No
No. 98-489
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1999 MT 241
296 Mont. 176
988 P.2d 782
AMERICAN AGRIJUSTERS CO.,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
MONTANA DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY,
BOARD OF LABOR APPEALS,
and ROBERT GILMORE, JR.,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lewis and Clark,
The Honorable Jeffrey M. Sherlock, Judge presiding.
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COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Robert J. Campbell, Department of Labor and Industry, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Robert R. Throssell, Keller, Reynolds, Drake, Johnson & Gillespie, Helena, Montana; R. Laubenthal,
Smith Peterson Law Firm, Council Bluffs, Iowa
Submitted on Briefs: March 18, 1999
Decided: October 14, 1999
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶ The Montana Department of Labor and Industry (the Department) appeals from
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the order of the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, reversing the
decision of the Board of Labor Appeals (the Board), which had adopted the findings
and affirmed the decision of the Department that Robert Gilmore, Jr. (Gilmore), and
other similarly situated crop adjusters were employees of American Agrijusters Co.
(Agrijusters). The District Court determined that Gilmore and similarly situated
crop adjusters were independent contractors and, therefore, that Agrijusters was not
liable for unpaid unemployment insurance tax contributions. We reverse.
¶ We restate the issue on appeal: Did the District Court correctly review the Board's
findings of fact and apply § 39-51-201(14), MCA (1995), in determining that Gilmore
and other similarly situated crop adjusters were independent contractors?
Factual and Procedural Background
¶ On June 1, 1992, Gilmore entered into an Independent Adjusters Agreement with
Agrijusters, pursuant to which he was to provide crop adjusting services to
Agrijusters for the ensuing crop season. Gilmore later quit because he was not
receiving enough work. Thereafter, he filed a claim for unemployment insurance
benefits with the Department but was told that Agrijusters did not report crop
adjusters in the unemployment insurance program. The Unemployment Insurance
Division of the Department determined, on December 15, 1992, that Gilmore and
other similarly situated crop adjusters were employees of Agrijusters for
unemployment insurance tax purposes.
¶ Agrijusters appealed that determination and a hearing on the merits of the dispute
was held on October 3 and 4, 1995, before a Department Hearings Officer. On May
10, 1996, the Hearings Officer affirmed the prior determination, finding that the
work which Gilmore and other similarly situated crop adjusters performed for
Agrijusters constituted employment, and that Gilmore and similarly situated crop
adjusters were not independent contractors.
¶ Agrijusters appealed the Hearings Officer's decision to the Board. The Board, in
affirming the two prior determinations, again found employee and not independent
contractor status for Gilmore and the other similarly situated crop adjusters.
Agrijusters then filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the First Judicial District
Court. On May 26, 1998, the District Court issued an order reversing the three prior
administrative determinations and holding that Gilmore and similarly situated crop
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adjusters were independent contractors.
¶ The Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1520, was established in 1938 to
improve the economic stability of American agriculture by providing a sound system
of crop insurance. Pursuant to the Act, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
(FCIC) was established to promulgate regulations and enter into agreements to
reinsure crop insurance contracts between producers and private insurance
companies. Redland Insurance Company has a Standard Reinsurance Agreement
with the FCIC to reinsure crop insurance contracts. Under the reinsurance
agreement, FCIC adjustment procedures and methods must be followed by Redland
Insurance Company and its subsidiaries. Agrijusters, a subsidiary of Redland
Insurance Company, provides crop adjusters to service loss claims under multiple
peril crop insurance policies.
¶ Agrijusters contracts with crop adjusters to perform crop insurance adjusting in
the field. The individual crop adjusters are hired on an "as needed" basis. Each
adjuster signs an Independent Adjusters Agreement. Crop adjusters may be either
experienced adjusters or inexperienced trainees. Many of the crop adjusters that
Agrijusters contracts with are inexperienced at adjusting claims. Gilmore had no
prior experience as a crop adjuster and knew nothing about the adjusting trade prior
to contracting with Agrijusters.
