due process, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 5 1983.
As in their first complaint, the Loves claimed damages for
crop loss and the right to recover punitive damages. In addition,
they alleged damage to their property.
The District moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Rule 12(c), M.R.Civ.P., based in part on the doctrine of resjudicata.
The District Court denied the Irrigation District's motion.
In response to the Irrigation District's petition for
supervisory control, we accepted original jurisdiction pursuant to
Rule 17(a), M.R.App.P, in order to prevent extended and needless
litigation.
DISCUSSION
Does the doctrine of resjudicata preclude litigation of the
issues raised in the Loves' amended complaint?
The District Court held that based on Boucher v. Dramstad
(D. Mont. 1981), 522 F. Supp. 604, the doctrine of resjudicata bars
a subsequent cause of action if the following three criteria are
satisfied: (1) if "the prior judgment was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction;" (2) if "the decision was a final judgment
on the merits;" and (3) if "the same cause of action and the same
4
parties or their privies were involved in both cases." See Boucher,
522 F. Supp. at 606.
The court reasoned that in LoveI, summary judgment was granted
based on immunity provisions of former 5 2-9-111, MCA (1989), and
as a result, the court held that there had been no prior judgment
on the merits. The court stated that even if the present claims
were the same as those previously litigated, the second requirement
in Boucher was not satisfied. The court added (also in reliance on
Boucher) that res judicata should not apply because it would be
manifestly unfair to the Loves. See Boucher, 592 F. Supp. at 607.
The Irrigation District argues that this Court does not follow
the three-part test from Boucher and that this court's resjudicata
analysis does not involve a case-by-case consideration of
fundamental fairness. While our discussions of the doctrine of ES
iudicata do (in a different form) consider all of the elements
discussed in Boucher, we have not yet had occasion to reject the
application of that doctrine based on considerations of fairness.
We have held:
The doctrine of resjudicata states that a final judgment on
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive as to causes of action or issues thereby
litigated, as to the parties and their privies, in all
other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal
of concurrent jurisdiction.
Meaghercounty Water Disl. v. Walter (1976), 169 Mont. 358, 361, 547 P.2d
850, 852 (citing 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 394).
5
In addition to the elements inferred from the previous
definition, we have held that the doctrine includes the following
four elements: (1) the subject matter of each action must be the
same; (2) the parties or their privies of each action must be the
same; (3) the issues must be the same and relate to the same
subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons must be the
same in reference to the subject matter and to the issues between
them. Whirryv.&w?nson (1992), 254 Mont. 248, 250-51, 836 P.2d 1227,
1228; Fillerv. RichlandCounty (1991), 247 Mont. 285, 291, 806 P.2d 537,
541; Wellman v. Wellman (1983), 205 Mont. 504, 507, 668 P.2d 1060,
1061.
Therefore, we do not agree that our own criteria for the
application of the doctrine would not require a final judgment on
the merits. However, neither do we agree that because the Loves'
first suit was dismissed by summary judgment, based on § Z-9-111,
MCA (1989), there was no prior judgment on the merits.
In Smithv.Schweigert (1990), 241 Mont. 54, 59, 785 P.2d 195, 198,
we held that summary judgment is a decision on the merits because
it is a conclusive determination of a legal issue presented by the
facts of a case. In Millsv.LincolnCounty (1993), 262 Mont. 283, 285,
864 P.2d 1265, 1267, we reaffirmed this holding, even though the
summary judgment in the prior decision had been based on immunity
pursuant to the pre-1991 amendment of § 2-9-111, MCA. Based on our
decision in Mills, we hold that the District Court's dismissal of the
6
Loves' original claims was a final judgment on the merits for
purposes of applying the resjudicata bar.
The Loves contend that the Boucher court's refusal to apply
that doctrine based on considerations of fundamental fairness
should guide our decision in this case because their claim, like
the claim in Boucher, is based in part on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
However, as pointed out in Boucher, the United States Circuit Courts
of Appeal are not in agreement on the question of whether resjudicata
bars a 5 1983 action in federal court where the constitutional
claims could have been raised in an earlier state court proceeding,
but were not. Boucher, 5.22 F. Supp. at 606. That court recognized
that the Ninth Circuit has held that such a failure bars a
subsequent § 1983 action in federal court. Boucher, 522 F. supp. at
606 (citing Scogginv. Schrunk (9th Cir. 1975), 522 F.2d 436).
