IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
No. 04-684
2004 MT 335
______________
STATE OF MONTANA, ex rel. )
IN THE MATTER OF D.M.B., )
)
Relator, )
)
v. ) OPINION
) AND
MONTANA THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL ) ORDER
DISTRICT YOUTH COURT, YELLOWSTONE )
COUNTY, Honorable Gregory R. Todd, Presiding, )
)
Respondent. )
______________
¶1 D.M.B., a juvenile, through counsel of record, filed an application for writ of
supervisory control. By order entered on October 14, 2004, we ordered the Respondent
District Court and/or the Yellowstone County Attorney or Montana Attorney General on
behalf of Respondent court, to prepare, file and serve a response to the application, which
has now been filed. Further, we granted, at the request of D.M.B., a stay of the Youth Court
proceedings herein until resolution of the issues raised in the application.
¶2 The State filed a petition on June 22, 2004, alleging that D.M.B. was a delinquent
youth under the Montana Youth Court Act. The petition alleged that D.M.B. had committed
the misdemeanor offenses of assault, criminal mischief, and obstruction of a police officer.
On August 11, 2004, D.M.B. appeared in Youth Court and admitted to the three charged
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offenses. The Youth Court accepted the admissions and adjudicated D.M.B. to be a juvenile
delinquent.
¶3 Prior to D.M.B.’s dispositional hearing, Youth Court Services Officer Becky Wagner
prepared a report regarding D.M.B. for the Youth Court. Wagner’s report set forth D.M.B.’s
juvenile record, including a sex offense which had occurred eight years earlier. In light of
this past offense, Wagner recommended that D.M.B. undergo a psychosexual evaluation
with a qualified evaluator who would provide the Youth Court with an evaluation prior to
the entry of a dispositional order by the Youth Court.
¶4 Wagner further noted the inability or unwillingness of D.M.B.’s parents to contact her
office or otherwise appear on D.M.B.’s behalf or to be involved in his life and explained that
without a parent or other responsible adult to take responsibility for D.M.B., the youth had
nowhere to go. Wagner noted that over the past eight years, D.M.B. had resided in three
different residential psychiatric facilities and three different group homes, had a significant
history of alleged offenses, and committed the three charged offenses in this matter about
one month after his release from his previous placement.
¶5 However, D.M.B., through counsel, objected to the State’s request for a psychosexual
evaluation, asserting that there was no nexus to the underlying offenses. In response, the
Youth Court ordered briefing on the issue, and following oral argument granted the State’s
request for the evaluation, reasoning that, although there was no nexus between the
evaluation and the underlying offenses, the Montana Youth Court Act nevertheless granted
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broader discretion to fashion a rehabilitative disposition and, therefore, a predispositional
psychosexual evaluation was appropriate. D.M.B. then sought supervisory control.
¶6 Supervisory control is an extraordinary remedy that is only appropriate when a district
court is proceeding under a mistake of law which, if not corrected, would cause significant
injustice and the remedy by appeal is inadequate. Evans v. Montana Eleventh Judicial
District Court, 2000 MT 38, ¶ 15, 298 Mont. 279, ¶ 15, 995 P.2d 455, ¶ 15. Our
determination of whether supervisory control is appropriate is a case-by-case decision, based
on the presence of extraordinary circumstances and the need to prevent an injustice from
occurring. Park v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 1998 MT 164, ¶ 13, 289 Mont. 367, ¶ 13,
961 P.2d 1267, ¶ 13.
¶7 D.M.B. argues that the District Court is proceeding under a mistake of law in two
respects. First, although acknowledging that § 41-5-1512(1)(g) and (i), MCA, provides
statutory authority for the Youth Court to order that a youth submit to an evaluation as part
of a final disposition, D.M.B. argues that § 41-5-1503, MCA, allows predisposition
evaluations only when the youth has waived his or her constitutional rights. Because D.M.B.
has refused to waive those rights, D.M.B. asserts that the Youth Court’s order conflicts with
this provision. Secondly, D.M.B., argues that the evaluation is not permitted under this
Court’s holding in State v. Ommundson, 1999 MT 16, 293 Mont. 133, 974 P.2d 620, because
no nexus exists between the underlying charges and the psychosexual evaluation.
¶8 The State responds that the Youth Court was authorized to order the psychosexual
evaluation under § 41-5-1511(2), MCA. That section provides:
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Before conducting the dispositional hearing, the court shall direct that
a youth assessment or predisposition report be made in writing by a probation
officer or an assessment officer concerning the youth, the youth’s family, the
youth’s environment, and other matters relevant to the need for care or
rehabilitation or disposition of the case . . . . The youth court may have the
youth examined, and the results of the examination must be made available to
the court as part of the youth assessment or predisposition report.
Section 41-5-1511(2), MCA (emphasis added).
¶9 The State is correct in its assertion that the evaluation ordered in this matter by the
Youth Court falls within the plain language of the above-cited provision. However, § 41-5-
1503, MCA, contains more specific provisions in regard to predisposition “medical or
psychological” evaluations, stating as follows:
(1) The youth court may order a youth to receive a medical or
psychological evaluation at any time prior to final disposition if the youth
waives the youth’s constitutional rights in the manner prior for in 41-5-331
[setting forth advisory and parental notification requirements].
