No: 02-462
1% THE SOPREME COURT OF 'THE STATE OF kf0NTANA
- 'MT 238
')002
ROBEKT SPOKLIE and SPOKLiE EXTERPRLSES, LLC,
Pla~ntiifs Respondents.
and
L
p*{A ~* .~..*J*..
,~
$,&I 1L
a lij[
2000 are not permitted to dispatch their aninlals with a high powered rifle, bow
and arrow, or crossbow." This interpretation interferes with the ordinary
managenlent of domesticated livestock and clearly goes far beyond the
statutory prohibitions. If this interpretation were allowed to be used during the
pendency ofthis action, the Plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed before the
case was resolved . . . When the Intervenors were petitioning the Supreme
Court, they themselves argued "a grant of a stay of further proceedings b i l l not
prejudice the plaintiffs since the District Court already enjoined thc
enforcement of 1-143". The Intervenors were wrong in their siaiemcnr, in tliut
the injunction did not restrict enforcement of 1-143 and the related statutes, it
restricted "...enforcement actions against Plaintiffs for selling their privately-
owned alternative livestock to thhird parties who then seek to harvest their
newly acquired property at Plaintiffs' facility and against third parties who
purchase the livestock,.." It is not a restktion to enforcement of Section 87-4-
4 14 MCA and the prohibition of shooting alternative livestock for a fee.
'122 On appeal, Spoklics contend that the District Court's reasoning is sound and that the
tnjunction does not interfere mith the execution of 5 87-4-414(2), LICA. FWP and
Sportsmen, however, contend that the Distnet Court erred as a matter of lau when it refused
to dissolbe the preliminary injunction in spite of 3 27-19-103(4), MCA, which prohibits
injunctions "to prevent the execution of a public statute by officers of the law for the public
benefit. . . ." Sportsmen suggest that Spoklies' planncd sales are schemes to sell a "canned
hunti~~g
experience," and FWP made slmilar claims before the court during the October 5,
2001, shon cause hearing. itccordingly, it is necessary that we consider the coliduct at issue
to collsidcr whether it is prohibited by the language of 5 87-4-414(2), MCA.
1/23 The District Court entered the follov~ing
injunction in the TRO:
DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ORDERED to immediately cease, desist, and
restrain from initiating enforcement actions against Plaintiffs for selling their
privately-owned alternative livestock to third parties who then seek to harvest
their newly acquired property at Plaintiffs facility and against the third parties
who purchase the livestock. . . .
724 To deterniine vhether the Distrtct Court's orders tnterfere w ~ t h enforcement of
the
4 87-4-414(2), MCA, or other related statutes. we apply general ~ u i e sof statutory
construct~on. Sectton 1-2-101, MCA, provldes that our duty "IS simply to ascecait: and
dcclilrc n hat i s in terms or in substance conta~ned
thercln, nor to tiisen whdt hds been orn~ited
or to omit what has been inserted. Wl~crc
there are several provisions or particulars, such
-
constructiori is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." This Court tvill r-j ect :
:
constrtrctlon of a statute that mould lea\ e any part of the statute without effect. hlontto v
Sirnonich (1997). 285 Mont. 280,287, 947 P.2d 1047, 1051 (citation omitted)
125 Section 87-4-414(2), MCA, with the 1-143 amendment italicized, pro\:ides as follows:
The licensee may acquire, breed, grow, keep, pursue, handle, harvest, use, sell,
or dispose of the alternative livestock and their progeny in any quantity and at
any time of year as long as the licensee complies with the requirements of this
part, e.xcept tilcrt the licerzsee tnuy not allow the shooting of game urzin~als
or
alternative livestock, u s tiefined in 87-2-101 or 87-4-406, or ofarzy exotic big
game species jbr a fee or other ref?zunerationon an alternative livestoclc
faci(ity.
Absent statutory definitions, the plain meaning of the words used in the statute eoutrols.
??~omasRros. Cnrgill, Inc. (1996), 276 Mont. 105,110,915 P.2d 226,229. An alternative
v.
licestock "facility" is defined as "perimeter fences and other enclosures that provide for the
confinement, handling, and quarantine of altenlative livestock." Seeti01187-4-406(5), MCA.
"Fee" is commonly understood as: "[a] fixed sum charged, as by an institution or by law for
a privilege." AMERICAN Tl\GE 1)IC'TIONARY 01; THE EKGLISfI I.ANC;UA(;E 669 (3d ed.
