No. 04-117
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2005 MT 76
IN THE MATTER OF V.F.A.,
A Youth in Need of Care.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DN 2001-090
The Honorable Gregory R. Todd, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Kevin T. Sweeney, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, Ilka Becker, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County
Attorney, Rick Helm, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 26, 2004
Decided: March 29, 2005
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 J.A., the biological mother of V.F.A., appeals the Thirteenth Judicial District Court’s
Order terminating her parental rights and awarding permanent custody of the child to the
Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services
Division (DPHHS). We affirm.
¶2 J.A. presents the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the District Court make clearly erroneous Findings of Fact amounting to an
abuse of discretion?
2. Did the District Court err by not making any findings or conclusions determining
V.F.A. was a youth in need of care by clear and convincing evidence?
BACKGROUND
¶3 V.F.A. was born October 18, 2001, to mother J.A. and father D.A.1 On October 24,
2001, DPHHS petitioned for investigative authority and removed V.F.A. from J.A.’s care
upon discharge from the hospital after her birth. DPHHS subsequently petitioned for
temporary legal custody.
¶4 J.A. admitted to using drugs in the past, including usage while pregnant with V.F.A.
J.A. was offered two Treatment Plans by DPHHS, both of which had the purpose of
rehabilitating her so as to allow her to parent V.F.A. The first Treatment Plan covered the
period from October 19, 2001, to January 19, 2002. The second Treatment Plan covered the
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D.A.’s parental rights have also been terminated and are not at issue in this
appeal.
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period from May 20, 2002, to September 1, 2002. The court approved both Treatment Plans,
but J.A. did not sign either one.
¶5 The District Court granted temporary legal custody on February 19, 2002, finding by
a preponderance of the evidence that V.F.A. was a “youth in need of care.” DPHHS
subsequently moved for permanent legal custody and termination of J.A.’s parental rights.
A hearing on this petition was conducted before the District Court on various days in
October, November, and December, 2002, and January, February, and March, 2003. The
District Court granted the petition October 8, 2003.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6 We review a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights to determine whether
the court abused its discretion. In re Matter of J.V., 2003 MT 68, ¶ 7, 314 Mont. 487, ¶ 7,
67 P.3d 242, ¶ 7 (citation omitted). The test for an abuse of discretion is “whether the trial
court acted arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment, or exceeded the
bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice.” In re K.C.H., 2003 MT 125, ¶ 11, 316
Mont. 13, ¶ 11, 68 P.3d 788, ¶ 11 (citation omitted). However, because a parent’s right to
the care and custody of a child is a fundamental liberty interest, it must be protected by
fundamentally fair procedures. J.V., ¶ 7 (citation omitted).
¶7 To satisfy the relevant statutory requirements for terminating a parent-child
relationship, a district court must make specific factual findings. We review those findings
of fact to determine whether they are clearly erroneous. It is well established that in
reviewing a district court’s findings, this Court does not consider whether the evidence could
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support a different finding; nor does it substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder
regarding the weight given to the evidence. In re D.V., 2003 MT 160, ¶ 23, 316 Mont. 282,
¶ 23, 70 P.3d 1253, ¶ 23 (citation omitted). It is the district court’s responsibility to weigh
the evidence presented and ascertain witnesses’ corresponding credibility. In re K.S., 2003
MT 212, ¶ 20, 317 Mont. 88, ¶ 20, 75 P.3d 325, ¶ 20. Lastly, we review the court’s
conclusions of law to determine whether the court interpreted the law correctly. J.V., ¶ 7.
¶8 The district court is bound to give primary consideration to the physical, mental and
emotional conditions and needs of the children. Consequently, the best interests of the
children are of paramount concern in a parental rights termination proceeding and take
precedence over the parental rights. Section 41-3-609(3), MCA. Moreover, the party
seeking to terminate parental rights must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
the statutory requirements for termination have been met. J.V., ¶ 8 (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
ISSUE ONE
¶9 Did the District Court make clearly erroneous Findings of Fact amounting to an abuse
of discretion?
¶10 J.A. argues the District Court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order are
clearly contrary to the witness testimony and exhibits presented to the District Court.
Specifically, J.A. assigns error to the District Court’s findings in regard to her parenting
ability, her urine analysis (UA) and hair sample testing results, the testimony of psychologist
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Dr. Woolston, and her progress with her therapist, Darryl Weber. J.A. argues that minor
noncompliance with a Treatment Plan does not render her an unfit parent.
