No. 05-179
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2006 MT 132
_______________________________________
NORTH 93 NEIGHBORS, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF FLATHEAD
COUNTY, acting as the governing body of the County of
Flathead, a government entity, and WOLFORD DEVELOPMENT
MONTANA, LLC, Intervenor,
Defendants and Respondents.
______________________________________
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and for the County of Flathead, Cause No. DV 2003-637A
The Honorable Stewart E. Stadler, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
David K. W. Wilson, Jr., Reynolds, Motl & Sherwood, PLLP, Helena,
Montana
For Respondent Flathead County Board of Commissioners:
Alan F. McCormick and William T. Wagner, Garlington, Lohn &
Robinson, PLLP, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent Wolford Development Montana, LLC:
Kristin L. Omvig and Scott D. Hagel, Crowley Haughey Hanson Toole &
Dietrich, PLLP, Kalispell, Montana
Ken Kalvig, Scott & Kalvig, Kalispell, Montana
For Amicus Montana Smart Growth Coalition:
Richard R. Thweatt, Attorney at Law, Helena, Montana
____________________________________
Submitted on Briefs: December 13, 2005
Decided: June 13, 2006
Filed:
______________________________________
Clerk
Justice Brian Morris delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 A citizens’ group challenges the decision of its local elected officials to amend
various planning documents to facilitate the development of a large suburban shopping
mall on land that formerly had been used for agricultural purposes. The citizens’ group,
North 93 Neighbors, Inc. (Neighbors), appeals from an order of the Eleventh Judicial
District, Flathead County, affirming the Flathead County Board of Commissioner’s
(Board) decisions to amend the Flathead County Growth Policy (Growth Policy) and to
amend portions of the Flathead County Zoning Regulations (Zoning Regulations). We
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
¶2 Neighbors present the following issues on appeal:
¶3 1. Whether the Board developed a factual record sufficient to overcome
Neighbors’s claim that it abused its discretion by failing to support its decisions to amend
the Growth Policy and the Zoning Regulations with independently adopted findings of
fact.
¶4 2. Whether the Growth Policy documents suffer from fatal internal
inconsistencies.
¶5 3. Whether the Wolford Amendment conflicts with the Growth Policy.
¶6 4. Whether the Zoning Amendment constitutes illegal spot zoning.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶7 This case involves the long, convoluted, and sometimes fractious history of
planning and zoning in Flathead County. The Board and the Kalispell City Council
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created the Kalispell City-County Planning Board in 1965. Flathead County and the
cities of Kalispell, Whitefish, and Columbia Falls established the Flathead Regional
Development Office (FRDO) in 1971 to provide planning staff and administrative
services for Flathead County and the three cities. The Board and the Kalispell City
Council adopted the Kalispell City-County Master Plan (City-County Plan) in 1986.
¶8 The City-County Plan includes a master plan map and goals in twelve specific
areas, including growth management, environment, economy, land use, and agriculture,
along with specific objectives for each of these goals. The Board also adopted the
Flathead County Master Plan (County Plan) in 1987 to cover those areas not otherwise
covered by the City-County Plan. The County Plan discusses five elements: agriculture,
land use, transportation, public facilities, and parks and open space.
¶9 Growth pressure in Flathead County soon spelled the end of county-wide and
cooperative planning efforts. For our purposes, the first chink in county-wide planning
came when the Board adopted the Stillwater Neighborhood Plan (Stillwater Plan) as an
amendment to both the County Plan and the City-County Plan in 1990. The Board then
revised the Stillwater Plan in 1992 to include an additional 40 acres for a total plan area
of 340 acres. The Stillwater Plan provides for the construction of a golf course, hotel and
conference center, commercial development, and residential single-family and townhouse
development. The Board zoned the property as resort commercial, residential apartment,
and suburban agriculture consistent with the Stillwater Plan. The Stillwater Plan never
materialized, but the planning and zoning amendments remained in effect.
¶10 Flathead County withdrew from the FRDO and the 1971 planning agreement with
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the City of Kalispell in 2001. The Flathead County Planning and Zoning Office
(Planning Office) now provides planning and zoning administrative staff and services for
Flathead County. The Board extended the jurisdiction of the Flathead County Planning
Board (Planning Board) to include that portion of the county outside of the City of
Kalispell that previously had been included in the jurisdictional area of the Kalispell
City-County Planning Board. The Board created a new Growth Policy in August of 2003
by combining the County Plan with those portions of the City-County Plan that covered
lands outside the City of Kalispell.
¶11 Wolford Development Montana, LLC (Wolford) entered this Balkanized planning
process when it submitted a request to the Planning Office. Wolford sought to amend the
Growth Policy by revising and expanding the Stillwater Plan in order to accommodate
the proposed Glacier Mall (Mall). Wolford’s proposal (Wolford Amendment) sought to
increase the size of the Stillwater Plan from 340 acres to 481 acres to accommodate a
commercial, office and residential development. The Wolford Amendment proposed 271
acres for commercial, 64 acres for mixed use, 141 acres of suburban agriculture, and five
acres for construction of a road. Wolford’s application indicated that it proposed to set
the agricultural land aside for the possible development of an on-site wastewater
treatment and disposal system.
¶12 The Planning Office reviewed Wolford’s application and submitted a report to the
Planning Board and the Board. The Planning Office concluded that the Wolford
Amendment complied with the Growth Policy. The Planning Board held a public hearing
on September 10, 2003, to consider the Wolford Amendment. The Planning Board
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adopted the Planning Office’s report as findings of fact and recommended that the Board
approve the amendment.
¶13 The Board then passed a resolution of intent to consider the Wolford Amendment
on September 29, 2003. The Board gave notice that it would take written public
comment on the Wolford Amendment before October 31, 2003. More than four thousand
members of the public submitted public comment on the proposal, with over 57 percent
opposing the Wolford Amendment. The Board held a public meeting on November 5,
2003, wherein it voted to approve the Wolford Amendment despite the public opposition
to the proposal. The Board passed a resolution adopting the Wolford Amendment to the
Growth Policy that same day. The Board did not prepare or adopt any independent
findings to support its decision and the Board did not analyze or discuss any of the issues
raised by the public comments in its decision.
¶14 Wolford submitted an application to the Planning Office to rezone the now 481
acres within the Stillwater Plan boundaries on August 25, 2003, in anticipation of the
Board’s decision to amend the Growth Policy. The Planning Office issued a report for
the zoning change, noting that approval of the zoning change depended on approval of
the amendment to the Growth Policy. The Planning Office’s report further noted that the
proposed development would have a significant impact on traffic and “should be
connected to public water and sewer as soon as practical.” The Planning Board held a
public meeting on the zoning change on November 13, 2003. Eight people spoke in
favor and four people spoke in opposition to the zoning change (Zoning Amendment).
