July 24 2008
DA 07-0548
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 260
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
MATTHEW HILL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Park, Cause No. DC 2006-094
Honorable Wm. Nels Swandal, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jami Rebsom, Karl Knuchel, P.C., Livingston, Montana
For Appellee:
Hon. Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, C. Mark Fowler,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Brett Linneweber, Park County Attorney, Livingston, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 18, 2008
Decided: July 24, 2008
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Matthew Hill (Hill) appeals his convictions for felony criminal possession of
dangerous drugs with intent to distribute and misdemeanor possession of dangerous drugs
in the Sixth Judicial District, Park County. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 On the night of August 16, 2006, Captain Corey Lussier, Officer John Mathias,
and Officer John Leonard of the Livingston Police Department (LPD) responded to a
dispatch concerning a domestic disturbance. The dispatch stated that the disturbance was
occurring at a trailer with a fence and a truck in its yard at the corner of M and Lewis
Streets in Livingston, Montana. When officers arrived on the scene, they were unable to
locate a trailer at that location, but then noticed a trailer matching that description
approximately one block away. When they approached the trailer, officers heard a
female screaming. Officer Mathias later testified that upon arriving at the trailer, he
recognized it as the home of Hill and a woman named Toni Culver (Culver), both of
whom were believed to be using and distributing drugs based on complaints received by
the Missouri River Drug Task Force (Task Force).
¶3 According to Captain Lussier’s testimony, when he arrived at the trailer he
announced the presence of law enforcement through a wide open door at the rear of the
trailer. Through that door, Captain Lussier observed Hill inside the trailer passing by him
in an aggressive manner towards the rear of the trailer. Captain Lussier ordered Hill to
stop, but he did not respond. At that point, Captain Lussier could still hear a female
screaming from inside the trailer, and then entered through the open door to intercept
2
Hill. Hill continued to walk towards the rear of the trailer and put his hands behind a
door, at which point Captain Lussier reached for his gun. At that point, Hill stopped and
began responding to Captain Lussier. As Officer Mathias later testified, after Captain
Lussier entered he heard him order a male subject to come out of a bedroom in the trailer.
At that point the screaming and yelling was still continuing and officers continued to be
concerned about safety within the house.
¶4 After Captain Lussier detained Hill, he handed him off to Officer Mathias who
spoke with him outside the trailer. Captain Lussier then continued to the living room
where the yelling was coming from. Once he arrived there, he found Culver yelling and
attempted to calm her down. Officer Leonard was also present at the scene but he was
outside of the trailer near the front door, which was closed. Previously, Officer Mathias
had radioed Officer Leonard that they were both inside the trailer, that he had a male
subject running towards the rear of the trailer, and that Officer Leonard should enter the
trailer as soon as he could. When Officer Leonard entered the trailer he observed Captain
Lussier speaking with Culver, who was familiar to Officer Leonard from previous
contacts. Upon beginning a visual safety sweep of the area, Officer Leonard noticed two
glass pipes in an ashtray directly in front of him. He immediately identified them as
“crank pipes”—that is, pipes used to smoke methamphetamine. When asked about the
pipes, Culver stated they were hers. In speaking with Culver, Officer Leonard noticed
her mannerisms were consistent with someone under methamphetamine intoxication,
including rapid speech, uncontrollable body movements, rapid mood changes, and dilated
pupils. Officer Leonard then seized the crank pipes as evidence.
3
¶5 Subsequently, Officer Mathias conducted a security sweep of the trailer, bringing
Hill back inside the trailer with him. In the course of this sweep, he observed drug
paraphernalia. Moreover, when Officer Mathias conducted a pat down of Hill, he
discovered that Hill had drug paraphernalia on his person. Officer Mathias observed that
Hill appeared under the influence of methamphetamine as he was acting nervous,
appeared gaunt and thin, and his jaw muscles were convulsing rapidly. During a
conversation with Officer Mathias, Hill admitted he smoked methamphetamine. He also
stated that there was marijuana in the trailer, and that Culver actively sells
methamphetamine from the trailer. Hill also stated that he observed Culver smoking
methamphetamine in the trailer earlier that day.