¶11 DPHHS responds that J.A.’s refusal to comply with either of her Treatment Plans
supports the District Court’s findings. DPHHS points to J.A.’s testimony at trial where she
admitted to not complying with several terms of the Treatment Plans.
¶12 To terminate a parent-child relationship, a district court must determine that one of
the criteria in § 41-3-609, MCA, exists. In re M.J.W., 1998 MT 142, ¶ 16, 289 Mont. 232,
¶ 16, 961 P.2d 105, ¶ 16. The sections of this statute relevant to this case are:
(1) The court may order a termination of the parent-child legal relationship
upon a finding . . . that any of the following circumstances exist:
...
(f) the child is an adjudicated youth in need of care and
both of the following exist:
(i) an appropriate treatment plan that has been
approved by the court has not been complied with
by the parents or has not been successful; and
(ii) the conduct or condition of the parents rendering them
unfit is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
¶13 Complete compliance with a treatment plan is required. D.V., ¶ 27. Substantial or
partial compliance is insufficient to prove that a person is prepared to be a fit or responsible
parent. D.V., ¶ 27. From a thorough review of the record, it is apparent that J.A. did not
completely comply with either of her Treatment Plans. A DPHHS social worker testified
that J.A. did not meet all of the goals outlined in the Treatment Plans and did not comply
with either Treatment Plan. Specifically, the evidence showed J.A. had suspect UA’s, was
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failing to keep her social worker informed of the people living in her home, was failing to
provide monthly verification of her income, was not consistently demonstrating increased
parenting skills, was not following the recommendations of the Family Support Network,
would not sign a general medical release, did not provide DPHHS information relating to her
application for Social Security benefits, and did not maintain income through employment
or other legal means. J.A. admitted to some of these things during her testimony.
¶14 Additionally, testimony supported the District Court’s conclusion that J.A.’s conduct
and condition rendering her unfit was unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
Specifically, the evidence showed J.A. had a long history of choosing drugs over her
children and that she either suffered from serious medical problems or was exaggerating
them in order to claim she was not capable of securing gainful employment. The District
Court refused to accept her contention that she was too disabled by her medical conditions
to maintain employment, but was still capable of parenting a young child on a full-time
basis. Further, a clinical psychologist testified J.A. was underestimating the demands of
being a parent and that she would not comply with the intent of her Treatment Plans a minute
longer than necessary.
¶15 While J.A. did present some evidence of her intent to change her lifestyle, there was
also ample evidence to the contrary. This Court does not consider whether the evidence
offered could support a different finding; nor does it substitute its judgment for that of the
fact-finder regarding the weight given to the evidence. D.V., ¶ 23. Even if the District
Court’s findings contain a few minor errors, there was more than sufficient evidence to
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support the District Court’s determination that J.A. failed to comply with either Treatment
Plan and that J.A.’s conduct and condition rendering her unfit was unlikely to change within
a reasonable time. Thus, we conclude the District Court’s findings were not clearly
erroneous and the District Court did not abuse its discretion.
ISSUE TWO
¶16 Did the District Court err by not making any findings or conclusions determining
V.F.A. was a youth in need of care by clear and convincing evidence?
¶17 J.A. faults the District Court for not making a finding that clear and convincing
evidence existed rendering V.F.A. a “youth in need of care.” J.A. asserts the District Court
merely relied on its findings from the February 19, 2002, temporary custody proceeding
which bore the lesser standard of proof, preponderance of the evidence.
¶18 Section 41-3-609(1), MCA, outlined earlier, does not require the District Court, in the
termination proceeding, to find by clear and convincing evidence that the child is a youth in
need of care; rather, it requires a finding that the child is an adjudicated youth in need of
care. The District Court made this finding in its Finding of Fact Number 2. Further, in
Conclusion of Law Number 7, the District Court applied the correct standard of proof noting
that DPHHS “presented clear and convincing evidence to establish that continuation of the
parent-child legal relationship between [V.F.A. and J.A.] will likely result in continued abuse
and neglect, and will likely cause serious emotional damage to this child.”
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¶19 Thus, the District Court did not err and made the proper Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law supporting the termination of the parent-child legal relationship between
J.A. and V.F.A.
CONCLUSION
¶20 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court.
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
We Concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
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