The Planning Board voted to support the proposed Zoning Amendment and
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recommended its passage to the Board that same day.
¶15 The Board held a public meeting on December 23, 2003, to consider the Zoning
Amendment. Thirty members of the public spoke at the meeting in addition to Wolford’s
representatives. Fourteen people spoke in favor and 16 spoke in opposition to the Zoning
Amendment, including three of Neighbors’s board members. The Board unanimously
voted to approve the Zoning Amendment immediately following the close of the public
comment period. The Board again did not issue any independent findings of fact to
support its decision, but the Board did state in its decision that it considered issues raised
through the public comment process. The Board granted final approval of the Zoning
Amendment on February 4, 2004.
¶16 Neighbors brought this action in the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County,
challenging the Board’s decisions to amend the Growth Policy and Zoning Regulations.
Wolford intervened. The parties submitted cross-motions for summary judgment. The
District Court denied Neighbors’s motion for summary judgment and granted the Board’s
and Wolford’s motions. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶17 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same evaluation under Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., as the district court. Richards v. Knuchel,
2005 MT 133, ¶ 12, 327 Mont. 249, ¶ 12, 115 P.3d 189, ¶ 12. We review a district
court’s conclusions of law to determine if they are correct. Richards, ¶ 12.
¶18 Amending a growth policy or a zoning designation constitutes a legislative act.
Section 7-1-104, MCA. Courts review challenges to a governing body’s decision for an
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abuse of discretion. Schanz v. City of Billings (1979), 182 Mont. 328, 335, 597 P.2d 67,
71.
DISCUSSION
¶19 1. Whether the Board developed a factual record sufficient to overcome
Neighbors’s claim that it abused its discretion by failing to support its decisions to
amend the Growth Policy and the Zoning Regulations with independently adopted
findings of fact.
A. Growth Policy
¶20 Neighbors contend that the Board’s amendment of the Growth Policy without
issuing independent findings of fact in support rendered its decision unlawful, an abuse of
discretion, and arbitrary and capricious. They argue that the Planning Office’s report
cannot serve as a substitute in light of the fact that the staff prepared its report before the
Board received more than 4,400 public comments and thus the report did not, and could
not, address any of the concerns raised by the public. Neighbors assert that the Growth
Policy language, statutory public participation provisions, and case law, taken together,
required the Board to issue independent findings of fact in support of its decision.
¶21 We first examine the Growth Policy. In counties where a planning board has been
created, “the preeminent planning tool is the comprehensive jurisdiction-wide
development plan, which is today known as a growth policy. A growth policy essentially
surveys land use as it exists and makes recommendations for future planning.” Citizen
Advocates v. City Council, 2006 MT 47, ¶ 20, 331 Mont. 269, ¶ 20, 130 P.3d 1259, ¶ 20
(internal citations and quotations omitted). Neighbors argue that the Board must
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substantially comply with the Growth Policy and that the Growth Policy requires the
Board to issue independent findings of fact.
¶22 Section 76-1-605, MCA, provides that a governing body “must be guided by and
give consideration to” its growth policy. We held in Little v. Board of County Com’rs,
Etc. (1981), 193 Mont. 334, 353, 631 P.2d 1282, 1293, that local government units must
substantially comply with comprehensive master plans. We noted that strict compliance
would prove unworkable, but that requiring no compliance at all would defeat the whole
idea of planning. Little, 193 Mont. at 353, 631 P.2d at 1293. Although Little involved
the role of comprehensive master plans in zoning decisions, the principles set forth in
Little regarding the role of master plans when making future planning decisions apply
with equal force here. See Ash Grove Cement Co. v. Jefferson County (1997), 283 Mont.
486, 496, 943 P.2d 85, 91 (applying substantial compliance standard to local government
unit’s adoption of local vicinity plans). The substantial compliance standard set forth in
Little and affirmed in Ash Grove Cement incorporates the statutory standard in § 76-1-
605, MCA, of being guided by and considering a growth policy.
¶23 We see no tension between these two standards and therefore agree with
Neighbors that the Board must substantially comply with its Growth Policy. We
struggle, however, with Neighbors’s claim that substantial compliance with the Growth
Policy obligates the Board to issue independent findings of fact. Neighbors rely on the
following language from the Growth Policy in arguing the Board’s lack of substantial
compliance:
8
A Plan, to be effective, must be used. Each time the Plan is consulted,
because of an issue, those policies that are relevant should be identified. A
finding should then be made as to the conformance of the identified policies
to the issue. Where polices are not complied with or cannot be met, a
specific finding should be made stating whether this is a clear violation of
the policy or whether site conditions or extenuating circumstances exist and
justify the violating of the policy or policies. [Emphasis added.]
The question arises as to whether the Board substantially complied with the Growth
Policy by identifying relevant issues and making findings regarding the conformance of
the issues raised by the Wolford Amendment.
¶24 Neighbors further argue that the public participation provisions of the Growth
Policy Act, §§ 76-1-602 through -604, MCA, contemplate that the Board consider issues
identified through the public comment process. This consideration, argue Neighbors,
includes having the Board incorporate issues identified through the public participation
process, not otherwise addressed in the Planning Office report, into its findings of fact in
support of its decision to amend the Growth Policy.
¶25 These public participation statutes outline the necessary procedures for adopting
and revising growth policies. Section 76-1-604(3)(a), MCA, allows for governing bodies
to revise a growth policy by following the same procedures for adoption of a growth
policy. The procedures require that a planning board hold a public hearing on a proposed
growth policy before the submission of a growth policy to the governing body. Section
76-1-602, MCA.
¶26 A planning board then considers the suggestions elicited at the public hearing and
either recommends acceptance or rejection of the growth policy to the governing body.
Section 76-1-603, MCA. The Planning Board held a public meeting on September 10,
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2003, and heard 28 people speak in favor of the Wolford Amendment and 18 speak in
opposition to the amendment. The Planning Board drafted a letter recommending
approval to the Board, wherein it stated that it “discussed the proposal and considered the
public testimony.” The Planning Board further stated that it had adopted the Planning
Office’s report as findings of fact. The Planning Office prepared the report, however,
before the Planning Board received any public comments on the Wolford Amendment.
