July 21 2009
DA 07-0478
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2009 MT 242
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
DAVY LEE KENFIELD,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Hill, Cause No. DC 05-149
Honorable John C. McKeon, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jim Wheelis, Chief Appellate Defender; Tammy Hinderman (argued),
Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Hon. Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General;
Jonathan M. Krauss (argued), Assistant Attorney General;
Helena, Montana
Cyndee L. Peterson, Hill County Attorney; Havre, Montana
Orally Argued and Submitted: January 23, 2009
Decided: July 21, 2009
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Davy Lee Kenfield (Kenfield) pleaded guilty in the Twelfth Judicial District
Court, Hill County, to criminal production or manufacture of dangerous drugs (one
count) and criminal distribution of dangerous drugs to a minor (two counts). Prior to
pleading guilty, Kenfield moved to suppress evidence, including statements obtained by
officers subsequent to the warrantless entry of his residence. The District Court denied
Kenfield’s motion to suppress on the basis of the community caretaker doctrine.
Kenfield appeals. We affirm the denial of the motion to suppress, but on different
grounds than those articulated by the District Court.
¶2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:
¶3 Did the District Court err when it denied Kenfield’s motion to suppress evidence
obtained subsequent to the warrantless entry of his residence?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶4 On November 23, 2005, a Liberty County dispatcher in Chester, Montana,
received an anonymous tip from a caller who said that Kenfield was on his way to
Inverness to purchase alcohol for three young people who were allegedly with Kenfield
in a pickup truck. The caller identified Kenfield by his first and last name. The three
young people were identified as a female by the name of “K,” 1 a male by the name of
Michael Morelli (Morelli), and another unknown male whose name the caller did not
know. The dispatcher, through a caller identification system, determined that the call had
been placed from Morelli’s grandmother’s residence. The dispatcher relayed the
1
K.H.’s name is abbreviated for purposes of this Opinion pursuant to this Court’s privacy rules.
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information to Deputy Steve Cameron who was on duty that evening. Deputy Cameron
had lived in Liberty County for approximately 38 years and had been a deputy with the
Liberty County Sheriff’s Department for nine years.
¶5 Upon receiving the information from the dispatcher, Deputy Cameron
immediately suspected that the female identified by the anonymous caller was “K.H.,” a
troubled 15 year old resident of Liberty County. Deputy Cameron suspected K.H.
because he knew of no other young person by the name of “K” who lived in Liberty
County (population 2,100) or the town of Chester (population 920). Deputy Cameron
also suspected K.H. because he had recently issued her a ticket for minor in possession of
alcohol and knew her to hang around with Morelli, another young man by the name of
Tim Voise (Voise), and another young girl by the name of A.A. Deputy Cameron also
knew that Kenfield was approximately 45 years old.
¶6 Deputy Cameron then proceeded from the sheriff’s office to K.H.’s grandmother’s
residence to inquire about the young girl’s whereabouts. K.H.’s grandmother told
Deputy Cameron that K.H. was with her girlfriend “A.A.” Deputy Cameron then told
K.H.’s grandmother about the report that K.H. was allegedly in a vehicle with Kenfield
on the way to purchase alcohol in Inverness. After hearing who her granddaughter was
possibly with and where she was possibly headed, K.H.’s grandmother told Deputy
Cameron to pick K.H. up. Deputy Cameron then confirmed that K.H. was not where she
told her grandmother she would be that evening by going to A.A.’s residence (and
another female’s residence suggested by A.A.’s father).
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¶7 After leaving A.A.’s residence, Deputy Cameron went back to the sheriff’s office
in Chester and told the dispatcher to notify Hill County that he needed to go to Inverness
to look for K.H. Deputy Cameron knew that Kenfield lived in Inverness, which is
located approximately 14 miles east of Chester because he knew that a colleague,
Undersheriff Dave Riggin, had recently responded to a weapons complaint at Kenfield’s
residence. Deputy Cameron also knew that Kenfield had been investigated for stealing
ladies’ underwear from the local high school approximately 20 years earlier. Deputy
Cameron received permission to enter Hill County but did not request assistance or
backup at that time.
¶8 Before heading to Inverness, Deputy Cameron stopped to get directions to
Kenfield’s residence from Undersheriff Riggin. In addition to the directions,
Undersheriff Riggin told Deputy Cameron that Kenfield had a penchant for hanging
around with young people and that he had picked up another young girl from Kenfield’s
residence a couple of years earlier without incident. Deputy Cameron then proceeded
towards Kenfield’s residence in Inverness. While en route, Deputy Cameron learned that
the repeater channel was down, which meant that he had no means of communicating
with anyone once he was outside of Chester. Deputy Cameron did not stop to inform the
dispatcher or otherwise notify anyone about the problem.