¶6 In talking with Captain Lussier, Culver explained that she had been yelling at her
daughter, Mistie Burks (Mistie), and that they had been in an argument. This alerted
Captain Lussier that Mistie was possibly in the trailer, so he went to locate her. Captain
Lussier found Mistie’s room and knocked on her door. When she answered, she was
crying, yelling and sobbing. While Captain Lussier was attempting to talk with Mistie,
Culver was still yelling, screaming, and generally “out of control.” At that point, Captain
Lussier decided that Culver would have to be arrested since she continued to be
disorderly. Culver was then arrested and taken to a detention center.
¶7 After Culver’s arrest, officers requested a search warrant for the trailer and
remained there to keep the trailer secure. During that time, Captain Lussier continued to
speak with Mistie. Mistie told Captain Lussier that her mother, Culver, used to have a
methamphetamine problem. Detective Steve Voss (Voss) of the Task Force soon arrived
4
at the trailer with a search warrant. During the search, Detective Voss and Officer
Leonard discovered another crank pipe in Mistie’s room. She was subsequently detained
and taken to a youth detention center in Galen, Montana. Officer Mathias accompanied
Mistie to the detention center. While awaiting medical clearance for admission, Mistie
told Officer Mathias that Culver had a severe drug and alcohol problem, that Hill had
made some of the drug paraphernalia found in the home, and that Culver sold drugs from
the trailer.
¶8 A search of the home by officers eventually turned up a total of twenty-three items
of evidence relating to drug use and the distribution of drugs, including drug
paraphernalia, a digital scale, baggies, suspected buds of marijuana, and a vial containing
a white crystal substance. Detective Voss, a trained narcotics investigator, performed a
narcotics identification kit (NIK) test on the white crystal substance at the sheriff’s office
and the test positively determined the substance was methamphetamine or MDMA
(commonly referred to as ecstasy). According to Detective Voss’s testimony, a NIK test
will give a blue result for either methamphetamine or ecstasy. However, Detective
Voss’s visual examination of the substance, based on his training and experience, led him
to conclude that it was methamphetamine and not ecstasy, because the substance was in a
crystalline form which, in his opinion, was not consistent with the appearance of ecstasy.
Detective Voss also tested the suspected marijuana buds, and that test came back
positive.
¶9 The State subsequently charged Hill with one felony count of criminal possession
of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute based on the seized methamphetamine, and
5
one misdemeanor possession of dangerous drugs based on the seized marijuana. Prior to
trial, Hill filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him on the grounds that there was
not probable cause to support them. In particular, Hill argued that no drugs were seized
in the trailer and that no evidence was produced showing he was involved in selling
drugs. The District Court denied the motion.
¶10 Hill also filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the trailer on the grounds
that it was seized in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, because officers failed to knock and announce their presence prior to
entering the trailer. The District Court denied that motion as well, concluding that
officers did announce their presence prior to entering, and that exigent circumstances
justified their entry into the trailer. On March 14, 2007, Hill filed a motion in limine
seeking to limit the presentation of evidence to events which occurred on August 16,
2006, and evidence which was seized from the trailer on that date. In particular, Hill
argued that any evidence of possible drugs sales or other prior bad acts would be
inadmissible under M. R. Evid. 404(b) and highly prejudicial to him. The State
responded that Mistie’s declarations to Officer Mathias about drug use and sales of drugs
from the trailer should be admitted under the transaction rule, codified at § 26-1-103,
MCA. The District Court agreed with the State that Mistie’s declarations were
admissible under the transaction rule, but otherwise granted Hill’s motion. The case
proceeded to trial on March 19, 2007.
¶11 During trial, there was testimony elicited from Mistie and the officers concerning
Mistie’s statements to police about the use and sale of methamphetamine in the trailer
6
and Hill’s knowledge of and involvement in those events. During trial, Hill registered
objections to this testimony on the same grounds as set forth in his motion in limine. The
District Court noted these objections for the record, but allowed the evidence to be
presented.
