No. 03-805
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2004 MT 232
CITY OF BILLINGS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ROCKY T. PETERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC 03-438
Honorable Gregory R. Todd, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jack E. Sands, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Robert Stutz,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Brent Brooks, City Attorney; Moira Murphy D’Alton, Deputy,
Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 7, 2004
Decided: August 24, 2004
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 A Billings Municipal Court jury convicted Rocky T. Peterson of the misdemeanor
offenses of careless driving and driving under the influence of alcohol. After a number of
interim procedural steps, the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County,
affirmed an earlier order upholding the Municipal Court’s denial of certain pretrial motions.
Peterson appeals and we affirm.
¶2 We restate the issues as follows:
¶3 1. Did the District Court err in affirming the Municipal Court’s determination that
an officer had particularized suspicion to stop Peterson when no recording of the hearing on
Peterson’s motion was available for review?
¶4 2. Did the District Court err in affirming the Municipal Court’s denial of Peterson’s
motion to dismiss for unnecessary delay in his initial appearance?
¶5 3. Did the District Court err in affirming the Municipal Court’s denial of Peterson’s
motion to dismiss for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial?
¶6 4. Did the District Court err in affirming the Municipal Court’s denial of Peterson’s
discovery request to review an officer’s personnel records?
BACKGROUND
¶7 On August 30, 2001, Billings Police Officer Shawn Finnegan issued Peterson a notice
to appear October 2, 2001, in the Billings Municipal Court on charges of careless driving and
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Peterson appeared and pled not guilty.
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¶8 Peterson moved to dismiss, alleging Finnegan lacked particularized suspicion to stop
his vehicle. He also moved to suppress his breath test results, alleging improper
administration of his breath alcohol tests. After a hearing, the Municipal Court orally denied
the motion.
¶9 Peterson also moved for an order requiring the City to respond to discovery requests,
one of which asked for “[t]he personnel records of the officers involved in defendant’s arrest
and in the operation of any tests given him.” After a hearing, the Municipal Court denied
the request for personnel records and granted Peterson’s other discovery requests.
¶10 The Municipal Court originally scheduled trial for December 5, 2001. The City
moved for continuances on November 27, December 11 and February 22. Peterson did not
object to the first continuance, which was due to the prosecutor’s illness. The Municipal
Court granted the second and third motions, which were based on Finnegan’s unavailability,
over Peterson’s objections. Peterson then moved to dismiss, asserting unnecessary delay in
his initial appearance and violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The
Municipal Court denied the motion. On April 1, 2002, a jury convicted Peterson of both
charged offenses.
¶11 Peterson appealed to the District Court, requesting preparation of a trial transcript and
all recorded pretrial hearings. The Municipal Court transmitted the record, including a form
identifying the tape of the pretrial hearing on Peterson’s particularized suspicion motion as
#945. The tape was not transmitted, as Peterson’s briefs to the District Court acknowledged.
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¶12 The District Court affirmed in part, determining the Municipal Court correctly denied
Peterson’s pretrial motions, but reversed on other issues and remanded for retrial. On
remand, Peterson pled guilty, reserving the right to appeal those portions of the District
Court’s earlier order affirming the Municipal Court. The District Court granted Peterson’s
request to reaffirm its earlier order for purposes of appeal to this Court. Peterson appeals.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶13 The existence of particularized suspicion to justify an investigatory stop is a question
of fact determined under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Eixenberger, 2004 MT
127, ¶ 16, 321 Mont. 298, ¶ 16, 90 P.3d 453, ¶ 16 (citation omitted). A court’s finding of
particularized suspicion is reviewed under the clearly erroneous test. See State v. Nelson,
2004 MT 13, ¶ 5, 319 Mont. 250, ¶ 5, 84 P.3d 25, ¶ 5 (citation omitted). Whether an initial
appearance violated § 46-7-101(1), MCA, is a question of statutory construction, which we
review for correctness. See City of Missoula v. Lesko, 2003 MT 177, ¶ 7, 316 Mont. 401,
¶ 7, 73 P.3d 166, ¶ 7 (citation omitted). Whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial was
violated is a question of constitutional law, which we also review for correctness. See State
v. Ray, 2003 MT 171, ¶ 12, 316 Mont. 354, ¶ 12, 71 P.3d 1247, ¶ 12 (citations omitted).