¶ Trainee crop adjusters are provided with both classroom and on-the-job training
and supervision by experienced adjusters until they master the adjusting procedures
required by federal regulations. Trainees must successfully complete both classroom
and on-the-job training before they are permitted to adjust crop damage on their
own without an experienced adjuster monitoring their performance. Both
experienced and trainee crop adjusters must also complete ongoing education
required by the FCIC, to remain current on changes in industry procedures and
company policies. Gilmore's separation from Agrijusters occurred during the
training stages of the work relationship.
¶ Crop adjusters are compensated at a daily rate as individually specified in each
Independent Adjusters Agreement. Agrijusters also reimburses individual adjusters
for reasonable and necessary expenses, including meals, lodging, mileage, maps,
postage, and telephone calls. However, individual adjusters are responsible for all
office and secretarial expenses, transportation, vehicle maintenance and repair, and
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automobile liability insurance. Beginning in 1995, individual adjusters were also
required to pay for formal classroom training; however, Agrijusters provides
adjusters who successfully pass the tests with a signing bonus of $500 to $700 for
agreeing to provide adjusting services to Agrijusters for the ensuing crop season.
Gilmore attended two training sessions which were paid for by Agrijusters, and was
also reimbursed for the expenses of attending such training.
¶ The equipment necessary to crop adjust is minimal and the majority of individual
adjusters furnish their own equipment. However, some of the adjusters lease their
equipment through Agrijusters, which provides tools such as a calculator, a grain-
measuring scale, a wheel measurer, and/or a tape measurer to these adjusters for a
nominal annual fee. Crop adjusters must also purchase a standardized FCIC crop
adjusting manual for a nominal fee. Adjusters are required to complete their
assessments on standardized FCIC claim forms provided by Agrijusters.
¶ Individual crop adjusters are responsible for scheduling and performing their
duties. Adjusters are not required to work set hours. Nor are adjusters required to
file periodic progress reports with Agrijusters; they must only file a completed policy
report, containing the results of the adjuster's crop assessment, when the job
assignment is completed. Crop adjustment assignments are to be completed by
adjusters in a "reasonable time," preferably as quickly as possible. Adjusters submit
their crop adjustments to Agrijusters for review. If the adjustment was completed
incorrectly and needed to be reworked by the adjuster, then Agrijusters would pay
that adjuster for the time required to revise the adjustment. If the original adjuster
was not available, another adjuster would be asked to revise the adjustment.
¶ Under a standard provision in each Independent Adjusters Agreement, either
party could terminate the relationship for any reason and without cause by giving
the other party ten days written notice. Because of the uncertainty of various
conditions affecting the crop growing season, most adjusters do not work full-time
adjusting crop damage and many adjusters have other primary occupations such as
ranching, farming, real estate sales, teaching school, selling insurance, and so on.
Under the Independent Adjusters Agreement, individual adjusters retain the right to
perform crop adjusting services for other entities. Approximately seventy to eighty
percent of the crop adjusters who contract with Agrijusters perform crop adjusting
services for other companies. Gilmore did not have an independently established
business, crop adjusting or otherwise, during the time that he was under contract
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with Agrijusters.
Discussion
¶ Did the District Court correctly review the Board's findings of fact and apply § 39-
51-201(14), MCA (1995), in determining that Gilmore and other similarly situated
crop adjusters were independent contractors?
¶ A district court's review of a decision by the Board, rather than being governed by
the Montana Administrative Procedure Act, is circumscribed by § 39-51-2410(5),
MCA. Thomas Bros. v. Cargill, Inc. (1996), 276 Mont. 105, 108-09, 915 P.2d 226, 228.
Section 39-51-2410(5), MCA, sets forth the applicable standard of review of a Board
decision:
In any judicial proceeding under 39-51-2406 through 39-51-2410, the findings
of the board as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of
fraud, shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined
to questions of law. . . .
Section 39-51-2410(5), MCA.
¶ The statutory phrase "supported by evidence" has been construed to mean
supported by substantial evidence. Reynolds v. Pacific Telecom, Inc. (1993), 259
Mont. 309, 314, 856 P.2d 1365, 1368. Substantial evidence is "something more than a
scintilla of evidence, but may be less than a preponderance of the evidence." Gypsy
Highview Gathering Sys. Inc. v. Stokes (1986), 221 Mont. 11, 15, 716 P.2d 620, 623.
