Snyder v. Spaulding

July 13 2010

DA 10-0027

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2010 MT 151

IN RE THE GRANDPARENT-GRANDCHILD CONTACT OF

SHARON K. SNYDER,

Petitioner and Appellee,

v.

TANYA N. SPAULDING,

Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DR 07-943
Honorable Gregory R. Todd, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Benjamin J. LaBeau, LaBeau Law Firm, L.L.C., Billings, Montana

For Appellee:

Kevin T. Sweeney, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: May 18, 2010

Decided: July 13, 2010

Filed:

__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 This is an appeal from the decision of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court,

Yellowstone County, reaffirming previously ordered contact between two minor children

and their paternal grandmother over the objection of the children’s mother. We reverse

and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Sharon K. Snyder is the paternal grandmother of W.B.S. and D.C.S. Tanya N.

Spaulding is the children’s mother. Their father (Sharon’s son) is deceased. Sharon

commenced the instant action in September 2007 by filing a petition for grandparent

visitation pursuant to § 40-9-102, MCA (grandparent-grandchild contact). Tanya initially

objected to Sharon’s request for contact with the children; however, “with misgivings,”

she eventually entered into a stipulation with Sharon under which Sharon would be

allowed specified periods of contact with the children (alternating Saturdays, three days

during Christmas/winter break from school, and one week during the summer). The

District Court entered an order adopting the stipulation on May 27, 2008. Notably, the

case had not yet proceeded to a hearing on the merits of Sharon’s petition, and neither the

stipulation nor the District Court’s order recites any of the findings specified in

§ 40-9-102, MCA, except that “it serves the best interests of the children for there to be

grandparent/grandchild contact as permitted by § 40-9-101, et seq., MCA.”

¶3 Fifteen months later, in August 2009, Tanya terminated contact between Sharon

and the children. According to Tanya, a number of factors led to this decision. First, she

had recently seen a manuscript, written by Sharon about her own life, which Tanya found

2
greatly disturbing. In it, Sharon expressed the view that W.B.S. is a “crystal child” who

has “healing hands” and can “see the future.”1 In a letter to Tanya, Sharon suggested that

Tanya, “as a responsible parent,” should see to it that W.B.S. receives all the help he can

get as he grows in his abilities. Sharon also suggested that she (Sharon) was the person to

provide W.B.S. with the help and guidance he needs. These beliefs conflicted with

Tanya’s beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness. Second, Tanya felt that Sharon was discrediting

Tanya’s family beliefs and interfering with Tanya’s parenting of the children. Tanya

stated that Sharon was instilling certain views in the children against Tanya’s express

wishes. Moreover, Tanya believed that Sharon was encouraging the children to be

deceptive toward Tanya, and she noted that W.B.S. was hostile and distant toward her

following his visits with Sharon. Lastly, Tanya cited Sharon’s “mental health issues,”

and in this regard, she pointed to Sharon’s claim in the manuscript that she (Sharon) had

been reborn as a different person with a different name and memories. Tanya concluded

that Sharon should not be around the children and that contact between Sharon and the

children was not in the children’s best interests. Tanya thus decided to terminate the

contact previously stipulated to.

1
Crystal children, also known as indigo children, were first described in the 1970s
by a San Diego parapsychologist who noticed the emergence of children with an indigo
aura, a vibrational color she had never seen before. This color, she reasoned, coincided
with a new consciousness. See John Leland, Are They Here to Save the World? N.Y.
Times (Jan. 12, 2006). Indigo children are said to have high IQs, acute intuition, and
special abilities—e.g., the ability to read minds, predict the future, and bend silverware
through sheer brainpower—and they are believed by some to play a significant role in
human evolution, although skeptics argue that this is simply New Age credulity and “a
sham diagnosis” for authority-resistant, disruptive, impatient, and easily bored children.
See id.; Sharon Jayson, Indigo Kids: Does the Science Fly? USA Today (posted May 31,
2005; updated June 1, 2005); Jesse Hyde, Little Boy Blue Dallas Observer (Mar. 9, 2006).

