NO. 94-464
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1995
IN THE MATTER OF J.K.C.,
A Youth.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Cascade,
The Honorable John M. McCarvel, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jeffrey T. McAllister; Conklin, Nybo, LeVeque &
Murphy, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Micheal S.
Wellenstein, Ass't Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Patrick L. Paul, Cascade County Attorney, Great
Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 9, 1995
Decided: March 23, 1995
Filed:
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
J.K.C. appeals from an order of the Eighth Judicial District
Youth Court, Cascade County, waiving jurisdiction and transferring
his case from Youth Court to District Court. We reverse.
BACKGROUND
The facts the State alleges which lead to the case against
J.K.C. are as follows. On April 4, 1994, J.K.C., who was fourteen
years old at that time, was scheduled to accompany his adoptive
parents to the Great Falls police station to discuss allegations of
J.K.C.'s misconduct unrelated to the charges in this case. Before
the appointment at the police station, J.K.C. ran away from home.
J.K.C. had a handgun in his possession and stole the keys to a car
at Rice Motors' car lot. On the evening of April 4, 1994, J.K.C.
and another youth went to Rice Motors and stole the car.
J.K.C. and the other youth eventually drove to Anne Kolstad's
house. While carrying the handgun, J.K.C. went to Kolstad's door,
broke out a window in her door, and demanded money from her.
Kolstad hid to the side of her door and called 911. J.K.C.
retreated to the car without taking anything from Kolstad. The two
youths then drove to a convenience store. J.K.C. filled the car
with gas and entered the store. Once inside, he asked the clerk
something to the effect of "Doesn't it suck working nights?"
J.K.C. then shot the clerk twice. The clerk was not killed.
J.K.C. was apprehended in the early morning hours of April 5, 1994.
On April 5, 1994, the State filed a petition in Youth Court
alleging that J.K.C. was a delinquent youth and had committed
2
attempted deliberate homicide, attempted robbery, and felony theft.
On April 20, 1994, the State moved the Youth Court for an order to
transfer the case against J.K.C. from Youth Court to District
Court. The Youth Court held a hearing on the motion to transfer
J.K.C.'s case on June 21, 1994. On July 12, 1994, the Youth Court
entered its order transferring all three charges against J.K.C. to
District Court.
One issue raised on appeal is dispositive: Whether the Youth
Court erred in ordering J.K.C.'s case transferred to District
Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review orders transferring a matter from youth court to
district court to determine whether the youth court abused its
discretion. In the Matter of T.N. (Mont. 1994), 881 P.2d 1329,
1332, 51 St.Rep. 955, 956 (citing In the Matter of J.A. (1992), 255
Mont. 214, 841 P.2d 1130). This Court will not find an abuse of
discretion where there is substantial credible evidence to support
the findings of the youth court. Matter of T.N., 881 P.2d at 1332.
DISCUSSION
Section 41-5-206, MCA, controls transfers from youth court to
district court. It provides in relevant part:
(1) After a petition has been filed alleging delinquency,
the court may, upon motion of the county attorney, before
hearing the petition on its merits, transfer the matter
of prosecution to the district court if:
(a) (i) the youth charged was 12 years of age or
more at the time of the conduct alleged to be unlawful
and the unlawful act would constitute . . . the attempt,
as defined in 45-4-103, of either deliberate or mitigated
deliberate homicide if the act had been committed by an
adult;
3
idi th,ancd ourt finds upon the hearing of all relevant
evidence that there is probable cause to believe that:
(i) the youth committed the delinquent act alleged;
(ii) the seriousness of the offense and the
protection of the community require treatment of the
youth beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities; and
(iii) the alleged offense was committed in an
aggressive, violent, or premeditated manner.
J.K.C. contends that the State failed to demonstrate that the
seriousness of the offense and the protection of the community
require treatment beyond that afforded in juvenile facilities as
required by § 41-5-206(l) (d) (ii), MCA.
One of the purposes of the Montana Youth Court Act is "to
remove from youth committing violations of the law the element of
retribution and to substitute therefor a program of supervision,
care, rehabilitation, and, in appropriate cases, restitution as
ordered by the youth court . . . .'I Section 41-5-102(2), MCA. We
previously have stated that:
To assume that juvenile facilities are inadequate from
the mere fact that the youth is charged with a serious
offense, completely ignores the rehabilitative purpose of
the [Youth Court1 Act . . and is tantamount to a
judicial admission the juvenile facilities in Montana are
inadequate to cope with the hard core youth offender. @
will not do this.