¶12 At the conclusion of the first day of trial, after the jury was excused for the day,
the State, Hill, and the District Court set about resolving some of the proposed jury
instructions. Hill proposed a cautionary instruction which would have prevented the jury
from speculating as to the contents of the white substance that was seized in the trailer
since it was never sent to the Montana State Crime Lab for testing, but only NIK-tested
by Detective Voss. The District Court denied the instruction, and informed Hill that he
could present his concerns about the fact that the substance was not tested at the Montana
State Crime Lab to the jury, but that it would go to the weight of the evidence, not to its
underlying admissibility.
¶13 On the second day of trial, at the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Hill moved to
dismiss the criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute charge on the
grounds that the white substance which was alleged to be methamphetamine could not be
introduced to the jury because it had not been sent to the Montana State Crime Lab for
testing, and because the NIK tests performed by Detective Voss did not necessarily rule
out the possibility that the substance was actually something other than
methamphetamine. The District Court denied the motion from the bench stating,
Again, that goes to weight. I think that’s a legitimate concern, but it goes
to the weight of the testimony. And we do have statements, here. If there
hadn’t been statements made that they were using meth, that meth was in
7
the trailer, I think there’s even a statement from your client that there was
meth in the trailer, or somebody had been using meth.
¶14 On March 20, 2007, Hill was convicted by a jury on both counts. Hill now
appeals his conviction. Hill maintains that the District Court erred in denying his motion
to suppress because officers failed to knock and announce their presence prior to entering
the trailer as required under the Fourth Amendment. Hill also maintains that the charge
of criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute was not supported by
sufficient evidence, and thus the District Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss this
charge, as well as his request for a cautionary jury instruction. Additionally, Hill argues
that the District Court abused its discretion and denied his right to a fair trial by allowing
the introduction of prior acts without providing him written notice of the State’s intent to
admit such evidence as required under State v. Matt, 249 Mont. 136, 814 P.2d 52 (1991).
¶15 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
¶16 Issue One: Did the District Court err in denying Hill’s motion to suppress?
¶17 Issue Two: Did the State present sufficient evidence to support the charge of
criminal possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute?
¶18 Issue Three: Did the District Court abuse its discretion and admit evidence of
other acts in violation of M. R. Evid. 404(b), and without the written notice as required
under State v. Matt?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶19 We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress to determine whether
the findings of fact in support of its decision are clearly erroneous, and whether its
8
interpretation and application of the law is correct. State v. Bieber, 2007 MT 262, ¶ 20,
339 Mont. 309, ¶ 20, 170 P.3d 444, ¶ 20.
¶20 We review questions regarding the sufficiency of the evidence “to determine
whether, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Field, 2005 MT 181, ¶ 15, 328 Mont. 26, ¶ 15, 116 P.3d 813,
¶ 15 (quotation omitted). A motion for a directed verdict is properly referred to as a
“motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence.” State v. McWilliams, 2008 MT 59, ¶ 36,
341 Mont. 517, ¶ 36, 178 P.3d 121, ¶ 36. We review de novo a district court’s denial of a
motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. McWilliams, ¶ 37 (citing State v. Swann,
2007 MT 126, ¶ 19, 337 Mont. 326, ¶ 19, 160 P.3d 511, ¶ 19). The granting of such a
motion “is only appropriate if, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, there is no evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Swann, ¶ 16.
¶21 We also review de novo the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal
case. State v. Howard, 2008 MT 173, ¶ 8, 343 Mont. 378, ¶ 8, 184 P.3d 344, ¶ 8. Our
review of a motion to dismiss is plenary, and we determine whether a district court’s
conclusions in support of its decision were correct. Howard, ¶ 8.
¶22 We review a district court’s decision pertaining to the admissibility of evidence for
an abuse of discretion. Perdue v. Gagnon Farms, Inc., 2003 MT 47, ¶ 21, 314 Mont.
303, ¶ 21, 65 P.3d 570, ¶ 21. Similarly, we review a district court’s decision whether to
9
grant or deny a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. Schuff v. Jackson, 2008 MT
81, ¶ 15, 342 Mont. 156, ¶ 15, 179 P.3d 1169, ¶ 15.