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¶4 To that end, Tanya filed a motion in the District Court on September 14, 2009, to

terminate the court-ordered contact between Sharon and the children. Sharon then filed a

cross-motion for contempt, claiming that Tanya had violated the May 2008 stipulation by

suspending all contact “without sufficient justification.” In response to this claim, Tanya

asserted that her constitutional right to parent and protect her children gave her authority

to remove the children from “a harmful situation” and that the court should not punish

her or interfere with her decision as a parent in doing what she believed was best for her

children. The District Court held a hearing in December 2009, at the conclusion of which

it denied Tanya’s motion to terminate and held her in contempt of the court’s May 27,

2008 order adopting the stipulation. The court noted, though, that Tanya “can purge that

contempt by honoring the stipulation and order.”

¶5 In denying Tanya’s motion, the District Court concluded that she had not met her

burden. There was some uncertainty by all involved, however, as to the applicable law

and the showing that had to be made. Section 40-9-102, MCA,2 sets out the procedures

to be followed, the burdens of proof, and the showings to be made with regard to an

initial petition for grandparent-grandchild contact. However, neither this statute nor any

other statute in Title 40, chapter 9, MCA, purports expressly to address modifications to

or terminations of previously entered orders for such contact (with one exception not

applicable here, see § 40-9-102(7), MCA). Thus, Tanya argued that the court should

simply follow the framework of § 40-9-102, MCA, since this statute lists the factors that

are relevant in determining whether grandparent-grandchild contact is appropriate.

2
Statutory references are to the 2009 Montana Code Annotated.

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Sharon, however, suggested that the court should apply § 40-4-219, MCA, which is

applicable to amendments of parenting plans. This statute provides, in relevant part, that

a court may amend a prior parenting plan “if it finds, upon the basis of facts that have

arisen since the prior plan or that were unknown to the court at the time of entry of the

prior plan, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child and that the

amendment is necessary to serve the best interest of the child.” Section 40-4-219(1),

MCA. Sharon thus argued that Tanya had to show that something had happened after the

signing of the stipulation, or that something had come to light that was unknown at the

time the stipulation was signed, which triggered or necessitated a modification to the

stipulation.

¶6 The District Court disagreed with Tanya’s approach, reasoning that § 40-9-102,

MCA, was inapplicable because a contact arrangement was already in place. Instead, the

court essentially followed Sharon’s approach. The court agreed that events occurring

prior to the stipulation, as well as the parties’ intentions upon entering into the stipulation,

were irrelevant. The court posited that the stipulation was a “contract,” which Tanya had

“breached,” and that the issue was whether the contract should now be modified due to

new circumstances. Ultimately, the court concluded that Tanya had not carried the

burden imposed by § 40-4-219, MCA, to show that an amendment was warranted. The

court emphasized several times that Tanya had not established a “cause and effect”

between Sharon’s conduct and any harm to the children. It is apparent from the court’s

reasoning that it believed Tanya had to show demonstrable harm to the children as a

result of their contact with Sharon before a modification would be warranted. The court

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did not consider the presumption in favor of a fit parent’s wishes. See § 40-9-102(4),

MCA. Indeed, the court did not address whether Tanya is a “fit” parent under

§ 40-9-102(2), MCA, nor did it give any special weight to Tanya’s determination of her

children’s best interests. To the contrary, the court discounted Tanya’s concerns relating

to Sharon as mere “speculation” and “innuendo,” and the court basically chalked up their

dispute to “religious beliefs mixed up with family feuds” and “an incredible amount of

family dysfunction and accusations and simmering hatred.”

¶7 The District Court entered an order on December 30, 2009. As noted, the court

denied Tanya’s motion to terminate the stipulation and held her in contempt of the court’s

May 27, 2008 order adopting the stipulation, though the court stated that she could purge

this contempt by complying with the court’s order for grandparent-grandchild contact.

Tanya now appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 Although Tanya articulates a number of issues, we conclude that the following

issue (restated here) is dispositive: Did the District Court apply an incorrect standard for

evaluating a parent’s request to modify or terminate an order for grandparent-grandchild

contact? We review for correctness a district court’s interpretation and application of

statutes. In re T.H., 2005 MT 237, ¶ 35, 328 Mont. 428, 121 P.3d 541.