¶9 When Deputy Cameron arrived at Kenfield’s trailer, he immediately recognized
Voise’s pickup truck and recorded the license plate numbers. Deputy Cameron also
heard loud music and voices coming from the residence and could tell that the lights in
the trailer were on, although the windows were heavily curtained. Deputy Cameron
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approached the trailer, opened the screen door, and noticed the “faint smell of
marijuana.” Deputy Cameron then knocked on the outside steel door and identified
himself as the Sheriff’s Department. At this point, the music went off, the lights went
out, and Deputy Cameron heard the sound of running feet. After waiting approximately
8-10 seconds, Deputy Cameron entered the trailer, first through the screen and steel
doors, and then through another interior door, which opened into the trailer’s main living
space.
¶10 Upon entering the trailer, Officer Cameron was confronted with the
“overwhelming” odor of marijuana and saw Voise sitting at the kitchen table. He then
saw someone run down the hall into a back room and slam the door. Deputy Cameron
opened the door and saw Kenfield standing in the room. Kenfield asked Deputy
Cameron what he was doing in his house. Deputy Cameron explained that he was
looking for K.H. In response, Kenfield said that K.H. was “out there.” After gathering
everyone into the kitchen, Deputy Cameron noticed that Morelli was not present and left
the group in the kitchen to look for him. When he returned to the kitchen, Deputy
Cameron saw Kenfield washing his hands and noticed marijuana paraphernalia and
residue on the kitchen stove next to Kenfield. Concerned that Kenfield was trying to
destroy evidence, Deputy Cameron placed Kenfield in handcuffs and called dispatch
from the trailer to request assistance. Deputy Cameron then gave Miranda warnings to
Kenfield, K.H., Morelli, and Voise.
¶11 After Hill County deputies arrived, they seized contraband on the stove and two
open grocery bags filled with marijuana in the living room. The deputies asked Kenfield
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for permission to search his residence, but he refused. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) was called and a search warrant for the premises was subsequently
obtained. Ultimately officers seized a variety of marijuana related items, such as potting
soil and marijuana leaves and stems. They also seized a video camera and three tapes
from a cupboard, two rifles and a shotgun, a box of documents with telephone numbers,
pornographic magazines, grow lights, and marijuana plants. The tapes evidently showed
young girls, unaware that they were being filmed, using his bathroom in the trailer. The
tapes also showed Kenfield supplying people with marijuana at his residence. Kenfield
was charged by Information with the following offenses: Criminal Production or
Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs; Criminal Distribution of Dangerous Drugs to a Minor
(two counts); and Sexual Abuse of Children (three counts).2
¶12 On April 27, 2006, Kenfield filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained by
officers following the warrantless entry of his residence, including various statements
Kenfield made to the officers and evidence obtained pursuant to the subsequently
obtained search warrant. Kenfield claimed the entry into his residence was illegal and
could not be justified by any exception to the warrant requirement. In response, the State
claimed the entry was justified under the community caretaker doctrine and that Deputy
Cameron had a reasonable belief that K.H. was in need of help or in peril, and that this
suspicion justified the warrantless entry and search of Kenfield’s residence.
2
Kenfield was also convicted and sentenced in federal court for receipt and possession of child
pornography under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2), (a)(5)(B).
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¶13 A hearing on Kenfield’s motion to suppress was conducted on May 31, 2006.
During the hearing, Deputy Cameron stated that at the time he entered Kenfield’s
residence he was very concerned about K.H. and that he was sure K.H. was in the
residence “because of the vehicle and the people she’s hanging out with.” Deputy
Cameron also said the following: “I have no radio contact. I have no phone. I can’t call
for backup. I can’t try to get a warrant. I can’t try to do anything. I was concerned for
[K.H.’s] safe[t]y.” The District Court concluded that the community caretaker doctrine
justified the warrantless entry of Kenfield’s residence and denied the motion to suppress.
¶14 Kenfield pleaded guilty to criminal production or manufacture of dangerous drugs
(one count) and to criminal distribution of dangerous drugs to a minor (two counts). In
exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the sexual abuse of children charges. Kenfield was
sentenced to a total of 15 years to the Department of Corrections, with all but two years
suspended. The sentences imposed were ordered to run concurrent with Kenfield’s
federal sentence, which stemmed from the same incident. Kenfield appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶15 We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress to determine whether
its findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its interpretation and application of
the law is correct. State v. Wheeler, 2006 MT 38, ¶ 12, 331 Mont. 179, 134 P.3d 38.
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by substantial evidence,
the court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if our review of the record
convinces us that a mistake has been made. Wheeler, ¶ 12. Further, we review a district
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court’s conclusions of law with respect to the application of the community caretaker
doctrine to determine if they are correct. Wheeler, ¶ 12.
