September 4 2012
DA 12-0084
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2012 MT 193N
STEPHEN PATRICK HAFFEY,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV 09-351
Honorable Ed McLean, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Stephen Patrick Haffey, (self-represented litigant); Shelby, Montana
For Appellee:
Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; C. Mark Fowler,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Fred Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney; Shawn P. Thomas,
Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 25, 2012
Decided: September 4, 2012
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court Internal
Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and
does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be
included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific
Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Stephen Haffey appeals from an order of the District Court for the Fourth Judicial
District, Missoula County, denying his petition for postconviction relief. We affirm.
¶3 In 2007, a jury convicted Haffey of felony assault with a weapon and driving
under the influence of alcohol. This Court affirmed Haffey’s conviction on direct appeal
in 2008. State v. Haffey, 2008 MT 433N (table).
¶4 Proceeding pro se, Haffey then filed a hand-written petition for postconviction
DNA testing pursuant to § 46-21-110, MCA. The District Court denied that request, and
we affirmed the District Court’s order in 2010. Haffey v. State, 2010 MT 97, 356 Mont.
198, 233 P.3d 315. In the interim, however, Haffey filed several motions and an
amended petition for postconviction relief, so we remanded the case to the District Court
for its consideration of those issues.
¶5 On remand, the District Court denied Haffey’s petition for postconviction relief.
After extracting seventeen claimed grounds for relief from Haffey’s petition and
supporting memorandum, the District Court determined that they were all procedurally
barred. Section 46-21-105(2), MCA, provides that grounds that were or could reasonably
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have been raised on direct appeal cannot again be raised when seeking postconviction
relief. Section 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA, provides that petitions for postconviction relief
must be supported by sworn, provable facts. These statutes clearly apply to Haffey’s
later pleadings, and, upon review, we find no reason in fact or in law to disturb the
District Court’s order.
¶6 On appeal, Haffey now raises a number of other issues. First, he argues that the
District Court abused its discretion by denying him an opportunity to “correct” his
petition for postconviction relief. However, he did not move the District Court to amend
his petition or otherwise attempt to make “corrections.” Haffey also argues for the first
time on appeal that he is being denied access to the courts. He additionally asserts that
the District Court abused its discretion by denying his discovery requests. Haffey is
apparently referring to an order the District Court issued on April 23, 2009 that denied his
request for production of his trial counsel’s “trial file.” He did not appeal that order.
This Court will not review issues that were not raised below or properly preserved for
appeal in the district court. State v. Price, 2007 MT 269, ¶ 14, 339 Mont. 399, 171 P.3d
293; State v. Ferguson, 2005 MT 343, ¶ 38, 330 Mont. 103, 126 P.3d 463; Ellenburg v.
Chase, 2004 MT 66, ¶ 14, 320 Mont. 315, 87 P.3d 473. Because Haffey did not raise or
preserve these issues in the District Court, he is now barred from raising them on appeal.
¶7 Lastly, Haffey argues that the District Court erred by failing to properly address
his “other-driver defense.” Haffey’s “other-driver defense” was central to his claim that
his trial counsel was ineffective, a claim that was fully adjudicated and rejected on direct
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appeal. Again, because this issue was previously considered, our review is now
precluded by § 46-21-105(2), MCA.
¶8 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of
our 1996 Internal Operating Rules, as amended in 2006, which provides for
memorandum opinions. The issues are clearly controlled by settled Montana law, and it
is manifest on the face of the briefs and the record that there was not an abuse of
discretion. We find no reason in fact or law to disturb the District Court’s order.
¶9 Affirmed.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We concur:
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BETH BAKER
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