DISCUSSION

¶9 At the outset, we do not agree that the May 2008 stipulation was a “contract” that

Tanya “breached.” The stipulation merely served as “[a] voluntary agreement between

opposing parties concerning some relevant point,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1455 (Bryan

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A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West 2004), which the District Court in turn adopted as the

disposition of Sharon’s petition for grandparent-grandchild contact. Hence, contract

principles concerning breach, remedy, and rescission do not govern here. Rather, the

issue is simply whether the court’s May 27, 2008 order providing for contact between

Sharon and the children should be modified or terminated.

¶10 In this regard, the District Court erred in relying on § 40-4-219, MCA. For one

thing, this statute governs amendments to parenting plans adopted in the context of

marriage dissolutions; and here, Sharon is not the children’s “parent”3 and the court’s

May 27, 2008 order does not constitute a “parenting plan,” see § 40-4-234(2), MCA. But

more importantly, it is not appropriate to simply import wholesale into the context of

grandparent-grandchild contact the standards and procedures that govern the allocation

of parenting functions upon a dissolution of marriage. In the latter context, the central

issue is the division of parenting responsibilities between the parents, whereas in the

former context, the issue is contact between a child and a nonparent over the parent’s

objection. This is a critical distinction. Both parties to a “parenting plan” are “parents”;

3
A “parent” is “[t]he lawful father or mother of someone,” which “commonly
includes (1) either the natural father or the natural mother of a child, (2) the adoptive
father or adoptive mother of a child, (3) a child’s putative blood parent who has expressly
acknowledged paternity, and (4) an individual or agency whose status as guardian has
been established by judicial decree.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1144. The Montana Code
Annotated contains similar definitions. See e.g. §§ 20-5-501(4)(e), 40-5-201(10),
40-5-804(10), 40-6-501(4)(e), 40-6-601(2)(b), 41-3-102(16), 41-5-103(32),
42-1-103(14), MCA; see also § 40-4-211(6), MCA (defining “child-parent relationship”);
§ 40-4-234(1), MCA (defining “parenting functions”). In addition, § 40-4-228, MCA,
provides that a nonparent may obtain a parental interest in a child. See Kulstad v.
Maniaci, 2009 MT 326, 352 Mont. 513, 220 P.3d 595. That is not the situation here,
however.

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and, in this sense, both are possessed of the same fundamental rights with respect to the

parenting of their child. But the same is not true in grandparent-contact cases, where one

party is a nonparent asking a court to overturn the decision of a parent notwithstanding

the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning her child’s associates. This

second scenario requires delicate balancing of the rights of the parent vis-à-vis the

interests of the nonparent, as well as the interests of the child.

¶11 The question remains, then, as to the analysis the District Court was to conduct in

considering Tanya’s motion. As just explained, § 40-4-219, MCA, is not the appropriate

framework; yet, as noted earlier, the grandparent-contact statutes do not expressly

address modifications to or terminations of a previously entered contact order (except

where the child is adopted by a person other than a stepparent or a grandparent, in which

case contact is automatically terminated, see § 40-9-102(7), MCA, which is not the

situation here). We must turn, therefore, to the underlying constitutional principles and

legislative intent regarding initial petitions for grandparent contact and apply those to

motions for modification or termination of an existing contact order.

¶12 The Supreme Court has held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by

the Bill of Rights, the “liberty” specially protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause includes the right to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children.

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997). Indeed,

“the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children” is perhaps the

oldest of the fundamental liberty interests the Supreme Court has recognized under the

Due Process Clause. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000)

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(plurality opinion). “The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong

tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children,” including

“the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.”

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 233, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1541, 1542 (1972). “This

primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond

debate as an enduring American tradition.” Id. at 232, 92 S. Ct. at 1541-42.

¶13 We have likewise recognized that “ ‘a natural parent’s right to care and custody of

a child is a fundamental liberty interest.’ ” In re E.W., 1998 MT 135, ¶ 12, 289 Mont.