Orders granting or denying discovery are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. DuBray,
2003 MT 255, ¶ 103, 317 Mont. 377, ¶ 103, 77 P.3d 247, ¶ 103 (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶14 1. Did the District Court err in affirming the Municipal Court’s determination
that Finnegan had particularized suspicion to stop Peterson when no recording of the
hearing on Peterson’s motion was available for review?
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¶15 In reviewing the Municipal Court’s finding of particularized suspicion, the District
Court noted the recording of the pretrial hearing was unavailable and stated it “reviewed the
record before it . . . .” The District Court relied on Finnegan’s experience in DUI
investigations, his observations of Peterson crossing a dividing line and making an improper
turn, his identification of Peterson and Peterson’s comment that he was possibly swerving.
¶16 Peterson contends the District Court could not affirm the Municipal Court in the
absence of the pretrial hearing tape. He first relies on FIRS Holding Co., Inc. v. Lemley
(1995), 272 Mont. 490, 901 P.2d 571. There, a judge amended a retired judge’s findings of
fact after a bench trial without reviewing a transcript. On appeal, we held the amending
judge committed reversible error. FIRS Holding, 272 Mont. at 492, 901 P.2d at 573. In
FIRS Holding, the amending judge essentially made new findings of fact. Here, the District
Court merely reviewed the Municipal Court’s oral decision. FIRS Holding is of no
assistance to Peterson.
¶17 Peterson next argues the District Court had “nothing to review.” In its order, the
District Court listed several facts that did not appear in the documents of record. The record
reflects the District Court did not have the tape of the particularized suspicion hearing, but
did have one or more recordings of Peterson’s proceedings. On these facts, we accept the
District Court’s repeated statements that it reviewed the record before it and that the record
reflected the evidence on which the District Court relied. The propriety of doing so is further
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buttressed in this case by Peterson’s total failure to argue, or even hint, that the pretrial
hearing tape would have shown error in any part of the District Court’s order on review.
¶18 Peterson next asserts the District Court violated “statutory mandates” by affirming
based on an incomplete record. He points to §§ 3-6-101(1), -110(1), and -302, MCA, which
provide that a municipal court must “be a court of record,” an appeal to a district court is
“confined to review of the record and questions of law,” and a municipal court clerk is
responsible for keeping records. Nothing in the statutes precludes a district court from
affirming on an incomplete record, provided the record is sufficient for review. The District
Court having determined it had a sufficient record, we conclude Peterson has not established
a violation of the statutory mandates on which he relies.
¶19 Peterson next argues he cannot be held responsible for the municipal court clerk’s
failure to transmit a complete record. An appellant bears the burden of establishing error on
appeal, however, and a trial court’s decision is presumed correct. See State v. Aakre, 2002
MT 101, ¶ 43, 309 Mont. 403, ¶ 43, 46 P.3d 648, ¶ 43 (citation omitted). Peterson does not
assert, let alone establish, error in the Municipal Court’s finding of particularized suspicion.
Nor, as just discussed, does he contend that a complete record would have established error
by the District Court in reviewing that finding. Therefore, we conclude Peterson has not met
his burden on appeal.
¶20 In this regard, however, the Court is increasingly alarmed about the number of cases
currently on appeal to this Court which involve incomplete, unavailable and disorderly
municipal court records. It is apparent that some municipal courts do not properly docket
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case documents or preserve recordings. When clerks of municipal courts fail to meet their
statutory obligation to maintain and provide an appropriate record on appeal, the
consequences to the parties, district courts, this Court and other litigants can be significant.