In the Matter of J.D.W. (Mont. 1994), 881 P.2d 1324, 1328, 51
St.Rep. 958, 961 (quoting In the Matter of Stevenson (1975), 167
Mont. 220, 228, 538 P.2d 5, 9). In Matter of Stevenson, the youth
was accused of committing, or being legally accountable for,
attempted robbery and aggravated assault as a result of an
attempted armed robbery in which the proprietor of a grocery store
was severely wounded by a shotgun blast. The youth court ordered
4
the case transferred to district court. This Court remanded the
case because the seriousness of the offense alone did not
demonstrate that juvenile facilities were inadequate. Matter of
Stevenson, 538 P.2d at 9.
The State contends that it offered sufficient testimony to
uphold the transfer from Youth Court to District Court. However,
the testimony in the case does not support the State‘s position.
Caroline Tyler, a deputy juvenile probation officer who was
assigned to J.K.C.'s case, testified that J.K.C. had emotional
problems that could be effectively treated in the juvenile system.
She also testified that she did not think the adult system offered
appropriate treatment programs for J.K.C. and that J.K.C.'s case
should not be transferred to District Court. Richard Boutilier,
the chief juvenile probation officer for Cascade County, testified
that it was his opinion that J.K.C. 's case should be transferred to
District Court so J.K.C. could be supervised beyond the age of la
or 19. Boutilier testified that J.K.C. should remain in the
juvenile system until age 18 to receive the services available in
the juvenile system. He stated that the juvenile system had
sufficient resources to treat J.K.C. up to the age of 18 or 19. He
also expressed his opinion that the juvenile system offered J.K.C.
a better rehabilitation program than the adult system does.
Boutilier admitted that there was no evidence that J.K.C. would
need treatment or supervision beyond the age of 19. On cross-
examination, Boutilier stated that his opinion that J.K.C.'s case
should be transferred to District Court was based solely on the
5
seriousness of the offenses charged.
The State cites In the Matter of K.M.H. (1988), 231 Mont. 180,
752 P.2d 162, and Matter of T.N., supra, in support of its position
that there was sufficient evidence to justify a transfer to
district court. However, both are distinguishable from the present
case. In Matter of K.M.H., testimony was offered that the youth
could very possibly repeat his destructive behavior and that
juvenile facilities were inappropriate for his treatment. Matter
of K.M.H., 752 P.2d at 164. In Matter of T.N., testimony was
offered that the youth could feel pressured into committing similar
violent behavior, that Pine Hills was inadequate for the youth's
treatment, and that other juvenile treatment centers probably would
not accept the youth. Matter of T.N., 881 P.2d at 1332-33.
In the present case, no testimony was offered that juvenile
facilities would be inappropriate for J.K.C. In fact, both Tyler
and Boutilier testified that J.K.C. should be rehabilitated in the
juvenile system, although Boutilier testified that J.K.C. should be
transferred to the adult corrections system after the age of 18.
This case is also distinguishable from Matter of J.D.W., 881
P.2d at 1327-28, where the youth court transferred jurisdiction
relying on the fact that the youth court would not have
jurisdiction over the youth for as long as the district court. We
held that it was error to transfer the youth's case to district
court without taking any evidence as to whether the juvenile system
would be adequate for the youth's rehabilitation. Since no
evidence was offered on the adequacy of the juvenile system, we
6
remanded the case for a further hearing and redetermination.
Matter of J.D.W., 881 P.2d at 1329.
Here, the testimony of several witnesses indicates that the
juvenile system is adequate to treat J.K.C. Dave Peterson, a
juvenile parole officer for the Department of Family Services,
testified that Pine Hills juvenile facility currently holds youths
who have committed serious offenses, and that Pine Hills is a
secure facility. Tyler stated that J.K.C. should be treated in the
juvenile system and that the adult court system did not offer
sufficient rehabilitation. Boutilier recommended that J.K.C. be
placed in a juvenile facility for treatment until reaching the age
of 18. He also conceded that his belief that the case should be
transferred to District Court was based solely on the seriousness
of the offenses charged. The testimony of Tyler and Boutilier does
not indicate that juvenile facilities are inadequate to deal with
J.K.C. In fact, their testimony indicates just the opposite.
There is no substantial credible evidence to support the Youth
Court‘s findings. We hold that the Youth Court abused its
discretion by ordering J.K.C. 's case transferred to District Court.
