State v. Keys

No

No. 98-349

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1999 MT 10

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL LEE KEYS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,

In and for the County of Flathead,

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-349%20Opinion.htm (1 of 11)4/5/2007 4:25:09 PM
No

The Honorable Katherine R. Curtis, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Daniel R. Wilson; Daniel R. Wilson, P.C.; Kalispell, Montana

For Respondent:

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; C. Mark Fowler

Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana

Thomas J. Esch, Flathead County Attorney; Kalispell, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: November 19, 1998

Decided: January 25, 1999

Filed:

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-349%20Opinion.htm (2 of 11)4/5/2007 4:25:09 PM
 No

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice Jim Regnier delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶1. On October 7, 1996, Michael Lee Keys was charged by information in the
Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, with felony theft in violation of §
45-6-301(1)(c), MCA. Keys pled not guilty on October 17, 1996. On June 9, 1997,
Keys entered an Alford plea pursuant to a plea agreement. On June 26, 1997, the
District Court ordered that Keys' sentence be deferred for six years, two years longer
than Keys had agreed to in the plea agreement. On July 3, 1997, Keys filed a motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. The District Court denied the motion on February 26,
1998. Keys filed a notice of appeal on April 21, 1998. We affirm the judgment of the
District Court.

¶2. The issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion
when it denied Keys' motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶3. In 1994, Michael Lee Keys loaned $550 to Lance Vitt. By late 1995, Vitt had not
returned Keys' money, so Keys agreed with Vitt to accept a motorcycle as collateral
for the loan. Keys later needed money and so asked for and received Vitt's
permission to pawn the motorcycle. Keys pawned the motorcycle to his father and
left it at his father's residence near Kalispell. Shortly before the felony theft charge
was filed against Keys, the sheriff's department received a complaint regarding the
motorcycle. According to the information provided to the sheriff, the motorcycle
actually belonged to Quentin Vitt, Lance Vitt's father.

¶4. On October 7, 1996, the Flathead County Attorney charged Keys with the offense
of theft, a felony, and charged Keys' father with the same offense. Keys appeared for
arraignment on October 17, 1996, at which time he entered a plea of not guilty.

¶5. Keys negotiated a settlement whereby he would enter an Alford plea to the offense
of felony theft. The plea agreement provided that in exchange for Keys' Alford plea,
the State would recommend that the imposition of his sentence be deferred for a

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-349%20Opinion.htm (3 of 11)4/5/2007 4:25:09 PM
 No

period of four years, and further provided that the State would dismiss the related
criminal charge against Keys' father.

¶6. At the change of plea hearing, the District Court tried to determine whether Keys
understood that the court was not a party to the plea agreement. Keys first
responded that he did not understand what the judge was saying. He then explained
that he had agreed to plead guilty in order to receive the sentence contained in the
plea agreement, or in Keys' words "for what's on that paper." Although Keys
expressed some difficulty understanding the court, the District Court was assured
that Keys finally understood that it was not bound to follow the State's sentencing
recommendation. After a lengthy question and answer period, during which Keys
said that he did not understand that the court is not bound by the plea agreement,
the court asked "do you, now?" and Keys replied "yeah." The District Court then
asked Keys if he still wanted to go forward with the agreement, and Keys said "yes."

¶7. When the District Court announced Keys' sentence, it declined to follow the plea
agreement by deferring imposition of the sentence for six years, rather than four
years. Seven days later, Keys filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, urging the
District Court to find that the plea was not knowingly and intelligently made. The
State opposed the motion but conceded that the motion was timely.

¶8. Keys' attorney later testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw Keys'
guilty plea that, in his opinion, Keys never really understood that the District Court
was not bound by the plea agreement. Keys' attorney testified that he assumed Keys
would read the agreement himself and formulate his own questions about it before
pleading guilty, but that he did not know that Keys could not read. Keys later
explained to the District Court that he pled guilty out of a sense of loyalty to his
father.