In the present case, the District Court had a sufficient record for review purposes, but the
amount of time and resources squandered by counsel and courts as a result of the clerk’s
failure to provide the entire record on appeal can never be recovered. Moreover, it is not
unlikely that crucial evidence will be lost in some future case if municipal court clerks do not
satisfy their statutory obligations. The people of Montana would not be amused to learn that
misdemeanor criminal convictions may be in jeopardy because of sloppy record-keeping by
their municipal employees.
¶21 Finally, we note the City’s reference to Rule 9(e), U.M.C.R.App., which allows an
appellant to prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings “within 3 days from the
hearing or trial or such time extended as the municipal court may for good cause shown
permit” if a record is unavailable, as well as its argument that Peterson failed to follow this
procedure. In this regard, we observe that Rule 9(f), U.M.C.R.App., allows parties to submit
an agreed statement of the record in lieu of the record on appeal. Peterson correctly responds
that the City’s legal theory regarding Rule 9(e), U.M.C.R.App., is presented for the first time
on appeal. Consequently, and in accordance with our longstanding rule that we do not
address theories or issues raised for the first time on appeal, we do not address the City’s
argument. See, e.g., State v. May, 2004 MT 45, ¶ 15, 320 Mont. 116, ¶ 15, 86 P.3d 42, ¶ 15
(citation omitted).
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¶22 We hold the District Court did not err in affirming the Municipal Court’s finding of
particularized suspicion.
¶23 2. Did the District Court err in affirming the Municipal Court’s denial of
Peterson’s motion to dismiss for unnecessary delay in his initial appearance?
¶24 The Municipal Court denied Peterson’s motion to dismiss for unnecessary delay in
his initial appearance. The District Court affirmed on appeal, agreeing that a 33-day delay
would not be normal procedure for an incarcerated defendant but was acceptable for a
defendant who received a notice to appear.
¶25 Peterson asserts the delay violated § 46-7-101(1), MCA, which reads “[a] person
arrested, whether with or without a warrant, must be taken without unnecessary delay before
the nearest and most accessible judge for an initial appearance.” He contends the statute
applies to all arrested persons, whether incarcerated or not.
¶26 The City responds that Peterson was not arrested and, therefore, the statute does not
apply. The District Court’s order states Peterson was arrested. The City did not cross-appeal
the issue of whether Peterson was arrested vis-a-vis § 46-7-101(1), MCA. Therefore, that
issue is not properly before us. See State v. Gardner, 2003 MT 338, ¶ 24, 318 Mont. 436,
¶ 24, 80 P.3d 1262, ¶ 24. Consequently, for purposes of this case, Peterson was arrested.
¶27 Returning to Peterson’s argument, he first relies on County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin (1991), 500 U.S. 44, 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 1670, 114 L.Ed.2d 49, 63, in which
the United States Supreme Court stated “a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations
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of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the
promptness requirement” of a prior case. McLaughlin has no application here. That case
involved Fourth Amendment considerations relating to “prompt” probable cause
determinations for persons arrested and detained. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 55-56, 111 S.Ct.
at 1669-70, 114 L.Ed.2d at 62. The present case involves neither a probable cause
determination nor a detained person.
¶28 Next, Peterson acknowledges our statement in State v. Dieziger (1982), 200 Mont.
267, 270, 650 P.2d 800, 802 (citation omitted), that the purposes of § 46-7-101, MCA, are
to enable a defendant to assist in preparing the defense and to protect a defendant from being
held incommunicado for a protracted time. He also correctly observes that the Montana
Legislature amended § 46-7-101, MCA, after Dieziger. See 1991 Mont. Laws, Ch. 800, Sec.
87. Peterson argues Dieziger is irrelevant to the present case because of the amendment, the
lack of arrest and timing of the charge in Dieziger, and the failure of the defendant in
Dieziger to file a suppression motion or put on a defense. We disagree.
¶29 Section 46-7-101, MCA, as addressed in Dieziger, provided in pertinent part that
[a]ny person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person
without unnecessary delay before the nearest or most accessible judge in the
same county, and a complaint stating the charges against the arrested person
shall be filed forthwith.