¶27 The statutory scheme then requires the governing body to adopt a resolution of
intention to adopt, adopt with revisions, or reject the proposed growth policy. Section
76-1-604(1), MCA. The Board adopted a resolution of intent to adopt the Wolford
Amendment and then received over 4,400 comments from the public. The Board adopted
a resolution to approve the amendment following the public comment period, wherein it
stated that the Board had “considered the information presented to it since the adoption of
[the] resolution of intent.” Contrary to the Board’s resolution to approve the Zoning
Amendment, discussed below, this resolution did not expressly mention the public
comments. Nothing in the record indicates what issues, aside from a request from the
public to put the Wolford Amendment to a public vote, were raised by the public
participation process. Commissioner Hall testified that he personally reviewed the
comments, but that he could not speak for his fellow Commissioners. Nothing in the
record indicates that the other members of the Board considered the public comments.
¶28 Neighbors analogize the Board’s role in this process to that of an agency decision-
maker in the administrative process under the Montana Administrative Procedures Act
(MAPA). Neighbors cite to Stewart v. Region II Child and Fam. Serv. (1990), 242 Mont.
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88, 93, 788 P.2d 913, 916, for the proposition that the “rules of agency review rely on the
principle that the agency, and not the district court, is the finder of fact.” According to
Neighbors, a court should remand a case for appropriate findings “[i]f a factual question
is essential to an agency’s decision, and the agency’s findings of fact are so insufficient
that they cannot be clarified or are entirely absent . . . .” Stewart, 242 Mont. at 93, 788
P.2d at 916. Section 2-4-102(b) of MAPA admittedly excludes units of local
government, such as the Board, from the requirements of MAPA, nevertheless
Neighbors’s analogy proves apt to a degree.
¶29 Neighbors argue that the Board effectively preempted judicial review through a
process by which it “left no tracks.” Neighbors contend that a reviewing court is left with
the problem of evaluating the reasonableness of the Board’s decision that boils down to
the Board’s claim that “it is okay because we said it is okay.” We have faced this
obstacle in the context of zoning changes approved by elected city councils. First in
Lowe v. City of Missoula (1974), 165 Mont. 38, 525 P.2d 551, we reversed a zoning
amendment based upon the city council’s failure to address the statutory requirements for
zoning amendments through the development of a factual record that could be reviewed
by a court for an abuse of discretion. Later in Schanz, 182 Mont. 328, 597 P.2d 67, we
determined that the information relied upon by the city council in approving the zoning
amendment was “so lacking in fact and foundation” as to render the city council’s
decision clearly unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. We remanded to the city
council for consideration of the statutory criteria. Schanz, 182 Mont. at 336, 597 P.2d at
71.
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¶30 Lowe and Schanz involve zoning amendments rather than amendments to master
plans or growth policies similar to the one at issue here. These same principles still
apply. As a general principle of administrative law, the record developed by an agency,
here the Board, serves “to flesh out the pertinent facts upon which a decision is based in
order to facilitate judicial review.” Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 333 F.
Supp. 2d 773, 782 (S.D. Ind. 2004). This requirement helps prevent “judicial intrusion
into matters committed to administrative discretion by the legislature.” Annex Books, 333
F. Supp. 2d at 782. The absence in the record of facts relied upon by the Board in
making its decision to approve the amendment to the Growth Policy would place the
Court in the untenable position of having to substitute its own judgment for the Board’s
judgment. See Burgess v. Gallatin County Com’n (1985), 215 Mont. 503, 507, 698 P.2d
862, 865.
¶31 The Board generally complied here with any such fact-finding requirements. The
Planning Office reviewed Wolford’s application and analyzed the Wolford Amendment.
The Planning Office’s report identified the relevant policies implicated by the Wolford
Amendment and described its findings. For example, the Growth Policy lists
Transportation as one of its major goal and policy elements. The report noted that the
Wolford Amendment’s proposal to extend Rose Crossing from Whitefish Stage Road to
Highway 93 at Wolford’s expense provides a positive transportation improvement for the
County and helps remediate the Growth Policy’s concern regarding a lack of suitable
east-west traffic movement.
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¶32 Further, one of the policies states that “[a]dditional commercial development in
the Planning Jurisdiction along Highway . . . 93 . . . should be discouraged.” The
Planning Office seemingly justified deviation from this policy by concluding that it “is
far better to locate potential projects of the scale contemplated by this change within a
jurisdiction that is planned, has development standards, and is virtually adjacent to the
largest existing city in Flathead County and adjacent to similar uses such as the Mountain
View Plaza and the Spring Prairie Center.” The Planning Office’s report concluded that
the “proposed amendment is consistent with the intent of the existing Growth Policy Plan
policies and goals.”
¶33 The Planning Board then adopted the Planning Office’s report as findings of fact
and passed a resolution recommending that the Board adopt the Wolford Amendment.
The Board did not explicitly adopt the report as findings of fact. The Planning Office’s
report did identify the policies relevant to the Wolford Amendment. The report further
analyzed the compliance, or lack of compliance, of the Wolford Amendment with the
relevant policies. As discussed above, however, the Planning Office prepared the report
before the Board opened the proposal to public comment. The Board received more than
4,400 comments from the public regarding the Wolford Amendment. The Board closed
the public comment period on October 31, 2003, and amended the Growth Policy just
five days later on November 5, 2003.
¶34 Nothing can be found in the record that discloses what issues, aside from calls
from the public to put the Wolford Amendment to a public vote, were raised through the
public participation process. As the Dissent notes, the Board expressed appreciation for
13
the public comments and thanked its clerk for preparing a tally of the comments.
Dissent, ¶ 76. Commissioner Howard Gipe referenced a newspaper article that reported
various organizations and individuals supported the change, and estimated that the
breakdown for and against the Wolford Amendment was “about 50-50.” The Board then
denied the public’s request to vote on the Wolford Amendment. The Board adopted the
amendment immediately thereafter. Aside from these comments and the Board’s vague
reference to having “considered the information presented to it since the adoption of [the]
resolution of intent” nothing in the record demonstrates that the Board, the Planning
Board, or the Planning Office ever considered any issues, other than denying the public
the opportunity to vote on the Wolford Amendment, raised through the more than 4,400
written public comments.
¶35 The Board failed to address the public comments in its decision-making and
thereby failed “to flesh out the pertinent facts upon which [its] decision [was] based in
order to facilitate judicial review.” Annex Books, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 782. Accordingly,
we cannot know whether the public raised novel issues not addressed by the Planning
Office’s report and whether the Board appropriately responded to those issues. The
public participation statutes contemplate more than merely eliciting public comment.
Section 76-1-603, MCA. Further, the Board must equip reviewing courts with a record
of the facts it relied upon in making its decision to avoid judicial intrusion into matters
committed to the Board’s discretion. Annex Books, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 782.
¶36 We conclude that the Board’s reliance upon the Planning Office’s report was
justified and appropriate to an extent. The Board’s sole reliance on the report, prepared
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before over 4,400 members of the public voiced their concerns, however, renders its
decision to amend the Growth Policy unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. See
Schanz, 182 Mont. at 336, 597 P.2d at 70. The Board has an obligation to consider the
public comments and incorporate those comments into its decision-making process.