¶9. The District Court entered an order which denied Keys' motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. The court determined that the timeliness of Keys' motion was highly
questionable, that there was an adequate interrogation of Keys regarding his
understanding and consequences of the guilty plea, and that Keys had signed a plea
agreement which constituted a waiver of his rights.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-349%20Opinion.htm (4 of 11)4/5/2007 4:25:09 PM
 No

¶10. The issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion
when it denied Keys' motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

¶11. Pursuant to § 46-16-105(2), MCA, a court may for good cause permit the plea of
guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted. We review a district
court's discretion to grant or deny a motion for the withdrawal of a guilty plea for an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Bowley (1997), 282 Mont. 298, 304, 938 P.2d 592, 595.
To determine whether good cause existed and whether there was an abuse of
discretion, we consider the following factors: (1) the adequacy of the district court's
interrogation at the time of the plea regarding the defendant's understanding of the
consequences of the plea; (2) the fact that the plea was the result of a plea bargain in
which the guilty plea was given in exchange for dismissal of another charge; and (3)
the promptness with which the defendant attempted to withdraw the plea. See State
v. Johnson (1995), 274 Mont. 124, 127-28, 907 P.2d 150, 152.

¶12. The test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea
represents a "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent choice among the alternative
courses of action open to the defendant." State v. Radi (1991), 250 Mont. 155, 159, 818
P.2d 1203, 1206 (quoting North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160,
27 L. Ed. 2d 162). This Court will deem a guilty plea involuntary when it appears
that the defendant was laboring under such a strong inducement, fundamental
mistake, or serious mental condition that the possibility exists he may have pled
guilty to a crime of which he is innocent. See State v. Miller (1991), 248 Mont. 194,
197, 810 P.2d 308, 310. If there is any doubt that a guilty plea was not voluntarily or
intelligently made, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant. See State v.
Enoch (1994), 269 Mont. 8, 18, 887 P.2d 175, 181.

DISCUSSION

A. The adequacy of the District Court's interrogation at the time of the plea

¶13. Keys maintains that he did not understand that by signing the plea agreement
and entering a plea of guilty, the District Court was not bound by the plea
agreement. Keys claims that his inability to understand that a plea agreement
contains only a sentence recommendation and not a sentence guarantee is due to the
fact that he cannot read and because his attorney never properly explained the
agreement to him. He further contends that no matter how many times he was told

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-349%20Opinion.htm (5 of 11)4/5/2007 4:25:09 PM
 No

about the significance of the plea agreement and the District Court's policy regarding
plea agreements, he was never made to completely understand. Keys, however,
admits that he was told no less than ten times that the District Court was not bound
by the plea agreement. The first instance was by the District Court at Keys'
arraignment, the second was by Keys' own attorney, the third was by the written
plea agreement signed by Keys three days before he pled guilty, and the other seven
instances were by the District Court at the change of plea hearing.

¶14. Pursuant to § 46-12-201(1), MCA, the District Court has a duty to determine
Keys' understanding of the consequences of this guilty plea before the court accepts
the guilty plea. The statute does not require that the District Court guarantee that
Keys continues to retain his understanding after the plea hearing ends and the court
renders a sentence. The issue here therefore is whether Keys understood the
consequences of his guilty plea when he entered his guilty plea.

¶15. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the District Court did not
err when it found that Keys understood its policy regarding plea agreements and
entered his plea voluntarily and knowingly. At the change of plea hearing, the
District Court referred to the plea agreement provision regarding waiver of rights in
which Keys acknowledged "I am not suffering from any mental disease or defect . . .
nor am I acting under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or prescription medicine."
Keys told the District Court that he was sober and clearheaded and that nothing
impeded his judgment. Yet, without offering any evidence, Keys now claims that he
suffered from a fundamental mistake about the District Court's policy regarding
plea agreements. We disagree with Keys that the District Court should have known
that he was allegedly suffering from a disability at the time of the plea hearing.
Moreover, at the end of a lengthy colloquy between the District Court and Keys
regarding whether Keys understood that the District Court is not bound by the plea
agreement, the following dialogue occurred:

KEYS: I'll say I didn't understand that part.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you now?

