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No. 98-620
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1999 MT 198
295 Mont. 409
983 P.2d 995
JAMES M. VAN HOOK and CHARLENE E.
VAN HOOK,
Defendants and Appellants,
v.
TODD JENNINGS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
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In and for the County of Mineral,
The Honorable John W. Larson, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Quentin M. Rhoades, Sullivan & Tabaracci; Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Timothy D. Geiszler, Geiszler & Newcomer, PLLP; Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 11, 1999
Decided: August 26, 1999
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
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Justice Jim Regnier delivered the opinion of the Court.
q ¶James M. Van Hook and Charlene E. Van Hook (collectively, the Van Hooks)
appeal from the order of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Mineral County,
granting summary judgment to Todd Jennings in this action to declare the existence
and enforceability of an access easement. We reverse.
q ¶The sole issue before us is whether the District Court erred in awarding summary
judgment to Jennings.
BACKGROUND
r ¶Jennings and the Van Hooks own neighboring tracts of property located in
Mineral County, Montana, which lay in Section 34, Township 19 North,
Range 27 West, P.M.M. and Section 3, Township 18 North, Range 27 West, P.
M.M. Prior to 1965, both tracts, along with additional parcels of surrounding
property in Sections 34 and 3, were owned by Roy and Virginia Leland. On
September 1, 1965, the Lelands conveyed the tract currently belonging to the
Van Hooks to John and Barbara Shaw.
r ¶The conveyance of property from the Lelands to the Shaws was made
subject to the following reservation of rights:
(b) Said property is subject to a right of way for an existing private road
which extends across said property for the purpose of reaching other lands in
said Sections 34 and 3. The grantors reserve the right to use the existing
private road, which crosses said property, for the use and benefit of Section 3
and the S1/2,, [sic] the NW1/4 of the NE1/4, the NE1/4 of the NW1/4 and the
S1/2 of the NW1/4 of Section 34, Township 19 North, Range 27 W.M.M.,
[sic] excepting the land covered by this deed, and for the use and benefit of
the grantors, their heirs, successors and assigns in the ownership of said lands.
The grantees shall have the right to use of said private road across other
portions of said Sections 34 and 3 for the purpose of reaching their property.
The grantees shall not block said private road at any point but shall leave the
same clear for use by the grantors or their successors in the ownership of the
land in said Sections 34 and 3 herein described. The grantors shall have no
responsibility for the upkeep or maintenance of said private road nor any
liability in connection with the use of said road by any person. Said private
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road also may be subject to use for the purpose of reaching lands other than
those in said Sections 34 and 3.
(c) The grantors further reserve an easement within 25 feet of the existing
private road as now located across the property covered by this deed, for the
construction of utilities in the future as may be desired for the grantors' other
lands in said Sections 3 and 34 herein described.
s ¶Both parties agree that pursuant to the 1965 deed, Jennings possesses a
right of access over a road which traverses the whole of the Van Hook
property in a generally east-west direction (hereinafter, the Jennings
Road). A dispute exists, however, with regard to whether Jennings' right
of access extends over a road which T-intersects with the Jennings Road
inside the Van Hook property near the southeastern boundary of the
Van Hook parcel and runs in a northern direction beyond the Van Hook
property toward the center of the southwestern corner of Section 34
(hereinafter, the Subject Roadway).
s ¶This case was submitted to the District Court on competing motions
for summary judgment on the sole issue of whether the 1965 deed
between the Lelands and the Shaws provides Jennings with a right of
way over the Subject Roadway. The District Court conducted a hearing
and entered judgment in favor of Jennings. The Van Hooks appeal the
District Court's denial of their motion for summary judgment and the
entry of summary judgment in favor of Jennings.
DISCUSSION
s ¶Did the District Court err in entering summary judgment in
favor of Jennings?
s ¶We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.
