March 18 2008
DA 06-0823
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 95N
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
TRUDY M. MOORE,
Petitioner and Appellant,
and
JIMMY C. MOORE,
Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DR 04-398
Honorable John W. Larson, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Trudy M. Moore, pro se, Stevensville, Montana
For Appellee:
Mark McLaverty, McLaverty & Associates, PLLC, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 4, 2008
Decided: March 18, 2008
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice John Warner delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a
public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,
Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter Publishing Company and to
West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.
¶2 Trudy Moore appeals from an order by the Fourth Judicial District Court dissolving
her marriage to Jimmy Moore and distributing their marital estate.
¶3 Trudy and Jimmy Moore married in 1978 and separated in 1999. In 2004, Trudy filed
a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage. The parties were unable to reach a settlement
agreement regarding what the marital estate consisted of and how it should be divided. On
September 1, 2006, the District Court held a bench trial. On November 14, 2006, the District
Court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and a decree distributing the marital
estate. Trudy disputes the District Court’s distribution in four respects.
¶4 The parties owned a vacation cabin in Crestline, California. Trudy asserts that she
made the down payment necessary to purchase the cabin and paid for improvements using
her business account. She also alleges that the necessary mortgage payments came from the
parties’ joint funds. She claims that when they separated, they agreed to sell the cabin, but
Jimmy instead rented it and kept the proceeds. Jimmy asserts that he had made all payments,
improvements and maintenance on the property after the separation. In October 2003, the
cabin burned down. It was insured for $92,556, and when Jimmy received the insurance
proceeds, he deposited the money into his account. The District Court awarded all the
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insurance proceeds to Jimmy, stating only that it was fair and equitable because of the
payments he had made on the cabin. The District Court’s findings of fact do not address
whether Trudy’s assertions were credible, why it is equitable that Trudy receive none of the
proceeds of the insurance policy, or how the distribution of the insurance proceeds to Jimmy
relates to an equitable distribution of the remainder of the marital estate.
¶5 Second, Trudy testified that Jimmy had removed $38,000 from their joint checking
and savings accounts prior to the separation. Jimmy denied taking the money. The District
Court made no findings of fact concerning this money. We are unable to determine what the
District Court found happened to this money and whether it is necessary to consider this
allegation in the distribution of property.
¶6 Third, Trudy testified that prior to their marriage, she used nearly $22,000 of her own
funds as a down payment on the couple’s first home. She claims that this down payment
provided the equity for the parties to buy and sell several other properties and that she is thus
entitled to receive payment for money she had contributed, plus interest. The District Court
did not make any findings regarding Trudy’s initial down payment. Thus, we are unable to
review whether distribution of the marital estate considered this allegation by Trudy.
¶7 Finally, Trudy appeals the District Court’s order regarding money Jimmy has
received, and apparently will continue to receive, on account of his employment as a railroad
engineer. The District Court found that through December 2005 he received $120,000, in
addition to his regular pay, from what is called a productivity fund. It seems that Jimmy may
continue to receive money from the productivity fund after the marriage is dissolved. Trudy
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claims that she is entitled to half the amount, $60,000, which has already been paid. In
addition, she claims half the amount Jimmy will receive from the productivity fund in future
years.
¶8 Relating to productivity fund payments, the District Court ordered that, “[Trudy] is
entitled to the same amount of past and future payments he has received and will receive as
calculated pursuant to the Railroad Retirement Formula set out below.” The District Court
then set out a standard formula for computing the amount of Tier II retirement benefits a
divorced spouse could be entitled to receive under the Railroad Retirement Act. This
formula determines the percentage of the railroad retirement system retirement benefit a
divorced spouse might be entitled to receive. It fixes the amount by calculating a percentage
of the benefit considering the years worked for a railroad during the marriage as a fraction of
the total number of years worked for a railroad. In this instance, considering the District
Court’s order, we are unable to determine if Trudy is entitled to a present cash payment of
the amount Jimmy has already received from the productivity fund and, if so, the amount of
the payment and when it is due. Further, considering the District Court’s order, Trudy is to
be paid an unspecified portion of the productivity fund money Jimmy may receive after
dissolution of the marriage, and there is no indication why such future payments are
equitable. Also, there is no order as to whether future payments to Trudy are to be treated as
a property distribution or as maintenance. Nor is there any determination of how the railroad
retirement distribution formula is to be applied, as Jimmy is still working for the railroad and
it cannot now be determined the total number of years he will have worked before he retires.
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¶9 We review a district court’s findings of fact regarding the division of marital property
to determine if they are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Kovarik, 1998 MT 33, ¶ 20,
287 Mont. 350, ¶ 20, 954 P.2d 1147, ¶ 20.
¶10 The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure require that a district court “shall find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon.” M. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Rule
52(a) requires findings of fact which are “a recordation of the essential and determining facts
upon which the District Court rested its conclusions of law and without which the District
Court's judgment would lack support.” In re Marriage of Barron, 177 Mont. 161, 164, 580
P.2d 936, 938 (1978). If the record does not contain the essential facts underlying the
decision, this Court cannot conduct a meaningful review on appeal, and we must remand to
allow the District Court to issue additional findings that clarify its rationale. In re Marriage
of Mills, 2006 MT 149, ¶¶ 20-21, 332 Mont. 415, ¶¶ 20-21, 138 P.3d 815, ¶¶ 20-21.
¶11 We conclude that the findings of fact entered by the District Court are not sufficiently
specific to meet the requirements of Rule 52(a). We are unable to ascertain what essential
and determining facts the District Court relied upon when making its findings of fact. On
remand, the District Court should include the facts underlying its decree equitably
distributing the marital estate.
¶12 In addition to further findings of fact, the District Court should enter a decree that
enables the parties to determine exactly how, when, in what amounts, and in what manner
the marital estate is to be distributed.
¶13 Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
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/S/ JOHN WARNER
We Concur:
/S/ JIM RICE
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
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