KEYS: Yeah.
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-349%20Opinion.htm (6 of 11)4/5/2007 4:25:09 PM
 No

THE COURT: Okay. Do you still want to go forward with this agreement?

KEYS: Yeah.

¶16. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by accepting the
representations of a sober, clear-minded person who, while showing some difficulties
understanding the proceedings, expressed to the District Court's satisfaction a clear
statement of understanding at the time the court accepted his plea. The District
Court took great pains to resolve Keys' difficulties, and the record establishes that
Keys stated that he did in fact understand. The District Court is entitled to rely on
Keys' oral and written representations and, absent some indication of a disability at
the time of the hearing, accept his plea as voluntary and intelligent.

B. The fact that Keys' Alford plea was the result of a plea bargain

¶17. Keys claims that the fact that he pled guilty pursuant to a plea bargain should
not militate against the withdrawal of his plea. He urges this Court to disregard the
State's agreement to dismiss the charges against his father as consideration because
Keys claims he did not directly benefit from the dismissal. Contrary to Keys' claim,
however, the State's dismissal of charges against his father did directly benefit Keys.
Keys prevented the potential loss of his father's liberty and, as Keys stated, he pled
guilty out of loyalty to his father.

¶18. The plea bargain agreement between Keys and the State is a contract which is
subject to contract law standards. See State v. Butler (1995), 272 Mont. 286, 291, 900
P.2d 908, 911. Thus, Keys must show that there existed no consideration to support
the plea agreement in order to invalidate it. See Nitzel v. Wickman (1997), 283 Mont.
304, 309, 940 P.2d 451, 454. In this case, there was consideration in the form of the
State's promises of benefits to Keys, including the dismissal of charges against his
father. This was both a benefit to Keys and a detriment to the State. The fact that the
State forewent its prosecution of Keys' father creates valid consideration for the
contract. The State had a right to pursue its charge against Keys' father. By

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-349%20Opinion.htm (7 of 11)4/5/2007 4:25:09 PM
 No

dismissing the case, the State suffered the deprivation of a right which the law did
not require. See § 28-2-801, MCA. Valid contract consideration includes the promise
to refrain from suing or pressing a claim. See Devon Oil & Gas Co. v. Ayers (1985),
218 Mont. 223, 227, 707 P.2d 523, 526. Moreover, the State fulfilled promises to Keys
other than refraining from prosecuting his father, namely the State promised a
deferral of Keys' own sentence. Finally, after the State dismissed the case against
Keys' father pursuant to the plea agreement, and the District Court rendered the
sentence, Keys told his attorney, "I didn't get the deal I was supposed to get." The
record therefore refutes Keys' assertion that the State's promise to dismiss his
father's charges was the sole inducement for him to plead guilty. Keys clearly
understood the benefit he would receive by accepting the plea agreement and by
entering an Alford plea.

¶19. We have held that we will not assist a defendant in escaping the obligations of
his plea agreement after he has received its benefits. See State v. Nance (1947), 120
Mont. 152, 166, 184 P.2d 554, 561. We conclude that Keys did benefit from the plea
agreement with the State and has failed to invalidate it by establishing that no
consideration existed.

C. The promptness with which Keys attempted to withdraw his plea

¶20. In a determination of whether a defendant should be permitted to withdraw a
guilty plea, we finally consider how promptly the defendant has moved to withdraw
the plea. See State v. Bowley (1997), 282 Mont, 298, 304, 938 P.2d 592, 595. Because
the State conceded that Keys' motion was timely made, however, promptness is not
in dispute and therefore we need not address this issue on appeal.