¶37 The District Court granted summary judgment based on the fact that the Board did
not abuse its discretion in amending the Growth Policy. The District Court failed to
account, however, for the issue of whether the Board considered matters raised through
the 4,400 public comments. Absent any indication in the record that the Board
considered these public comments, the Board cannot demonstrate that it satisfied its duty
to flesh out the pertinent facts upon which it relied in approving the Wolford
Amendment.
¶38 The District Court must evaluate whether the Board satisfied this obligation by
requiring the Board to demonstrate what issues, if any, were raised through the public
comment process that were not addressed by the Planning Office’s report. The Board
must further demonstrate to the District Court that it evaluated such issues with the
requirements of the Growth Policy. As the parties initially filed cross-motions for
summary judgment, the District Court on remand likewise must allow Neighbors to
present evidence to refute the Board’s assertions. We reverse and remand to the District
Court for this limited purpose. Schanz, 182 Mont. at 336, 597 P.2d at 71. If the District
Court determines that the Board failed to satisfy its obligation, or if the record proves
insufficient to determine whether the Board complied, it should send the case to the
Board for development of the factual record that it relied upon in making its decision to
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amend the Growth Policy.
B. Zoning Regulations
¶39 Neighbors next contend that the zoning statutes and the Zoning Regulations
require the Board to issue findings of fact in support of its decision to amend the zoning
ordinance. Neighbors assert that the Board’s failure to issue findings of fact entitles them
to summary judgment voiding and setting aside the Board’s zoning decision.
¶40 Section 76-2-205, MCA, provides the process for amending a zoning ordinance.
A board of county commissioners must publish a notice of a public hearing on the
proposed zoning regulation amendment and provide the public an opportunity to be heard
at the hearing. Section 76-2-205(1) and (2), MCA. A board then must review the
recommendation from the planning board and make any revisions or amendments it
deems proper based on the public comments received. Section 76-2-205(3), MCA. A
board of county commissioners may then pass a resolution of intent to adopt the
amendment. Section 76-2-205(4). If a board passes a resolution of intent to adopt an
amendment to the zoning regulations it must publish notice of the resolution, and provide
for a 30-day protest period. Section 76-2-205(5), MCA. A board must pass a final
resolution adopting the amendment unless 40 percent of the landowners within the zoning
district protest the amendment within the 30-day protest period. Section 76-2-205(6),
MCA.
¶41 Neighbors further assert that Flathead County’s own Zoning Regulations require
the Board to issue independent findings of fact. Section 2.08.040 of the Zoning
Regulations state that when “considering an application for amendment to the provisions
16
of these regulations or the Zoning Districts, the Planning Board and the Board . . . shall
be guided by and adopt findings of fact based upon [the following 12 criteria].” The 12
criteria in § 2.08.040 of the Zoning Regulations mirror the criteria for considering a
zoning amendment from § 76-2-203, MCA.
¶42 The Board must make zoning amendments in accordance with the 12 statutory and
Zoning Regulation criteria. Section 76-2-203, MCA. Wolford’s application to amend
the zoning regulations addressed all 12 of these criteria at length. The Planning Office
also addressed the 12 statutory criteria and issued a report outlining the Zoning
Amendment in the context of the criteria. The Planning Board discussed the amendment,
voted to recommend approval, and adopted the Planning Office’s report as findings of
fact.
¶43 The Board then held a public hearing on the proposed Zoning Amendment. The
Board passed a resolution of intent to adopt the Zoning Amendment following the public
hearing. The Board adopted a final resolution approving the Zoning Amendment at the
conclusion of the required protest period, wherein it stated that it based its decision upon
the recommendation of the Planning Board and public testimony. The resolution further
stated that the Board made its decision in accordance with § 76-2-205, MCA. The Board
did not expressly adopt the Planning Office’s report as findings of fact. The Board did
state, however, that it adopted the Zoning Amendment based upon the Planning Board’s
recommendation, and the Planning Board adopted the report as findings of fact. Further,
the plain language of § 2.08.040 requires only that the Planning Board and the Board “be
guided by and adopt findings of fact . . . .” Nothing requires that the Board separately
17
issue its own independent factual findings.
¶44 The applicable standard of review is whether the information upon which the
Board based its decision “is so lacking in fact and foundation” that “it is clearly
unreasonable and constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Schanz, 182 Mont. at 335-36, 597
P.2d at 71. The Board reviewed the Planning Board’s recommendation. The Planning
Board discussed the Zoning Amendment, voted unanimously to recommend approval,
and adopted the Planning Office’s report as findings of fact. The Board considered
public comment, including a statement by Sharon DeMeester, President of Neighbors,
wherein she reviewed the 12 statutory criteria, and made its decision based upon these
considerations. The Board thus followed the proper statutory and regulatory procedure
for adopting zoning amendments and had sufficient evidence before it to make an
informed decision.
¶45 Neighbors finally argue that this Court’s decisions in Lowe and Schanz mandate
reversal of the Board’s decision because of the Board’s failure to consider the 12
statutory criteria. Lowe and Schanz require governing bodies to consider the 12 statutory
criteria from what is now § 76-2-203, MCA, before making changes to zoning
regulations. Lowe, 165 Mont. at 40, 525 P.2d at 552; Schanz, 182 Mont. at 336, 597 P.2d
at 71. The Planning Office’s report outlines each of the 12 statutory criteria in detail as
they relate to the Wolford’s Amendment. The Planning Board adopted the report as
findings of fact and recommended approval to the Board. The Board considered the
Planning Board’s recommendation. The Board also heard public comment on the 12
statutory criteria, and, unlike the amendment to the Growth Policy, expressly considered
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those public comments before approving the Zoning Amendment. The Board therefore
followed the requirement articulated in Lowe and Schanz before making changes to the
Zoning Regulations. We agree with the District Court that the Board did all that the law
required.
¶46 2. Whether the Growth Policy documents suffer from fatal internal
inconsistencies.
¶47 Neighbors argue that the Growth Policy suffers from a fatal flaw because it
contains internal inconsistencies. Neighbors allege that the Board failed to reconcile vast
discrepancies when it combined the City-County Plan of 1986 with the County Plan of
1987 to create the new Growth Policy in August of 2003. Specifically, Neighbors point
to three such inconsistencies.
¶48 Neighbors first argue that the Board premised its approval of the Stillwater Plan
upon annexation of the area into the city of Kalispell and the area obtaining city services.