With respect to the dissent, it must be pointed out that in
Matter of J.D.W., we remanded because the Youth Court simply took
judicial notice that, in the court's view, Pine Hills and the Youth
Court system were inadequate for the youth's rehabilitation. The
State did not have an adequate opportunity to present evidence on
that issue. To the contrary, in the instant case, the State had
every opportunity to present evidence and testimony on the issue of
the adequacy of the juvenile facility; it simply failed to do so
and, accordingly, failed to meet its statutory burden of proof.
While this Court is as appalled as the dissent at the aggressive,
violent and premeditated nature of the youth's conduct,
nevertheless, the State having had its day in court, there is no
legal basis upon which to send this case back to the Youth Court on
the premise that at some point the prosecution will finally get it
right.
We reverse the order of the Youth Court transferring
jurisdiction to District Court. The Youth Court shall assume
jurisdiction of the case.
Justice / I
We concur:
Chief Justice
Justices
8
Justice Fred J. Weber concurs and dissents as follows:
I agree with the majority opinion in its holding that the
Youth Court abused its discretion by ordering J.K.C.'s case
transferred to District Court. As a result I concur in the
reversal of the order of the Youth Court which transferred
jurisdiction to the adult District Court. My dissent from the
majority opinion is at this point. I would remand the case to
Youth Court for a further hearing and a redetermination of the
issue of the transfer to adult District Court.
The majority opinion refers to Matter of J.D.W. (Mont. 1994),
881 P.2d 1324, 51 St.Rep. 958. In Matter of J.D.W. this Court
concluded that the order of the youth court transferring the matter
to district court was vacated, and the cause was remanded to the
youth court for a further hearing and redetermination. I believe
the same procedure should be followed here.
In Matter of J.D.W., this Court pointed out that the critical
determination was whether the seriousness of the offense and the
protection of the community required treatment of the youth beyond
that afforded by the juvenile facilities. That is the identical
issue which is before us in our present case. In Matter of J.D.W.,
the judge took judicial notice of the limited type of commitment he
could make - he could only commit to the Department of Family
Services and that commitment had to be indefinite. In addition the
judge pointed out that the average length of time that youths were
kept at Pine Hills was three to four months which was not an
adequate time for a youth charged with a serious crime. This Court
9
pointed out in its opinion that there was an absence of any
recommendation from staff or other persons to demonstrate that
J.D.W. could not be properly treated in a youth court facility. As
a result, this Court concluded there was an improper waiver of
jurisdiction, and reversed the decision of the district court and
remanded the case to the same court for a further hearing and
redetermination of the issue.
In contrast to Matter of J.D.W., in the present case there was
considerable evidence presented by three different parole and
probation officers as to the treatment available in the system and
as to their opinions as to the adequacy and inadequacy of the
system. The majority has concluded that evidence was not adequate
and I agree with that conclusion. However, in the same manner as
in Matter of J.D.W., I conclude that it is essential in fairness to
all involved that the case be remanded to the Youth Court for a
further hearing and a redetermination of the issue of transfer. In
reaching this conclusion, I note that the defendant does not
contest the Youth Court finding that his crime of attempted
deliberate homicide was committed in an aggressive, violent, or
premeditated manner. The testimony presented to the District Court
established that J.K.C. initially demonstrated his aggressive and
violent behavior when he attempted with a handgun to rob an 87 year
old woman whom he knew from his paper route. Next, after that
unsuccessful robbery, J.K.C. suggested robbing the Gas-A-Matt and
devised the plan. After pumping gas, J.K.C. entered the store,
said to the clerk, "Doesn't it suck working nights?" and then shot
10
the clerk twice with a 9mm pistol in a clear attempt at deliberate
homicide.
I would therefore remand this cause to the Youth Court for a
further hearing, following an examination by a qualified mental
health expert, and a redetermination of the issue with specific
findings and conclusions on the statutory requirements.
Chief Justice J.A. Turnage concurs in the foregoing special
concurrence and dissent.
11
March 23, 1995
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the
following named:
Jeffrey T. McAllister, Esq.
Conklin, Nybo, Leveque & Murphy
P.O. Box 1049
Great Falls, MT 59403-2049
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek
Attorney General
Justice Bldg.
Helena, MT 59620
Patrick L. Paul
County Attorney
Cascade County Courthouse
Great Falls, MT 59401
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MONTANA