On judicial review, the sole inquiry with respect to the evidence is " 'whether the
findings are supported by substantial evidence, regardless of whether there is also
substantial evidence or even a preponderance of evidence to the contrary.' " Gypsy
Highview, 221 Mont. at 15, 716 P.2d at 623 (quoting Jordan v. Craighead (1943), 114
Mont. 337, 343, 136 P.2d 526, 528).
¶ Due to this deferential standard of review, it is impermissible, pursuant to § 39-51-
2410(5), MCA, for a district court to "balance conflicting evidence in support of and
in opposition to the Board's findings, determine which is the more substantial
evidence, or consider where the preponderance of the evidence lies . . . ." Thomas
Bros., 276 Mont. at 109, 915 P.2d at 228. Indeed, doing so would effectively nullify
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the "conclusive nature" of the Board's findings. Thomas Bros., 276 Mont. at 109, 915
P.2d at 228. This Court's review of a Board decision in unemployment compensation
cases is governed by the same limited standard. Zimmer-Jackson Assocs., Inc. v.
Department of Labor and Indus. (1988), 231 Mont. 357, 360, 752 P.2d 1095, 1097
(citing Gypsy Highview, 221 Mont. at 15, 716 P.2d at 623); see also § 39-51-2410(6),
MCA.
¶ Since the Board adopted the findings of fact made by the Department's Hearings
Officer, we will review those findings as if they were made by the Board. There is no
allegation of fraud in this matter. Therefore, if the findings of the Board are
supported by substantial evidence, then those findings are conclusive in nature and
both the District Court's and this Court's jurisdiction is limited to the legal question
of whether crop adjusters are employees or independent contractors for
unemployment insurance tax purposes. We review a trial court's conclusion of law as
to whether it is correct. Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470,
474, 803 P.2d 601, 603.
¶ We determine, as discussed below, that the Board's findings are supported by
substantial evidence, and are therefore conclusive and binding. In accord with this
determination, we further conclude that the District Court erred in applying § 39-51-
201(14), MCA (1995), and adjudging that Gilmore and other similarly situated crop
adjusters were independent contractors.
¶ Section 39-51-201(14), MCA (1995), sets forth what has become commonly referred
to as the "AB test":
"Independent contractor" means an individual who renders service in the
course of an occupation and:
(a) has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the
performance of the services, both under a contract and in fact; and
(b) is engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession,
or business.
Section 39-51-201(14), MCA (1995).
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¶ Because the statute utilizes the conjunctive "and" in the definition of "independent
contractor," the absence of either the "A" or "B" portion of the test results in a
conclusion of employment. Northwest Pub. v. Montana Dep’t. of Labor and Indus.
(1993), 256 Mont. 360, 363, 846 P.2d 1030, 1032. Therefore, Agrijusters must satisfy
both prongs of the "AB test" in order to sustain its contention that Gilmore and
other similarly situated crop adjusters are independent contractors. Since we
conclude, for the reasons that follow, that Agrijusters has failed to establish the
"A" (right of control) component of the test, we need not address whether the
"B" (independently established business) part was met.
¶ In determining whether a right of control exists sufficient to give rise to an
employer-employee relationship in a given situation, we have identified four factors
that guide the inquiry: (1) direct evidence of right or exercise of control; (2) method
of payment; (3) furnishing of equipment; and (4) right to fire. Sharp v. Hoerner
Waldorf Corp. (1978), 178 Mont. 419, 425, 584 P.2d 1298, 1301-02 (citing 1A Arthur
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 44.31, at 8-35). These four factors do not
constitute a balancing test. Rather, independent contractor status must be
established by a convincing accumulation of evidence under the factors and other
tests. However, employee status may be established on the strength of the evidence
under one of the four factors standing alone. Sharp, 178 Mont. at 425, 584 P.2d at
1302 (quoting 1A Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 44.31, at 8-35).