Neither contingency has been realized. The City-County Plan likewise contains
objectives of adopting a municipal annexation program. The County Master Plan, on the
other hand, has no stated requirement that developments be annexed into the City.
Second, Neighbors allege that the City-County Plan stresses joint administration between
the City and County while the County Plan lacks any goals of joint administration.
Finally, Neighbors point to the fact that the City-County Plan contains a table projecting
future land use needs for the plan area in a number of categories, but the County Plan
contains no such projection.
¶49 Neighbors rely on BCPOA v. Planning & Zoning Com’n (1995), 270 Mont. 160,
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175, 890 P.2d 1268, 1277, for the proposition that “in order to effectively plan for the
development of a planning and zoning district, the planning documents which comprise
the development pattern must be internally consistent as well as consistent with
companion planning documents.” A clear conflict existed in BCPOA. The general plan
and the zoning map specifically excluded single family housing in the base area. The
zoning ordinance and base area plan, by contrast, contained a provision for high density
subdivision in the same area. BCPOA, 270 Mont. at 167, 890 P.2d at 1272. The
inconsistencies within the planning documents made it impossible to determine the
appropriate population densities for the area. BCPOA, 270 Mont. at 173, 890 P.2d at
1276.
¶50 The alleged inconsistencies within the Growth Policy do not rise to the level of the
inconsistencies in BCPOA. The annexation objective in the City-County Plan on which
Neighbors rely provides for the adoption of “a municipal annexation program which
coordinates with the Extension of Services Plan to aggressively deal with fringe
developments setting the stage for immediate or future annexation so as to preserve the
tax base of the city and eliminate future barriers to orderly growth.” Neighbors assert
that the Board premised its approval of the Stillwater Plan upon annexation into the City,
but that the County Plan contains no objectives for annexation. Wolford counters that the
Board considered annexation to be a future possibility, not an immediate requirement.
¶51 The Board amended both the City-County Plan and the County Plan by revising
the Stillwater Plan in 1992. The 1992 Stillwater Plan Amendment contains an objective
to “provide for public sewer services.” As part of the strategy to provide for public sewer
20
services, the 1992 Stillwater Plan Amendment calls for development of an onsite
engineered sewer system for the first 200 users. Only when use exceeds 200 users does
the 1992 Stillwater Plan Amendment state that connection to the city of Kalispell sewage
collection would occur and that the developer would seek annexation. We therefore
agree with Wolford that the Board considered annexation to be a future possibility rather
than an immediate requirement in approving the Stillwater Amendment. The Wolford
Amendment to the Stillwater Plan also contains no requirement of annexation or hook up
to city sewer services. Neighbors cannot establish that the alleged inconsistencies
regarding annexation rise to the level of contradiction apparent in BCPOA, and thereby
impede the planning process.
¶52 Neighbors next argue that the City-County Plan requires joint administration while
the County Plan contains no such requirement. The City-County Plan contains a “goal”
for administration wherein the city and county “jointly cooperate in promoting, guiding,
and directing the planning jurisdiction’s growth and development.” The City-County
Plan defines goals as “very long range statements about the future of a community, they
give direction. They are, in essence, what the people of the Kalispell Planning
Jurisdiction are striving for in terms of neighborhood and community environment,
growth, community services, etc.” The County Plan contains a similar goal for joint
cooperation, wherein “[i]ntergovernmental cooperation between the three cities of
Whitefish, Kalispell, and Columbia Falls and Flathead County should be encouraged . . .
.” The Court must pause to scratch its collective heads and ponder whether the City-
County Plan’s “goal” for joint administration conflicts with the County Plan’s goal of
21
“encouraging” intergovernmental cooperation. We are hard pressed to conclude that the
City-County Plan and County Plan conflict on the topic of joint administration to such a
degree as to impede the planning process.
¶53 Neighbors finally argue that the City-County Plan contains a table projecting
future land use needs, while the County Plan does not. Once again, the City-County
Plan’s projections represent projections of future needs rather than binding criteria.
Neighbors do not explain how this alleged inconsistency impedes the planning process.
Both the City-County Plan and County Plan discuss similar goals in the areas of
residential, commercial, and industrial development. We fail to see how the County
Plan’s omission of a future land needs projection impedes the planning process in light of
the County Plan’s discussion of goals in these same areas of residential, commercial, and
industrial development. These goals largely mirror in relevant part the future land needs
projections.
¶54 We recognize the City-County Plan and the County Plan are not identical. They
do not suffer from internal inconsistencies, however, to such a degree that render them
inherently unreliable. BCPOA, 270 Mont. at 173, 890 P.2d at 1276. The lack of
significant inconsistencies arises from the intentionally vague and sometimes open-ended
language employed in the two documents. The local elected officials in Flathead County
have chosen to adopt planning documents that contain these ambiguities. BCPOA
requires that the two plans be sufficiently consistent to allow public officials to follow
them. BCPOA, 270 Mont. at 174, 890 P.2d at 1276. The Growth Policy, comprising the
City-County Plan and the County Plan and all amendments thereto, despite the presence
22
of much vague and open-ended language, provides sufficient consistency for the Board to
follow. The Board therefore did not exceed its authority or jurisdiction in amending the
Growth Policy.
¶55 3. Whether the Wolford Amendment is consistent with the Flathead Growth
Policy.
¶56 Neighbors next argue that the Wolford Amendment to the Growth Policy does not
substantially comply with the Growth Policy, and therefore must be annulled and set
aside. Section 76-1-601(4)(a), MCA, provides that growth policies may contain
neighborhood plans. If a growth policy contains a neighborhood plan, such as the
Stillwater Neighborhood Plan, such a plan must be consistent with the growth policy.
Section 76-1-601(4)(a), MCA. We therefore note that the proper standard is not whether
the Wolford Amendment substantially complies with the Growth Policy, as the parties
have framed the issue, but whether the Wolford Amendment proves consistent with the
Growth Policy.
¶57 Neighbors contend that the City-County Plan slated the area of the proposed Mall
for annexation to the City. Neighbors further contend that the Board “has gone to great
lengths to ensure that this massive development . . . is not annexed into the City and does
not get connected to city water and sewer services” without providing any supporting
authority for such a statement. As we already have determined that the Board did not
premise its approval of the Stillwater Plan upon annexation into the city, and that the
Wolford Amendment neither required nor precluded annexation into the city, we focus on
the two other inconsistencies alleged by Neighbors.
23
¶58 Neighbors argue that the Wolford Amendment conflicts with the Growth Policy’s
goals pertaining to commercial development in the Kalispell area. Neighbors rely, in
part, on a Planning Office report from 2001 for a previous application submitted by
Wolford to locate the mall in the Evergreen area. Neighbors further rely on the 1987
County Plan’s statement that “additional development in the planning jurisdiction along
Highway . . . 93 should be discouraged.” Neighbors finally argue that the development
of agricultural land at the proposed Mall site conflicts with the Growth Policy.