190, 959 P.2d 951 (quoting In re R.B., Jr., 217 Mont. 99, 103, 703 P.2d 846, 848 (1985)).

This Court has held that “the constitutional rights of a natural parent to parent his or her

child” require “ ‘careful protection.’ ” In re A.R.A., 277 Mont. 66, 70, 919 P.2d 388, 391

(1996) (quoting In re Doney, 174 Mont. 282, 286, 570 P.2d 575, 577 (1977)).

¶14 In Troxel, the Supreme Court considered a Washington statute (Wash. Rev. Code

§ 26.10.160(3) (1994)) which permitted “[a]ny person” to petition a superior court for

visitation rights “at any time,” and which authorized that court to grant such visitation

rights whenever “visitation may serve the best interest of the child.” The Washington

Supreme Court held this statute invalid on its face, In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash.

1998), and the Supreme Court affirmed, although under somewhat differing rationales.

¶15 A plurality (Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice

Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer) concluded that the statute, as applied to Granville (the

mother), unconstitutionally infringed her fundamental parental right to make decisions

concerning the care, custody, and control of her two daughters. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67,

9
120 S. Ct. at 2060-61. Essentially, the plurality found the trial court’s decision

problematic, not because the court had intervened in the dispute between Granville and

the Troxels (the grandparents), but because its decision granting the Troxels’ petition for

visitation rights was based on “nothing more than a simple disagreement” with Granville,

a fit custodial parent. Id. at 69, 72, 120 S. Ct. at 2062, 2063. The trial court gave no

special weight at all to Granville’s determination of her daughters’ best interests; the

court’s presumption in favor of grandparent visitation directly contravened the traditional

presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of her child; and in that respect,

the court failed to provide any protection for Granville’s fundamental constitutional right

to make decisions concerning the rearing of her own daughters. Id. at 69-70, 72, 120

S. Ct. at 2062, 2063; see also id. at 67-68, 120 S. Ct. at 2061.

¶16 Writing separately, Justice Souter would have affirmed the Washington Supreme

Court’s determination that its statute was invalid on its face because it swept too broadly.

See id. at 75-77, 120 S. Ct. at 2065-66 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Also

writing separately, Justice Thomas concluded that “the State of Washington lacks even a

legitimate governmental interest—to say nothing of a compelling one—in second-

guessing a fit parent’s decision regarding visitation with third parties.” Id. at 80, 120

S. Ct. at 2068 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).

¶17 Six years later, in Polasek v. Omura, 2006 MT 103, 332 Mont. 157, 136 P.3d 519,

this Court considered the interplay between Troxel and § 40-9-102, MCA. At the time,

the statute authorized a district court to grant grandparent-grandchild contact “upon a

finding by the court, after a hearing, that the contact would be in the best interest of the

10
child.” See Polasek, ¶ 10 n. 2. We concluded that while this criterion was not

inconsistent with Troxel, the statutory scheme failed to delineate all of the criteria that

must be considered in a grandparent-contact proceeding. After examining the Troxel

decision, we concluded that the following procedure must be followed. First, the court

must determine whether the child’s parent is fit, i.e., whether the parent “ ‘adequately

cares for his or her children.’ ” Polasek, ¶ 15 (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68, 120 S. Ct.

at 2061). Second, if the parent is fit, then a presumption arises in favor of the parent’s

wishes, because “ ‘the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the

fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge

believes a “better” decision could be made.’ ” Polasek, ¶ 15 (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at

72-73, 120 S. Ct. at 2064). But if the parent is not fit, then no presumption arises and the

parent’s wishes are due no deference. Polasek, ¶ 15. Lastly, we noted that the statute’s

best-interest standard “remains intact as the standard by which a grandparent’s request for

contact must be judged.” Polasek, ¶ 20. But we held that the petitioning grandparent

must prove “by clear and convincing evidence” that it is in the child’s best interest to

have contact with the grandparent and, in the case of an objecting fit parent, that the

presumption in favor of the parent’s wishes has been rebutted. Polasek, ¶ 15. We

explained that the clear-and-convincing standard is proper given the “close scrutiny” we

apply to any infringement on a person’s right to parent a child. Polasek, ¶ 15 (citing In re

Aschenbrenner, 182 Mont. 540, 544-45, 597 P.2d 1156, 1160 (1979), and Pierce v.