Dieziger, 200 Mont. at 269-70, 650 P.2d at 802. The statutory language “without
unnecessary delay,” upon which Dieziger’s determination of the statute’s purposes was
based, remains unchanged in § 46-7-101, MCA, as amended. Nothing in the 1991
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amendments to § 46-7-101, MCA, impacts on the statute’s purposes as stated in Dieziger.
Moreover, factual distinctions between Dieziger and the present case do not relate to the
statute’s purposes.
¶30 Here, Peterson was not incarcerated and does not assert impairment of his defense due
to the 33-day delay in his initial appearance. Under these facts and given the purposes of §
46-7-101(1), MCA, we discern no error in the District Court’s agreement with the Municipal
Court that the delay in Peterson’s initial appearance was acceptable under the statute.
Having concluded the 33-day delay of Peterson’s initial appearance did not violate the
statutory requirement, we need not consider Peterson’s arguments regarding the appropriate
remedy for a violation of § 46-7-101(1), MCA.
¶31 We hold the District Court did not err in affirming the Municipal Court’s denial of
Peterson’s motion to dismiss for unnecessary delay in his initial appearance.
¶32 3. Did the District Court err in affirming the Municipal Court’s denial of
Peterson’s motion to dismiss for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial?
¶33 On August 30, 2001, Peterson received a notice to appear and Finnegan filed a
complaint against him. Peterson’s trial occurred April 1, 2002. He argues his constitutional
right to a speedy trial was violated.
¶34 The constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches at arrest or the filing of a complaint.
Ray, ¶ 23 (citations omitted). Four factors pertain to constitutional speedy trial analysis: (1)
the length of the delay; (2) the reason for it; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right; and
(4) the prejudice to the defense. Ray, ¶ 13 (citation omitted). In the present case, the parties
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agree that the length of the delay mandates constitutional speedy trial analysis and that
Peterson timely asserted his right to a speedy trial. It also is undisputed that Peterson carries
the burden of establishing prejudice under the fourth factor. See Ray, ¶¶ 14, 16, 24 (citations
omitted).
¶35 Peterson’s constitutional speedy trial argument focuses on prejudice to the defense.
We analyze whether prejudice exists based on the three interests speedy trials are intended
to protect: (1) prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimization of anxiety
and concern; and (3) avoidance of impairment of the defense. State v. Longhorn, 2002 MT
135, ¶ 33, 310 Mont. 172, ¶ 33, 49 P.3d 48, ¶ 33 (citation omitted). The weightiest interest
is avoiding impairment of the defense. Longhorn, ¶ 39 (citation omitted). Here, Peterson
was not incarcerated and does not contend his defense was impaired. He asserts, however,
that he “experienced considerable anxiety” in missing work to attend proceedings that were
rescheduled several times.
¶36 Because anxiety and concern are inherent in being charged with an offense, the proper
analysis is the degree to which a delay of trial aggravated them. Longhorn, ¶ 38 (citation
omitted). Based on his assertion that he “experienced considerable anxiety,” Peterson
contends that “virtually no defendant, knowing that he would have to take that much time off
work and be prepared for so many fruitless hearings and trial dates, would ever be likely to
contest a misdemeanor charge.” He advances no authority under which these asserted facts
would constitute sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal, however. Rule 23(a)(4),
M.R.App.P., requires an appellant to support arguments with citations to the record and to
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relevant authorities; an appellant cannot meet the burden of establishing error absent such
citations. See State v. Bailey, 2004 MT 87, ¶ 26, 320 Mont. 501, ¶ 26, 87 P.3d 1032, ¶ 26
(citation omitted). We conclude Peterson’s missed work, repeated court appearances, and
related anxiety--standing alone--are insufficient to constitute the prejudice necessary to
establish a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
¶37 We hold the District Court did not err in affirming the Municipal Court’s denial of
Peterson’s motion to dismiss for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
¶38 4. Did the District Court err in affirming the Municipal Court’s denial of
Peterson’s request to review Finnegan’s personnel records?