Wendell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1999 MT 17, ¶ 9, 974
P.2d 623, ¶ 9, 56 St.Rep. 73, ¶ 9. When we review a district
court's grant of summary judgment, we apply the same criteria as
that used by the district court. Wendell, ¶ 9. Summary judgment is
proper where no genuine issues of material fact exist and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56
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(c), M.R.Civ.P. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from
the offered proof are to be drawn in favor of the party opposing
the summary judgment. Wood v. Old Trapper Taxi (1997), 286
Mont. 18, 23, 952 P.2d 1375, 1381.
s ¶In its Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Judgment
and Reconsideration, the District Court determined that the
reservation of rights in the 1965 deed was ambiguous because,
although the grant refers in the singular to an existing private road
over which the easement would lie, the purpose of the grantors
was to reserve as many means of access as possible to their
remaining properties. The District Court concluded that in
reserving an easement "for the use and benefit of Section 3 and
the S1/2,, [sic] the NW1/4 of the NE1/4, the NE1/4 of the NW1/4
and the S1/2 of the NW1/4 of Section 34," the grantors intended
to include the use of the Subject Roadway, because "[g]iven the
topography of Mineral County in general, and of the specific area
at issue, the benefit to Grantor can only be achieved from an
interpretation which gives an expanded application to include the
Subject Roadway." Therefore, the District Court concluded, "[a]
ccess in this rough terrain can only be accomplished by the use of
a broad definition of 'road' to include the Subject Roadway, and
as such this overall intent will override any limitation of the
singular use of 'road' in the reservation."
s ¶A transfer of property is to be interpreted in like manner with
contracts in general. Section 70-1-513, MCA. The interpretation
and construction of a contract presents a question of law. City
Council of Laramie v. Kreiling (Wyo. 1996), 911 P.2d 1037,
1049; Redlin v. Redlin (N.D. 1989), 436 N.W.2d 5, 7; see also
Wendell, ¶ 10 (the interpretation of an insurance policy presents a
question of law). A contract should be interpreted so as to give
effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the
time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.
Section 28-3-301, MCA. When a contract is reduced to writing,
the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing
alone if possible. Section 28-3-303, MCA.
s ¶The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation if the
language is clear and explicit and does not involve an absurdity.
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Section 28-3-401, MCA. Where the language of an agreement is
clear and unambiguous, the duty of the court is to apply the
language as written. Carelli v. Hall (1996), 279 Mont. 202, 209,
926 P.2d 756, 761.
s ¶The same principles are applied in determining the meaning of
an easement grant. Ambiguities in a reservation of rights in any
grant of property are to be interpreted in favor of the grantor.
Section 70-1-516, MCA. However, the breadth and scope of an
easement are determined upon the actual terms of the grant. See
Section 70-17-106, MCA; Bridger v. Lake (1995), 271 Mont.
186, 191, 896 P.2d 406, 408.
s ¶We disagree with the District Court's conclusion that the
reservation of rights in the 1965 deed is ambiguous because the
reservation of rights over a single roadway conflicts with the
grantors' intent to reserve as many means of access as possible to
their remaining properties. A contract is ambiguous where the
terms of the contract are susceptible to more than one
interpretation. Carelli, 279 Mont. at 209, 926 P.2d at 761. The
easement in this case is described as "a right of way" over "an
existing private road which extends across" the servient tenement
"for the use and benefit of Section 3 and the S1/2, the NW1/4 of
the NE1/4, the NE1/4 of the NW1/4 and the S1/2 of Section 34."
That the grantors intended to utilize the easement "for the use and
benefit of Section 3 and the S1/2, the NW1/4 of the NE1/4, the
NE1/4 of the NW1/4 and the S1/2 of Section 34" indicates the use
to which the easement would be put, not the scope of the
easement itself.
s ¶To determine the scope of the easement, we refer to the
language in the reservation which expressly describes the rights
being reserved, which is "a right of way" over "an existing private
road which extends across" the servient tenement. The terms
"right of way" and "an existing private road" are used consistently
throughout the reservation of rights to describe the extent of the
easement reserved by the Lelands. Had the Lelands intended to
include all roads then in existence within the scope of their right
of way, they could easily have done so by drafting the reservation
of rights to read "rights of way" over "existing private roads."