Given the provisions of § 41-5-1503, MCA, regarding predispositional medical and
psychological evaluations, which is the kind of evaluation here ordered, it must control, as
the more specific provision, over the more general authorization for youth assessments
provided to the Youth Court under § 41-5-1511, MCA. As we recently stated:
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that the specific prevails over
the general. A particular statutory intent controls over a general one which is
inconsistent with it. Section 1-2-102, MCA. Further, when two statutes deal
with a subject, one in general and comprehensive terms, and the other in
minute and more definite terms, the more definite statute will prevail to the
extent of any opposition between them.
State v. Smith, 2004 MT 191, 322 Mont. 206, 95 P.3d 137. Thus, the more specific
requirements of § 41-5-1503, MCA, including the requirement that the youth waive the
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youth’s constitutional rights in order to conduct a predispositional medical or psychological
evaluation, must be met. Therefore, the Youth Court erred in ordering a predispositional
psychosexual evaluation over the youth’s objection.
¶10 However, the State argues that even if we would conclude that a predispositional
psychosexual evaluation required the youth’s waiver of constitutional rights, the Youth Court
could nonetheless order the evaluation as part of its final dispositional order pursuant to §
41-5-1512(1)(g) and (i), MCA. That provision provides that the Youth Court may, as part
of its disposition, “require the medical and psychological evaluation of the youth” and “order
further care, treatment, evaluation or relief that the court considers beneficial to the youth
and the community.” See also § 41-5-1513(1)(a), MCA. We agree. Although the State
argues that the psychosexual evaluation would better serve the interests of D.M.B. if
conducted prior to disposition, and we do not disagree that a predispositional evaluation may
be more convenient, it is clear from the statutes that an evaluation without the youth’s
consent is authorized only as part of the court’s disposition. D.M.B. does not contest this
statutory interpretation, but argues that the psychosexual evaluation cannot be ordered in this
case by reason of this Court’s holding in State v. Ommundson, supra.
¶11 In Ommundson, a defendant of convicted of DUI challenged the District Court’s
imposition of sex offender treatment as a condition of sentence. We reversed the imposition
of the condition, holding that a sentencing limitation or condition must have “some
correlation or connection to the underlying offense for which the defendant is being
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sentenced.” Omundson, ¶ 11. D.M.B. argues that none of the three offenses charged here
are sex-related offenses, and therefore, a psychosexual evaluation cannot be ordered.
¶12 However, Ommundson does not bar the Youth Court from ordering D.M.B. to
undergo a psychosexual evaluation as part of D.M.B.’s disposition. Unlike Ommundson, this
matter is not a criminal matter, but is brought under the Youth Court Act. Section 41-5-102,
MCA, requires that the Act be interpreted and construed to effectuate the “express legislative
purposes” of providing for “the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical
development of a youth” as well as “a program of supervision, care, rehabilitation, detention,
competency development, and community protection” of a youth. The Youth Court Act’s
emphasis on the mental and physical care, development and rehabilitation of a youth are
statutory directives which were not at issue in Ommundson. Further, at this point, the Youth
Court has merely ordered a psychosexual evaluation for purposes of D.M.B.’s proper
placement and has not ordered sex offender treatment, as in Ommundson. The primary
purpose of the evaluation, according to Wagner’s report, is to assess D.M.B.’s condition so
that placement within the appropriate facility can be made. Her report indicated that without
the evaluation “no licensed home or facility will accept him in their program. This is
especially true given his lengthy placement history and his history of sexual offending.”
Thus, the challenged evaluation is essential to D.M.B.’s appropriate placement, and,
therefore, essential to fulfillment of the purposes of the Youth Court Act.
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¶13 D.M.B. makes additional arguments which we conclude are without merit, including
a constitutional argument which we conclude is not sufficiently supported by authority.
Therefore, we decline to address the additional issues raised in the petition. Therefore,
¶14 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for writ of supervisory control is hereby
granted. This matter is remanded to the Thirteenth Judicial District Youth Court, in and for
Yellowstone County, for further proceedings consistent with this order.
¶15 The Clerk is directed to mail copies hereof to all counsel of record and to the
Honorable Gregory R. Todd, Youth Court Judge.
DATED this 24th day of November, 2004.
/S/ JIM RICE
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
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Justice John Warner concurring.
¶16 I agree with the Court’s order. However, it appears from the record that the
information necessary to place the youth is available in records of examinations and
treatment that have already been prepared. The County Attorney represented to the Court
that he could not get copies of such records without the consent of the youth’s mother, and
she is not only unwilling to cooperate, she is hiding from the law.
¶17 I fail to see why the District Court accepted without question the representation that
the records could not be recovered. A court order to the custodian of the records could have
avoided this whole problem. Also, since the mother does not seem to be in the picture, the
appointment of a guardian ad litem may have served to avoid this procedure.
¶18 It is not always necessary to do things the hard way.
/S/ JOHN WARNER
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