DISCUSSION
¶23 Issue One: Did the District Court err in denying Hill’s motion to suppress?
¶24 Hill argues that officers of the LPD violated his Fourth Amendment rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures because they failed to knock and announce their
presence prior to entering the trailer, and that the evidence seized from the trailer should
have been suppressed. Hill maintains that officers were responding to a possible
domestic disturbance made by a third party, and that officers were not certain of the
location reported to them, so they entered the trailer of Culver and Hill apparently
because they were known drug users. Then, when they approached the trailer, officers
heard only a female yelling at someone, which Hill claims does not provide exigent
circumstances for the officers to enter without knocking and announcing their presence.
In short, Hill implies that the officers used the domestic disturbance as a pretext to enter
the trailer unannounced in order to search for drugs.
¶25 The State points out several deficiencies in Hill’s argument. First, the State argues
that Hill essentially asks this Court to reweigh the evidence before the District Court, and
does not argue that the District Court’s findings were clearly erroneous, or otherwise not
supported by substantial evidence. The State maintains that the testimony given by the
officers at trial demonstrates that officers were certain that they were responding to the
correct residence even though the dispatch initially gave the wrong address, that they did
not go to the trailer simply because they knew Culver and Hill were drug users, and that
10
they did in fact announce their presence when they arrived at the trailer and heard a
woman screaming. The State maintains that Hill improperly asks this Court to scrutinize
the officer’s subjective motivations in suggesting that the officers used the domestic
disturbance as a pretext to enter Hill and Culver’s trailer.
¶26 Moreover, the State maintains that exigent circumstances did exist in this case.
The State notes that officers were responding to a domestic disturbance call, and that they
heard a woman screaming inside the trailer. Additionally, Captain Lussier did announce
his presence at the open door of the trailer, but once he noticed Hill run by him without
stopping in response to an order to do so, Captain Lussier was justified in immediately
entering the trailer in order to prevent physical harm to himself, the other officers, or
other persons who might be in the trailer.
¶27 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Sections
10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution, protect the citizens of this State from
unreasonable searches and seizures at the hands of government agents. State v. Anyan,
2004 MT 395, ¶ 61, 325 Mont. 245, ¶ 61, 104 P.3d 511, ¶ 61. In Montana, the “knock
and announce” rule requires that government agents knock and announce their presence
prior to entering an individual’s home without a warrant unless exigent circumstances are
present. Cassady v. Yellowstone Co. Mont. Sheriff Dept., 2006 MT 217, ¶ 31, 333 Mont.
371, ¶ 31, 143 P.3d 148, ¶ 31 (citing Anyan, ¶ 33). We have defined “exigent
circumstances” as,
[T]hose circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to believe
that entry (or other relevant prompt action) was necessary to prevent
physical harm to the officers or other person[s], the destruction of relevant
11
evidence, the escape of a suspect, or some other consequence improperly
frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.
Cassady, ¶ 33 (quotation omitted).
¶28 Exigent circumstances “may not always obviate the knock and announce
requirement. Law enforcement and courts still must evaluate the circumstances in each
situation on a case by case basis, adhering to the ‘flexible requirement of reasonableness’
implicated whenever law enforcement interests are present.” Cassady, ¶ 31 (quoting
Wilson v. Ark., 514 U.S. 927, 934, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1918 (1995)). Moreover, the State
bears the burden of proving exigent circumstances, otherwise the evidence seized by
government agents will be rendered inadmissible. Cassady, ¶ 32.
¶29 Based on the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the officers did not
violate Hill’s rights against unreasonable searches and seizures when they entered the
trailer. In the first instance, we note that the District Court found that the officers were
responding to the trailer to investigate a domestic disturbance, and not for any other
reason. Hill has failed to demonstrate that this finding, which was based on officer
testimony at a suppression hearing, was clearly erroneous.