DISCUSSION
¶16 Kenfield claims the District Court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence obtained subsequent to the warrantless entry of his residence, including various
statements he made to officers following the entry. Specifically, Kenfield argues that the
District Court erred by applying the community caretaker doctrine to justify the
warrantless intrusion. Instead, Kenfield claims that the District Court should have
applied the test for the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement; a test
which he also claims cannot be satisfied. Although the District Court relied on the
community caretaker doctrine, we conclude that there were exigent circumstances and
thus, we need not address the community caretaker doctrine. We will, however, affirm a
court’s decision if it reaches the correct result, albeit for the wrong reason. See State v.
Dickinson, 2008 MT 159, ¶ 29, 343 Mont. 301, 184 P.3d 305.
¶17 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section
11 of the Montana Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.
It is well-settled that warrantless searches and seizures conducted inside a home are per
se unreasonable, subject to a few carefully drawn exceptions. State v. Wakeford, 1998
MT 16, ¶ 21, 287 Mont. 220, 953 P.2d 1065. The exigent circumstances exception is a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement and provides that a “warrantless entry
by law enforcement officials may be legal when there is a compelling need for official
action and no time to secure a warrant.” Wakeford, ¶ 23 (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436
8
U.S. 499, 509, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1949 (1978). In order to establish the exigent
circumstances exception, the state must demonstrate the existence of both probable cause
and exigent circumstances. Wakeford, ¶ 22. Accordingly, we first turn to a discussion of
whether probable cause has been established.
¶18 Probable cause exists when “the facts and circumstances within the officer’s
personal knowledge, or imparted to the officer by a reliable source, are sufficient to
warrant a reasonable person to believe that the suspect has committed an offense.”
Wakeford, ¶ 22. Further, “probable cause is evaluated in the light of a police officer’s
knowledge, and all the relevant circumstances.” State v. Van Dort, 2003 MT 104, ¶ 19,
315 Mont. 303, 68 P.3d 728.
¶19 Kenfield claims that Deputy Cameron did not have “probable cause to believe any
crime, let alone a sexual offense, had occurred or was occurring.” In support of his
argument, Kenfield cites testimony from Deputy Cameron provided at the hearing on the
motion to suppress in which he stated that he “didn’t know what was going on” and that
he could not “describe everything involved in it.” Kenfield claims that no reasonable
person would believe that he was sexually assaulting K.H. or holding her against her will
on the basis of the evidence available to Deputy Cameron. Kenfield also notes that the
faint smell of marijuana noticed by Deputy Cameron prior to the entry did not, in and of
itself, support a finding of probable cause.
¶20 Kenfield ignores, however, that the odor of marijuana coupled with additional
facts and circumstances may establish probable cause. See State v. Morse, 2006 MT 54,
¶¶ 17-18, 331 Mont. 300, 132 P.3d 528 (concluding that other facts in addition to the
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odor of marijuana contributes to a determination of probable cause). Here, it is
undisputed that Deputy Cameron noticed the odor of marijuana upon approaching the
trailer. Further, after hearing an officer announce his presence, the occupants of the
trailer did not come to the door or otherwise attempt to communicate with Deputy
Cameron. Instead, the occupants immediately turned off the music and lights and
attempted to evade law enforcement. These facts, when combined with the additional
evidence Deputy Cameron possessed prior to the entry, including that Kenfield was
headed to Inverness to purchase alcohol for an underage minor, were sufficient for the
officer to form a reasonable belief that Kenfield had committed or was committing an
offense. (See § 45-5-623(b), MCA, (stating that it is unlawful to sell or give intoxicating
substances to a child under the age of majority); see also § 45-5-623(c), MCA, (stating
that it is unlawful for a person to sell or give an alcoholic beverage to a person under the
age of 21).) Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Deputy Cameron had probable
cause to believe that Kenfield had committed an offense.
¶21 This case is distinguishable from our decision in State v. McBride, 1999 MT 127,
294 Mont. 461, 982 P.2d 453, wherein we concluded that probable cause and thus, the
exigent circumstances exception, could not be established. In McBride, a father of a
sixteen-year-old runaway, A.H., reported to police that he had received a phone call from
A.H. and that the call at been placed from the defendant’s residence. A.H.’s father also
told police that A.H. was in violation of her probation and asked the officers to respond to
the location. When officers arrived at the defendant’s residence, there were no signs of
ongoing criminal activity. Further, when the officers knocked on the door, no one
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responded. After a second knock, which caused the door to open slightly, the defendant
attempted to shut the door. The officer pushed back on the door and the door swung
open. With the door open, the officer could see the defendant, who appeared to be under
the age of 21, holding a beer. The defendant then refused the officer’s request to enter
and talk. Nevertheless, the officer entered the residence and discovered A.H. sitting in
the living room. The defendant was cited for minor in possession of alcohol and was
arrested on an outstanding warrant. Officers also subsequently discovered
methamphetamine in the defendant’s pocket. The defendant moved to suppress the
evidence seized and statements he made to officers following the entry. The district court
denied the motion.
