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No. 00-729
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2001 MT 193
KAREN CALCATERRA, individually and as the
Personal Representative of the Estate of Carl J.
Calcaterra, deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MONTANA RESOURCES,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District,
In and for the County of Silver Bow,
Honorable John W. Whelan, Judge Presiding
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Bernard J. Ben Everett, Knight, Dahood, McLean & Everett,
Anaconda, Montana
For Respondent:
Ronald B. MacDonald, Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind,
Missoula, Montana
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Submitted on Briefs: March 1, 2001
Decided: September 20, 2001
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Karen Calcaterra (Karen) filed a Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., motion for reconsideration
and relief from a judgment of dismissal, based on a change in the law, in the Second
Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County. The motion was deemed denied after the
District Court failed to timely rule on it, and Karen appeals. We affirm.
¶2 The issue on appeal is whether the denial of Karen's Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., motion
was an abuse of discretion. BACKGROUND
¶3 The underlying case was before us in Calcaterra v. Montana Resources, 1998 MT 187,
289 Mont. 424, 962 P.2d 590. Karen, the surviving spouse and personal representative of
the estate of Carl J. Calcaterra (Carl), brought a wrongful death and survivorship action
against Montana Resources, Carl's employer, alleging it violated federal safety regulations
by directing Carl to work on an unsecured ladder, thereby intentionally and maliciously
causing Carl's injuries and death. Calcaterra, ¶ 7. Montana Resources moved to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss but did not rule on
the alternative motion. Calcaterra, ¶ 7.
¶5 Montana Resources subsequently renewed its motion for summary judgment, arguing
Karen's claims were barred by § 39-71-411, MCA, because the Montana Workers'
Compensation Act (the Act) was the exclusive remedy for Carl's injuries and death. The
District Court granted summary judgment to Montana Resources, dismissed Karen's
complaint, and entered judgment accordingly. Calcaterra, ¶ 8. Karen appealed, and we
affirmed on July 29, 1998, concluding that she "failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether Montana Resources caused Carl's injuries and death via an
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intentional and malicious act or omission." Calcaterra, ¶ 22. In reaching that conclusion,
we relied on Schmidt v. State (1997), 286 Mont. 98, 105, 951 P.2d 23, 28, for the
proposition that proof of negligence, even wanton negligence, is not sufficient to avoid the
exclusive remedy of the Act. Calcaterra, ¶¶ 20-21.
¶6 Subsequently, we clarified the definition of "intentional and malicious" within the
context of § 39-71-413, MCA. In Sherner v. Conoco, Inc., 2000 MT 50, ¶ 37, 298 Mont.
401, ¶ 37, 995 P.2d 990, ¶ 37, we held that "intentional and malicious act" as used in § 39-
71-413, MCA, is defined according to the plain language of that statute and the definition
of "actual malice"contained in § 27-1-221(2), MCA. Departing from previous cases, we
stated we would no longer "weave together a patchwork of inconsistent definitions from
earlier case law . . . ." Sherner, ¶ 37.
¶7 After Sherner and nearly two years after the dismissal of her case, Karen filed a motion
for reconsideration and relief from that dismissal pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P.
The District Court did not rule on the motion, which was deemed denied after 60 days
under Rule 59(d) and (g), M.R.Civ.P. Karen appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8 Our standard in reviewing a ruling on a Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., motion for relief
from judgment depends on whether or not the judgment is set aside. Karlen v. Evans
(1996), 276 Mont. 181, 185, 915 P.2d 232, 235. Where, as here, the judgment is not set
aside, only a slight abuse of discretion need be shown to warrant reversal. Karlen, 276
Mont. at 185, 915 P.2d at 235.
DISCUSSION
¶9 Was the denial of Karen's Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., motion an abuse of discretion?
¶10 Karen's motion for relief from judgment was premised on Sherner. She contended in
the District Court-and contends on appeal-that Sherner substantially changed the
definition of "intentional and malicious" with respect to the exclusivity provision of the
Act, and that she is entitled to relief from the dismissal of her case and application of that
new definition under Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P. Montana Resources does not dispute that
we changed the definition of "intentional and malicious" in Sherner. It argues, however,
that Calcaterra is the law of Karen's case and Sherner does not meet the extraordinary
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circumstances requirement for relieving Karen from the earlier dismissal of her case under
Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P. We agree.
¶11 "Under the doctrine of law of the case, a prior decision of this Court resolving a
particular issue between the same parties in the same case is binding and cannot be
relitigated." State v. Gilder, 2001 MT 121, ¶ 9, 305 Mont. 362, ¶ 9, ___P.3d___, ¶ 9. The
purpose of the law of the case doctrine is to promote judicial economy and prevent the
never-ending litigation of a single case (Gilder, ¶ 10) and the doctrine has a long
jurisprudential basis in Montana. See, e.g., Carlson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (1929), 86
Mont. 78, 81, 281 P. 913, 914.
¶12 The parties in the present case do not dispute the fact that we expressly determined in
Calcaterra the issue of whether Karen's proof met the "intentional and malicious act"
exception to the exclusive remedy of the Act. Indeed, we specifically concluded therein
that she raised no genuine factual issue as to whether Carl's injuries and death were caused
by an intentional and malicious act or omission. See Calcaterra, ¶ 22.
¶13 Karen correctly argues, however, that the doctrine of law of the case is not inviolable
and that there may be exceptions to the application of the doctrine. See Gilder, ¶ 13 (citing
Carlson, 86 Mont. at 81, 281 P.2d at 914). She contends in this regard that our decision in
Sherner created extraordinary circumstances justifying an exception to the doctrine under
Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P. We disagree.
¶14 Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., applies at all only if extraordinary circumstances exist.
Bahm v. Southworth, 2000 MT 244, ¶ 14, 301 Mont. 434, ¶ 14, 10 P.3d 99, ¶ 14. However,
"a change in the decisional law subsequent to a final judgment does not represent
extraordinary circumstances under Rule 60(b) so as to allow reopening of that judgment."
In re Marriage of Waters (1986), 223 Mont.183, 187, 724 P.2d 726, 729. Moreover, we
held in another Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., case that "when a decisional law change
occurs, subsequent to final judgment in a particular case, the 'law of the case' is that final
judgment should not be altered." Fiscus v. Beartooth Electric Cooperative, Inc. (1979),
180 Mont. 434, 442, 591 P.2d 196, 200. Thus, while Karen argues that the revised Sherner
definition of "intentional and malicious" constitutes extraordinary circumstances meriting
relief from the final judgment in Calcaterra under Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., our cases
simply do not support her argument. Nor does she distinguish those cases in any concrete
way.
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¶15 We hold that the denial of Karen's Rule 60(b)(6) motion was not an abuse of
discretion.
¶16 Affirmed.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
We concur:
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
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