MEIU'
lOO6). " R C I I I L I C I C ~ ~this O ~ I " is co~nrno~ily
in ~ ~ contest understood as: "[s lomething, such as a
payment, that remunerates." A~:~EKI(.AK
IIERITAGE DIC~.ION,I~:KIc:A\~
ltllRli'h(ii- D!(:l'lONAKY OF T i i t I:N(;I.ISil I.4Xc;I;;ic;t: 1527.
7126 The language o f 5 87-4-414(2); MCA, as amended, provides a licensee with several
clear options: he can sell his livestock; he can harvest (or shootj his own livestock; or he can
allot.ii the livestock to be harvested by someone else--so long as it is not done on his premises
for a fee.
'127 Spoklies argue, and the District Court agreed, that they arc not getting a fee for the
right to shoot elk at their facility. However, that contention is belied by the fact that Spoklies
havc alleged irreparable h a m if the animals cannot be harvested (shot) by their clients on
their premises. If the only charge i s for the value of the animal, then the right to shoot it is
inconsequential. If the right to shoot the animal on Spoklies' property is inconsequential,
then they cannot rncet the necessary test for a preliminary injunction. See 6 27-1 9-201(2),
MCA.
128 From the facts alleged in Spoklies' complaint, it is difficult to understand how FWP's
interpretation of 6 87-4-414(2), MCA, would eliminate most or all of their sales irn1e.s.~the
fee or other remuneration is related to the privilege to shoot the "newly-purchasedlivestock."
If the Spoklies' average elk pricc, $5,462, merely represents the actual market value of the
average elk, tllen FWP's interpretation of the "fee shooting" provisions should not cause
Spoklies to lose any of their cunent pcrrchasers. Assuming nvg~cetzclo Spoklies' elk price
that
accurately reflected the true value of the elk and that ir excluded the value of shooting the
cik, FWP's interpretatio~~ 9 87-4-414(Zj. MCA, "fee shooting" prohiloition shotrid llave no
of
impact on its clk sales whatsoever.
12
19 Therefore, we conclude that the activity at issue in this case does constitute the type
of activity prohibited by 3 87-4-414(2), MCA, as amended by 1-143. Spoklies clearly
consider the right of third persons to harvest elk at their facility an important part of the
consideration they receive in exchange for the fees Spoklies are paid. That arrangement is
exactly what is rtou7prohibited by statute. Therefore, we concludc that the District Court's
preliminary injunction does interfere with FWP's execution of jj 87-4-414(2), MCA-a statute
enacted for the public benefit.
7\30 We must next consider Spoklies' argument that the District Cou1-t may grant a
preliminary injunction despite 5 27-1 9-1 03(4), MCA, where a party demonstrates irreparable
inju~y.
1131 F W P and Sportsmen contend that our holding in State e , rel. Fveehouvrz v. Catroll
~
(1929), 85 Mont. 439, 279 P. 234, expressly precludes il~junctionsagainst public officials
executing public statutes for thc public welfare, unless there is a valid claim that the statute
enforced was itself unconstitutional or invalid. FMIP and Sportsmen do not challenge
Spoklies' claiim of irreparable h a ~ m argue that injunctive relief ~vould
but only be arailable
if Spoklies claimed and sufficiently proved that $ 87-4-414(2), MCA, as amended is
nnconstitutional or invalid. FWP and Sportsmen additionally note that there are sevcral otlier
cases pending in other forums, several of which do challenge the constitutionality of 1-143
and i 87-17-414(2), MCA, as amended. EWP and Sportsmen conclude t h a ~
; Fieeboz~rn
distinguish, or dismiss as dicta
cxpressiy coamls this situatioi~; rcqucst that rile o~crruie,
and
language in New Club Cilrliii I:. Cir). (fBilliizgs (l989j, 237 Mont. 194,772 P.2d 303, to the
cxtcnt that it suggests that a district court may enjoin the execution of a publrc statute where
the plaintiff demonstrates irreparable injury
1132 In ,liL.l~ C?ub Curlin, the plaintiff, a bar operator, sought a preliminary injunction
against the City of Billings and its pohce chicf aftcr police arrested several employees of the
bar for nude dancing or permitting nude dancing in the bar. The District Court denied the
5
bar's mot~onfor a preliminary injunction. On appeal we ackno~vledged 27-19-103(4),
MCA, but also noted ~ L L O injunctions are permitted pursuant to 5 27-
ctrclrmstances in u h ~ c h
19-201, MCA. We then stated that:
To overcome the Montana statute 5 27-1 9- 103(4), MCA, i u ~ well-settled case
d
law that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the execution of a public
statute for the public benefit, [the bar] must show ~rreparableinjury or a
v~olationof constitutional rights.
