June 17 2008
DA 06-0604
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 217
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH WAYNE HINKLE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. CDC 05-299
Honorable Dirk M. Sandefur, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
William F. Hooks, Attorney at Law; Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General; Sheri K. Sprigg, Assistant
Attorney General; Helena, Montana
Brant Light, Cascade County Attorney; Matthew Robertson,
Deputy County Attorney; Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 20, 2008
Decided: June 17, 2008
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Appellant Joseph Wayne Hinkle appeals from the order of the Eighth Judicial
District Court, Cascade County, revoking his youth court probation, imposing his
previously stayed adult sentence, and suspending that sentence subject to sentencing
conditions. We affirm.
¶2 We consider the following issues on appeal:
¶3 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by revoking Hinkle’s youth court
probation and imposing Hinkle’s previously stayed twenty-year suspended sentence for
negligent homicide?
¶4 2. Did the District Court impose an illegal sentence by restricting Hinkle from
playing games of chance or entering casinos?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶5 In June 2005, Hinkle and his best friend, Kyle McCracken, both age seventeen,
were eating lunch in the cab of McCracken’s pickup when a .22 caliber revolver that
Hinkle was playing with discharged, striking McCracken in the head and killing him
instantly. Hinkle admitted to detectives that he and McCracken were joking around with
the gun when McCracken said “go ahead and shoot me,” at which point the gun
accidentally discharged. Hinkle was subsequently charged with negligent homicide, a
felony, in violation of § 45-5-104, MCA (2003). Because Hinkle was seventeen years
old at the time of the offense, the county attorney filed an information in district court
under § 41-5-206(2), MCA (2003). Thereafter, pursuant to a plea agreement, Hinkle pled
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“True” to the charge of negligent homicide and in return the county attorney agreed to
recommend that he be “committed to the Youth Court for a suspended placement in a
treatment facility until age 18 or sooner released; formal juvenile probation until age 25
or sooner released; and a stayed adult sentence of 20 years to the Montana Department of
Corrections . . . .” The District Court “conditionally accepted the terms of the binding
plea agreement” and transferred the matter to the Youth Court as an extended jurisdiction
prosecution under § 41-5-1602, MCA (2003).
¶6 A sentencing hearing was held March 6, 2006, and the District Court sentenced
Hinkle in accordance with the plea agreement. Pursuant to § 41-5-1604(1)(a)(ii), MCA,
Hinkle was supplementally sentenced to an adult sentence of twenty years commitment to
the Department of Corrections, with the sentence stayed on the condition that he not
violate the provisions of the dispositional order and not commit a new offense. The court
ordered Hinkle to fully comply with twenty-two conditions of his juvenile probation and
warned him that “he would be held strictly accountable for any probation violation.”
¶7 Twelve days after the sentencing hearing, Hinkle was cited for being a minor in
possession of alcohol. At an evidentiary hearing on April 17, 2006, Hinkle admitted that
he had violated two conditions of his youth court probation which required him to
(1) “obey all laws, court orders, rules of the home, and rules of probation” and
(2) “prohibited [him] from possessing or consuming alcoholic beverages or any illicit
drug or inhalant, except as prescribed by a licensed physician.” The court revoked
Hinkle’s probation under the Youth Court Act and transferred the matter back to the
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District Court for further proceedings. A new pre-sentence investigation (PSI) was
ordered.
¶8 During the dispositional hearing, the juvenile probation officer who supervised
Hinkle and the adult probation officer who prepared Hinkle’s PSI recommended that
Hinkle be placed on adult probation and supervision. The PSI further recommended that
Hinkle not be immediately incarcerated, “thereby giving this Defendant another chance,
but one with serious consequences should he falter.” The PSI also included a
psychological evaluation of Hinkle, stating that Hinkle’s profile was disconcerting in the
area of “fearlessness,” because Hinkle “is likely to engage in risky or potentially life-
threatening activities . . . . Perhaps more significantly, he is recklessly foolhardy,
seemingly uninhibited by genuine hazards, and disposed to pursue truly perilous
ventures.” Last, the court read two letters into the record: a victim impact statement from
McCracken’s parents and a letter in support of Hinkle. The court commented that both
letters typified the balancing of interests which the court faced.
¶9 In imposing sentence, the court explained that it had considered a number of
factors, including: (1) the negotiated agreement between the State and Hinkle that
provided for imposition of an adult sentence if the conditions of youth probation were not
followed; (2) that Hinkle should be held accountable because he violated the terms of his
youth probation “right out of the gate;” (3) that the PSI did not indicate that Hinkle was
unable to comply with the terms of his youth probation; (4) the testimony of the
probation officers that the youth court was not “fully equipped to monitor and effectively
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address probation and probation problems of an adult until age 25;” and (5) the victim
impact report submitted by McCracken’s family. The court imposed the twenty-year
adult sentence which had originally been stayed, but suspended that sentence subject to
nineteen conditions. Condition 4 prohibited Hinkle from entering any casinos or playing
any games of chance. Hinkle appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 An offender who is not sentenced to a term of one year or more of actual
incarceration is statutorily ineligible for sentence review by the Sentence Review
Division (SRD). Section 46-18-903, MCA (2003). In such cases, we first review the
sentence for legality to determine whether it falls within statutory parameters and, if so,
we then examine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing the
sentence. State v. Armstrong, 2006 MT 334, ¶ 8, 335 Mont. 131, ¶ 8, 151 P.3d 46, ¶ 8.
An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court acts arbitrarily without conscientious
judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason. State v. Ruiz, 2005 MT 117, ¶ 22, 327 Mont.