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This they did not do.
s ¶Moreover, the Jennings Road is: (1) "an existing private road";
(3) "which extends across said property"; and (3) may be used
"for the purpose of reaching other lands in said Sections 34 and
3." By itself, therefore, the Jennings Road adequately satisfies
each of the criteria used to describe the easement. The inclusion
of additional roadways within the scope of the easement is not
necessary in order to give full effect to the language of the deed,
but rather, would only frustrate the plain meaning of the term "an
existing private road."
s ¶We hold that the reservation of rights in the 1965 deed is not
ambiguous on its face, because the reservation of a single right of
way over an existing private road does not conflict with the
intended use of the easement to benefit the grantors' remaining
properties in Sections 34 and 3. For these reasons, we hold that
the District Court's conclusion that the grantors' intent "override
[s] any limitation of the singular use of 'road' in the reservation"
was in error.
s ¶We further hold that the District Court erred in entering
summary judgement in favor of Jennings. We therefore reverse
the judgment of the District Court and remand this case with
instructions that summary judgment be entered in favor of the
Van Hooks.
/S/ JIM REGNIER
We Concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
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/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
Justice W. William Leaphart, dissenting.
1. ¶I dissent. I would affirm the decision of the District Court.
The express language of the 1965 deed refers to an
"existing private road," in the singular. That reference
conflicts with other deed language that describes the
parcels benefitting from the roadway as being almost 75%
of the entire Section 34 which was retained by the grantors.
The Subject Roadway is the only means of physical access
to much of these lands, including the northern portions of
Section 34 now owned by Jennings as well the adjacent
parcel of Section 34 now owned by Sigsby.
2. ¶When interpreting written documents, the cardinal rule of
construction is to glean the intent of the parties from the
four corners of the document and not to focus on isolated
tracks, clauses and words. Rumph v. Dale Edwards, Inc.
(1979), 183 Mont. 359, 368, 600 P.2d 163, 168. The
District Court determined that the overall intent of the deed
was to reserve access to the grantors to roughly 75% of
Section 34. Undisputed testimony was presented by
Jennings regarding the mountainous terrain served by the
Subject Roadway. This testimony constitutes "evidence of
the circumstances under which the agreement was made or
to which it relates . . . ." Section 70-20-202(2), MCA.
Access to those portions of Section 34 in this mountainous
terrain can only be accomplished by employing a broad
definition of "road" so as to include the Subject Roadway.
It was incumbent upon the District Court to construe the
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reservation "in favor of the grantor." Section 70-1-516,
MCA; see also Reichle v. Anderson (1997), 284 Mont.
384, 389, 943 P.2d 1324, 1327 (noting that a grantor who
reserves an easement retains the rights "intended to be
enjoyed" by that reservation). I agree with the District
Court that the intended purpose of accessing Section 34
overrides any limitation inherent in the singular use of
"road" or "right of way" in the reservation.
3. ¶The Court implicitly recognizes that the "use to which the
easement would be put"--to reserve reasonable access to
Section 3 and the S½, the NW¼ of the NE¼, the NE¼ of
the NW¼ and the S½ of the NW¼ of Section 34--also
defines the benefits intended to be enjoyed by the grantors'
original reservation of that easement. As the Court puts it,
the easement was intended "to benefit the grantors'
remaining properties in Sections 34 and 3." However,
because a "mountain ridge" separates the NE¼ of the SW¼
from the remainder of Jennings' holdings in Section 34, the
Court's plain language approach achieves an absurd result
in that it denies the grantors' successor in interest, Jennings,
reasonable access to much of the lands originally retained
by the grantor and intended to be enjoyed by the
reservation of the easement.
4. ¶"The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation
if the language is clear and explicit and does not involve an
absurdity." Section 28-3-401, MCA. In focusing solely
upon the singular use of terms in the deed, the Court has
cut off access to much of Section 34. In so doing, the Court
has ignored the overriding purpose of the grantors'
reservation of the easement--to benefit all, and not just part,
of the grantors' retained lands in Sections 3 and 34. The
District Court's resolution of this matter was the more
reasonable: by construing the term "road" to include the
Subject Roadway, the court gave the conveyance a
construction in favor of the grantors necessary to give
Jennings, the successor in interest to the grantors,
practicable physical access to all of the parcels intended to
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be enjoyed by the grantors' reservation of the easement. I
would affirm.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage and Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., join
in the foregoing dissent of Justice W. William Leaphart.
/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
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