¶30 Secondly, we note that the District Court found, based on testimony given at the
suppression hearing, that Captain Lussier did in fact announce his presence upon arrival
at the trailer. While it is not clear whether Captain Lussier leaned in slightly over the
open threshold to announce his presence, or whether he simply announced his presence
through the open door from outside of the trailer, it is undisputed that he did announce his
presence at or near the open door, and that he did not simply rush into the trailer
12
unannounced. More importantly, however, after he announced his presence, he observed
Hill running by him towards the back of the trailer. When he ordered Hill to stop, Hill
did not respond to Captain Lussier’s command but continued toward the rear of the trailer
and put his hands behind a door, out of Captain Lussier’s sight. As he stood at the open
threshold, Captain Lussier could still hear a woman screaming inside the trailer, but did
not know where she was located or whether Hill was intending to get a weapon.
Moreover, Captain Lussier did not know whether someone had already been assaulted or
not. The situation was rapidly evolving and potentially dangerous.
¶31 We agree with the State that once Captain Lussier ordered Hill to stop and he
failed to respond, the futility exception to the knock and announce rule supported his
entry into the trailer. “The futility exception to the knock and announce rule excuses the
knock and announce requirement where police officers have a reasonable suspicion that
the occupants know of the presence and purpose of the police prior to their entry into the
residence.” Anyan, ¶ 51. We agree with the State that, given the continued screaming of
a woman from inside the trailer which indicated an on-going domestic disturbance,
continuing to wait at the open threshold after Hill failed to respond to Captain Lussier’s
command would have been superfluous, futile, and dangerous. Thus, the District Court
did not err in denying Hill’s motion to suppress.
¶32 Issue Two: Did the State present sufficient evidence to support the charge of
criminal possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute?
¶33 As noted above, Hill’s motion to dismiss filed prior to trial, his request for a
cautionary jury instruction, and his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence were all
13
denied by the District Court. While the basis for the two motions and the proposed jury
instruction are not identical, all three rest on the notion that there was insufficient
evidence to support the charges against Hill. The genesis of Hill’s argument is that
Detective Voss conducted only an on-site NIK test of the seized drugs, and that the State
did not send the drugs for testing at the Montana State Crime Lab before he was tried and
convicted. Hill argues that because the State did not have the substances tested at the
Montana State Crime Lab, whether the white substance seized from the trailer was
actually methamphetamine was never proven. Thus, the District Court should have either
dismissed the charge of criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute,
or, at a minimum given the proposed cautionary jury instruction.
¶34 The State urges us to affirm the District Court with respect to these rulings. The
State notes, as a threshold matter, that we evaluate claims based on the insufficiency of
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and consider whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Swann, ¶ 16. The State goes on to point out that § 45-9-103(1), MCA,
criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute, provides that “a person
commits the offense of criminal possession with intent to distribute if the person
possesses with intent to distribute any dangerous drug as defined in 50-32-101.” The
State maintains that it provided ample circumstantial evidence that the white substance
seized in the trailer was in fact methamphetamine through Detective Voss’s testimony,
including the fact that he performed NIK tests on the substance. As the State notes, in
State v. Vandersloot, 2003 MT 179, 316 Mont. 405, 73 P.3d 174, we found that
14
circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under § 45-9-101, MCA,
even though no direct lab test of alleged drugs was conducted. Vandersloot, ¶ 34. In its
case against Hill, the State presented Detective Voss’s testimony concerning the NIK test,
along with the entire environment and activities at the trailer, including the seized
evidence (drugs, drug paraphernalia, a digital scale, and baggies which are consistent
with methamphetamine distribution), as well as Mistie’s statements to Officer Mathias.
¶35 We agree with the State and affirm the District Court. In general, circumstantial
evidence by itself is sufficient to sustain a conviction if it is “of such a quality and
quantity as to legally justify a jury in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and
all the facts and circumstances [of the case are] considered collectively.” State v.
Southern, 1999 MT 94, ¶ 92, 294 Mont. 225, ¶ 92, 980 P.2d 3, ¶ 92 (quotation omitted);
see also State v. Merrick, 2000 MT 124, ¶ 13, 299 Mont. 472, ¶ 13, 2 P.3d 242, ¶ 13
(“Circumstantial evidence may be used to prove any element of an offense.”). Other than
pointing out that the State did not have the white substance tested at the Montana State
Crime Lab, Hill provides no authority demonstrating that a state crime lab analysis of
alleged drugs is required in order to sustain a conviction under § 45-9-101, MCA, or that
the circumstantial evidence presented by the State was insufficient to either support the
charges in the first place, or sustain a conviction under those charges. Instead, as the
State correctly notes, circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to support such a charge.