As the newest edition of Larson's treatise explains:
[F]or the most part, any single factor is not merely indicative of, but, in
practice, virtually proof of, the employment relation; while, in the opposite
direction, contrary evidence is as to any one factor at best only mildly
persuasive evidence of contractorship, and sometimes is of almost no such
force at all.
3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 61.04, at 61-7
(1999).
(1) Direct Evidence of Right or Exercise of Control
¶ Right of control, as we have repeatedly recognized, is the "most crucial factor" in
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors. Standard Chem.
Mfg. Co. v. Employment Sec. Div. (1980), 185 Mont. 241, 247, 605 P.2d 610, 613; see
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also Zimmer-Jackson, 231 Mont. at 362, 752 P.2d at 1098 (labeling right of control
"the most important factor in determining employment relationships"). It is the
"right, not just the exercise, of control" that is of the utmost importance under this
factor. Sharp, 178 Mont. at 424, 584 P.2d at 1301. Thus, an individual is an employee
of another when that other has the right to control the details, methods, or means of
accomplishing the individual's work, and not just the end result of the work. Sharp,
178 Mont. at 424, 584 P.2d at 1301; Walling v. Hardy Constr. (1991), 247 Mont. 441,
447-48, 807 P.2d 1335, 1339; Johnson v. Montana Dep’t. of Labor and Indus. (1989),
240 Mont. 288, 292-93, 783 P.2d 1355, 1358; St. Regis Paper Co. v. Unemployment
Compensation Comm'n (1971), 157 Mont. 548, 552-53, 487 P.2d 524, 526-27.
¶ Regarding direct evidence of right or exercise of control, the Board found in
relevant part that: (1) Agrijusters provided specific training to crop adjusters to
comply with the requirements and regulations of the FCIC; (2) crop adjusters were
required to adjust crop losses according to FCIC procedures and regulations, and
were not allowed to use their own discretion to select an alternative method to adjust
crop losses; (3) trainee crop adjusters were required to satisfactorily complete both
classroom and on-the-job training, often remaining under the direct supervision of
experienced adjusters for up to two years before being allowed to crop adjust on
their own; and (4) Agrijusters reviewed the completed work of crop adjusters and
returned incomplete or erroneous work to adjusters for revision. These findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record and, therefore, are conclusive in
nature. Notwithstanding these findings, the District Court reasoned that: (1)
Agrijusters did not control the adjuster's day-to-day work activities; (2) Agrijusters
return of insufficient or incorrect work indicates that Agrijusters controls only the
end result of the adjusters' work; and (3) classroom and on-the-job training and
supervision of adjusters to comply with FCIC regulations indicates control by the
FCIC, not Agrijusters.
¶ While we acknowledge that there is substantial evidence in support of a conclusion
that crop adjusters were not subject to close day-to-day supervision by Agrijusters
(for example, adjusters could accept or reject assignments from Agrijusters and were
free to choose their hours of work), we agree with the Department that the District
Court improperly re-weighed the evidence in concluding that the control factor was
not established. As mentioned previously, where the Board's findings are supported
by substantial evidence, it is impermissible for a district court to "balance conflicting
evidence in support of and in opposition to the Board's findings . . . ." Thomas Bros.,
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276 Mont. at 109, 915 P.2d at 228. This is true even where " 'there is also substantial
evidence or even a preponderance of evidence to the contrary.' " Gypsy Highview,
221 Mont. at 15, 716 P.2d at 623 (quoting Jordan, 114 Mont. at 343, 136 P.2d at 528).
Even though there is sufficient evidence in the record for reaching opposite
conclusions, we conclude that the Board's findings of fact are supported by
substantial credible evidence.
¶ In Johnson, a homeowner hired carpenters to complete a remodeling project.
During completion of the remodeling project, the homeowner "did not correct the
carpenters as to the details in the performance of their work," and expected them to
utilize their expertise to achieve his desired outcome for the project. Johnson, 240
Mont. at 292, 783 P.2d at 1358. Noting that the homeowner told the carpenters only
"what he wanted done but not how to do it," this Court concluded that the
homeowner "merely controlled the result" and "not the methods . . . used to
accomplish the end result." Johnson, 240 Mont. at 292-93, 783 P.2d at 1358.
