No. 96-654
IN THE SUPREMECOURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1996
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
NINA J. GARLAND, Deceased,
Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lewis & Clark,
The Honorable Dorothy McCarter, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Dennis G. Loveless, Attorney at Law, Helena,
Montana
For Respondent:
Carl Hatch; Small, Hatch, Doubek & Pyfer,
Helena, Montana
.
"'7 Submitted on Briefs: October 17, 1996
Decided: -November 15, 1996
Filed:
Clerk'
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court
Anson Fredenberg, the personal representative of the Estate of
Nina J. Garland, deceased (the Estate), appeals from the order of
the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County,
distributing the assets of the Estate. We reverse and remand.
The Estate raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the District Court err in concluding that the
surviving spouse who killed the deceased spouse is entitled to a
one-half interest in the proceeds from the sale of the real
property which he and the decedent owned as a matter of law?
2. Did the District Court err in failing to settle and
distribute all of the Estate's assets?
Nina J. Garland (Nina) and Larry Garland (Larry) were married
in Alaska in 1986. Sometime thereafter, Nina and Larry moved to
Montana and purchased a house in Helena, Montana, as joint tenants
with the right of survivorship.
Nina died testate on October 22, 1993. Larry subsequently was
convicted of deliberate homicide for her death and is presently
incarcerated in the Montana State Prison. Two minor daughters
survive Nina; one of them, Emily Garland, is also Larry's daughter.
Nina left a will providing for an equal division of her assets
between her two daughters. Nina's brother, Anson Fredenberg
(Anson), was appointed personal representative of her Estate and
Nina's will was admitted to informal probate. Pursuant to a
stipulation between the Estate and Larry, the house in Helena which
Larry and Nina owned in joint tenancy was sold and the proceeds
placed in a special trust account to be distributed by the District
court.
A hearing on the final distribution of the Estate's assets was
held in September of 1995. The Estate and Larry disagreed
regarding the proper distribution of the proceeds from the sale of
Nina and Larry's house, a Saab automobile and various items of
personal property which Larry contended were his premarital
property. In its decision and order, the District Court concluded
that the Estate and Larry are each entitled to fifty percent of
both the proceeds from the sale of the house and any personal
property "which Larry cannot prove to have been obtained by him
prior to the marriage and used by him exclusively during the
marriaye[;]" the court included the Saab automobile which was
titled in Nina's name in the Estate. The Estate appeals.
1. Did the District Court err in concluding that Larry
is entitled to a one-half interest in the proceeds from
the sale of the real property which he and Nina owned as
a matter of law?
Larry and Nina purchased the real property at issue as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship and, as a result, each of
them owned equal shares in the property. See § 70-l-307, MCA.
Ordinarily, upon the death of one joint tenant, the decedent's
ownership interest ceases and the jointly-held property immediately
passes to the surviving joint tenant as a matter of law. Voyele v.
Estate of Schock (1987), 229 Mont. 259, 263, 745 P.2d 1138, 1140.
The District Court recognized that, under § 72-2-813(3)(b),
MCA, Nina and Larry's interests in the real property were
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transformed into tenancies in common upon Nina's death resulting
from Larry's felonious act. Relying on the Official Comments to §
72-2-813(3) (b), MCA, however, the court interpreted § 72-2-
813(3) (b), MCA, as severing only Nina's interest in the property
and allowing that interest to pass under her will, with Larry
retaining his equal interest with no right of survivorship. As a
result, the District Court concluded that the Estate and Larry each
retained a one-half interest in the value of the property as a
matter of law.
The Estate argues on appeal that the District Court's
conclusion was erroneous. It contends that both Nina and Larry's
interests were severed and transformed into tenancies in common
pursuant to § 72-2-813(3) (b), MCA, and, therefore, that tenancy in
common principles apply. The Estate argues that, under those
principles, it was entitled to attempt to prove that Nina
contributed more to the property than Larry did, with the potential
result that the Estate would receive a larger share of the proceeds
from the sale of the property. We review a district court's
conclusions of law to determine if the court's interpretation of
the law is correct. Loney v. Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, P.C.
(1995), 273 Mont. 506, 510, 905 P.2d 158, 161 (citation omitted).
The resolution of this case turns, initially, on the proper
interpretation of 5 72-2-813(3) (b), MCA, a statute we have not
previously construed. Section 72-2-813(3), MCA, provides, in
pertinent part:
The felonious and intentional killing of the
decedent:
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(b) severs the interests of the decedent and killer
in property held by them at the time of the killing as
joint tenants with the right of survivorship and
transforms the interests of the decedent and killer into
tenancies in common.
Our role in interpreting statutes is simply "to ascertain and
declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein. . .'I
Section l-2-101, MCA. We must pursue legislative intent if
possible. See § l-2-102, MCA. Where the intention of the
legislature can be determined from the plain meaning of the words
used, our role in interpreting the statute is at an end. Clarke v.