¶21. Upon a review of the record, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse
its discretion by denying Keys' motion to withdraw his guilty plea because (1) the
District Court's interrogation of Keys provided him with an adequate understanding
of the effect of the plea agreement; (2) Keys' plea bargain agreement which he struck
with the State is valid and did benefit Keys; and (3) although Keys' request to
withdraw his guilty plea was timely, promptness cannot outweigh all of the evidence
which weighs in favor of the District Court's decision when analyzing the other
factors. Keys entered his guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently and there exists no
good cause to now permit Keys to withdraw it.

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-349%20Opinion.htm (8 of 11)4/5/2007 4:25:09 PM
 No

¶22. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

/S/ JIM REGNIER

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

Justice W. William Leaphart, dissenting.

¶23. I dissent. If there is any doubt that a guilty plea was not voluntarily or
intelligently made, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant. See State v.
Enoch (1994), 269 Mont. 8, 18, 887 P.2d 175, 181 (citations omitted). Given the fact
that this defendant could not read and given his obvious state of confusion as to the
role of the court in accepting a plea pursuant to a plea agreement, it is apparent to
me that there was doubt that Keys' plea was voluntarily and intelligently made.

¶24. In his colloquy with the court at the change of plea hearing, Keys made it very
clear that he understood that he had an agreement that his sentence would be
deferred for a period of four years and that the State would dismiss the related
charged against Keys' father. Keys stated, "[w]ell, the reason I'm signing that,
pleading guilty, because that's what I agreed to do, to say I'm guilty for what's on

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-349%20Opinion.htm (9 of 11)4/5/2007 4:25:09 PM
 No

that paper." When advised by the court that the Judge can "change" the sentence
from what was agreed on, Keys responded "[w]hy is the paper made up? . . . So the
paper don't really mean anything?" Again, the court explained that the agreement
was between Keys and the State and that the State was bound to make the agreed
upon recommendation but the court was not bound to follow that recommendation.
Again, Keys expressed confusion: "Well, if the paper was good, the one I signed, ain't
that the way it should be? Or, I mean, if you don't agree to it, the paper aint' no
good?" The court then continued in its effort to disabuse him of his belief that the
agreement guaranteed him a specific sentence. Finally, Keys indicated that he
understood what the court was saying and that he wanted to proceed to change his
plea. His counsel then proceeded to question him and took great pains to point out
that, unless something unexpected came up in the presentence investigation, there
was no reason to think that the court would not go along with the agreement. More
importantly however, the court, on two subsequent occasions in the discussion,
reaffirmed Keys' understanding that the court was in agreement with the agreed
upon four-year deferment. The court asked Keys whether he understood what a
deferred sentence was. Keys indicated that if he did what he was told and stayed out
of trouble, "then it's off my record." To which the court replied: "Exactly. And you
understood that you'll be on probation for four years?" Shortly thereafter, Keys
indicated that the agreement was a good deal because, if he complied, everything
would be dropped. The court, in confirming his understanding, again specifically
referenced the agreed upon four-year deferment: "Because, even though you have to
abide by the rules and all that stuff for four years, at the end of that, assuming that
you have done what you're supposed to, that's important to you?"

¶25. The court did all that it could to fully explain to Keys that the court is not a
party to the plea agreement. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the court's role in
accepting a change of plea pursuant to a plea agreement is confusing even to those
schooled in the law. In reviewing the record before us, I am convinced that Keys, who
was unable to read the controlling statutes or the plea agreement itself, but who had
a layman's understanding of an "agreement," was confused by the assurances that
there was no reason to think that the court would not go along with the agreement,
and by the court's concluding references to the agreed upon four-year deferment. I
would resolve the doubt in favor of allowing Keys to withdraw his plea of guilty.

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-349%20Opinion.htm (10 of 11)4/5/2007 4:25:09 PM
 No

Justices Terry N. Trieweiler and William E. Hunt, Sr., join in the foregoing dissent of
Justice W. William Leaphart.

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/98-349%20Opinion.htm (11 of 11)4/5/2007 4:25:09 PM