Although the Boucher decision did not apply the bar, based on
the court's concern for manifest unfairness, its decision was based
on the unique facts of that case. We are not presented with the
same considerations in this case and conclude, as we did in Whiny,
that we are not here presented with facts which would justify
rejection of the doctrine of resjudicata based on principles of
fundamental fairness. We hold that the doctrine of resjudicata does
bar § 1983 claims in Montana's courts when the constitutional
claims could have been raised in an earlier proceeding, but were
not.
The Loves also claim that new theories of recovery, and new
facts alleged in their amended complaint in this case, preclude the
application of resjudicata. However, applying our four-part test, we
conclude otherwise.
The underlying subject matter which formed the basis for the
complaints in Love I and the current litigation are the same. In
LoveI, the Loves claimed that the Irrigation District shut off their
water in violation of their rights, Montana law, and the District's
bylaws. The amended complaint filed in this case claimed that the
District's alleged failure to provide water violated contractual
obligations, statutory duties, bylaws, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and constituted fraud.
The underlying subject matter in the amended complaint in this case
was the District's failure to provide water. The same subject
matter that gave rise to the initial claim was the basis for the
additional causes of action.
Both actions were brought by the Loves against the Irrigation
District and its individual members. Therefore, the parties or
their privies are the same.
The third element is whether the issues in the two cases are
the same and whether they relate to the same subject matter. The
Loves contend that because new theories of recovery are alleged,
the issues are not the same.
8
However, the doctrine of resjudicata bars not only issues that
were actually litigated, but also those that could have been
litigated in a prior proceeding. Mills, 864 P.2d at 1267. A party
should not be able to litigate a matter that the party already had
the opportunity to litigate; public policy dictates that there must
be some end to litigation. Shefield Ins. Co. v. Lighthouse Properties (1992 ) ,
252 Mont. 321, 324, 828 P.2d 1369, 13 7 1; First Bank v. Fourth Judicial Dist.
Court (1987)) 226 Mont. 515, 519-20, 737 P.2d 1132, 1134-35. Once
a party has had an opportunity to present a claim, the judgment in
a previous case is final as to the issues that were raised, as well
as those that could have been raised. SeeBurgessv.Montana (1989), 237
Mont. 364, 366, 772 P.2d 1272, 1273. This notion arises from
public policy designed to prevent endless piecemeal attacks on
previous judgments. we’ellmanv. Wellman (1982), 198 Mont. 42, 46, 643
P.2d 573, 575. We conclude that the theories of recovery alleged
in this cause of action could have been litigated in the prior
proceeding.
The Loves, in another attempt to distinguish Love I from the
current case, claim that the only damages claimed in LoveI were for
lost crops in 1983, and for punitive damages. In this case, they
claim damage for 1983, 1988, 1989, and the years affected
thereafter, as well as costs of reconditioning the land. However,
their prior complaint was not dismissed until November 9, 1989.
The same damages could have been alleged by amendment of their
9
complaint in the Love I litigation, or they could have claimed
damages, as they have in this case, for 1983 and years affected
thereafter. Additional damages, like new theories, could have been
alleged in the previous proceeding. Further, had they succeeded in
their original action, they could have sought equitable relief
which would have avoided the damage now complained of.
Finally, the fourth requirement is satisfied. The Loves were
the plaintiffs, and the Irrigation District, as well as its
individual commissioners, were the defendants in both actions. The
capacities of the parties involved have not changed in relation to
the subject matter and the issues in the litigation. See First Bank,
737 P.Zd at 1135.
The petition for supervisory control is granted. The order of
the District Court which denied the Irrigation District's motion
for judgment on the pleadings based on the doctrine of resjudicata,
pursuant to Rule 12(c), M.R.Civ.P., is reversed and this case is
remanded to the District Court for entry of judgment for the
defendants.
Jus c e
We concur:
the