¶ We reach the opposite conclusion here. The findings of the Board demonstrate that
Agrijusters, through training, supervision, and review of completed job assignments,
substantially controlled "how" the crop adjusters performed their adjusting work.
Thus, we hold that Agrijusters exercised a right of control over the means or
methods by which crop adjusters completed their job assignments.
(2) Method of Payment
¶ Under this factor:
"[p]ayment on a time basis is a strong indication of the status of employment.
Payment on a completed project basis is indication of independent contractor
status. Payment on a piece-work or commission basis is consistent with either
status."
Walling, 247 Mont. at 449, 807 P.2d at 1339 (quoting 1C Arthur Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law § 44.33, at 8-94 (1990)).
¶ The District Court concluded that the Board's findings on the method of payment
factor were not supported by substantial evidence. In so concluding, the court
reasoned that:
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[T]he Board found that the adjusters were paid by the hour in two-hour
increments. This finding is not supported by substantial evidence, however.
The adjusters testified that they were paid on a daily, not an hourly, basis. The
day could be broken up into portions, but the adjusters then received payment
for the portion of the day they worked. . . .
Although the adjusters were still paid on a time basis, such a method of
payment is not conclusive of either an independent contractor or an
employment relationship if the method is the custom in the industry. . . . The
fact that adjusters were paid on a per diem basis is consistent with industry
custom and does not establish that the adjusters were employees rather than
independent contractors.
The court further rejected the Board's finding that adjusters were paid for correcting their
work as not supported by substantial evidence, since whether or not such payment was
made "depended on" the nature of the error itself and the time required to rectify it. Based
on the foregoing, the District Court concluded that evidence of payment on a time basis
did not necessarily indicate that crop adjusters were employees.
¶ We disagree with the District Court. The administrative record indicates that crop
adjusters were indeed paid on a per diem basis and, as the court acknowledged, were
paid for partial days on a prorated basis. In particular, there is substantial evidence
suggesting that Agrijusters compensated crop adjusters for partial days by breaking
work days down into "quarters," which, assuming an eight-hour workday, clearly
supports the Board's finding that adjusters were effectively paid in two-hour
increments. Moreover, in concluding that the Board's finding on compensation for
work corrections was not supported by substantial evidence, it appears that the
District Court ignored credible testimony that crop adjusters were paid for the
period of time it took to revise an inaccurate or incorrect claim unless the error was
attributable to the individual adjuster's clear failure to follow required federal
procedures in adjusting crop losses for Agrijusters.
¶ As noted previously, payment by a unit of time, such as an hour, day, or week, is
strong evidence of employment status. See Walling, 247 Mont. at 449, 807 P.2d at
1339; 3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law §
61.06(1), at 61-12 (1999). We hold that the Board's findings on method of payment
are supported by substantial evidence, and that the Board correctly concluded that
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payment of adjusters on a time basis is strongly indicative of employee rather than
independent contractor status.
(3) Furnishing of Equipment
¶ Both the Board and the District Court found that crop adjusters needed only
"minimal" equipment to complete their jobs (for example, a manual, a calculator,
and measuring tapes or wheels), and that adjusters either provided their own
equipment or leased the necessary equipment from Agrijusters for a nominal annual
fee. These findings are supported by substantial evidence. However, the District
Court also found that adjusters had to provide the most significant piece of
equipment, a vehicle, themselves; and had to supply their own office supplies and
place of business. Based on the foregoing, the District Court concluded that the
record "suggests that the adjusters were independent contractors."
¶ With respect to the District Court's additional findings that an adjuster's provision
of a vehicle and a place of business "suggests" independent contractor status, it
appears that the court again improperly re-weighed the evidence when it should have
instead concluded that the Board's findings were conclusive because supported by
substantial evidence. Furthermore, there is no indication in the record that adjusters
were required by Agrijusters to maintain an office or place of business, and
numerous individual crop adjusters testified that they did not maintain a separate
office or place of business for crop adjusting. The District Court's analysis also
appears to ignore the economic reality underlying the undisputed fact that even
though adjusters provided their own vehicles, Agrijusters reimbursed adjusters for
any work-related mileage on their vehicles.