¶22 In McBride, we concluded that the facts and circumstances were not sufficient to
establish probable cause. There was no evidence at the time of the entry that the
defendant had committed an offense or that a crime was being committed at the
residence. We also noted that the girl’s father had no reason to believe that the defendant
(or any one else in the residence) “had caused his daughter to be absent from home.”
McBride, ¶ 14.
¶23 Here, in contrast, Deputy Cameron was aware of facts and circumstances that were
sufficient for an experienced officer to believe that a crime had been committed or was
occurring. Specifically, Deputy Cameron noticed the smell of drugs upon approaching
the trailer. He was also confronted with the sound of running feet and the lights and
music going off after he knocked on the door and announced his presence. In addition,
Deputy Cameron had received a report that a young girl (who he believed to be K.H.)
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was out with at least three older men and that they planned to purchase alcohol. He also
knew that Kenfield, one of the men specifically mentioned in the report, was at least 30
years older than K.H. and had a reputation for hanging out with people much younger
than he, including young girls. Additionally, Deputy Cameron knew that officers had
previously responded to a weapons complaint at Kenfield’s residence. These facts, taken
together, are much more substantive and compelling than those in McBride, where the
officers did not know the defendant or any of the people involved, where there was no
factual, observable evidence that a crime had been committed, and where there was no
attempt by the occupants to flee the scene.
¶24 We turn next to a discussion of whether exigent circumstances were present.
Exigent circumstances are “those circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to
believe that entry (or other relevant prompt action) was necessary to prevent physical
harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of
the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law
enforcement efforts.” Wakeford, ¶ 24. We have stated that “exigent circumstances for
conducting a warrantless search exist, ‘where it is not practicable to secure a warrant.’”
State v. Gomez, 2007 MT 111, ¶ 27, 337 Mont. 219, 1158 P.3d 442 (citing State v.
Bassett, 1999 MT 109, ¶ 47, 294 Mont. 327, 982 P.2d 410. We have also stated that the
state “bears the heavy burden of showing the existence of exigent circumstances.”
Wakeford, ¶ 24.
¶25 Kenfield argues that Deputy Cameron could not have believed that K.H. was in
need of immediate assistance given that he did not race to Kenfield’s residence with his
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lights on, nor did he stop to request backup when he realized that his radio was not
working or stop to call “his dispatcher or the local authorities.” Kenfield also notes that
Deputy Cameron stopped to write down the license plates numbers of the vehicles parked
in front of the trailer when he arrived, apparently insinuating that Deputy Cameron was
not sufficiently concerned about K.H.’s well-being to justify the warrantless intrusion.
¶26 We do not agree. Given the remote location of Inverness, the time of the incident,
the failure of the communication channel, and the response to the knock and announce, it
was not practicable for Deputy Cameron to secure a warrant prior to the entry of
Kenfield’s residence. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Deputy Cameron
expressed his concern about the circumstances; he said, “I have no radio contact. I have
no phone. I can’t call for backup. I can’t try to get a warrant. I can’t try to do anything.
I was concerned for [K.H.’s] safe[t]y.” Inverness is an isolated community with no local
police presence, and the failure of the communication channel left Deputy Cameron in a
position where he had to decide whether to proceed into the residence or risk delaying
entry and possibly exposing K.H. to further harm. Deputy Cameron also had evidence
that drugs were being used in the residence. Leaving the scene to find assistance would
have given the occupants an opportunity to destroy any drug related evidence. Based on
the response to his knock on the door, Deputy Cameron specifically stated that he
believed the occupants of the residence were attempting to hide marijuana when they
reacted by turning off the music and lights and ran instead of coming to the door. As
noted above, the belief that relevant evidence is being destroyed supports the existence of
exigent circumstances. These circumstances in conjunction with all of the information
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Deputy Cameron possessed about K.H. and Kenfield prior to the entry would cause a
reasonable person to believe that an immediate entry of Kenfield’s residence was
necessary. Accordingly, we conclude that exigent circumstances were present. Because
probable cause and exigent circumstances existed, we also conclude that Deputy
Cameron’s entry into Kenfield’s residence was justified under the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement. Finally, since Deputy Cameron was lawfully in the
residence pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception, his observation of the
marijuana residue and paraphernalia was also lawful and admissible under the plain view
doctrine, which “allows peace officers, under certain circumstances, to seize evidence in
plain view without a warrant.” State v. Lewis, 2007 MT 295, ¶ 22, 340 Mont. 10, 171
P.3d 731.
CONCLUSION
¶27 For these reasons, we affirm the District Court’s order denying Kenfield’s motion
to suppress evidence obtained by officers following the warrantless entry of his
residence.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ BRAD NEWMAN
District Court Judge Brad Newman
sitting in for Chief Justice Mike McGrath
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