Massey (1995), 271 Mont. 412, 416, 897 P.2d 1085, 1088. Where the
language is clear and unambiguous, the statute speaks for itself
and we will not resort to legislative history or other extrinsic
means of interpretation. Clarke, 897 P.2d at 1088.
Section 72-2-813(3) (b), MCA, clearly, unambiguously and in
plain language mandates that upon the intentional and felonious
killing of one joint tenant by another, the interests of both the
decedent and the killer are severed and transformed into tenancies
in common. Thus, the killer is divested of the benefits of a joint
tenancy--the right to survivorship and ownership of "equal shares"
in the property. See § 70-l-307, MCA.
In interpreting 5 72-2-813(3)(b), MCA, the District Court
relied on the Official Comments to § 72-2-813(3) (b), MCA, in
determining that the legislature's purpose in enacting the statute
"was to preclude the co-tenant's killer from gaining benefit from
his criminal conduct." On that basis, the court concluded that
only the decedent's interest is severed and the killer loses only
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his right of survivorship. Since the language used in § ?2-2-
813(3)(b), MCA, is clear, unambiguous and plain, however, the
court's role in interpreting the statute was at an end and it could
not properly resort to legislative history or other extrinsic means
of interpretation. See §§ l-2-101, l-2-102, MCA; Clarke, 897 P.2d
at 1088.
Moreover, in its decision and order, the District Court stated
that "the interest of the decedent is severed so that her share
passes as her property and her killer has no right of
survivorship." The District Court's statement appears to
incorporate language from § 72-2-104(2), MCA (1991), the
predecessor to 5 72-2-813(3)(b), MCA, which provided:
Any joint tenant who feloniously and intentionally kills
another joint tenant thereby effects a severance of the
interest of the decedent so that the share of the
decedent passes as his property and the killer has no
rights by survivorship. [Emphasis added.]
Section 72-2-104(2), MCA (1991), was renumbered and substantially
revised in 1993. See 5 72-2-813(3) (b), MCA (1993). Thus, while
the 1991 version of the statute provided for severance of only the
decedent's interest, the 1993 version--which remains unchanged--
provides for severance of both the decedent's and the killer's
interests in the property held as joint tenants at the time of the
killing. Section 72-2-813(3) (b), MCA.
Furthermore, the effect of the statutory severances under the
1991 and 1993 versions of the statute differ significantly.
Section 72-2-104(2), MCA (1991), expressly stated that the
decedent's interest was severed "so that the share of the decedent
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passes as his property and the killer has no rights by
survivorship." (Emphasis added.) Section 72-2-813(3) (b), MCA, on
the other hand, expressly provides that both the decedent's and the
killer's interests are severed and that the killing "transforms the
interests of the decedent and killer into tenancies in common."
(Emphasis added).
Thus, as is evident from a review of the plain language of the
statutes, §§ 72-2-104(2), MCA (19911, and 72-2-813(3)(b), MCA,
provide for substantially different results based on the same
factual situation--the felonious and intentional killing of a joint
tenant by another joint tenant. The District Court incorrectly
interpreted § 72-2-813(3) (b), MCA, to mandate an effect on the
decedent's and killer's interests identical to that mandated under
the predecessor statute, § 72-2-104(2), MCA (1991).
Larry relies on In re Estate of Matye (1982), 198 Mont. 317,
645 P.2d 955, in support of his argument that he is entitled to
one-half of the proceeds from the sale of the real property he and
Nina owned as joint tenants. Estate of Matve is not applicable
here.
In Estate of Matve, we addressed a situation factually
analogous to the present case. There, the wife killed the husband
with whom she owned property in joint tenancy. Estate of Matve,
645 P.2d at 956. The district court determined that the wife was
entitled to one-half of the proceeds from the joint tenancy
property and the husband's estate appealed. Estate of Matve, 645
P.2d at 956-57.
On appeal, we interpreted 5 72-2-104(2), MCA (1981), which
remained unamended by the legislature through 1991. We concluded
that, according to the plain language of the statute, only the
decedent's interest was severed and that share must be distributed
as property of the decedent without any right of survivorship in
the killer. Estate of Matve, 645 P.2d at 957. The effect was that
the killer retained her one-half interest in the proceeds of the
property. See Estate of Matve, 645 P.2d at 957.
As discussed above, however, fi 72-2-104(2), MCA (19811, has
since been renumbered and substantially revised. See § 72-2-
813(3) (b), MCA. Thus, OUT analysis in Estate of Matve is
inapplicable to the present case in which we interpret and apply §
72-2-813(3) (b), MCA.
We conclude that where a joint tenant kills another joint
tenant, the plain language of 5 72-2-813(3) (b), MCA, effectuates a
severance of both the decedent's and the killer's interests and
transforms those interests into tenancies in common as a matter of
law. Therefore, in determining the respective interests of the
killer and the estate of the decedent under § 72-2-813(3) (b), MCA,
district courts must apply the legal rules applicable to tenancies
in common.