¶59 The 2001 Planning Office report noted that “the development will cannibalize
downtown Kalispell commercial operations, force vacancies in the existing business and
redirect growth into the unincorporated portions of Flathead County.” The Planning
Office prepared this report in 2001 for location in a different part of Flathead County.
More importantly, factors on the ground have changed significantly since 2001. The area
has seen significant population growth. The proposed Mall now comports with the
prevailing uses in the area. Thirty-six businesses surround the proposed Mall in all
directions, including large box retailers such as Target, Home Depot, TJ Maxx, Lowes,
Ross, Borders Books, and Costco. The proposed Mall admittedly may not serve to
preserve downtown Kalispell retail operations, a fear expressed by the 2001 report. It
will at least be located, however, among other “cannibalizing” sprawl developments that
the Board previously had determined to be appropriate for the area.
¶60 We find similarly unpersuasive Neighbors’s next contention that the Wolford
Amendment conflicts with the Growth Policy because the County Plan discourages
additional developments along Highway 93. The County Plan encourages development
24
“toward existing commercial areas either as expansion or infill.” The Planning Office
noted, however, that the County planned that area in 1992 (via the 1992 Amendment to
the Stillwater Plan) for “future growth because of significant population growth and
development in the Kalispell area . . . .” Flathead County thus amended the County Plan
nearly fifteen years ago through enactment of the Stillwater Plan to create a new policy
objective--one that allows for commercial development in the location of the proposed
Mall. The Planning Office report noted that the surrounding areas were slated for large
retailers and box stores, projects that have since been completed. The proposed Mall will
be sited in an “existing commercial area.”
¶61 Neighbors’s final argument, that the development of agricultural land at the
proposed site conflicts with the Growth Policy, fails to recognize that the Stillwater Plan,
and the zoning in effect before the Wolford Amendment, also allowed for significant
commercial and residential development at the proposed Mall location. The Wolford
Amendment and Zoning Amendment designate 141 acres north of the proposed Mall for
suburban agricultural zoning, an increase of 31 acres over the 2002 version of the
Stillwater Plan.
¶62 We therefore conclude that the Wolford Amendment is consistent with the Growth
Policy. We further conclude that the Board complied with this Court’s directive in Little.
Little dealt with zoning amendments that conflicted with the master plan. We noted that
we were “aware that changes in the master plan may well be dictated by changed
circumstances occurring after the adoption of the plan. If this is so, the correct procedure
is to amend the master plan rather than to erode the master plan by simply refusing to
25
adhere to its guidelines.” Little, 193 Mont. at 354, 631 P.2d at 1293. Here, the Board
amended the Growth Policy directly, rather than attempting to erode it through zoning
amendments. We remain mindful of the concerns regarding the pitfalls of piecemeal
amendments to comprehensive planning documents expressed by Justice Leaphart and
Justice Nelson in Ash Grove Cement, 283 Mont. at 500-01, 943 P.2d at 94-95 (Leaphart,
J., and Nelson, J., specially concurring). Nevertheless, the Board followed the procedure
we established in Little in amending the Growth Policy and we have not abandoned the
Little standard.
¶63 4. Whether the Zoning Amendment constitutes illegal spot zoning.
¶64 Wolford moved for summary judgment on whether the Zoning Amendment
constituted illegal spot zoning. Neighbors failed to present any evidence to the District
Court to support its position. The District Court addressed the claim despite this
omission. Neighbors now argue on appeal that the Board’s decision to amend the Zoning
Regulations constituted illegal spot zoning.
¶65 We consider three factors when determining whether a zoning amendment
constitutes spot zoning. Little, 193 Mont. at 346, 631 P.2d at 1289. We first evaluate
whether the requested use differs significantly from the prevailing use in the area. Little,
193 Mont. at 346, 631 P.2d at 1289. We next determine whether the area proposed for
rezoning is small, although not solely in physical size. Little, 193 Mont. at 346, 631 P.2d
at 1289. Finally, we evaluate whether the requested change resembles special legislation
designed to benefit only one or a few landowners at the expense of the surrounding
landowners or general public. Little, 193 Mont. at 346, 631 P.2d at 1289.
26
¶66 Wolford presented evidence to the District Court demonstrating that the proposed
land uses in the Zoning Amendment were not significantly different from prevailing uses
in the area. Neighbors did not refute Wolford’s assertions regarding the prevailing uses
surrounding the proposed Mall. Thirty-six businesses surround the proposed Mall in all
directions. One hundred and ten acres of commercially zoned property lies to the east of
the area encompassing the proposed Mall. This area includes the Spring Prairie Center
and retail establishments such as Lowes and Costco. Sixty acres make up the Mountain
View Plaza Development to the south of the proposed Mall. The Mountain View Plaza
includes Home Depot, Target, Ross, TJ Maxx and Borders. The 40-acre Semi-Tool
complex also lies to the south and within 250 feet of the proposed Mall. The Semi-Tool
area is zoned County I-1 and allows for the same commercial uses that the Zoning
Amendment allows, plus industrial uses.
¶67 The Zoning Amendment allows for zoning and uses consistent with the
neighboring properties. The County zoned the Stillwater Plan area for residential,
commercial, and agricultural uses. The Stillwater Plan allowed for 290 acres for High
Density Residential and 50 acres for Resort Commercial. Extending a preexisting zone
classification to include a larger area does not constitute spot zoning. State ex rel.
Gutkoski v. Langhor (1972), 160 Mont. 351, 353, 502 P.2d 1144, 1146. Additionally, we
may consider the current zoning when evaluating whether the requested use differs
significantly from the prevailing use in the area. Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Bd. Of
Com’rs, 2001 MT 99, ¶ 23, 305 Mont. 232, ¶ 23, 25 P.3d 168, ¶ 23. Because the areas
surrounding the Wolford Amendment are largely commercial, and because the existing
27
zoning allowed for commercial development, we conclude that the Zoning Amendment
does not allow for uses that differ significantly from the prevailing uses in the area.
¶68 We analyze the second and third elements of the Little test together. Boland v.
City of Great Falls (1996), 275 Mont. 128, 134, 910 P.2d 890, 894. The number of
separate landowners affected by the rezoning directly relates to whether the zoning
constitutes special legislation designed to benefit only one person. Boland, 275 Mont. at
134, 910 P.2d at 894. Wolford is the sole owner of the parcel. Zone changes for property
owned by one person, however, do not automatically equate to spot zoning. Greater
Yellowstone Coal., ¶ 27. We also consider whether the zoning change occurred at the
expense of surrounding landowners or the general public and whether the requested use
accords with the comprehensive plan. Greater Yellowstone Coal., ¶ 21.