¶36 Hill fails to demonstrate that no rational trier of fact could have convicted him of
the crimes with which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence, when
considered in a light most favorable to the prosecution in the context of all the facts and
15
circumstances, was sufficient to sustain his conviction, even though the proof of whether
the white substance seized in the trailer was methamphetamine was somewhat
circumstantial. Detective Voss’s expert testimony, and the result of the NIK test he
performed in the field, was sufficient to support the jury’s finding as well as the charges
in the first place, and Hill has not demonstrated that Detective Voss’s testimony was in
error, or that the methods he relied upon were somehow questionable or deficient. In this
regard, we note that a conviction under § 45-9-101, MCA, does not specify that any
particular quantity of drugs is necessary to sustain a conviction. In cases where the
precise quantity of drugs is a necessary element of the offense, state lab testing may
indeed be required. See State v. Long, 2005 MT 130, ¶ 42, 327 Mont. 238, ¶ 42, 113 P.3d
290, ¶ 42 (Nelson, J., concurring). However, these concerns are not present in this case,
and the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain Hill’s conviction.
¶37 Along similar lines, Hill has not demonstrated that the failure to give a cautionary
jury instruction on this point was an abuse of discretion. (See ¶ 12.) Instead, we agree
with the State that Hill is essentially attempting to have this Court make an independent
determination of the credibility and relative weight of the evidence which was considered
by the jury. We decline the invitation to second-guess the jury’s determination in this
regard. See Merrick, ¶ 13 (stating that “the weight and credibility of witnesses are
exclusively the province of the trier of fact.”). Thus, we affirm the District Court.
¶38 Issue Three: Did the District Court abuse its discretion and admit evidence of
other acts in violation of M. R. Evid. 404(b) and without the written notice as
required under State v. Matt?
16
¶39 Hill argues that the District Court abused its discretion and failed to provide him
written notice as required under Matt of its intent to use prior acts against him at trial.
The prior acts Hill refers to were presented through the testimony of Mistie and LPD
officers, which the District Court ruled was admissible under the “transaction rule,”
codified at § 26-1-103, MCA, which reads as follows:
Where the declaration, act, or omission forms part of a transaction
which is itself the fact in dispute or evidence of that fact, such declaration,
act, or omission is evidence as part of the transaction.
“Pursuant to the transaction rule, prior acts that are inextricably linked to, and
explanatory of, the charged offense are admissible notwithstanding the rules relating to
other crimes evidence.” State v. Gittens, 2008 MT 55, ¶ 37, 341 Mont. 450, ¶ 37, 178
P.3d 91, ¶ 37 (quotations omitted).
¶40 As the State notes, the statements from Mistie which are challenged by Hill all
concerned her knowledge of Hill’s involvement in the use and sale of methamphetamine
in the trailer, and his presence and knowledge of such activity. These statements related
to the count of criminal possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute because
that count was based on Hill’s presence at the trailer while sales of methamphetamine
were occurring, his awareness of those sales, and his personal use of drugs in the trailer—
all of which gave rise to the inference that he was also involved in the sale of drugs. We
agree with the State that Hill has failed to demonstrate that Mistie’s statements were not
covered by the transaction rule, § 26-1-103, MCA, and that the District Court abused it
discretion in admitting them into evidence. Because these statements are covered by the
transaction rule, the State did not need to provide Hill with written notice under Matt.
17
CONCLUSION
¶41 We conclude that the District Court did not err in denying Hill’s motion to
suppress and that the charges against him and his conviction were supported by sufficient
evidence. We also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting evidence of other acts because this evidence was covered by the transaction
rule, § 26-1-103, MCA. Thus, we affirm Hill’s conviction.
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
We concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ JIM RICE
18