¶39 Peterson moved for discovery of 16 items, including the personnel files of officers
involved in his case--namely, Finnegan’s file. In support of his motion, Peterson relied on
§ 46-15-322(1), MCA, United States Supreme Court cases cited for due process principles,
United States v. Henthorn (9th Cir. 1991), 931 F.2d 29, and right to know statutes. The
Municipal Court granted all of Peterson’s discovery requests except the request for
Finnegan’s personnel file, reasoning the request was not sufficiently supported to warrant
an in camera investigation of the file for exculpatory evidence. The District Court affirmed,
and Peterson asserts error.
¶40 Pursuant to § 46-15-322(1), MCA, a prosecutor must make certain material and
information available to a defendant upon request. Peterson does not identify what language
in § 46-15-322(1), MCA, supports his request for Finnegan’s file.
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¶41 In State v. Romero (1996), 279 Mont. 58, 74, 926 P.2d 717, 727, this Court applied
§ 46-15-322(5), MCA, to a defendant’s request for an officer’s personnel file. Section 46-
15-322(5), MCA, provides in pertinent part that
[u]pon motion showing that the defendant has substantial need in the
preparation of the case for additional material or information not otherwise
provided for . . . the court, in its discretion, may order any person to make it
available to the defendant.
In Romero, a defendant requested an officer’s personnel file, and the State denied his
request. The defendant did not seek to compel production, but filed a motion in limine to
preclude the officer from testifying. Romero, 279 Mont. at 73, 926 P.2d at 726. The district
court denied the motion, advising that § 46-15-322(5), MCA, required the defendant to
secure a court order compelling discovery of the personnel file. We affirmed, agreeing that
the defendant had failed to file a discovery motion. Romero, 279 Mont. at 74, 926 P.2d at
727.
¶42 Here, the District Court relied on Romero and applied § 46-15-322(5), MCA, to
Peterson’s request for Finnegan’s file. The District Court concluded Peterson had not
demonstrated “substantial need” for the file because the basis for his request was “cross-
examination purposes.”
¶43 On appeal, Peterson does not contest the applicability of § 46-15-322(5), MCA, to his
request for Finnegan’s file. Indeed, he correctly asserts he satisfied Romero’s requirement
that a defendant must file a motion for discovery of a personnel file. He contends, however,
that he could not specify how he would use the information in Finnegan’s file until he
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obtained it. This argument ignores the plain language of § 46-15-322(5), MCA, which
requires a motion demonstrating substantial need.
¶44 Peterson further argues he should have had an opportunity to inquire about whether
Finnegan’s file contained any blemishes, because the Municipal and District Courts relied
on Finnegan’s training, experience and awards in their determinations that Finnegan was an
experienced officer who developed particularized suspicion based on his observations.
Peterson did not offer and could not have offered this justification in his original motion, as
required by § 46-15-322(5), MCA, because he filed his discovery motion more than two
months before the hearing in the Municipal Court on the particularized suspicion issue. We
conclude Peterson did not establish “substantial need” for Finnegan’s personnel file, as
required by § 46-15-322(5), MCA.
¶45 Alternatively, Peterson asserts a defendant’s constitutional right to due process is
violated when the prosecution fails to produce relevant documents that could be used to
cross-examine key government witnesses. He cites Davis v. Alaska (1974), 415 U.S. 308,
94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, and Kyles v. Whitley (1995), 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555,
131 L.Ed.2d 490, in support of this assertion, but neither discusses nor applies those cases
to the present case. It is not this Court’s obligation to develop parties’ arguments for them.
State v. Flowers, 2004 MT 37, ¶ 44, 320 Mont. 49, ¶ 44, 86 P.3d 3, ¶ 44 (citation omitted).
Thus, we address Davis and Kyles only briefly.
¶46 In Davis, the United States Supreme Court held a defendant’s right to cross-
examination under the Confrontation Clause was violated when a trial court issued a
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protective order precluding defense counsel from using a juvenile’s record to impeach him
regarding his potential bias or motive in identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of a
crime. Davis, 415 U.S. at 317-18, 94 S.Ct. at 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d at 354-55. The Supreme
Court further determined the constitutional error required automatic reversal. Davis, 415
U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. at 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d at 355. Thus, Davis did not address a due process
violation stemming from a prosecution’s failure to provide information. Nor does Peterson
assert a violation of the Confrontation Clause. Therefore, his reliance on Davis is misplaced.