¶69 In Greater Yellowstone Coal. we evaluated whether the Gallatin County
Commissioner’s decision to amend the zoning regulations to allow for a large planned
unit development project constituted spot zoning. Greater Yellowstone Coal., ¶¶ 20-37.
We concluded that the zoning request was in the nature of special legislation designed to
benefit one or a few landowners at the expense of the surrounding landowners or general
public. Greater Yellowstone Coal., ¶ 32. We relied in part on the publicly owned nature
of the surrounding land. The public owned 59 percent of the surrounding area, including
some of the most significant wildlife habitat in the country. Greater Yellowstone Coal., ¶
32. Similarly, in Little we concluded that the Flathead County Commissioner’s decision
to rezone land from medium-density residential to allow for a regional mall was done at
the expense of the surrounding landowners. Little, 193 Mont. at 348, 631 P.2d at 1290.
28
¶70 Unlike Greater Yellowstone Coal. and Little, similar uses surround the location of
the proposed Mall. As noted above, the surrounding properties are largely commercial,
including large box retailers. We already have determined that the Zoning Amendment’s
requested use comports with the Growth Policy. We therefore conclude that despite
Wolford’s sole ownership of the parcel, the Board did not enact the Zoning Amendment
at the expense of surrounding landowners or the general public. Greater Yellowstone
Coal., ¶ 21.
CONCLUSION
¶71 We affirm the District Court’s determination that the Board adequately supported
its decision to amend the Zoning Regulations with findings of fact. We affirm the
District Court’s ruling that the Growth Policy documents do not suffer from fatal internal
inconsistencies and that the Wolford Amendment is consistent with the Growth Policy.
We further affirm the District Court’ determination that the Zoning Amendment does not
constitute illegal spot zoning. We reverse and remand, however, for the District Court to
evaluate whether the extensive public comments raised any new issues not addressed by
the Planning Office’s report and to determine whether the Board considered any such
issues.
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
We Concur:
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
29
Justice Jim Rice dissenting.
¶72 With all due respect to the Court’s sincere effort to navigate through the maze of
the local planning process, I believe the opinion misapplies authority and imposes new,
uncertain duties upon local governing bodies which will prove to be confusing and
burdensome. Ultimately, I believe the opinion is inherently contradictory.
¶73 My primary concern is with the reasoning and holding under Issue 1A. The Court
first addresses the standard of review, “agree[ing] with Neighbors that the Board must
substantially comply with its Growth Policy,” and citing Little v. Board of County
Com’rs, Etc. (1981), 193 Mont. 334, 353, 631 P.2d 1282, 1293. See ¶¶ 22-23. The
problem is that Little was a zoning case, and the substantial compliance standard adopted
therein was for the purpose of reviewing zoning decisions vis-à-vis s growth policy.
Little, 193 Mont. at 353, 631 P.2d at 1293. In contrast, the issue here is not a zoning
decision’s compliance with a growth policy, but, rather, an amendment to the Stillwater
Neighborhood Plan, a part of the Growth Policy itself. Under § 76-1-601(4), MCA
(2003), a growth policy may include one or more neighborhood plans, but they are
optional. Contrary to the “substantial compliance” standard asserted by the Neighbors
and applied by the Court, the statute governing such plans requires that “[a]
neighborhood plan must be consistent with the growth policy.” Section 76-1-601(4)(a),
MCA (2003) (emphasis added.). This just makes common sense: there is no need to
require that an amendment to a growth policy “substantially comply” with itself.
Consistency is all that is required. Although the Court cites to Ash Grove in support of
the “substantial compliance” standard, that case offers little assistance. The discussion
30
about the neighborhood or local vicinity plan (“LVP”) at issue there was properly
couched in terms of whether it was consistent with the county’s Master Plan, and we
concluded that “[t]hus, the LVP is clearly inconsistent with the Master Plan and violates
the mandate of that Plan which authorizes local vicinity plans only to the extent they are
consistent with the Master Plan and designed to implement it. Likewise, the LVP also
violates the spirit and language of § 76-1-605, MCA . . . .” Ash Grove Cement v.
Jefferson County (1997), 283 Mont. 486, 497-98, 943 P.2d 85, 92 (emphasis added).
Although the Court also stated “that the County Commissioners failed to substantially
comply with the Master Plan in adopting the LVP,” for the reasons set forth above, that
brief reference was technically incorrect. Ash Grove, 283 Mont. at 498, 943 P.2d at 92.
The Court should have retained the statutory distinctions and used the “consistent with”
standard throughout the discussion of that issue. 1
¶74 Even with regard to zoning decisions, which the Court addresses under Issue 1B,
we have recognized that the “substantial compliance” standard has probably been
affected by recent legislation. See Citizen Advocates for a Livable Missoula v. City
Council, 2006 MT 47, ¶¶ 20, 24-25, 331 Mont. 269, ¶¶ 20, 24-25, 130 P.3d 1259, ¶¶ 20,
24-25 (“[I]t may be assumed that the 2003 legislation was intended to reduce in some
1
Further, in apparent support of its adoption of Neighbors’ substantial compliance
test, the Court quotes from the Growth Policy that “[a] finding should then be made as to
the conformance of the identified policies to the issue.” ¶ 23. Read in context, this
suggestion in the Growth Policy for making findings is for the purpose of assessing the
compliance of a new planning proposal (see reference to “site conditions” therein) with
the Growth Policy, not assessing an amendment to the Growth Policy itself, or adoption
of neighborhood plans, matters separately addressed in the Growth Policy under a section
entitled “Continued Planning.” That section makes no suggestions about making findings
of fact or the standard by which to assess such Policy revisions.
31
fashion the reliance which local governing bodies are required to place upon growth
policies when making land use decisions. However, although alluding to the passage of
the new statute, both Appellants and Respondents have nonetheless framed their
arguments regarding the validity of [Zoning] Ordinance 3234 under Little’s ‘substantial
compliance’ standard . . . .” Thus, the Court did not address the issue further.). In sum,
under Issue 1A, a zoning issue is not presented and the substantial compliance standard is
not applicable. Under Issue 1B, the Court fails to recognize that the standard has been
adjusted by legislation, but I nonetheless concur with the Court’s conclusion that the law
was complied with. Under Issue 3, where the Court addresses the question of whether
the Wolford Amendment conflicts with the Flathead County Growth Policy, the Court
properly applies the “consistent” standard.
