No. 03-001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2003 MT 196N
RICKY LYNN COATES
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC 2000-354
The Honorable Susan P. Watters, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Ricky Lynn Coates, Glendive, Montana, pro se
For Respondent:
Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, Jennifer Anders, Assistant
Montana Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone
County Attorney, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 29, 2003
Decided: August 4, 2003
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent. It shall be filed as
a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,
Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter Publishing Company and to
West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.
¶2 The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, denied Ricky Lynn
Coates' Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Coates appeals. We affirm.
¶3 Coates was originally charged with Felony Aggravated Burglary and Felony Theft
by Accountability. He pled guilty to the felony theft charge and was committed to the
Department of Corrections for five years, with two years suspended. The aggravated
burglary charge was dismissed. Approximately one year later, Coates filed a pro se petition
for postconviction relief in the District Court. The District Court interpreted this petition to
argue that 1) Coates' guilty plea was not voluntarily entered; 2) he is entitled to a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence; and 3) his counsel was ineffective. The District Court
denied the petition. Coates filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion for
extension of time in which to challenge the District Court's order denying postconviction
relief. We declined to grant habeas relief but construed his motion for extension of time as
a notice of appeal from the District Court's order denying postconviction relief.
¶4 We decide this case pursuant to our Order dated February 11, 2003, amending Section
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1.3 of our 1996 Internal Operating Rules and providing for memorandum opinions. The
proper standard of review on appeal from an order denying postconviction relief is whether
the District Court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its conclusions of law
are correct.
¶5 In reviewing Coates' petition for postconviction relief, the District Court carefully
applied the three factors that have been used for at least two decades to determine whether
withdrawal of a guilty plea is permitted. See State v. Huttinger (1979), 182 Mont. 50, 54,
595 P.2d 363, 366. The District Court found that each factor weighed against Coates and
that the record did not substantiate a legal right to withdraw his guilty plea. The court also
determined that Coates had waived his right to a new trial by pleading guilty. It analyzed
his argument on the merits, nonetheless, and concluded that the "new evidence" was nothing
more than an attempt to impeach witnesses and therefore did not meet the well-established
requirements for a new trial as set forth in State v. Greeno (1959), 135 Mont. 580, 586, 342
P.2d 1052, 1055. Moreover, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed because he
presented no credible evidence from which to conclude that counsel's performance was
deficient or that he did not know the nature of the crime for which he pled guilty. Lastly,
the District Court concluded that Coates was not entitled to appointed counsel based upon
the record.
¶6 On appeal, Coates argues that the State, in its response to Coates' previously-filed
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, stated that "Coates was presumably charged with a
felony, and pled guilty to a felony. . . ." Coates maintains that his arrest, prosecution and
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plea agreement were all based on this "presumption" standard rather than "probable cause."
He claims that his defense counsel was ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty to a
felony when he, in fact, was guilty of a misdemeanor. In the alternative, Coates claims that
the District Court erred when it denied him the right to counsel.
¶7 Our review of the District Court record reveals that the District Court addressed and
correctly resolved Coates' "presumption v. probable cause" issue. Furthermore, in the
District Court's comprehensive and well-analyzed order, its findings were supported by the
evidence and it correctly interpreted Montana law applicable to Coates' Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. Therefore, we affirm.
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
We Concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART’
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