Section 70-l-313, MCA, defines tenancy in common as an
interest "owned by several persons, not in joint ownership or
partnership." Thus, unlike § 70-l-307, MCA, which defines joint
interests, § 70-l-313, MCA, does not expressly provide for
ownership in "equal shares." Nor do tenancies in common under §
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70-l-313, MCA, include the right of survivorship under which
ownership of the entire interest in the joint tenancy property
vests in the surviving joint tenant as a matter of law upon the
death of the other joint tenant. See Vosele, 745 P.2d at 1140.
Tenants in common presumptively own undivided equal interests
in property; however, that presumption is subject to rebuttal. See
Sack v. Tomlin (Nev. 1994), 871 P.2d 298, 304; Lawrence v. Harvey
(1980), 186 Mont. 314, 322-24, 607 P.2d 551, 557; Ivins v. Hardy
(1947), 120 Mont. 35, 42, 179 P.2d 745, 748 (overruled on other
grounds). Therefore, on the death of one co-tenant, the surviving
co-tenant and the decedent's estate may be entitled to unequal
shares in the property. The respective shares of the decedent's
estate and the surviving co-tenant depend on the decedent's and the
surviving tenant's individual contributions to the acquisition and
maintenance of the property. See, e.q., Tomlin, 871 P.2d at 305.
Absent proof of disparate contributions, however, the presumption
that the co-tenants are entitled to undivided equal interests
stands.
Here Nina and Larry's interests were severed and transformed
into tenancies in common upon Nina's death. & § 72-2-813(3) (b),
MCA. Presumptively, those interests became undivided equal
interests in the property; the presumption, however, can be
rebutted. & Lawrence, 607 P.2d at 557. Thus, the Estate and
Larry's respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of the
house ultimately will depend on whether the presumption is rebutted
via proof regarding Nina and Larry's disparate individual
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contributions to the acquisition and maintenance of the property at
issue. We hold, therefore, that the District Court erred in
concluding that the Estate and Larry are each entitled to fifty
percent of the proceeds from the sale of the property Nina and
Larry owned as joint tenants as a matter of law.
2. Did the District Court err in failing to settle and
distribute all of the Estate's assets?
The Estate argues on appeal that the District Court erred as
a matter of law in failing to order the complete settlement and
distribution of the Estate's assets and the discharge of Anson from
further claims. It relies on § 72-3-1001(3), MCA, which provides:
After notice to all interested persons and hearing, the
court may enter an order or orders, on appropriate
conditions, determining the persons entitled to
distribution of the estate and, as circumstances require,
approving settlement and directing or approving
distribution of the estate and discharging the personal
representative from further claim or demand of any
interested person.
Anson petitioned for determination of testacy and heirs and
for settlement and distribution of the Estate's assets pursuant to
55 72-3-1001(l) and (2), MCA. He also filed a final account which
contained a proposed distribution of the Estate's assets. Larry
objected to the Estate's final account. He argued that he was
entitled to one-half of the proceeds from the sale of the real
property he and Nina held as joint tenants, that the Saab
automobile should be distributed to him and that various items were
his personal premarital assets. The Estate filed an amended final
account immediately preceding the hearing in which it requested the
court to distribute a retirement account not listed in its original
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final account and authorize repayment of a debt against the Estate.
In its decision and order, the District Court stated that "[a]
hearing on the final distribution of the [Estate's] assets" was
held. It subsequently determined that
[a]ny [personal] property which Larry cannot prove to
have been obtained by him prior to the marriage and used
by him exclusively during the marriage is deemed to have
been held jointly by the parties during the marriage, and
as tenants in common from the time of Nina's death.
The court did not address the additional items in the amended final
account such as the retirement account. Nor did it settle and
distribute the contested personal property which Larry contends is
his personal premarital property, leaving the Estate and Larry to
continue to dispute the proper disposition of such property.
Finally, the District Court did not discharge Anson.
Section 72-3-1001(3), MCA, provides that, in making a final
distribution of an estate, a court must discharge the personal
representative from further claims by interested persons; however,
nothing in 5 72-3-1001(3), MCA, mandates that a court settle and
distribute an estate at the time requested by the parties. It is
unclear in this case whether the District Court intended its
decision and order to constitute a final settlement and
distribution of the Estate pursuant to § 72-3-1001(3), MCA. What
is clear, however, is that the District Court did not meet the
statutory requirements for a final distribution by "determining the
persons entitled to distribution of the estate and . . approving
settlement and directing distribution of the estate and
discharging the personal representative. . . .'I See § 72-3-
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1001(3), MCA. Therefore, this case must be remanded to the
District Court for further proceedings toward final distribution of
the Estate.
Reversed and remanded.
We concur:
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