dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
It is well established that a ruling in the discretion of the trial judge raises no question of law. Britt v. Allen, 291 N.C. 630, 231 S.E.2d 607 (1977). The order of the trial court to grant a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure is a discretionary order.
It has been long settled in our jurisdiction that an appellate court’s review of a trial judge’s discretionary ruling either granting or denying a motion to set aside a verdict and order a new trial is strictly limited to the determination of whether the record affirmatively demonstrates a manifest abuse of discretion by the *813judge. Goldston v. Chambers, 272 N.C. 53, 59, 157 S.E.2d 676, 680 (1967); see e.g., Bryant v. Russell, 266 N.C. 629, 146 S.E.2d 813 (1966); Robinson v. Taylor, 257 N.C. 668, 127 S.E.2d 243 (1962); Dixon v. Young, 255 N.C. 578, 122 S.E.2d 202 (1961); Caulder v. Gresham, 224 N.C. 402, 30 S.E.2d 312 (1944). The legislative enactment of the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1967 did not diminish the inherent and traditional authority of the trial judges of our state to set aside the verdict whenever in their sound discretion they believe it necessary to attain justice for all concerned, and the adoption of those Rules did not enlarge the scope of appellate review of a trial judge’s exercise of that power. Britt v. Allen, 291 N.C. 630, 634-35, 231 S.E.2d 607, 611-12 (1977), see also Insurance Co. v. Chantos, 298 N.C. 246, 253, 258 S.E.2d 334, 338-39 (1979) (Huskins, J., dissenting). . . .
Worthington v. Bynum and Cogdell v. Bynum, 305 N.C. 478, 482, 290 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1982). “[A]n appellate court should not disturb a discretionary Rule 59 order unless it is reasonably convinced by the cold record that the trial judge’s ruling probably amounted to a substantial miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 487, 290 S.E.2d at 605. My review does not indicate that the trial court in the present case abused its discretion, resulting in a substantial miscarriage of justice. Thus, I would affirm the order of the trial court wherein it granted plaintiff a new trial.
Rule 59 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
(a) Grounds. — A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues for any of the following causes or grounds:
(1) Any irregularity by which any party was prevented from having a fair trial;
(2) Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party;
(3) Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against;
(4) Newly discovered evidence material for the party making the motion which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial;
(5) Manifest disregard by the jury of the instructions of the court;
*814(6) Excessive or inadequate damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice;
(7) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or that the verdict is contrary to law;
(8) Error in law occurring at the trial and objected to by the party making the motion, or
(9) Any other reason heretofore recognized as grounds for new trial.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 59 (1999). A plain reading of the subject order indicates that although plaintiff based his motion on Rule 59(6), inadequate damages, the trial court granted a new trial under Rule 59(7), insufficiency of evidence to justify the verdict.
Plaintiff in the present case had pled and therefore had the burden of proving his personal injury damages, which must be proved to a reasonable certainty. While absolute certainty is not required, evidence of damages must be adequately specific and complete to permit the jury to arrive at a reasonable conclusion. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Supply Co., 292 N.C. 557, 234 S.E.2d 605 (1977). The order of the trial court in the present case provides, in pertinent part:
Plaintiff introduced evidence of significant special and general damages, and, that, Defendant did not offer sufficient evidence to refute the causal connection between the accident and the injury sustained and, that, the jury returned an Award of significantly less than the amount of special damages; the Court finds that said amount is inadequate to compensate Plaintiff and appears to have been awarded under passion or prejudice ....
Thus, it is clear that the trial court reasoned that plaintiff had proven special damages to a reasonable certainty, and that because defendant’s evidence was insufficient to rebut plaintiffs proof, the evidence did not justify the verdict rendered as to plaintiff’s special damages. While the trial court did not specifically state that its reasons for granting a new trial fell under Rule 59(7), its reasoning clearly falls under the ambit of this rule. Accordingly, the deletion of the words “and appears to have been awarded under passion or prejudice” in the order had no effect since the trial court did not grant a new trial under Rule 59(6).
The majority opinion correctly points out that the jury is not required to accept all of plaintiff’s allegations as to the nature and *815extent of his injuries; however, in its discretion, the trial court in the case at bar found that plaintiff had proven special damages to a reasonable certainty and defendant’s evidence was insufficient to rebut that proof. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that the jury’s verdict that plaintiff’s property damages were significantly less than those pled by plaintiff indicates that his special damages were less than those pled and proven at trial. Property damages and special damages are distinct and separate from each other, and may be dissimilar in degree and severity.
I note that absent a specific request by the opposing party, the trial court is not required to either state the reasons for its decision to grant a new trial, or make findings of fact showing those reasons. Strickland v. Jacobs, 88 N.C. App. 397, 363 S.E.2d 229 (1988); Edge v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 78 N.C. App. 624, 337 S.E.2d 672 (1985). Since the record does not reveal that defendant made a request in the present case, the trial court was not required to give any reason for granting the new trial. As previously stated, a ruling in the discretion of the trial judge raises no question of law. Britt, 291 N.C. 630, 231 S.E.2d 607. Furthermore, our Supreme Court has recognized the trial court’s superior position in making discretionary rulings regarding the grant of a new trial:
[T]he trial judges of this state have traditionally exercised their discretionary power to grant a new trial in civil cases quite sparingly in proper deference to the finality and sanctity of the jury’s findings. We believe that our appellate courts should place great faith and confidence in the ability of our trial judges to make the right decision, fairly and without partiality, regarding the necessity of a new trial. Due to their active participation in the trial, their first-hand acquaintance with the evidence presented, their observances of the parties, the witnesses, the jurors and the attorneys involved, and their knowledge of various other attendant circumstances, presiding judges have the superior advantage in best determining what justice requires in a certain case. Because of this, we find much wisdom in the remark made many years ago by Justice Livingston of the United States Supreme Court that “there would be more danger of injury in revising matters of this kind than what might result now and then from an arbitrary or improper exercise of this discretion.” Insurance Co. v. Hodgson, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 206, 218 (1810). . . .
Worthington, 305 N.C. at 487, 290 S.E.2d at 605. Based on the foregoing, it is my opinion that the trial court in the present case, while not *816required to state its reasons, did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial for the reasons articulated. My review of the record does not indicate that the trial court’s action resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the trial court.