Pierce, 198 Mont. 255, 260, 645 P.2d 1353, 1356 (1982)). We then reversed and

remanded the case for further proceedings given that the district court had not inquired

11
into the mother’s fitness as a parent and had failed to accord her wishes any deference.

See Polasek, ¶¶ 16-17. Indeed, not unlike the present case, the district court had reasoned

that “[o]ther than Petra [the mother] and Dr. Allen’s [the child’s clinical psychologist]

concern that the grandparents may impart something negative about the mother, there is

not a scintilla of evidence in this case that unfettered visitation between grandparents and

child would be in anyway [sic] harmful to the child.” See Polasek, ¶ 16.

¶18 Following our decision in Polasek, the Legislature amended § 40-9-102(2), MCA,

“to make Montana statutes reflect [the holdings in Troxel and Polasek] regarding the

constitutional rights of custodial parents to determine who a child may or may not have

contact with.” Laws of Montana, 2007, ch. 495, at 2228. As further explained in the

preamble to SB 27 (2007), “the Legislature believes in the constitutional right of parents

to control the actions and conduct of their children and believes that third parties should

not be allowed, through the courts, to control the actions of those children if the parents

are fit and proper parents.” Id. To that end, the Legislature incorporated into the statute

the procedure set out in ¶ 15 of Polasek. See id., § 1, at 2229. Following another

amendment in 2009, which clarified the standard for determining parental fitness, see

Laws of Montana, 2009, ch. 92, § 1, at 1377-78, the statute now states, in pertinent part:

(1) Except as provided in subsection (7), the district court may grant
to a grandparent of a child reasonable rights to contact with the child . . . .
(2) Before a court may grant a petition brought pursuant to this
section for grandparent-grandchild contact over the objection of a parent
whose parental rights have not been terminated, the court shall make a
determination as to whether the objecting parent is a fit parent. A
determination of fitness and granting of the petition may be made only after
a hearing, upon notice as determined by the court. Fitness must be

12
 determined on the basis of whether the parent adequately cares for the
parent’s child.
(3) Grandparent-grandchild contact may be granted over the
objection of a parent determined by the court pursuant to subsection (2) to
be unfit only if the court also determines by clear and convincing evidence
that the contact is in the best interest of the child.
(4) Grandparent-grandchild contact granted under this section over
the objections of a fit parent may be granted only upon a finding by the
court, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that the contact with the
grandparent would be in the best interest of the child and that the
presumption in favor of the parent’s wishes has been rebutted.

. . .

(7) This section does not apply if the child has been adopted by a
person other than a stepparent or a grandparent. Grandparent-grandchild
contact granted under this section terminates upon the adoption of the child
by a person other than a stepparent or a grandparent.

Section 40-9-102, MCA.

¶19 As stated earlier, we must apply the principles underlying the Troxel and Polasek

decisions and the legislative intent underlying § 40-9-102, MCA, to a motion by the

parent to modify or terminate an existing order for contact. In so doing, we first observe

that the constitutional rights discussed in Troxel and Polasek do not simply evaporate

because a contact order has been issued. The parent still retains her fundamental right to

make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her children. And, as a

component of that right, the parent may obtain modification or termination of a

previously issued contact order where it is in the best interests of the child or where the

contact previously ordered by the court is unduly interfering with the parent’s primary

role in the child’s upbringing, including the inculcation of moral standards, religious