¶47 Kyles addressed a habeas corpus petitioner’s argument that the prosecution violated
his right to due process by failing to provide information to the defense before his capital
murder trial. The undisclosed information included, among other things, six inconsistent
eyewitness descriptions of the murderer; license numbers taken from vehicles at the crime
scene; an informant’s inconsistent statements; and evidence linking the informant to other
crimes at the same location and to a similar, unrelated murder. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 428-29,
115 S.Ct. at 1563, 131 L.Ed.2d at 502. Applying a line of cases stemming from Brady v.
Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, the Supreme Court held a due
process violation occurred because the cumulative effect of the undisclosed evidence
amounted to a reasonable probability that the result of the defendant’s trial would have been
different if the evidence had been disclosed. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 432-54, 115 S.Ct. at 1565-
75, 131 L.Ed.2d at 505-18.
¶48 Peterson does not assert a Brady violation occurred in this case. Again, this Court is
not obligated to formulate arguments on a party’s behalf. Flowers, ¶ 44. Peterson’s passing
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reference to Kyles is insufficient to raise a Brady claim or a constitutional challenge to § 46-
15-322(5), MCA. Therefore, we decline to address Kyles further.
¶49 Peterson next advances Henthorn as authority specifically addressing discovery of law
enforcement officers’ personnel files. As with Davis and Kyles, he does not set forth any
argument regarding the application of Henthorn to the present case, but merely quotes from
it. In Henthorn, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
government must inspect a testifying officer’s personnel file upon a defendant’s request for
the file’s production, must turn over any material information from the file to the defense,
and must submit information to the trial court for an in camera review if the materiality of
the information is uncertain. Henthorn, 931 F.2d at 30-31. Under Henthorn, the defendant
is not required to “make an initial showing of materiality” in order to trigger the
government’s obligation to inspect the file. Henthorn, 931 F.2d at 31.
¶50 As noted above, Peterson does not set forth any argument regarding Henthorn’s
application and, specifically, the relationship of Henthorn and § 46-15-322(5), MCA.
Moreover, Peterson does not attempt in his reply brief to refute the City’s contention that
Henthorn is inapposite because it did not concern § 46-15-322(5), MCA, Romero superceded
it, and analysis under Montana law may differ due to the Montana Constitution’s right to
privacy. We decline to formulate arguments on Peterson’s behalf. See Flowers, ¶ 44. In
light of Peterson’s failure to present an argument, we decline to address Henthorn further.
¶51 Finally, Peterson relies on Great Falls Tribune v. Sheriff (1989), 238 Mont. 103, 775
P.2d 1267, in asserting his entitlement to Finnegan’s personnel file under the constitutional
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right to know. In the Municipal Court, however, he based his discovery request on §§ 2-6-
102 and -104, MCA, rather than the right to know set forth in Article II, Section 9, of the
Montana Constitution and discussed in Great Falls Tribune. Section 2-6-102, MCA, entitles
citizens to inspect and copy public writings, with exceptions for constitutionally protected
materials and certain statutorily protected materials. Section 2-6-104, MCA, provides that
public records and other matters in the office of any public officer are open to public
inspection during office hours, except as provided by law. In this regard, Peterson presents
no argument regarding the application of §§ 2-6-102 and -104, MCA. Peterson’s assertion
of a violation of the constitutional right to know constitutes a change of legal theory from his
earlier reliance on right to know statutes. As stated above, we do not address changes in
legal theory on appeal. May, ¶ 15. Therefore, we decline to address Peterson’s Great Falls
Tribune argument.
¶52 We hold the District Court did not err in affirming the Municipal Court’s denial of
Peterson’s discovery request to review Finnegan’s file.
¶53 Affirmed.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
We concur:
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ JIM RICE
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