¶75 I turn to the merits under Issue 1A. The Court asks “[w]hether the Board
developed a factual record sufficient to overcome Neighbors’s claim that it abused its
discretion by failing to support its decisions to amend the Growth Policy and the Zoning
Regulations with independently adopted findings of fact.” ¶ 19. In this issue, the Court
considers the sufficiency of the record and reverses the District Court for essentially two
reasons. First, it holds that the Board’s “vague reference to having ‘considered the
information presented to it since the adoption of the resolution of intent’” was an
inadequate consideration of the matters raised by the more than 4,400 written public
comments. ¶ 34; see also ¶¶ 13, 35, 36, 37. Secondly, it concludes that the Board had
“an obligation” to not only consider the public comments, but to “incorporate those
comments into its decision-making process,” ¶ 36, particularly those comments which
32
raised issues which the Court envisions as being “novel.” ¶ 35; see also ¶ 71. I disagree
with these conclusions, both factually and legally.
¶76 As an issue of fact, I disagree that the Board of County Commissioners
inadequately “considered” or “addressed” the over 4,400 public comments before making
its decision to adopt the Wolford Amendment to the Growth Policy. According to the
minutes of the November 5, 2003, Board meeting:
Commissioner Hall explained that before the Board for consideration today
was a final resolution for a master plan amendment. This was not an
approval of the mall. He expressed appreciation for the over 4,400
passionate comments received from all over the area. He summarized a
disclaimer relative to the validity of all the signatures. He noted that
several of the letters encouraged a public vote of the plan change.
Commissioner Gipe thanked Clerk Eggum for all of her work in reviewing
the correspondence and preparing a calculation of the comments. He
displayed a clipping from the Daily Interlake of October 26th wherein the
Columbia Falls and Kalispell Chamber of Commerce, Flathead Business
and Industry Association, Evergreen Business and Property Owners
Association, Kalispell Business Owners Association and Jobs Now all
support the plan change along with over 600 individual names. He
speculated if you could get an accurate count it would probably end up
about 50-50. He noted that this change was also supported by the other
elected officials from Flathead County.
Commissioner Hall reviewed the resolutions: One an approval of the plan
change and another one putting the approval before a public vote.
Chairman Watne and Commissioner Gipe stated they would not support
putting the plan change on the ballot. Commissioner Hall cited the over
4,000 comments providing a good feel of where the community stands
relative to the issue. He agreed putting the matter on the ballot at this time
was not appropriate.
The resolution adopting the amendment also noted:
WHEREAS, the Board of Commissioners has considered the information
presented to it since the adoption of that resolution of intent.
33
Thus, the Commissioners had their staff review the public correspondence and prepare a
calculation of the comments, noted that 600 individual names were listed in favor of the
proposal as well as various organizations, cited the comments during the meeting, noted
and rejected the suggestion made by some comments to put the matter on the ballot,
described the public comments as “passionate” and expressed appreciation for the 4,400
comments received, noting that they came from all the surrounding area. In view of the
statute, which, at most, requires “consideration of” public comments, see § 76-1-603,
MCA, I believe the minutes, along with the final resolution, demonstrate that the
Commissioners’ actions completely satisfied the statutory obligation to “consider” public
comment. Nothing more is required under the statute.
¶77 However, the Court imposes its own judicially-created requirements upon local
governing bodies. The Court holds that the Commissioners are to engage in factfinding
that will “incorporate [public] comments into its decision-making process,” including a
duty “to flesh out the pertinent facts upon which [it relied],” particularly those public
comments which “raised novel issues,” which the Court defines as those “not addressed
by the Planning Office’s report.” In other words, the Court now imposes on the Board
the obligation to evaluate each of the 4,400 comments to determine whether the
comments were addressed in the planning report, and, if not, to make findings of fact
about how the Commissioners disposed of each of these “novel” comments, whether
favorably or not. Obviously, there is no way to know whether public comments have
raised a “novel” issue unless each comment is individually scrutinized, recorded and
compared. I submit that, not only do such obligations far exceed the “consideration”
34
required by statute, but are inconsistent with any practical understanding of the duties of
local elected officials, particularly in rural counties which have little support staff. These
officials are lay citizens elected to listen, not to document everything they have heard. 2
¶78 In my opinion, these new requirements will foster micro-management of local
governing bodies by the courts, a development inconsistent with the very nature of the
decision we are reviewing—that is, as the Court acknowledges initially, “[a]mending a
growth policy . . . constitutes a legislative act.” ¶ 18 (emphasis added). Legislating
should not require factfinding of the public opinion which influenced it. This striking
error is brought about by the authority erroneously relied upon by the Court. Despite the
express exclusion of local government units from MAPA, the Court nonetheless
concludes that Neighbors’s analogy to MAPA “proves apt to a degree,” ¶ 28, and
proceeds to impose MAPA-like requirements. This case may well illustrate why the
Legislature explicitly exempted local governments from MAPA’s application. Further,
the Court relies on Lowe and Schanz, both of which were zoning cases, not growth policy
cases, and were thus resolved by different statutes. Lastly, the Court relies on Annex
Brooks, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, which was a constitutional challenge to a quasi-
judicial act of denying an adult entertainment license to a particular business under a city
ordinance which governed the license application process. It was this quasi-judicial act
which the federal court could not review without factfinding—not the city’s legislative
act in adopting the ordinance. Annex Brooks, 333 F.Supp.2d at 782 (“the purpose of a
2
Indeed, it would appear that any person making a public comment now has
standing to challenge the commissioners’ failure to properly consider the “novel” issue
raised in their comment.
35
quasi-judicial proceeding by an agency, in this case, the Controller, is to flesh out the
pertinent facts upon which a decision is based in order to facilitate judicial review”). I
must agree that having additional factfinding would, no doubt, be helpful to the courts
when reviewing these legislative decisions. However, convenience does not equate to a
requirement. Having imposed formal requirements upon the exercise of legislative
powers, this decision will have far-reaching and adverse ramifications for local
governments.
¶79 Turning to Issue 3, I find the Court’s decision to reach the issue of “[w]hether the
Wolford Amendment is consistent with the Flathead Growth Policy” inherently
contradictory with its decision to reverse and remand for more detailed consideration and
findings of fact under Issue 1A. If, as the Court concludes under Issue 1A, the Board
erred in not generating sufficient findings of fact to allow judicial review of the
Amendment, how can we reach the issue of whether that Amendment is consistent with
the Growth Policy and thereby satisfies the law? In doing the latter under Issue 3, the
Court impliedly concedes that there really is sufficient evidence for purposes of Issue 1A.
Of course, I agree with this conclusion, and therefore, concur with Issue 3, but dissent
from the Court’s reversal under Issue 1A.
¶80 I would affirm.
/S/ JIM RICE
36