August 23 2011
DA 11-0138
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2011 MT 205N
WILLIAM SHRINER,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY,
WILD JACK’S CASINO,
Respondents and Appellees.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. BDV 2010-41
Honorable Jeffrey M. Sherlock, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
William Shriner (self-represented), Lincoln, Montana
For Appellees:
Marieke Beck, Montana Department of Labor and Industry, Helena,
Montana (Department of Labor and Industry)
Sara R. Sexe, Marra, Sexe, Evenson & Bell, P.C., Great Falls, Montana
(Wild Jack’s Casino)
Submitted on Briefs: August 10, 2011
Decided: August 23, 2011
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Michael E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve
as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s
quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 William Shriner (“Shriner”) appeals the dismissal of his petition for judicial review
(“Petition”) by the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County. We affirm.
¶3 This case originates from Shriner’s banishment by Wild Jack’s Casino in Lincoln,
Montana. After being banned, Shriner filed a complaint with the Human Rights Bureau
(“HRB”). After investigating, the HRB dismissed the complaint. Shriner then filed an
objection with the Human Rights Commission (“Commission”). The Commission reviewed
the HRB’s decision, overruled Shriner’s objections, and affirmed the dismissal.
¶4 In its order, the Commission clearly states Shriner’s two options for further review:
(1) he could file a civil action within 90 days pursuant to § 49-2-511(3)(a), MCA; or (2) he
could petition for judicial review of the Commission’s decision within 30 days of the date of
the Commission’s order pursuant to §§ 2-4-702 and 49-2-511(3)(b), MCA. The
Commission’s order affirming the HRB’s determination is dated December 8, 2009.
¶5 Shriner filed a petition for judicial review on January 19, 2010. The Department of
Labor moved to dismiss Shriner’s petition for judicial review as procedurally time barred.
Shriner responded that he filed late because he was seeking an attorney. The District Court
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dismissed Shriner’s petition as time barred, finding no equitable reasons existed to allow
Shriner’s untimely petition to proceed.
¶6 We review a district court’s conclusions of law for correctness. BNSF Railway Co. v.
Cringle, 2010 MT 290, ¶ 11, 359 Mont. 20, 247 P.3d 706. The timeliness of a petition for
judicial review is an affirmative defense. Cringle, ¶ 18. It is important to apply procedural
time bars regularly and consistently. Cringle, ¶ 18; Weidow v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund,
2010 MT 292, ¶ 28, 359 Mont. 77, 246 P.3d 704. However, procedural time bars are subject
to constitutional review and equitable principles. Cringle, ¶ 18. Equitable issues are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ruegsegger v. Welborn, 237 Mont. 317, 321, 773 P.2d
305, 308 (1989).
¶7 After reviewing the record, we have determined to decide this case pursuant to
Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable
memorandum opinions. The issue in this case is legal and is controlled by settled Montana
law, which the District Court correctly interpreted. Shriner was clearly notified, in plain,
unambiguous language, of the time frame for filing a petition for judicial review. He did not
file within the given time. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding no
equitable reasons existed to toll the limitations period.
¶8 Affirmed.
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
We Concur:
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/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
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