April 1 2009
DA 08-0218
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2009 MT 105N
KEITH EUGENE DOYLE,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District,
In and For the County of Butte-Silver Bow, Cause No. DV-07-280
Honorable Kurt Krueger, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Keith Eugene Doyle (self-represented); Great Falls, Montana
For Appellee:
Hon. Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Mark W. Mattioli
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Robert McCarthy, Butte-Silver Bow County Attorney; Michael W.
Clague, Samm Cox, Mollie Maffei, Deputy County Attorneys, Butte,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 28, 2009
Decided: March 31, 2009
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be
cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court and its case title, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be included in
this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and
Montana Reports.
¶2 Keith Eugene Doyle (Doyle) appeals from an order from the Second Judicial
District Court, Butte-Silver Bow County, denying his petition for postconviction relief.
We affirm.
¶3 Doyle was convicted of deliberate homicide by accountability in a jury trial in
January of 2005, and sentenced to 65 years in prison. Doyle appealed his conviction,
which we affirmed in State v. Doyle, 2007 MT 125, 337 Mont. 308, 160 P.3d 516.
¶4 Doyle filed a petition in District Court seeking postconviction relief in October of
2007, in which he raised numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC),
each based on evidentiary issues that were raised in his appeal. Doyle claimed that the
District Court refused to clarify confusing jury instructions, notwithstanding the jury
twice requested clarification. Doyle also maintained that when the jury became
deadlocked, the District Court sent the jurors home for the evening, which exposed them
to media coverage of the trial. Doyle contends that the following day, the District Court
committed judicial misconduct by coercing the jury into reaching a guilty verdict.
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¶5 The District Court denied the petition as procedurally barred on the basis that no
IAC claims were raised on appeal, and the other claims constituted an effort to revisit
issues decided adversely to Doyle in his appeal.
¶6 The issues raised here on appeal are whether the District Court erred in denying
Doyle’s petition for postconviction relief, and whether the District Court erred in refusing
to allow Doyle to amend his petition.
¶7 A petition for postconviction relief may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure
to state a claim for relief under § 46-21-201(1)(a), MCA; Smith v. State, 2000 MT 327, ¶
14, 303 Mont. 47, 15 P.3d 395. Postconviction relief is not available on record-based
issues that were, or could have been raised on appeal. Section 46-21-105(2), MCA;
Smith, ¶ 14. We review the denial of postconviction petitions to determine if the district
court’s findings are clearly erroneous and whether the legal conclusions are correct.
Ellenburg v. State, 2004 MT 66, ¶ 10, 320 Mont. 315, 87 P.3d 473; Smith, ¶ 14.
¶8 Postconviction petitions confront demanding pleading requirements such that
mere allegations are insufficient. A postconviction petition must: “[I]dentify all facts
supporting the grounds for relief set forth in the petition and have attached affidavits,
records or other evidence establishing the existence of those facts.” Section 46-21-
104(1)(c), MCA; Ellenburg, ¶ 16 (citations omitted); Herman v. State, 2006 MT 7, ¶ 43,
330 Mont. 267, 127 P.3d 422. Failure to comply with pleading requirements constitutes
sufficient grounds to dismiss a claim as a matter of law for failure to state a claim.
Herman, ¶ 15; State v. Finley, 2002 MT 288, ¶¶ 7, 13, 312 Mont. 493, 59 P.3d 1132.
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¶9 Doyle’s IAC claims are comprised entirely of conclusory allegations that do not
constitute evidence establishing the existence of facts that support grounds for relief. See
§ 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA; Herman, ¶¶ 16, 49; Finley, ¶¶ 9, 10 (citing Vernon Kills On
Top v. State, 279 Mont. 384, 396, 928 P.2d 182, 189 (1996)). Therefore, Doyle’s petition
conclusively establishes that he is not entitled to relief on the IAC claims for failure to
satisfy these procedural prerequisites. Sections 46-21-104 and -201(1)(a), MCA;
Herman, ¶15.
¶10 We turn to the allegations related to the jury instructions and purported judicial
misconduct. Doyle argued on appeal that he was entitled to a mistrial based on these
issues. In our prior opinion, we concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion for a mistrial. Doyle, ¶¶ 75-77. The district court correctly
determined these issues are procedurally barred from further consideration. Section 46-
21-105(2), MCA.
¶11 Finally, Doyle contends he was precluded by the District Court from filing an
amended petition raising the claim that his family members were coerced into falsely
testifying against him. Doyle insists that the court ruled on his petition five days before
he could file an amended petition. Nothing in the record suggests that Doyle filed a
motion to amend his petition or that he attempted to file an amended petition with the
District Court. Moreover, witness coercion was raised in Doyle’s trial, but not on appeal.
The issue could have been addressed in the appeal. The procedural bar precludes Doyle
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from arguing in a postconviction proceeding that trial witnesses were coerced to testify
falsely. See § 46-21-105(2), MCA.
¶12 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), of
our 1996 Internal Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, which provides for
memorandum opinions. The IAC claims as pled, do not comply with the procedural
prerequisites required by § 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA. It is manifest on the face of the briefs
and the record that the remaining claims are procedurally barred.
¶13 Affirmed.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We concur:
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE
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