NO. 96-101
IN THE SUPREMECOURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1996
IN RE MARRIAGE OF
ALAN L. HOOKER,
Petitioner and Appellant,
and
DIANE L. HOOKER,
Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Garfield,
The Honorable Kenneth R. Wilson, Judge presiding.
COUNSELOF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Donald R. Herndon, Herndon, Sweeney & Halverson,
Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
J. Reuss, Wright, Tolliver & Guthals,
Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 27, 1996
Decided: September 12, 1996
Filed:
Justice Charles E. Erdmann delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court
1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be
cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public
document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its
result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing
Company.
Appellant Alan L. Hooker appeals from the amended findings of
fact, conclusions of law, decree of dissolution, and final order
issued by the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Garfield County.
We affirm.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether Alan should be
estopped from challenging the oral property settlement which the
District Court incorporated into its final decree of dissolution.
FACTS
In May 1989, Alan L. Hooker petitioned the District Court for
a dissolution of his marriage to Diane L. Hooker. Alan and Diane
were married in 1968 and together they operated Hooker Livestock,
Inc., a farming and ranching business. Alan's parents (John and
Mildred) also operated a farming and ranching operation called the
Hooker Cattle Company. Over the years, the operation of Hooker
Livestock and Hooker Cattle became commingled and essentially the
two companies were operated together. John died in 1975 and when
Mildred passed away in 1982 her will provided for equal
distribution of Hooker Cattle assets into two trusts--one for her
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grandchildren and one providing income to Alan during his life with
the remainder to her grandchildren. To establish the trusts, it
became necessary to value the assets of both ranching operations
and eventually the land, cattle, equipment, and cash were divided,
which resulted in a determination of the value of Alan's interest
in the trust.
The dissolution proceeding was set for trial on April 2, 1991.
On the morning of trial, the parties informed the court they were
in the process of negotiating a settlement regarding property
distribution. Later that day the parties told the court they had
reached an agreement. The court convened and the parties read the
settlement agreement into the record. Alan and Diane were sworn as
witnesses and both of them stated that they understood and agreed
to the terms of the property distribution. Both parties agreed to
sign the settlement agreement once it was reduced to writing and
the District Court requested a copy of the agreement once it was
signed. However, subsequent efforts by the parties to reduce the
agreement to writing failed and a written agreement was never
executed.
On June 4, 1991, Alan moved the District Court to adopt the
transcript of the April 2, 1991, proceedings as its findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and final decree in the matter. On
August 29, 1991, the District Court issued an order stating that
the oral stipulation was a contractual obligation between the
parties and ordered it to be specifically performed. On October 2,
3
1991, the court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and decree of dissolution stating that the "parties['] property
settlement agreement is not unconscionable and is approved by the
Court." On the same day, the parties filed a stipulation into the
record agreeing that the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
decree of dissolution should be entered.
Over the course of the next two years, the parties proceeded
to execute many of the terms of the property settlement agreement.
Property was exchanged, titles were signed, and monies were paid.
On March 10, 1994, two years and five months after the court had
entered its original decree, Alan filed a motion with the District
Court to revoke or modify the decree with respect to the property
distribution. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court
entered an order on May 4, 1994, denying Alan's motion to revoke or
modify stating that:
[Plrior to April 2, 1991, and subsequent thereto up to
the hearing of April 28, 1994, the parties have
voluntarily made exchanges, transfers and agreements
which in effect resulted in an almost total performance
of the settlement agreement . . . .
In April 1995, Diane filed a motion for leave to file a
third-party complaint against the First Trust Company of Montana to
resolve the terms of a land transfer associated with the property
distribution. On May 4, 1995, the District Court denied Diane's
motion and entered an amended decree and final order. In that
order the District Court concluded that:
The Property Settlement Agreement stipulated into the
record at the trial of this cause on April 2, 1991, is
4
not unconscionable and is approved by the Court, and is
by this reference incorporated herein as is this Court's
Order dated May 4, 1994, insofar as it makes any findings
or conclusions not inconsistent with this Order.
