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No. 00-201
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2001 MT 141
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL BRITTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Jefferson,
The Honorable Frank M. Davis, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Eric Rasmusson, Attorney at Law, Boulder, Montana
For Respondent:
Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Micheal S. Wellenstein,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Valerie D. Wilson, Jefferson County Attorney; Leonard J. Haxby,
Deputy County Attorney, Boulder, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 11, 2001
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Decided: August 2, 2001
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Michael Britton moved to dismiss hunting license-related charges against him in
Jefferson County Justice Court on the basis that Montana's residency laws are so vague as
to violate due process. After his motion was denied, Britton pled guilty to two counts of
swearing and affirming to a false statement to obtain a Montana resident hunting license in
violation of § 87-2-106, MCA, reserving the right to appeal to the Fifth Judicial District
Court, Jefferson County, on his challenge to the residency laws. The Justice Court
sentenced Britton and he appealed.
¶2 In the District Court, Britton again moved to dismiss the charges on vagueness grounds.
At the hearing on his motion, Britton's counsel represented that Britton had registered to
vote in Montana, obtained a Montana identification card, licensed his vehicle in Montana,
and his wife had purchased real property in Jefferson County, Montana, on which they
were building a residence. Britton neither testified nor filed his own affidavit. His
argument was that § 87-2-102, MCA (1995), is vague because other Montana statutes
define residency differently for purposes such as voting, dissolution of marriage, college
attendance and taxation. The District Court rejected Britton's argument, determining that
the fish and game residency requirements are neither vague nor ambiguous, and affirmed
Britton's Justice Court conviction. Britton appeals to this Court and we affirm.
¶3 Did the District Court err in concluding that the residency requirements for obtaining a
resident hunting license set forth at § 87-2-102, MCA (1995), are not facially
unconstitutional on vagueness grounds?
¶4 Statutes are presumed constitutional and a party challenging the constitutionality of a
statute bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statute is
unconstitutional. State v. Stanko, 1998 MT 321, ¶¶ 15-16, 292 Mont. 192, ¶¶ 15-16, 974
P.2d 1132, ¶¶ 15-16 (citations omitted). We review a district court's constitutional
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conclusions as we do other conclusions of law--to determine whether they are correct.
MEIC v. Dept. of Env. Quality, 1999 MT 248, ¶ 40, 296 Mont. 207, ¶ 40, 988 P.2d 1236, ¶
40 (citation omitted).
¶5 A statute may be challenged as violative of the right to due process for its vagueness on
two different bases: (1) the statute is so vague that it is void on its face; or (2) the statute is
vague as applied in a particular situation. Stanko, ¶ 17 (citations omitted). Although
Britton does not clearly state which basis he is claiming, he cites to the standards for facial
vagueness and does not set forth an "as applied" argument.
¶6 The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a criminal statute define the offense with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v.
Lawson (1983), 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909. A vague
law delegates basic policy matters to law enforcement officers, judges, and juries, for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application. Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92
S.Ct. 2294, 2299, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227.
¶7 Section 87-2-102, MCA (1995), sets forth the criteria for "determining a resident for
the purpose of issuing resident fishing, hunting, and trapping licenses[.]" It contains eight
subsections, some of which have several subpoints, addressing the means by which
members of the armed forces, students, job corps enrollees, unmarried minors and other
individuals can meet the residency requirements for the referenced licenses. Section 87-2-
102(1) through (8), MCA (1995). In addition, subsection (9) of § 87-2-102, MCA (1995),
defines when "a person is not considered a resident."
¶8 Britton does not claim that the words or terms used in § 87-2-102, MCA (1995), are
vague. Nor does he claim that, when viewed alone, § 87-2-102, MCA (1995), is void for
vagueness.
¶9 Britton does assert that Montana's various residency statutes, taken as a group, are void
for vagueness. He points out that residency is defined in approximately seven different
ways under Montana statutes and administrative rules. Section 1-1-215, MCA, provides
general rules for determining residence. Section 13-1-112, MCA, sets forth rules for
determining residency pertaining to voter registration. Section 18-1-103, MCA, addresses
residence for purposes of bidding on public contracts. Section 61-3-712, MCA, defines
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"legal residence" for purposes of motor vehicle registration. Section 87-2-102, MCA
(1995), defines residency for purposes of issuance of fishing, hunting, and trapping
licenses. Finally, the administrative rule for determining residency for taxation purposes
appears at Rule 42.15.102, A.R.M.
¶10 Relying on the general principles regarding vagueness challenges set forth in Stanko,
¶¶ 21-23, Britton asserts the existence of these various statutory definitions of residency
may confuse a person of ordinary intelligence and operate as a trap for the innocent. He
does not argue--and, indeed, could not successfully argue--that our decision in Stanko
holding Montana's "reasonable and prudent" speed statute as unconstitutionally vague
controls the outcome of this case involving a number of definitional statutes on residency.
Nor does Britton advance any authority under which a statute has been declared void for
vagueness on similar grounds. As a result, we address only briefly the statutes Britton
argues are, when taken together, unconstitutionally vague.
¶11 Section 1-1-215, MCA, Montana's general residency statute, provides "[i]f a person
claims a residence within Montana for any purpose, then that location is the person's
residence for all purposes unless there is a specific statutory exception." Section 1-1-215
(2), MCA. "[U]nless there is a specific statutory exception" sounds a clear warning that
other residency requirements or definitions may apply to particular circumstances, and §
87-2-102, MCA (1995), clearly provides a specific statutory exception to the general
definition of residence for purposes of obtaining a Montana fishing, hunting, or trapping
license.
¶12 In addition, other statutory residency provisions to which Britton refers clearly
provide that they are for specific acts or purposes other than obtaining a hunting license.
Section 13-1-112, MCA, states, "[f]or registration, voting, or seeking election to the
legislature, the residence of an individual must be determined . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Section 18-1-103, MCA, states "[f]or the purpose of 18-1-102, 18-1-111, and this section
[all dealing with bidders for public contracts], the word 'resident' includes . . . ." (Emphasis
added.) Section 61-3-712, MCA, specifically provides that its definition of "legal
residence" applies only as used "in § 61-3-711 through § 61-3-733" (regarding state
registration of motor vehicle fleets). It strains credulity to suggest that a person of ordinary
intelligence would be confused into believing that any of these statutes define residency
for the purpose of obtaining a resident hunting license. Moreover, § 87-2-102, MCA
(1995), could not state more clearly that its provisions apply in "determining a resident for
the purpose of issuing resident fishing, hunting, and trapping licenses[.]"
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¶13 Finally, Britton asserts one could be lulled into believing one had met the residency
requirements for a hunting license because the residency requirements for a driver's
license had been met. This argument is specious. The printed language on Britton's
hunting licenses and tags states, immediately above the space for the licensee's signature,
"I declare that I am a legal resident of Montana for Fish and Game Licensing purposes, as
defined in Section 87-2-102, M.C.A."
¶14 We conclude Britton has failed to establish that the residency requirements for
obtaining a resident hunting license set forth in § 87-2-102, MCA (1995), are facially
unconstitutional on vagueness grounds. We hold, therefore, that the District Court did not
err in denying his motion to dismiss on that basis.
¶15 Affirmed.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
We concur:
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
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