No. 04-317
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2005 MT 174
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ROBERT TROMBLEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DC 02-186
The Honorable Mike Salvagni, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Anna S. Hughes, Hughes Law Firm, PLLC, Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, Jennifer Anders,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Paul Luwe, Bozeman City
Attorney, Susan Wordal, Assistant City Attorney, Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 18, 2005
Decided: July 12, 2005
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Robert Trombley (Trombley), appeals from an order of the Eighteenth Judicial
District Court, Gallatin County, finding that a police officer had the requisite particularized
suspicion necessary to make an investigatory stop of his vehicle. We affirm.
¶2 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court properly affirmed the Municipal
Court’s denial of Trombley’s motion to dismiss for lack of particularized suspicion.
BACKGROUND
¶3 On December 28, 2001, a police officer driving north on North 7th Avenue in
Bozeman saw Trombley driving south on the same street, and observed him make a U-turn
into the east northbound lane, drift over the fog line, overcorrect into the west northbound
lane, and then continue north in the west northbound lane of North 7th Avenue. The officer
also observed Trombley straddle the yellow center line while driving through an intersection.
The officer activated his video camera and initiated a stop of Trombley. The officer’s stop
lead to Trombley’s arrest for DUI. Trombley was ultimately convicted of the offense in
Bozeman Municipal Court.
¶4 Before trial, Trombley filed a motion to dismiss the charge, arguing that the officer
did not have the requisite particularized suspicion necessary to initiate a traffic stop. The
Municipal Court rejected the claim based on its finding Trombley violated state law when
he executed the U-turn on North 7th Avenue. Trombley appealed to the District Court. The
District Court concluded that state law did not prohibit Trombley’s U-turn and determined
that the Municipal Court erred in relying upon this alleged violation to justify the traffic stop.
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The court, however, concluded that the totality of circumstances, including the erratic nature
of the U-turn, Trombley’s straddling of the double yellow line, and his drifting over the fog
line, all factored into the officer’s decision to initiate a stop of Trombley’s vehicle, and rose
to the level of particularized suspicion necessary to justify the stop. Trombley now appeals
from the District Court’s decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5 The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal proceeding is a question of
law, which we review to determine whether the district court’s conclusion of law is correct.
City of Missoula v. O’Neill, 2004 MT 328, ¶ 5, 324 Mont. 124, ¶ 5, 102 P.3d 21, ¶ 5. When
the question is one of particularized suspicion, the district court’s determination in that
regard is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Steen, 2004 MT 343, ¶ 5,
324 Mont. 272, ¶ 5, 102 P.3d 1251, ¶ 5.
DISCUSSION
¶6 Did the District Court properly affirm the Municipal Court’s decision denying
Trombley’s motion to dismiss for lack of particularized suspicion?
¶7 Trombley maintains the officer’s belief that his U-turn was illegal was a mistake of
law, and that the District Court should have therefore reversed the Municipal Court’s denial
of his motion to dismiss. He contends the District Court improperly considered evidence
unsupported by the record when it took into account factors other than Trombley’s U-turn.
¶8 The State argues the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that a particularized
suspicion existed to stop Trombley because the officer had objective data from which he
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could make certain inferences, when he witnessed Trombley drift over the fog line, fail to
signal while switching from the east northbound lane to the west northbound lane, and
straddle the yellow center line. We agree with the State.
¶9 To determine whether particularized suspicion exists to justify an investigative stop,
the State must show: (1) objective data from which an experienced officer could make
certain inferences, and (2) a resulting suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle in question
is or has been engaged in some wrongdoing. Steen, ¶ 7 (citation omitted). “Whether a
particularized suspicion exists is a question of fact dependent on the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the investigative stop.” Steen, ¶ 7 (citing Moore v. State, 2002
MT 315, ¶ 10, 313 Mont. 126, ¶ 10, 61 P.3d 746, ¶ 10). Particularized suspicion, however,
does not require certainty on the part of the law enforcement officer. Steen, ¶ 14 (citing State
v. Farabee, 2000 MT 265, ¶ 19, 302 Mont. 29, ¶ 19, 22 P.3d 175, ¶ 19).
¶10 We are not persuaded by Trombley’s assertion that a mistake of law regarding the
legality of the U-turn renders the officer’s stop unjustified. The existence of particularized
suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances. Steen, ¶ 7. As the State points out,
the officer testified during the hearing on Trombley’s motion to dismiss, that he observed
other erratic driving maneuvers, including straddling the center yellow line while driving
through an intersection, drifting over the fog line, and failing to signal while he moved from
the east northbound lane to the west northbound lane. These events constitute enough
objective data from which the officer could make certain inferences about Trombley,
resulting in a suspicion that Trombley was engaged in some sort of wrongdoing. Thus, the
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officer in this case had the requisite particularized suspicion to stop Trombley’s vehicle.
¶11 Accordingly, the District Court’s finding that the officer had a particularized suspicion
sufficient to justify the investigatory stop of Trombley was not clearly erroneous. The
District Court therefore did not err in upholding the decision of the Municipal Court.
¶12 Affirmed.
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
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