New Club Curlitz, 237 Mont. at 196, 772 P.2d at 305 (citing Freehour-n; 2 AniJur.2nd
I ~ ~ ~ n i ~5t 243).~After reviewing the bar's clairns, we concluded that thc bar did not have
ioi .~
standing for its coi~stitutionalchallenge to the statute and that the bar's monetary damages
claim did not den~onstratc
irreparable injury, and affirmed the District Court. The language
relied on by Spoklies was not necessary to those conclusions and was, at bcst, dicta.
However, lest there be future confusion, me take this opportuntty to point out that it uas also
partially itlcoilicct.
4133 Despite our citation to I7reebozmi for t l ~ ccited language in i\je~v Club Cadin,
F't-i-eeiiorrnzdoes not stand for the proposition that irreparable injury is sufficient to cverciir~~c
5 27-19-103(4), MCA. In Ft-eehozzrn, the plaintiff, a kennel club, sought to enjoin a county
attorneq froin thrcatenrng to arrest the officers and agents of the club and scue the club's
assets if they conducted races. The county attorney insisted that the races conducted at the
club were in violation of Montana law, and that it was his duty to inform those persons of
their violations of Montana law. The District Court entered a TKO aga~nstthe county
attorney, and on appeal we reversed that order. We recognized that a court of equity has no
prosecutions. I.-reebour~z, Mont. at 443,270 P. at 235. We
jurisdiction to enjoin crim~nal 85
adoptcd the general principle that:
[A] court of equity has no jurisdiction in matters merely criminal or immoral.
It leaves the correction of these matters to the criminal courts. The rule which
prevents a court of chancery from interfering with the administration of the
criminal laws of the state is a wise one, founded upon sound principles of
public policy. Any other would result in much confusion and embarrassment,
in preserving peace and order and enforcing the police power of the state
generally.
Freebourn, 85 blont. at444,279 P. at 235 (citing 10 Ruling Case Law 341,342). We further
dctem~ined "whether the manner in which the club is conducting its business constitutes
that
a ctirninal offensc is a question to be determined by the court sitting as a court of lax. in a
crrmtnal case, and not as a c o ~ ~oft equity." Freebourn, 85 blont. at 444, 279 P. at 235
r
(citatrons om~ttcd) Vlrc quoted Shzimnt~v (iiiber-r (Mass. i918), i IS N.E. 254, 257,as
follows:
"Simply that one is in business, and may be injured in respect of his busi~lcss
by prosecution for an alleged crime, is no sufficient reason for asking a court
of equity to ascertain in advance whether the business as conducted is in
violation of a penal statute."
734 In Freebozcril, we did recognize an exception to the general rule, however, it did not
in+olvc an "irreparable harm." We stated:
The courts recognize an exception to the general rule when property rights are
invaded by the threatened prosecution under a void statute. Hence equitable
jurisdiction exists to restrain criminal prosecutions under unconstitutional or
invalid statutes when necessary to safeguard property rights.
Freehourir, 85 Mont, at 444,279 P, at 235 (citing 32 C.J. 243,279-280 (1923)). When we
construed Fi+eebounzin iVew Clzrb Cut-lln to include ~rreparable
harm as an exception to the
statute, me ignored our previous citation in Freebourn to 32 C.J. 279-280 which also states,
in part:
The general rule is that an injunction will not be granted to stay criminal or
quasi criminal proceedings, whether the prosecution is for the violation of the
common law or the infraction of statutes or municipal ordinances, nor to stay
the enforcement of orders of a state commission. If the statute on which the
prosecution is based is valid, the fact that the enforcement thereof wotlld
materially injure complainant's business or property constitutes no ground for
equitable interference. It is o n l ~~.vhei-ethe statute or ordiizarzce is
~
tritcon.stitutioizi~l otizerulise invizlid rirzti ~vlzere the attempt to etforce it
or in
there is n tiii-ect irzvi~siorz
ofproper& rig11 ~%'s~lltifzg
fs irrepr~rahle
i~z illjury that
aiz illjz~nctionwill issue to restrain the enforceitzenf r h e ~ o f :Both ooftizese
elei~zents itzdirperzsnble . . . .
are
32 C.J. 279-280(emphasis addedj. In i-ieebouriz, we did not conclude that any statutory
acourt-recognized cxcepiion to 5 27-i9-1003(4),
cxcepriolls exist. W::rnercly ackr~owicdged
MCA.
735 Since Spoklies have neither alleged nor demonstrated that 1-143 or 4 57-4-414(2),
MCA, as amended is unconstitutional, we conclude that the District Court erred, as amattcr
of law, when it enjoined FWP's execution of 3 87-4-414(2), MCA. We reverse the District
Court's order that denied FWP's and Sportsmen's motion to dissolve the preliminary
injunction, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion