97-551
No. 97-551
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1998 MT 62
FORREST M. SANDERS,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Petitioner:
Brad L. Arndorfer; Arndorfer Law Firm, P.C.;
Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General;
Brenda Nordlund, Assistant Attorney General;
Helena, Montana
Craig Hensel, Billings City Attorney's Office,
Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 26, 1998
Decided: March 24, 1998
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
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Justice Jim Regnier delivered the opinion of the Court.
¶1 Forrest Sanders appeals from an order of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court,
Yellowstone County, denying his motion to hold the State of Montana in contempt of
court
for its failure to reinstate his driver's license. For the reasons stated below, we
affirm.
¶2 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying Sanders'
motion to hold the State of Montana's Department of Justice in contempt for its
refusal to
reinstate Sanders' driver's license after a six-month suspension and its decision to
instead
revoke his license for a period of one year.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 On November 6, 1995, Sanders filed an action in District Court, seeking the
reinstatement of his driver's license which had been suspended by the Montana
Department
of Justice following his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and
refusal to submit
to a breath test. Sanders asked the District Court to review the suspension,
arguing the
officer who stopped him lacked probable cause to pull him over. On May 8, 1996, the
District Court issued its findings of fact and conclusion of law, upholding the
suspension of
Sanders' driving privileges for a ninety-day period. On May 10, 1996, the State
filed a
motion to amend the court's order, conceding it had erroneously stated to the court
that
Sanders' license had been suspended for a period of ninety days, when in fact the
State had
suspended his driving privileges for a period of six months. On May 15, 1996, the
District
Court amended its findings of fact and conclusions of law to uphold the suspension of
Sanders' license for a period of six months.
¶4 Sanders appealed, and we affirmed the District Court's decision in a nonciteable
opinion dated January 14, 1997. In so doing, we first concluded the District Court
did not
err in finding the officer had reasonable grounds to believe Sanders was driving
under the
influence of alcohol. We also concluded the court had properly amended its findings
of fact
and conclusions of law to correct an error in the procedural history of the case and
affirm the
suspension of Sanders' license for a period of six months.
¶5 On July 8, 1997, Sanders' counsel wrote a letter to the Attorney General's
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office,
seeking reinstatement of Sanders' driver's license. Sanders' counsel argued that
"both the
District Court and the Supreme Court ruled that this was a six (6) months
suspension," but
recognized "[t]he Driver Improvement Bureau has put this down as a second refusal
and a
one year revocation." The Department of Justice refused to reinstate Sanders'
license on the
grounds that a one-year revocation was statutorily required under the circumstances
of this
case.
¶6 On July 24, 1997, in light of the Department of Justice's refusal to reinstate
his
license, Sanders filed a motion for contempt. Sanders argued that both this Court
and the
District Court had upheld the suspension of his license for a period of six months,
and that
respondents were in contempt of court for refusing to reinstate Sanders' license
after the
expiration of the six-month period.
¶7 In a September 18, 1997, order and memorandum, the District Court denied
Sanders'
motion for contempt, reasoning that the six-month suspension period had not become
the law
of the case, and concluding that a one-year revocation period was indeed statutorily
mandated. On September 22, 1997, Sanders filed his notice of appeal from the
District
Court's order denying his motion for contempt.
¶8 Moreover, Sanders filed a petition for writ of supervisory control on October
1, 1997,
and an amended petition on October 31, 1997. Sanders represented that the District
Court
had refused to stay its order denying Sanders' motion for contempt, pending
appeal. Sanders
argued that, unless this Court issued a writ of supervisory control, the one-year
revocation
period he complained of would expire before his appeal could be heard, thereby
rendering
his appeal moot. Thus, on November 18, 1997, we granted Sanders' petition for
supervisory
control, and ordered any further suspension of Sanders' driver's license stayed
pending the
present decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 We review contempt proceedings only to determine whether the District Court
acted
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within its jurisdiction and whether the evidence supports the court's order.
Gillespie v.
Sherlock (1996), 279 Mont. 21, 24, 929 P.2d 199, 200 (citing State ex rel., Foss v.
District
Court (1985), 216 Mont. 327, 331, 701 P.2d 342, 345).
DISCUSSION
¶10 Did the District Court err in denying Sanders' motion to hold the Department of
Justice in contempt for its refusal to reinstate Sanders' driver's license after a
six-month
suspension?
¶11 On appeal, Sanders argues this Court should not permit the State to disobey what
Sanders characterizes as a direct ruling by the District Court, affirmed on appeal,
that his
driver's license be suspended for a period of six months. Sanders argues the six-
month
suspension became the law of the case, and asserts the District Court was thus
without
authority to approve the State's decision to revoke Sanders' license for a period of
one year.
Sanders also argues the District Court was collaterally estopped from doing anything
other
than granting his motion for contempt in light of the State's refusal to reinstate
his license
after six months.
¶12 The law of the case doctrine relied upon by Sanders stands for the proposition
that
"the final judgment of the highest court is the final determination of the parties'
rights." Scott
v. Scott (1997), 283 Mont. 169, 175, 939 P.2d 998, 1002 (quoting Fiscus v. Beartooth
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (1979), 180 Mont. 434, 436, 591 P.2d 196, 197). We have
explained that when "the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its
opinion
a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the
law
of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the
trial court
and upon subsequent appeal." Scott, 283 Mont. at 175-76, 939 P.2d at 1002 (quoting
Fiscus,
180 Mont. at 437, 591 P.2d at 197).
¶13 As noted above, on May 8, 1996, the District Court issued an order upholding the
suspension of Sanders' driving privileges for a period of ninety days. Two days
later,
however, the State filed a motion to amend the court's order on the grounds that
Sanders'
driver's license had in fact been suspended for a period of six months, rather than
ninety
days. Thus, on May 15, 1996, the court amended its findings of fact and conclusions
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of law
to reflect that Sanders' "driving privileges were suspended October 30, 1995, for
six (6)
months by the State of Montana, Department of Justice, Motor Vehicle Division."
Although
the court noted the Department of Justice had suspended Sanders' license for six
months, that
observation was but incidental to the court's ultimate conclusion that the officer
who stopped
Sanders had reasonable grounds to believe he was operating his vehicle while under
the
influence of alcohol.
¶14 We affirmed the District Court's decision on appeal, concluding in pertinent
part that
the court had properly amended its findings of fact and conclusions of law to
correct an error
in the procedural history of the case and uphold the State's suspension of Sanders'
license for
a period of six months, rather than ninety days.
¶15 Relying on the foregoing decisions, Sanders argues this Court, as well as the
District
Court, has directly ordered that Sanders' license be suspended for a period of six
months.
Sanders argues our pronouncement became the law of the case, and asserts the
District Court
failed to adhere to our decision when it denied Sanders' motion to hold the State in
contempt
for its refusal to reinstate his driver's license after a six-month suspension.
¶16 As noted, the law of the case doctrine applies only to those principles or
rules of law
enunciated by this Court which are "necessary to the decision" before it. Haines
Pipeline
Construction, Inc. v. Montana Power Co. (1994), 265 Mont. 282, 289, 876 P.2d 632, 637
(citing Zavarelli v. Might (1989), 239 Mont. 120, 124, 779 P.2d 489, 492); Phalen v.
Rilley
(1970), 156 Mont. 91, 93, 475 P.2d 998, 999. Moreover, we have recognized that "[t]
he
doctrine does not extend so far as to include matter which was consequential,
incidental, or
not decided by the court." Phalen, 156 Mont. at 93, 475 P.2d at 999 (quoting
O'Brien v.
Great Northern Ry. Co. (1966), 148 Mont. 429, 439-40, 421 P.2d 710, 715).
¶17 Review of the record indicates that the only substantive question addressed by
the
District Court in its amended findings of fact and conclusions of law was whether
the officer
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who stopped Sanders had reasonable grounds to believe he was operating his vehicle
while
under the influence of alcohol. Moreover, although we held the District Court had
not erred
in amending its decision to uphold the suspension of Sanders' license for six
months, the
issue on appeal was whether the court erred in concluding the officer had reasonable
grounds
to believe Sanders was driving while under the influence of alcohol.
¶18 In fact, clearly not at issue before the District Court, or on appeal, was the
applicable
license suspension or revocation period pursuant to 61-8-402, MCA. Thus, neither
this
Court nor the District Court has had occasion to determine whether 61-8-402, MCA,
mandated that the Department of Justice suspend Sanders' license for a period of
ninety days,
six months, or one year. As mention of the six-month suspension term was not
necessary
to our conclusion that the officer had reasonable grounds to stop Sanders, it did
not become
the law of the case.
¶19 Instead, as we recognized in our January 14, 1997, decision, "[t]he Montana
Department of Justice is responsible for determining the applicable driver's license
suspension period in accordance with 61-8-402, MCA." Section 61-8-402(6), MCA,
provides as follows:
The following suspension and revocation periods are applicable upon refusal
to submit to one or more tests:
. . . .
(b) upon a second or subsequent refusal within 5 years of a previous
refusal, as determined from the records of the department, a revocation of
1 year with no provision for a restricted probationary license.
¶20 The record indicates that the suspension of Sanders' license on October 30,
1995,
resulted from his second testing refusal within a five-year period. Accordingly, as
determined by the Department of Justice and as reflected by Sanders' certified
driving record,
§ 61-8-402(6), MCA, mandated that Sanders' driving privileges be revoked for a
period of
one year. Moreover, the record indicates that Sanders had notice that his refusal
to take a
breath test for the second time within a five-year period would result in the
revocation of his
driving privileges for a period of one year. On January 19, 1996, the parties
stipulated that
Officer Longin had read an Implied Consent Advisory form to Sanders on the night of
his
arrest. The form explained the following: "If you have refused similar testing
within the
past five years and you refuse again today, your driver's license will be seized and
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revoked
for one year."
¶21 The record thus indicates Sanders had notice that, in light of his prior
driving record,
the Department of Justice would revoke his license for a period of one year.
¶22 That the District Court and this Court previously referenced a six-month
suspension
does not mean the court was then bound, pursuant to the law of the case doctrine, to
adhere
to a six-month suspension period. Rather, we conclude that the law of the case
doctrine is
inapplicable under the circumstances, and that the District Court did not err in
denying
Sanders' motion to hold the State in contempt for its refusal to reinstate his
driving privileges
following a six-month suspension.
¶23 Sanders also argues the District Court was collaterally estopped from doing
anything
but granting his motion for contempt. As with the law of the case doctrine,
however, the
collateral estoppel bar only prevents relitigation of those issues actually decided
in a prior
adjudication. Haines Pipeline, 265 Mont. at 288, 876 P.2d at 636. As neither the
District
Court nor this Court had previously addressed the question of whether a six-month
suspension was in fact appropriate under the circumstances of this case, we conclude
the
District Court was not collaterally estopped from denying Sanders' motion for
contempt.
¶24 We have held that a party may not be held in contempt of court for violating an
order,
unless the terms of the order are definite, certain, and specific. Goodover v.
Lindey's, Inc.
(1993), 257 Mont. 38, 42, 847 P.2d 699, 701. Furthermore, we have recognized that
"[i]f
there is no command, there is no disobedience." Goodover, 257 Mont. at 42, 847 P.2d
at
701. Here, although both the District Court and this Court made mention of a six-
month
suspension period, neither court evaluated the statutory propriety of that term or
specifically
ordered its imposition. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the District Court's
decision
denying Sanders' motion for contempt.
/S/ JIM REGNIER
We Concur:
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/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
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