¶ As this Court has observed, an employment relationship "almost invariably exists"
where the "employer furnishes valuable equipment." Solheim v. Tom Davis Ranch
(1984), 208 Mont. 265, 273, 677 P.2d 1034, 1038 (citing 1C Arthur Larson,
Workmen's Compensation Law § 44.34, at 8-95 to 8-104), overruled on other
grounds by Haag v. Montana Sch. Group Ins. Auth. (1995), 274 Mont. 109, 906 P.2d
693; accord Johnson, 240 Mont. at 293, 783 P.2d at 1359. Nevertheless,"[p]roof
showing a worker furnished his [or her] own equipment is not necessarily fatal to a
finding of employee status." Solheim, 208 Mont. at 273-74, 677 P.2d at 1038 (citing
1C Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 44.34, at 8-95 to 8-104); accord
Johnson, 240 Mont. at 293, 783 P.2d at 1359. Specifically, as the newest edition of the
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Larson treatise elucidates:
Since the furnishing even of heavy and valuable equipment by workers is
frequently inadequate to establish independent contractorship, a fortiori very
little weight is given to the furnishing by the worker of such small items as
trowels, hammers and other hand tools, axes, brushes, knives, snips, and
paperhanging equipment.
3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 61.07(7), at 61-
21 (1999).
¶ We determine that this case falls within the foregoing observation. This Court has
cautioned that the furnishing of equipment "test does not cut in both directions with
equal force." Solheim, 208 Mont. at 273, 677 P.2d at 1038. Given the economic reality
that crop adjusting requires minimal tools and our foregoing conclusions on the
other Sharp factors, we hold that the furnishing of minimal equipment by crop
adjusters does not necessarily indicate independent contractor status and, in fact,
tends to militate in favor of employee status here.
(4) Right to Fire
¶ " 'The power to fire,' " as this Court has recognized, " 'is the power to control.' "
Solheim, 208 Mont. at 274, 677 P.2d at 1039 (quoting 1C Arthur Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law § 44.35, at 8-116 to 8-122). The absolute right to terminate the
work relationship without liability is regarded as inconsistent with the concept of an
independent contractor, pursuant to which the contractor should have the legal right
to complete the project under contract and to treat any attempt to prevent
completion as a breach of contract. Solheim, 208 Mont. at 274, 677 P.2d at 1039
(quoting 1C Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 44.35, at 8-116 to 8-
122).
¶ Concerning the right to fire, the Board found only as follows: "Either party can
terminate the 'Independent Adjuster's Agreement' for any reason or for no reason
by the terminating party giving ten (10) days prior written notice to the other." Thus,
the Board concluded: "Absent conspicuously from the contract is any liability for
termination of the 'independent adjuster' relationship." Numerous individual crop
adjusters testified that they thought or believed that Agrijusters could fire crop
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adjusters at any time. However, the record is less than clear as to whether a failure to
provide ten days written notice prior to termination would subject the terminating
party to liability for breach of contract. The District Court reasoned in its order that
"if the agreement was terminated orally or with less than ten days' notice, the
terminating party breached the contract and faced potential liability."
¶ Agrijusters urges this Court to hold that, since the Board made an erroneous legal
conclusion on the right to fire, the District Court owed the Board no deference with
respect to the fourth Sharp factor. While the District Court's legal conclusion might
well be correct, we conclude, nonetheless, that application of the four Sharp factors
to the evidence in this case does not, on the whole, add up to a convincing
accumulation of the evidence in favor of a conclusion of independent contractor
status for Gilmore and the other similarly situated crop adjusters.
¶ In conclusion, we hold that the District Court erred in reversing the decision of the
Board. Thus, we vacate the District Court's order and remand this case to the
District Court for remand to the Department, with directions for entry of judgment
on the Board's decision.
¶ Reversed and remanded.
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
We Concur:
/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
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