The court found that:
The stipulation for settlement between the parties which
has been approved by this Court has been almost totally
performed and the remaining dispute over the land
exchange is considered by the Court to be de minimis.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The parties addressed the issues of whether the District Court
erred in determining that the oral property settlement agreement
was not unconscionable and whether the court erred in incorporating
the agreement into the amended final decree. However, we determine
that the dispositive issue in this case is whether Alan should be
estopped from challenging the agreement.
Diane argues that since Alan assented to the agreement in open
court and later moved the court to adopt the agreement as its
findings of fact and conclusions of law, he should be estopped from
challenging the agreement. Diane also argues that Alan should be
estopped because the agreement has been substantially performed.
Alan argues that he should not be estopped from challenging
the agreement because the District Court did not grant the motion
filed by his former counsel to adopt the on-record stipulation as
its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Alan also claims that
substantial portions of the agreement have not been performed.
5
In its May 4, 1995, final order the District Court found that
the property settlement between the parties "has been almost
totally performed and the remaining dispute over the land exchange
is considered by the Court to be de minimis." The court based its
finding on a number of other findings it had made in its May 4,
1994, order which it adopted into the final order.
This Court has stated that if a district court reaches the
correct result, its decision will be affirmed regardless of the
court's reasoning. Farmers Union Cent. v. Department of Revenue
(1995), 272 Mont. 471, 475, 901 P.2d 561, 563. We determine it is
not necessary to answer the evidentiary question of whether the
parties' settlement agreement has been substantially performed.
Instead, we conclude that Alan is judicially estopped from
challenging the agreement.
This Court has previously recognized the doctrine of judicial
estoppel. gee Caekaert v. State Comp. Mut. Ins. Fund (1994), 268
Mont. 105, 885 P.2d 495; Rowland v. Klies (1986), 223 Mont. 360,
726 P.2d 310. Under this doctrine we do not permit litigants to
assert inconsistent and contradictory positions in separate
litigation. Caekaert, 885 P.2d at 501. The clearest reason for
the rule is to prevent parties from playing "fast-and-loose with
the courts." Caekaert, 885 P.2d at 501 (citing Rowland, 726 P.2d
at 315). To give rise to judicial estoppel, the first
representation must have been made knowingly and free from the
other party's inducement and it applies particularly to admissions
6
or positions asserted under oath or in previous litigation.
Caekaert, 885 P.Zd at 501-02 (citing Rowland, 726 P.2d at 315).
In the present case, the record is clear that Alan
unequivocally expressed his assent to the stipulation which had
been read into the record in open court at the April 2, 1991,
hearing. In June 1991, through his counsel, Alan moved the
District Court to adopt the on-record stipulation as its findings
of fact and conclusions of law. In effect, the court granted the
motion in its August 29, 1991, order when it stated that it deemed
the stipulation to be a contractual obligation between the parties
and ordered it specifically performed through the filing of
findings of fact and appropriate decree. In September 1991, the
parties stipulated that the findings, conclusions, and decree be
entered.
Alan's previous actions in agreeing under oath to the
on-record stipulation, his motion requesting the court to adopt the
agreement as its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and his
stipulation that the decree be entered, all prevent him from now
asserting a contrary position.
We therefore hold that Alan is judicially estopped from
challenging the oral property settlement agreement which the
District Court incorporated into its amended final decree of
dissolution.
Affirmed.
ald%L
Justice
7
Chief Justice
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Justices
September 1996
12,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herebycertify that the following certified order was sentby United Statesmail, prepaid,to the
following named:
DonaldR. Herndon,Esq.
HERNDON, SWEENEY& HALVERSON, P.C.
Box 80270
BillingsMT 59108-0270
J. Reuss
Wright, Tolliver & Guthais
Box 1977
BillingsMT 59103
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREMECOURT
STATEOF MONTANA