109, ¶ 22, 112 P.3d 1001, ¶ 22. The sentencing statutes authorize a district court to
impose “reasonable restrictions” necessary to rehabilitate the offender or protect the
victim and society. State v. Ashby, 2008 MT 83, ¶ 9, 342 Mont. 187, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d 1164,
¶ 9 (citing § 46-18-201(4)(n), MCA (2005)). Accordingly, we first review a condition of
probation for legality and then review the condition for an abuse of discretion. Ashby,
¶ 9.
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¶11 Hinkle asserts that we should review sentences that are ineligible for SRD review
in a manner that would “permit the parties the same opportunities afforded in the SRD
process, at least to the extent that supplemental briefs may be filed, or additional
sentencing data provided, so that this Court could fully review the sentence imposed.”
Essentially, Hinkle would have this Court review all SRD ineligible sentences for
“uniformity.” However, we have previously stated that
[s]entence review is not a constitutional right, but a system the legislature
has voluntarily created. As such, there is no due process right to sentence
review. It is within the discretion of the legislature to determine under what
circumstances and conditions to allow sentence review.
State ex rel. Holt v. Dist. Ct., 2000 MT 142, ¶ 12, 300 Mont. 35, ¶ 12, 3 P.3d 608, ¶ 12.
Accordingly, we decline Hinkle’s invitation to review sentences for uniformity and we
adhere to the two-tiered review stated above.
DISCUSSION
¶12 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by revoking Hinkle’s youth
court probation and imposing Hinkle’s previously stayed twenty-year suspended
sentence for negligent homicide?
¶13 Hinkle asserts that the District Court abused its discretion by revoking Hinkle’s
youth court probation and imposing the previously stayed adult sentence. Hinkle
contends that the “District Court took an unduly harsh and punitive approach to
[Hinkle’s] drinking violation.” The State responds that the seriousness of the crime,
Hinkle’s age at the time it occurred, his demonstrated failure to heed warnings about his
actions, and the lack of other options under the youth court system demonstrate that the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the suspended adult sentence.
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¶14 Under the plea bargain agreement, the State originally agreed to recommend youth
court probation until age twenty-five as a sentence, conditioned upon Hinkle’s
compliance with the conditions of probation, including no commission of new offenses.
Upon these terms the State also agreed to recommend a stay of a twenty-year adult
sentence in order to provide an incentive for Hinkle to comply with the terms of his
sentence. However, twelve days after sentencing, Hinkle violated two conditions of his
probation, leaving the District Court with the options of either 1) continuing Hinkle’s
youth probation and the stay of the adult sentence or 2) ordering execution of the adult
sentence. The court was presented with testimony from two probation officers, both of
whom recommended that Hinkle be transferred to adult probation and parole on a
suspended sentence, subject to conditions. The court also considered the PSI, the victim
impact report, and a letter in support of Hinkle.
¶15 The court followed the recommendation of the probation officers, determining that
to continue Hinkle’s youth probation would act as little more than a “slap on the wrist”
that would send Hinkle “on [his] way with very little consequence, if any, and with
another seemingly hollow statement that this is serious business.” The court concluded
that this result would be inappropriate given the underlying offense of negligent
homicide. Accordingly, the court imposed a suspended adult sentence, which, as the
State asserts, was “a further act of grace” because, under the binding plea agreement, the
court could have imposed a twenty-year sentence of confinement. Hinkle ignores this
“act of grace” when asserting that the District Court acted in an “unduly harsh” manner.
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¶16 A review of the record convinces us that the court handled this case in a sensitive
and appropriate manner. Consequently, the District Court’s order was neither arbitrary
nor without conscientious judgment or exceeding the bounds of reason and was an
appropriate exercise of discretion.
¶17 2. Did the District Court impose an illegal sentence by restricting Hinkle from
playing games of chance or entering casinos?
¶18 Hinkle’s second argument is that the District Court imposed an illegal condition
by prohibiting him from entering casinos and playing games of chance. Hinkle contends
that there “simply is no connection between the offense of conviction and the challenged
restriction on entry into casinos, or playing any game of chance[,]” making the condition
illegal pursuant to the “nexus” requirement of State v. Ommundson, 1999 MT 16, ¶ 11,
293 Mont. 133, ¶ 11, 974 P.2d 620, ¶ 11.
¶19 However, we recently expanded the Ommundson rule in Ashby. There we
determined that “a sentencing judge may impose a particular condition of probation so
long as the condition has a nexus to either the offense for which the offender is being
sentenced, or to the offender himself or herself.” Ashby, ¶ 15. Additionally, we have
held a youth offender’s sentence may appropriately consider the purposes of the Youth
Court Act, which is to rehabilitate the Youth by establishing “a program of supervision,
care, rehabilitation, detention, competency development, and community protection for
youth before they become adult offenders[.]” Section 41-5-102(2)(b), MCA (2003); In re
D.A.S., 2008 MT 168, ¶ 15, __ Mont. __, ¶ 15, __ P.3d __, ¶ 15.
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¶20 Hinkle’s conviction of negligent homicide stemmed from his handling of a
firearm. That crime requires a conscious disregard of a risk involving a gross deviation
from a reasonable standard of conduct. Section 45-2-101(42), MCA (2003). The PSI
prepared for the revocation proceeding described Hinkle as reckless and foolhardy,
unable to appreciate risks and hazards, and predisposed to pursue perilous ventures.
These personal characteristics make Hinkle particularly vulnerable to the pitfalls of
irresponsible gambling. See State v. Kroll, 2004 MT 203, ¶ 31, 322 Mont. 294, ¶ 31,
95 P.3d 717, ¶ 31 (“the lure of easy money has long been a hallmark of gambling”).
Further, Hinkle is a youth offender who requires supervision and competency
development in order to successfully complete his sentence and achieve the objectives of
rehabilitation under the Youth Court Act. As such, the District Court appropriately
imposed the gambling and casino condition.
¶21 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
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