13
beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.4 Contrary to Tanya’s suggested approach, the

parent (as the moving party) has the burden to show that modification or termination is

appropriate. See §§ 26-1-401, -402, MCA. However, we conclude that this showing

must be made by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than clear and convincing

evidence.5 Furthermore, in evaluating the evidence, a fit parent’s estimation of her

child’s best interests is entitled to deference, and the judge may not disregard or reject a

fit parent’s views on continued visitation simply because he disagrees with them or thinks

himself more enlightened than the parent. Finally, the parent is not required to establish

that the previously ordered contact has, is, or will cause the child concrete harm. We

reject the proposition that a child must suffer demonstrable harm as a result of the contact

before the contact order may be modified or terminated (the “cause and effect” standard

employed by the District Court in this case). Nor is the parent restricted in the

presentation of evidence to “facts that have arisen since the prior plan or that were

unknown to the court at the time of entry of the prior plan.” Section 40-4-219(1), MCA

4
The Legislature, of course, may enact reasonable procedures designed to prevent
frivolous or vexatious motions to modify or terminate a contact order. Cf. § 40-4-219(5),
MCA (“Attorney fees and costs must be assessed against a party seeking frivolous or
repeated amendment if the court finds that the amendment action is vexatious and
constitutes harassment.”). As for the present case, however, there is no indication that
Tanya’s motion (which she filed after roughly 15 months of court-ordered contact) was
frivolous or vexatious.
5
In Polasek, we held that the petitioning grandparent’s showings must meet the
clear-and-convincing standard. Polasek, ¶ 15. We adopted this high standard because of
the close scrutiny we apply to any infringement on a person’s right to parent a child. Id.
But where the parent seeks to modify or terminate an existing order for contact, it is
counterintuitive to require her to meet this same high standard, which as noted was
adopted in the first place to protect her rights against infringement by the grandparent.
We therefore adopt the lesser preponderance standard for a parent seeking modification
or termination.

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(concerning parenting plan amendments). There are myriad facts—some occurring

before the entry of a grandparent-contact order, and some occurring after it—that may

inform a parent’s views on the prudence of continued contact with the nonparent. To

adequately protect the parent’s fundamental constitutional right to make decisions

concerning the care, custody, and control of her child, the parent must be allowed to

present any evidence which bears on those decisions as they relate to contact with the

nonparent.

¶20 In the present case, the May 2008 stipulation essentially short-circuited the process

dictated by § 40-9-102, MCA. No determination has been made as to whether Tanya is a

fit parent—i.e., whether she adequately cares for her children. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68,

120 S. Ct. at 2061; Polasek, ¶ 15; § 40-9-102(2), MCA. And no determination has been

made (if Tanya is in fact a fit parent) as to whether the presumption in favor of her wishes

has been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. See § 40-9-102(4), MCA. Also,

while the stipulation states that “it serves the best interests of the children for there to be

grandparent/grandchild contact,” the District Court never made such a finding based

specifically on clear and convincing evidence. See § 40-9-102(3), (4), MCA. At this late

point, however, these omissions are essentially water over the dam.

¶21 On remand, it will be necessary for the District Court to make a fitness

determination under § 40-9-102(2), MCA, and to allow Tanya to present evidence that

modification or termination of the court’s May 27, 2008 contact order is in the best

interests of her children or is necessary because the grandparent-grandchild contact

previously ordered by the court is unduly interfering with Tanya’s primary role in the

15
children’s upbringing. As noted, Tanya must show by a preponderance of the evidence

that modification or termination is appropriate. And if the court finds that she is a fit

parent, then Tanya’s views on continued visitation and the best interests of her children

must be given deference in the court’s analysis.

CONCLUSION

¶22 The District Court applied an incorrect standard for evaluating Tanya’s request to

modify or terminate the court’s May 27, 2008 order for grandparent-grandchild contact.

Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s December 30, 2009 Order and remand this

case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.6

¶23 Reversed.

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

We Concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
/S/ JIM RICE

6
Given our disposition of this appeal, we need not address Tanya’s claims that the
grandparent-grandchild contact statutes violate her fundamental right to parent by
restricting her ability to modify or terminate court-ordered contact when the grandparent
has interceded in the parent-child relationship. As for Tanya’s request that we reverse the
District Court’s order holding her in contempt, our reversal of the court’s December 30,
2009 order disposes of that particular contempt ruling. As for the subsequent contempt
ruling of February 25, 2010, that ruling is beyond the scope of this appeal.

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